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Abstract 
 
In this thesis I shall argue (1) that for Plato ‘moral’ education, rightly 
understood (or ‘Platonic education’ as I shall call it), can be an 
effective method for cultivating virtue in non-ideal societies; (2) that 
Platonic education is a process that occurs (or Plato hopes might 
occur) through an engagement with some of the dialogues; (3) that 
Platonic education strongly mirrors Sokratic discourse in its aims; (4) 
that Plato’s whole approach to education should be understood 
mainly from the context of the problem of teaching virtue in imperfect 
societies; (5) that Plato intends some of the dialogues to serve as a 
propaedeutic for a possible education in virtue and not as a method for 
creating fully virtuous people. Lastly, (6) Platonic education is 
primarily concerned with human virtue, and insofar as it can support 
a notion or notions of civic virtue, it cannot do so unequivocally.  The 
evidence for these claims is found not chiefly in the educational 
programmes and theories of the Republic and the Laws but in a 
number of techniques, such as protreptic rhetoric, life-models, 
argumentation, and myth, which Plato employs in some of the 
dialogues. Platonic education is specifically designed to function in 
imperfect societies. With this in mind therefore, an additional concern 
of this thesis is with whether we could imagine any of Plato’s 
educational principles or techniques being used to improve moral 
education today.  
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Introduction 
 
One of the problems that Plato was seeking to address in writing the 
dialogues is one that still faces us today: the problem is not merely ‘how 
do we teach virtue?’ but ‘how do we teach virtue in an imperfect society?’ In 
the ideal polis this problem does not exist because here the dream of 
true education becomes a reality.1 But such a society has never 
existed; virtue has never been taught. For Plato virtuous people did 
exist, but their virtue was derived not from teaching but from divine 
providence.2 And since, the argument runs, these people have never 
had the opportunity to practice their virtue for the benefit of the 
whole community, we remain, as we have always remained, in the 
dark, that is to say, largely ignorant about the true nature of virtue, 
happiness, and the good life.  
 
The problem of teaching virtue in imperfect societies rests not 
necessarily on the absence of adequate teachers, but on the difficulty 
of such a task in the face of the counter-influence of the prevailing, 
and state sponsored educational culture.3 However, for Plato there is 
still a way of making moral education, if not entirely successful, then 
at least more effective. The effectiveness of moral education does not 
depend upon its ability to create good citizens only, or citizens who 
unquestioningly accept the moral culture into which they are born, 
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but rather it depends upon its ability to create individuals who will 
try, against all the odds, to become virtuous.  
 
In his simile of the cave Plato gives us a powerful image of our nature 
in παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας (Republic 514a2). As I shall 
elaborate more thoroughly in Chapter Four, at the heart of Plato’s 
conception of education is the idea that the chief function of teaching 
is to turn the soul around from our shifting and illusionary moral 
culture towards true being. Education enables us to see our world for 
what it is, in all its complexity, and to recognise that the moral terms 
that we employ, and our conventional opinions about ‘right and 
wrong’ and ‘good and bad,’ as well as our conceptions of virtue and 
character, are in constant flux, never remaining the same and never 
fully reflecting the kind of truth that would set ethics on a firm 
footing.4 Plato directly identifies true education with the ascent out of 
the cave, and hence with the pursuit of and the desire for wisdom: 
education is philosophy.   
 
According to book 7 of the Republic, philosophy (understood as a 
subject) is the mastery of a group of scientific disciplines guided by 
the dialectical method. The most thorough education a person can 
receive is an education in philosophy, the aim of which is knowledge 
of the Good. Nowhere in any other dialogue are we given so 
complete a picture of the education of the philosopher, and it is one 
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that is set within the context of the ideal polis; it is taught in the state 
by the state for the state.5  
 
Therefore, for many scholars Plato’s theory of education is found 
almost exclusively in his ‘Utopian’ works.6  Such a view is advanced 
most strongly by I. M. Crombie. According to Crombie ‘Plato never 
talks about education except as it would be in his Utopias, and what 
he would recommend about education in normal circumstances has 
to be conjectured from this.’7 For Julia Annas Plato’s discussion of 
education in the Republic appears to be a ‘structural part’ of his 
overall argument, and therefore ‘he is not offering a detachable 
“philosophy of education” that can safely be extracted from the 
argument about the state.’8 The aim of education in the Republic, and, 
indeed, the Laws, seems to be clear, the creation and maintenance of 
‘Utopias.’  
 
But did Plato write about ‘Utopias’? The term utopia (no-place) is not 
one that Plato used,9 although it is in many ways an appropriate 
name. The problem with the term utopia, however, is its necessarily 
negative connotation with respect to the practicability of the 
imagined society to which it is assigned.10 What Plato envisions in the 
Republic is a city in speech (369a4, 369c9, 472d9-10, 592a11-b1), a 
eutopia (good-place), or, to be precise, a kallipolis (527c2),11 a fine, 
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beautiful or noble city. Is Plato’s ideal polis a serious proposal for 
political action?  
 
As Myles Burnyeat observes, ’the non-existence of the ideal city is a 
fact of history, not of metaphysics’:12 utopian thinking is, and always 
has been, a feature of political theorising.13 This is why we can 
appreciate Halloway’s maxim,14 and it is also why one must exercise 
caution when approaching questions of intent and practicability.15 
Even if some of Plato’s ‘proposals’ are impossible,16 whether by 
design, naivety or error, we are still presented with a thesis about 
how a person can attain the highest virtue.   
 
Contra Popper, some scholars dismiss the idea that Plato’s Kallipolis 
is a blueprint for political action,17 and in light of this the question of 
practicability takes on a new significance.18 According to Leo 
Strauss,19 in his The City and Man, the just city is impossible, ‘it is 
impossible because it is against nature,’ hence ‘the Republic conveys 
the broadest and deepest analysis of political idealism ever made,’ 
Allan Bloom concurs.20 A better course would be to acknowledge that 
the priority,21 both ontologically and logically, is with the person and 
not the city; this is where Plato’s real concern lies (and where, 
moreover, we should look when considering his theory of education).  
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In writing the Republic it was Plato’s intention, I would argue, to 
show the limitations,22 not of the city first and foremost, but of men, 
both in their political actions and their private ones.23 I shall have 
more to say on this later. In respect to the ideal polis, however, what 
many scholars stress, quite rightly, is that the just polis of the Republic 
is an approximation24 of an ideal, and not the ideal itself.25 The 
difficulty is not so much in approximating the ideal but in 
maintaining it, and, as we shall see, Plato was well aware of this.26 
 
However, and as I shall argue in this thesis, we are not to understand 
Plato’s theory of education as being one which rests upon either the 
desirability or the probability of ideal poleis, and nor should we 
understand Plato’s contribution to educational theory as being 
restricted to what we learn from the Republic and the Laws as such. 
My interest is not so much with what Plato says about education, but 
rather with Platonic education, that is, a process that can occur, or Plato 
meant to occur, when a person engages with certain dialogues. It is 
important to realise, therefore, that Platonic education is specifically 
designed to function in imperfect societies.  
 
I contrast Platonic education with ‘Sokratic education,’ by which I 
refer to the process that occurs (or is shown to have occurred) in the 
world of Platonic drama. These two forms of education are related in 
two ways. First, Sokratic education is embedded within the medium 
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of the other, that is, the dialogues; and second, they both share the 
same aims. The aim of both Sokratic and Platonic education is to turn 
people towards the pursuit of virtue, and I wish to distinguish this form 
of education from one that has a higher aim, that is, the creation of 
fully virtuous individuals, people who have attained perfect human 
virtue. I call this form of education ‘ideal,’ such as the education of the 
philosopher rulers in the Kallipolis. However, my primary concern in 
this thesis is with the more limited aim of Platonic education. 
 
Platonic education is carried out through an engagement with the 
dialogues, through written discourse. The written word, however, only 
has so much power, a power that is commensurate with the level of 
reality that it is able to communicate. The dialogues are a Sokratic call 
to virtue; and they can only be such, as I shall discuss in Chapter 
Four, if they contain no truth. The dialogues are not educational 
manuals containing facts, but rather they present the reader with 
various hypotheses on virtue, the good life, and happiness. It is not 
the task of the dialogues to tell the reader what is true but rather to 
urge them to try and discover it for themselves. Therefore, like the 
master they seek to emulate, the dialogues teach nothing.27   
 
What do the dialogues do if they do not teach? They inform, they 
entertain, they enrage, and a great many other things. Principally 
they recommend a method of teaching: dialektikē or discussion. The 
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dialogue is an image of dialectic, its offspring if you will. Sokrates’ 
reticence to speak of the Good in the Republic is not just a testament to 
a Sokratic principle, but also, and importantly, it is a reflection on the 
educational limitations of the dialogue form.28 However, even though 
the dialogues can only turn a person towards virtue and not lead 
them to it, this does not represent a failure: it represents a 
fundamental insight into the educative process.  
 
Platonic education uses a number of techniques in order to try to 
solicit this end: protreptic rhetoric (which I shall discuss in Chapter 
Two), argumentation, and myth (both of which are dealt with mainly 
in Chapter Four), ‘life-models’ (an analysis of which I shall provide in 
Chapter Five), all of which are embedded within the dialogues. Of 
course none of these techniques is sufficient for the creation of 
virtuous people, although Plato does regard them, I shall argue, as a 
necessary step towards that end.  
 
Plato may be silent about why he wrote dialogues as such, but as we 
shall see in Chapter Four, it is reasonably clear why he chooses the 
dialogue form over other types of written composition, one which 
lends some support to the idea that some of the dialogues could be 
seen as having a specific pedagogical aim. The best type of written 
discourse has, as well as its capacity to amuse, the ability to move a 
person towards the kind of subjects represented within it. The 
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dialogues, of course, are not mere discourses, accounts on any given 
subject: they are stories containing characters set within a historical (if 
not historically accurate) context. Therefore, the dialogues are not 
historical documents, they are inquiries interwoven with both history 
and myth (and the two often overlap); they represent a Sokratic 
Cycle, a dialogical story of the philosopher and his inquiries. It is a 
story with a predominately ethical context, and to understand this 
context represents a major challenge to Platonic scholarship. 
 
In recent years this aspect of the dialogues has come to be recognised 
by scholars.29 Angela Hobbs, in her Plato and the Hero, stresses the 
educative aspect of Plato’s works and in particular his use of role-
models or ‘life-models’ within the dramatic setting of the dialogues:  
 
In choosing the dialogue form, Plato…allows us to see a wide range of 
potential or actual role models in action, whether they are self-proclaimed 
authorities and guides such as Protagoras and Hippias, ancien régime officers 
such as Nicias and Laches, or charismatic mavericks such as Callicles and 
Alcibiades. Furthermore, we shall find that through the skilful use of 
forward-shadowing we are enabled to glimpse not only what their lives are 
currently like, but what they will shortly become. Far from tossing us vague 
injunctions, Plato wishes to ensure that our choices are as concrete as 
possible.30 
 
 
Harvey Yunis, in his “The Protreptic Rhetoric of the Republic,” echoes 
the broad thrust of Hobbs’ analysis, arguing that ‘Plato’s overarching 
purpose in writing the Republic was to effect a change in his readers 
similar to the change that Glaucon and Adeimantus undergo at 
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Socrates’ hands in the fictional world of dialogue.’31 According to 
Yunis ‘Plato’s purpose as a philosophical writer was not merely to 
present compelling arguments about how one should live, but to 
present them in such a way that the reader would most likely be 
compelled by them to choose to live in a particular way.’32 This puts 
Plato in the position of being both a philosopher and an educator 
(indeed, these roles are largely synonymous for Plato), who not only 
actively seeks to exhort his readers to virtue but also provides, within 
the formal and literary apparatus of the dialogues, techniques that 
might in some way contribute to this end.  
 
In this respect I follow Jill Gordon and others in claiming that one of 
the chief purposes of the dialogues ‘is to turn reader and audience 
toward the philosophical life by engaging them in philosophical 
activity in the form of deep examination.’33 A key component of this, 
argues Gordon, is the literary and dramatic aspects of the dialogues. 
On this reading, which is increasingly popular, Plato endeavours to 
affect his readers, not solely through argument, but also through 
other techniques embedded within the narrative.34 
 
The dialogues present us with various claims and counter-claims 
about how life should be lived, and they, like Sokrates himself, force 
us to stand back from and to scrutinise the conventions of our society. 
Indeed, it is integral to this idea of education as an art of turning 
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around that, strictly speaking, true education, outside of the ideal 
polis, cannot be too deeply embedded within the culture that it is 
seeking to distance us from; one must retain a critical distance from 
one’s culture if one is ever going to be in the position to question it 
and its presuppositions.  
 
That is one of the reasons, perhaps, that for the most part Plato is so 
sceptical about the possibility of a public and state run education in 
virtue. With the dialogues, however, Plato is able to create the 
necessary distance between the pupil and his moral culture; to 
present the pupil with a critical view of society without drawing him 
too close to it and its corrupting influence. It is left to the reader, 
ultimately, to decide which kind of life is the best and which is the 
most likely to lead to happiness, and, moreover, which methods are 
best employed to achieve that end. The dialogues can only take us so 
far on this journey, they can only recommend philosophy, they can 
only prepare the ground for the pursuit of wisdom; as Sokrates says 
in the Euthydemus, the value of philosophy is something that we have 
to decide for ourselves (307b7-c6).  
 
How a person responds to philosophy is going to depend largely on 
how much they have been corrupted by conventional education. In 
an imperfect society all potential philosophers will be subjected to 
non-Platonic education from an early age; there is nothing Plato can 
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do about this. Sokrates sought out talented young Athenians, and by 
such intervention tried his best to repair the damage caused by his 
educational rivals. Plato prefers a rather different method of 
intervention. If Plato was unwilling or unable to challenge 
conventional education in person, then he could at least do so 
indirectly, and perhaps, on account of this, do so more effectively. 
With a wider audience, and with the benefit of hindsight, and 
bolstered by his considerable artistic and philosophical ability, Plato 
thus continues Sokrates’ mission.  
 
 
 
In modern moral education in the UK and with how morality or 
ethics is dealt with throughout the curriculum as a whole, the issue is 
not just with competing claims about virtue or the good life (as it was 
for Plato), but rather with the educational system’s apparent inability 
or unwillingness to make any strong claims about what they mean by 
virtue, good character, and the good life. In a diverse society like the 
UK, there are many ways in which the good life is conceived. In itself 
this does not necessarily present a problem, that is to say, the issue is 
not with the fact that moral diversity exists but rather with the impact 
that its existence has on the ability of government to recommend or 
establish in mainstream education a robust programme of public 
moral education. In a morally diverse society no one single and 
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concrete view of virtue (or whatever term or terms we choose to use) 
can be privileged over another.  
 
The main issue in moral education today, argues James Davidson 
Hunter in his The Death of Character, is with inclusivity.35 Indeed, in 
recent years the language of inclusivity has become more pervasive, 
and not just in the UK, as this sample taken from the Canadian 
Ministry of Education’s Finding Common Ground: Character 
Development in Ontario Schools illustrates: 
  
Character development is the deliberate effort to nurture the universal 
attributes upon which schools and communities find consensus. These 
attributes provide a standard for behaviour against which we hold ourselves 
accountable. They permeate all that happens in schools. They bind us 
together across the lines that often divide us in society. They form the basis 
of our relationships and of responsible citizenship. They are a foundation of 
excellence and equity in education, and for our vision of learning cultures 
and school communities that are respectful, safe, caring and 
inclusive…Excellence in education includes character development. 
Through character we find common ground.36 
 
 
The report does not mention in any great detail what sort of character 
that they are recommending ought to be developed in schools.37 We 
do learn, however, that the development of character is threefold: ‘it 
develops a whole student as an individual, as an engaged learner and 
a citizen.’38 Hence: ‘character development is about excellence in 
education, communities that are vibrant and caring, and students 
who will think critically, feel deeply and act wisely.’ The language is 
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predominantly concerned with the nature of character development 
rather than what character itself is. The exhortation for pupils to think 
critically, feel deeply and act wisely says very little. The report is wary of 
charges of indoctrination and is, therefore, eager to point out that 
character education is not about ‘a government imposing a set of 
moral standards.’39   
 
The key thinking here, and one that has been in vogue for many 
years, and one that is particularly indebted to the influence of 
Lawrence Kohlberg, is that rather than transmitting to pupils a 
specific set of moral values one should develop their natural moral 
capacity: ‘character development strives for an ever-growing depth of 
self-awareness, reflection and understanding’;40 it is about ‘the 
universal attributes upon which diverse communities find common 
ground.’41 Inclusivity is an essential element of this: ‘inclusivity is not 
an option; it is a moral choice that must be made and someone must 
lead the way.’42 For Hunter there is a direct correlation between the 
lack of moral content in modern moral education and the drive 
towards inclusivity: 
 
Against the urgent demand made in every generation for a common moral 
education, is the question: how can it be conducted in a way that satisfies 
everyone? What are the moral parameters of its pedagogy? Who defines its 
principles? How shall these principles be taught, and by whom? By what 
authority and reasoning shall they be grounded? Every effort to find a 
solution that is both effective and inoffensive has eventually fallen apart by 
revealing its particularity43 
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For Hunter, because of the fragmentation of modern society and 
culture, and, in turn, of the moral culture on which it is dependent 
‘there has been a dissolution in the system of dispositions that give 
meaning to our moral vocabulary and coherence and purpose to our 
moral aspirations.’44 Therefore, if, as Hunter argues, character is 
socially embedded, then the disintegration of society will necessarily 
entail the demise of the dominant conceptions of character embedded 
within it.45  In the face of this, the strategies that educators and 
educational institutions employ are largely ineffective and, indeed, 
counterproductive.46 This rests upon what Hunter calls the ‘paradox 
of inclusion,’ wherein every generation seeks and fails to make moral 
education ‘inclusive and universal.’47 This failure is due to the denial 
or downplaying of the ‘particularity’ that is ‘central to moral 
reflection and engagement and decisive to character development.’48 
In a bid to deal with the ‘expanding pluralism in modern society and 
culture,’49 moral education has committed itself to inclusivity in order 
to neutralise ‘the possibility of conflict.’50 The problem, Hunter states, 
is this, that 
 
culturally speaking, particularity is inherently exclusive. It is socially awkward, 
potentially volatile, offensive to our cosmopolitan sensibilities. By its very 
nature it cuts against the grain of our dominant code of inclusivity and 
civility. In our quest to be inclusive and tolerant of particularity, we 
naturally undermine it. When the particular cultures of conviction are 
undermined and the structures they inhabit are weakened, the possibility of 
character itself becomes dubious. By now, the moral vocabularies available 
to us are so inclusive that nearly all particularity has been evacuated.51 
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What has given rise to this? The theories of Lawrence Kohlberg in 
particular have had a massive influence on moral education. One of 
the defining characteristics of the developmental approach to moral 
education is its antipathy towards virtue oriented theories of ethics. 
Indeed, for developmentalists, and Kohlberg especially, the language 
of virtue, that is, any talk about virtue, habit, character and so on, is 
not only unhelpful in the pursuit of a viable programme of moral 
education but also fundamentally flawed. ‘The psychologist’s 
objection to the bag of virtues,’ complains Kohlberg, ‘is that there is 
no such thing.’52 Virtues and vices are nothing but labels by which 
people award ‘praise or blame’ and have little value, Kohlberg 
claims, in determining ‘moral goals.’53  
    
For Kohlberg the most important aspect of moral development is 
moral reasoning:54 as James Hunter puts it, ‘the essence of morality 
for Kohlberg was found in the kinds of reasoning brought to bear on 
situations of tension and conflict – the way a person decides what to 
do when confronted by a moral dilemma.’55 The thinking behind this, 
as Hunter observes, is that by understanding the stages of moral 
development in children one can get a better understanding of how 
to educate them morally.56  
 
The Kohlbergian response [...] to the problem of value pluralism is to argue 
that there are real possibilities for moral consensus if development is 
sufficiently motivated to the highest stages of moral development57 
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As a Kantian, Kohlberg’s attitude to virtue and the role of virtue in 
moral development should not surprise us. However, even Kant, 
who has often been criticised on the same grounds, finds a place for 
virtue in his theory of character development.58  
 
The central problem is this: that by rejecting the ‘bag of virtues’ 
Kohlberg places too little emphasis on the content about which moral 
reasoning is ultimately concerned: as David Carr says ‘an account of 
the nature of morality which focuses pretty well exclusively on moral 
reason and judgement can hardly be sufficient or necessary to 
comprehend all that we should ordinarily take to be implicated in 
moral life and conduct.’59 As Robert T. Sandin observes in his The 
Rehabilitation of Virtue: 
 
Kohlberg’s dismissal of the philosophy of virtue as an example of an 
underdeveloped moralism is a grotesque distortion of the tradition of ethics. 
Aristotle, who assigned a central place to cognitive factors in moral 
development and decision making, nevertheless emphasised the importance 
of nurturing moral traits of character through habit formulation60 
 
 
According to Hunter, developmental psychology has consistently 
attacked the ‘religious and classic virtues associated with strong 
character,’ and in turn has downplayed the relevance of moral 
content and the particularity central to character and moral culture.61 
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The issue for Hunter is primarily cashed out in terms of the authority 
of moral culture: 
 
I take it as a given that learning (as well as life itself) is dialectical or 
reciprocal in nature. The individual acts in the world, to be sure, but the 
world also acts back on the individual. Indeed, a defining moment in this 
dialectic is the internalisation of that nomos as the very structure of our 
worldview and…the organising categories of our very identity in all its 
fluidity and complexity.  The moral culture, in other words, is not merely the 
environment within which identity plays out. It is, even more, a reality that 
frames the categories of identity, structures of identity, and even indelibly 
stamps identity. Without the authoritative presence of moral culture, 
internalised into subjective consciousness, there can be no character or 
“character development”62 
 
 
What people generally understand as good character or what they 
think the moral person is like is going to originate largely from how 
they view their relationship with their society, either narrowly in 
terms of their immediate communities, or more broadly to include 
the nation as a whole. The more diverse a society is, politically, 
ethnologically, and intellectually, and in its religions, the greater are 
the ways in which good character or what the moral person is like 
can be interpreted and understood. Whether a society is diverse or 
not, what the majority of its people think is good character is not 
going to be one which can be divorced from how they see themselves 
as social entities belonging to a distinct group or community. In each 
case, for most individuals and their communities, good character or 
the moral person is ‘this’ and not ‘that’ and not ‘this and that’: it is 
particular. 
18 
 
The particularity of moral culture certainly operates in a way that all of us 
are conscious or aware of. Even more powerful, however, are the ways in 
which it frames deeper, unconscious attitudes and attachments. Indeed, the 
power of culture is always measured by its power to bind us, to compel us, 
to oblige us in ways we are not fully aware of. In this, particular moral 
cultures define the horizons of our moral imagination in ways that we are 
not fully conscious. They set out the possibilities that we can envision in 
specific circumstances63 
 
 
Therefore, it is part of Hunter’s thesis that how character is actually 
conceived and developed is dependent upon a complex set of factors 
peculiar to the culture and society from which it originates: ‘character 
may possess a common form but is, by definition, diverse in 
manifestation and practice.’64  Hence, from differing ideas of the 
common good come differing ideas about which model of character 
will best satisfy the collective aims of society, and, in turn, differing 
educational strategies dedicated to this aim.  
 
Hunter cites the ideal polis of Plato’s Republic as a prime example of a 
society with an authoritative moral culture and a strong notion of 
good character created by and grounded in an effective moral 
education. However, Hunter is not endorsing the ideal polis, and nor 
does he think that any reform of moral education today would result 
in any substantial results, because ‘the enterprise of moral education 
is a prism through which we observe a larger and changing moral 
culture,’65 hence:  
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The question is not about how to reform moral education in order to make it 
work better, for moral education is inextricably bound to the moral culture 
within which it is found. Rather, the question is about how moral cultures 
change and what, if anything, people might do to influence that change in 
ways that secure benevolence and justice…in the meantime, perhaps the 
most we can do is to create greater space in our social life (and not just in 
private life) for what remains of our wide-ranging and diverse moral 
communities to be renewed and to renew66 
 
 
Is Hunter right to be so pessimistic about the potential that moral 
education has to restore a strong sense of character? Considering the 
agenda of inclusivity, perhaps the best we can do is to preserve what 
little moral particularity now remains. Certainly, a government in a 
morally diverse society could not easily promote a particular 
conception of good character, and still less initiate a public and 
universal programme of education dedicated to that aim. 
 
A good deal depends upon whether character, as Hunter argues, is 
inextricably bound to particular society and culture; whether or not it 
may be possible to envision a notion of good character (or indeed 
virtue) that stands apart from and is resistant to an uncertain and 
changing society.67 In England, moral education is seen mainly 
against the backdrop of civic awareness, political literacy, and of 
moral and social responsibility, in a word, citizenship.  
 
For Plato, however, the effectiveness of moral education in an 
imperfect society seems to demand a total divorce between educator and 
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government. In modern moral education in England, whether through 
subjects like Citizenship Education and PSHE (Personal, Social, and 
Health Education), or in more traditional subjects (especially 
religious education and history), the teaching of ‘morality’ (usually 
understood in terms of ‘values’) is one which is firmly placed within 
a distinct social and political context (liberal, democratic, and 
multicultural), and it is this context which also forms the basis of how 
morality and ethical issues are to be understood. The good person is 
the good citizen and ethical issues are largely those issues which 
confront the citizen rather than the human. This view, which is still 
very much in vogue in educational policy, is one which I wish to 
question in this thesis. For Aristotle the human being is a citizen of a 
certain kind, and a person’s civic life, of whatever variety, is (or ought 
to be) the natural outlet for the expression of or the practicing of 
virtue; but for Plato, however, virtue in the imperfect society, in 
contrast to the perfect society, can only be indirectly and secondarily 
civic: the whole purpose of attaining virtue is to gain that happiness 
that is peculiarly human, and where one happens to find oneself is of 
little importance.  
 
Plato would argue that, for the person who wishes to be virtuous, 
whether he is a Spartan or an Athenian citizen, or a citizen of the 
United Kingdom, the method is the same, philosophia. However, this 
does not mean that one’s duties and rights as a citizen are ignored or 
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taken lightly, they just become subsidiary to something which is 
obviously of higher value, one’s psychē. It is, of course, a good 
question to ask to what degree one can pursue philosophy (as Plato 
understands it) and at the same time be recognizable by one’s fellow 
citizens as being a good citizen (as they would understand that 
concept): for Plato there is very little chance of this. However, the 
philosopher is not interested in ruling others (not even in the best 
polis) or taking part in democratic procedures (although he may do 
so); his interest is with ruling himself and urging others to follow his 
example.68 Philosophy helps one to master oneself, not others.  
 
Given the political reality, that is, the diversity of modern society and 
current educational trends, it would be very difficult to teach a notion 
of virtue or character that is not in some way understood in terms of 
citizenship first and foremost. In ancient Greece, in communities far 
less inclusive than ours, it was natural (and more expedient) to 
understand virtue as primarily civic (this, of course, was not the case 
for Plato and Aristotle). Today, in our culturally and religiously 
diverse society, in which we have many competing opinions on what 
the moral person is like, we have been forced to give up on the search 
for true virtue, finding it much easier to swallow the rhetoric of this 
and the previous government. Instead, and like so many before us, 
we are content to be good citizens (or worse still ‘consumers’) rather 
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than trying to be good humans. Indeed, we do not even know what it 
means to be human today.  
 
Can Plato’s dialogues address these problems, or perhaps, point the 
way towards a solution? Despite current educational policy and 
practice, and indeed the general political, social and ethical climate, I 
will submit that there is such a possibility, although it is one which, if 
imbedded within the school system, would have serious 
repercussions for how moral education is currently delivered within 
the National Curriculum. 
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Chapter One 
 
Ethics and Exile 
 
ἡ πατρίς, ὡς ἔοικε, φίλτατον βροτοῖςi 
 
In the Apology Sokrates defends himself; in the Crito he defends 
Athens. Taken together, we might say, the Apology and the Crito force 
us to consider Sokrates the Athenian citizen and Sokrates the 
philosopher as a single entity. But how can this dual defence work? 
How can Plato have Sokrates declare his loyalty both to philosophy 
and to the state? In the Apology, Sokrates makes it clear that, made to 
choose, he would obey god rather than the law, and yet, at least 
according to the Crito, he owes Athens and her laws a great debt, 
great enough to make him submit to unjust execution.  
 
But what does Sokrates owe Athens? He owes Athens his very life, 
his upbringing, and, importantly, the opportunity to practice 
philosophy. So, despite what we learn in the Republic, the philosopher 
does seem to owe the bad regime something after all (Republic 520b1-
2). For the most part, however, Sokrates keeps his civic 
responsibilities at a distance. Nevertheless, he is not altogether 
inactive: he fought in Athens’ wars, and, when it cannot be sensibly 
                                                 
i ‘Dearest to men, it seems, is native soil’ (Phoenician Women 406). 
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avoided, he fulfils his democratic obligations; and he takes his ‘moral 
and social’ responsibilities very seriously.1 Indeed, Sokrates sees his 
philosophical mission not only as being beneficial to himself but also 
to his fellow Athenians.  
 
Paradoxically, however, to pursue philosophy as Sokrates does, 
makes him less recognisable as a citizen and yet more devoted to his polis 
and to his fellow citizens. This ‘devotion,’ however, is not unthinking 
patriotism, and nor is it uncritical of political structures. In a sense, it 
is a devotion that subsumes the duties of citizenship to a higher set of 
obligations. The Sokratic way of life, however, cannot be embraced by 
every citizen (or by the ruling elite) without radically altering the 
society in which they live. Outside the ideal polis the philosopher’s 
engagement with politics may be limited in scope (and 
incomprehensible to his fellow citizens), but he remains, according to 
Plato, and again however paradoxical this may seem, the only true 
statesman and the only citizen for whom the salvation of his society is 
his life’s concern (Gorgias 521d6-8).  
 
Sokrates’ dual defence could perhaps point to a possible 
reconciliation between the philosopher and society, but it seems 
much more likely, however, that Sokrates’ dual defence points to the 
tension that exists, and will always exist between the philosopher and 
the city and their aims.2 But it must be so. As I shall detail more 
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thoroughly in the coming chapters, the philosopher must always 
stand slightly apart from his society for his creditability and power as 
an educator depends upon precisely this. All I wish to explore here, 
before moving on to discuss Sokratic education in the next chapter, is 
the philosophical implications of Sokrates’ rejection of exile (φυγὴ) in 
the Apology and the Crito, and in particular these three questions: 
first, in what respect is Sokrates’ mission shaped by his Athenian 
citizenship? And second, does Sokrates’ ability to conduct philosophy 
depend upon his residence in Athens? And finally, how essential, for 
Plato, is one’s civic identity for philosophy, virtue and happiness? 
 
§1 
 
Sokrates Defends Himself 
 
And when they bring you unto the synagogues, and unto magistrates, and 
powers, take ye no thought how or what thing ye shall answer, or what ye 
shall say: For the Holy Ghost shall teach you in the same hour what ye ought 
to say (Luke 12.11-12, The Holy Bible, KJV) 
 
 
As Sokrates sees it, the Athenian jury has a simple choice to make: 
either accept him and his philosophy or condemn them both (Apology 
30b8-10). The jury chooses to condemn them (38d1-2), as Sokrates 
makes clear at 39c8-11: ‘νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἴργασθε οἰόμενοι μὲν 
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ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου.’ii But what were 
Sokrates’ alternatives and how seriously did he take them? Despite 
the guilty verdict and the penalty of death proposed by Meletos, 
Sokrates has the opportunity to put forward a counter penalty: 
‘τιμᾶται δ᾽ οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. εἶεν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν 
ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας’ (36b3-
5).iii  
 
This statement is certainly provocative. However, in asking to be 
sentenced according to what he deserves, Sokrates is not referring to 
the charges brought against him but to his role as a public benefactor. 
As a ἐξεταστής and gift from god (31a10-31b1), what does Sokrates 
deserve? What else but free meals in the Prytaneum. However, this is 
not a genuine counter penalty, as Sokrates was well aware;3 he may 
well believe that he ought to be treated like an Olympic victor4 but 
insofar as he is following the rules of the court (which he must) it is 
incumbent upon him to choose a genuine counter penalty,5 one that 
fits the charges against him. Sokrates has three options: 
imprisonment, a fine, or exile. Sokrates rejects imprisonment and 
exile, and eventually settles for a fine, since this entails the least harm, 
                                                 
ii ‘For now you have done this to me because you hoped that you would be 
relieved from rendering an account of your lives...’ (trans. Harold North 
Fowler p.137).  
iii ‘And so the man proposes the penalty of death. Well, then, what shall I 
propose as an alternative? Clearly that which I deserve, shall I not?’ (trans. 
Harold North Fowler p.129). 
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and proposes the modest sum of one silver mina, which, with the 
help of his friends, is raised to thirty (38a9-c1).6 Sokrates rejects exile 
out of hand, even though, as he says, this sentence might be to the 
jury’s liking (37c5-6; 37d4-6). Why was Sokrates not willing to 
countenance exile?  
 
First we should ask: what is exile and what would it have meant for 
the typical Athenian? In 5th Century B.C. Athens exile was a 
punishment, a legal act, but it could also be an act of political 
aggression or expediency.7 Although they are closely related, we 
must distinguish between exile in either of these senses and 
ostracism.8 Ostracism was a tool of democratic Athens, used to check 
the power of the leaders of the state, whilst exile was normally, in the 
classical period at least, either a legal penalty enacted by the judiciary 
or an extreme and often dubious political act.9 The relationship 
between political exile, forced or otherwise, and ostracism is certainly 
strong, and both are, to a degree, political phenomena.10 
 
To be an exile is to have no city (ἄπολις),11 and as an ‘ordeal,’ as 
Robert Gorman states, it has both ‘physical and psychological 
aspects.’12 The exile’s most immediate concern would be the loss of 
his property and the prospect of poverty. More pressing perhaps 
would be the loss of civic rights, and this would also be compounded 
by the loss of support from friends, family, and fellow citizens. An 
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exile would therefore be at the mercy of strangers, and would no 
longer be master of his own destiny. With his expulsion, the exile 
leaves behind the benefits and responsibilities of citizenship, which, 
in an age of city-states, meant leaving behind much of value.13  
    
In Greek tragedy exile is nearly always presented as a political act, 
the legitimacy of which is often questionable.14 This should not 
surprise us, of course, since exile and reclamation was such a strong 
feature of the internal power struggles that marred Athens in the 
second half of the 5th Century B.C. The fullest treatment of the 
consequences of exile in Greek drama is found in Euripides’ 
Phoenician Women. In the stichomythia between Iokaste and 
Polynikes, the essentials of a life in exile are sketched out: the exile 
has no freedom of speech (PW 391), lives like a slave (PW 392; 395), is 
dependent on bad rulers (PW 393-394), is denied the help of his 
friends (PW 402-403), and is not even guaranteed safety in spite of his 
noble birth (PW 404-405). 
    
Some of these seem particularly appropriate to Sokrates. However, 
Sokrates’ rejection of exile is not only based upon such considerations 
(Apology 37d4-6).15 For Sokrates it is a particular type of free speech16 
and a particular type of freedom that he values. For Sokrates the chief 
problem with exile is that it would mean that he would be unable to 
continue his philosophical inquiries, since they require him to not 
33 
 
only be residing in a city but in a city which will allow him to 
question its citizens, from the humble potter to the powerful 
politician (21b11-21e3). As Sokrates points out, if the Athenians 
cannot endure his words then who else could (37c7-37d5)? 
 
καλὸς οὖν ἄν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη ἐξελθόντι τηλικῷδε ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην ἐξ 
ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζῆν. εὖ γὰρ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι ὅποι 
ἂν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε· κἂν μὲν 
τούτους ἀπελαύνω, οὗτοί με αὐτοὶ ἐξελῶσι πείθοντες τοὺς 
πρεσβυτέρους· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες δὲ καὶ οἰκεῖοι δι᾽ 
αὐτοὺς τούτους (Apology 37d6-e2)iv      
 
 
Wherever Sokrates went he would be in the ridiculous position of 
either being driven out himself or driving others away (ironically, he 
would be in the position of ‘exiling’ others).17 Sokrates’ reputation 
ensures that he would not be able to practice philosophy, as Meno 
puts it in the eponymous dialogue: ‘καί μοι δοκεῖς εὖ βουλεύεσθαι 
οὐκ ἐκπλέων ἐνθένδε οὐδ᾽ ἀποδημῶν· εἰ γὰρ ξένος ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει 
τοιαῦτα ποιοῖς, τάχ᾽ ἂν ὡς γόης ἀπαχθείης’ (Meno 80b5-8).v In that 
case, comes the objection, perhaps Sokrates ought to remain quiet 
(Apology 37e4-5). But for Sokrates this would be more terrible than 
                                                 
iv ‘A fine life I should lead if I went away at my time of life, wandering from 
city to city and always being driven out! For well I know that wherever I go, 
the young men will listen to my talk, as they do here; and if I drive them 
away, they will themselves persuade their elders to drive me out, and if I do 
not drive them away, their father and relatives will drive me out for their 
sakes’ (trans. Harold North Fowler p.133).  
v ‘In my opinion you are well advised not to leave Athens and live abroad. If 
you behaved like this as a foreigner in another country, you would most 
likely be arrested as a wizard’ (Meno 80b5-8, trans. W. K. C. Guthrie p.128). 
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either exile or death since to do this would be to disobey the god 
(37e6-8).18  Sokrates’ ‘happiness’ is entirely predicated on his ability to 
live the examining life; to be an exile or remain and be silent makes 
little difference – both would entail ὁ ἀνεξέταστος βίος (38a5-6).  
 
With the jury’s rejection of his counter penalty Sokrates is sentenced 
to death. Considering what Sokrates has said about the implications 
of his philosophical mission, both for himself and for the city, we 
might expect, if we did not know better, that death would be no less 
of an evil than exile. For Sokrates will no longer be able to serve god 
and develop his and his fellow citizens’ understanding of virtue, and 
in turn the city will lose its greatest benefactor. But Sokrates is quick 
to emphasise that death, such a grim prospect for others, is for him a 
trifling matter. Indeed, Sokrates’ language is even stronger than this 
(40a4, 40b11). Since his daimon had not opposed him in any way, 
Sokrates feels sure that the outcome of his trial, his own death, cannot 
be a bad thing (40c1-4).  
    
At the very worst, claims Sokrates, death is nothing, a dreamless 
sleep (40c6-e3), or it is a change and migration of the soul to another 
place.19 In the first instance, death is easily preferable to exile, since 
Sokrates would not be aware of what he was missing, and, 
presumably, it would be in accordance with god’s will (cf. Crito 43d9-
44a1), and in the second case, Sokrates would be able to continue his 
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investigations on a higher level, and what could be finer than that 
(Apology 40e4-41c8, cf. Phaedo 67b7-c3)? As Sokrates makes plain at 
28b2-10, he does not consider death or the fear of death to be an 
adequate reason for not doing philosophy, or, indeed, any action. The 
most pertinent factor in any consideration of how one should act is 
the justice or injustice of the proposed action and whether it is 
representative of a good or a bad man (28b8-10, as it is in the Crito 
49a2-50a4).   
 
At his trial Sokrates imagines a hypothetical situation where the jury 
would consent to release him on the condition that if he were caught 
doing philosophy again that he would be promptly put to death 
(Apology 29c7-11). In such a case, Sokrates declares, he would obey 
god rather than the jury (29d3-6); he would continue to practice 
philosophy and accept the consequences. 
    
Drawing on his military experiences, Sokrates sketches out an 
analogy between the obligation a soldier has to his commanding 
officer and the obligation that he has to god, a god who has ordered 
him to spend his life doing philosophy and examining himself and 
others (28e5-29a6). Since Sokrates does not know if death is an evil 
(indeed, it could be the greatest good), he will not be led by an 
unfounded fear in to disobeying god, for ‘ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ 
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βελτίονι καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστιν οἶδα’ 
(29b7-9).vi  
    
It has to be noted, however, that there was no Athenian law that 
prohibited ‘philosophy,’ although there were certainly laws against 
impiety and the corruption of the young. What then do we make of 
Sokrates’ hypothetical situation? Strictly speaking, Sokrates is not on 
trial for being a philosopher and practicing philosophy but for 
impiety and corrupting the young. Sokrates must be implying that 
the charges brought against him are seen by the jury as a 
consequence of his philosophical activities, otherwise Sokrates’ 
hypothetical case would make little sense. This suggests, rightly in 
my opinion, that, as Plato presents it, Sokrates’ accusers are judging 
him as if he were a sophist.20 
 
Indeed, Sokrates expresses this concern early in the Apology, saying 
that the oldest prejudice against him, that he is a cross between a 
natural scientist and a rhetorician, is the most damaging. Sokrates’ 
defence rests on convincing the jury that he is not a sophist (which is 
not helped by his rhetorical style or by his questioning of Meletos), in 
short, that he is neither impious nor a corrupter of the young (since it 
is these two crimes that are most readily attributable to Sophistic 
                                                 
vi ‘I do know that it is evil and disgraceful to do wrong and to disobey him 
who is better than I, whether he be man or god’ (trans. Harold North Fowler 
p.107).  
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teaching).21 By ‘threatening’ to disobey the jury Sokrates is actually 
stating his commitment to piety and to the welfare of the young; he is 
suggesting that by obeying god and practising philosophy he is the 
person who is least likely to be guilty of the charges raised against him. 
Sokrates’ chief concern is with obeying god and with the moral well 
being of all Athenians, young or old.22 Therefore, as we shall see, 
when Sokrates expresses his obedience to the law in the Crito he is 
really just restating this point (Crito 50c4-51c6, cf. Apology 24e1-4).23 
 
§2 
 
Sokrates Defends Athens 
 
τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον…(Apology19a8)vii 
 
Despite Sokrates’ statement in the Apology, that he would abide by his 
sentence (Apology 39b6-8), in the Crito the question as to whether he 
should live or die is still an open one. Therefore, Sokrates must 
defend himself yet again, but this time not to a jury but to his friend 
Krito.24 This defence will apply not only to himself and his decisions as a 
philosopher but also to his obligations as a citizen of Athens and also to 
Athens herself.25  
                                                 
vii ‘The law must be obeyed.’  
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Krito’s arguments are based largely around the considerations of 
friendship, shame, and a traditional conception of justice.26 Before we 
look at these arguments, it is probably worth noting that Krito is not 
going to be arguing in favour of exile, but in so far as Sokrates’ escape 
and subsequent flight from Athens would involve his leaving the city 
he must try his best to make exile, never the most pleasing of 
prospects, at least seem like a viable alternative to death. In the case 
of someone other than Sokrates this strategy might have worked. But, 
as we will see, because of Krito’s inability to see beyond conventional 
morality (of which he is undoubtedly a spokesman) his arguments 
will have little impact on Sokrates.27 
 
Krito’s first point is this, that if Sokrates dies then he (Krito) will lose 
his oldest and greatest friend (Crito 44b5-8). And second, if Sokrates 
does not escape then it may appear as though his friends did not help 
him, and Krito’s own reputation would suffer as a consequence 
(44b8-c6). Krito’s third point runs as follows, whether Sokrates is 
refusing to escape out of concern for the welfare of his friends and the 
consequences it may have on them (44e1-45a5). To which Sokrates 
answers that he is thinking of this, and other things besides.28 Krito is 
delighted to hear this and re-assures Sokrates that he need have no 
worries on their part; not only do Krito and his friends have sufficient 
funds to pay off informers, but they also have friends in Thessaly 
who could help him (45a7-c4). Krito’s last line of attack is as follows: 
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in not escaping and saving himself Sokrates is betraying himself and 
his family, dying when he could live (an irrelevant objection if one 
considers the Apology 29a6-11), thus giving his enemies an easy 
victory, and again all this will also reflect badly on his friends (Crito 
45c5-46a10).29  
 
Krito’s first point is not directly addressed by Sokrates.30 A greater 
concern for Sokrates at this moment is Krito’s insistence that 
reputation and the opinion of hoi polloi, particularly in respect to 
virtue, are pertinent considerations as to whether he should escape 
and evade his sentence (44d1-5).31 Sokrates wants Krito to accept this 
principle: that one should only esteem good opinions (46d10-e2; 47a3-
8). Good opinions are those that are held by the wise, the bad by the 
foolish (47a10-11). In all matters one should obey the good and the 
wise, that is, those that hold correct opinions based upon a sound 
knowledge of the issues involved (47a10-47c4).32 To do otherwise, to 
follow the opinion of hoi polloi, would be to incur harm, not just to 
one’s body but to that part of oneself which ‘περὶ ὃ ἥ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἡ 
δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν’ (47e10-48a1).viii And life is hardly worth living if 
one’s body is ruined (47e4-5), so how much more wretched would 
one’s life be if one were harmed in respect to that which makes it 
possible for one to εὖ ζῆν (48b7-8)?33 Hence, for Sokrates’ own good, 
the consideration for whether he ought to escape must not be based 
                                                 
viii ‘Is concerned with right and wrong’ (trans. Harold North Fowler p.167).   
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upon the opinion of hoi polloi but on whether it is just for him to do 
so, and in this respect he will defer to the opinions of the wise and the 
good.34  
 
After having hopefully reminded Krito that in all matters concerning 
what is just one should defer to the moral expert, and perhaps 
claiming this expertise for himself, Sokrates can reinforce his 
philosophical authority and proceed with his main argument. (Is it 
ironic that it is only by such anti-democratic reasoning that Sokrates 
can then proceed to defend his obligations to Athens, a democratic 
polis?). The argument can be summed up in the following way: 
 
1. (49a2-6): One should never do injustice intentionally. 
 
2. (49b5-8): Doing injustice is bad for the agent. 
 
3. (49b10): ‘Then we ought not to do injustice at all’ (οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ 
ἀδικεῖν).  
 
4. (49b12-13): One should never requite injustice with injustice. 
 
5. (49c2): One should never do evil.  
 
6. (49c4-5): One should never requite evil with evil. 
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7. (49c7): Doing evil is the same as doing injustice. 
 
8. (49c9-49d1): ‘Then we ought neither to requite injustice with 
injustice nor to do evil to anyone, no matter what he may have done 
to us’ (οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα 
ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ὁτιοῦν πάσχῃ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν). 
 
Krito readily agrees with all these principles (whether he actually 
believes them is or not is another point, cf. Crito 49d1-6), so Sokrates 
moves on to the next, and crucial, stage in the argument: 
 
9. (49e7-8): ‘Ought a man to do what he has agreed to do, provided it 
is right, or may he violate his agreements?’ix 
 
‘Yes’ comes Krito’s answer, if a man has agreed to do something right 
he ought to abide by that agreement. Therefore:  
 
10. (49e9-50a4): If Sokrates escapes from prison he will be doing evil 
to the city by not abiding to do what was agreed to be just. 
 
Krito is puzzled. Krito accepts that one must abide by agreements, 
providing that they are just, but he is unable to transfer this principle 
to Sokrates’ current predicament (49e7-8). Krito is having a difficulty 
                                                 
ix ‘πότερον ἃ ἄν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῳ δίκαια ὄντα ποιητέον ἢ ἐξαπατητέον;’ 
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conceptualising this agreement between Sokrates and Athens. Krito 
cannot understand why if Sokrates escapes he will harm Athens. 
Even if Krito does believe that one must not requite evil with evil, he 
does not see Sokrates’ escape as an example of injustice (50c3), hence 
his confusion. 
 
Everything is going to depend upon the nature of Sokrates’ Athenian 
citizenship, and it is exactly on this point, as we shall see, that the 
Laws will make their stand. 
 
Indeed, Krito’s failure to understand the final move in Sokrates’ 
argument forces him (Sokrates) to speak in a different voice (50a6-9). 
Therefore, we now have the rather ironic situation of Sokrates 
arguing on behalf of the law and the city that has condemned him to 
death.35 Why does Sokrates do this? As Roslyn Weiss36 puts it ‘for 
whom do the laws speak?’37 I think the most tempting answer would 
be to say that the Laws speak both for themselves and for Sokrates.38 
As Kraut puts it ‘the speech of the Laws is a complicated mixture of 
Socratic philosophy and Athenian legal practice.’39 
 
But considering Krito’s feelings about the verdict (and the whole 
judicial process) and his failure to transfer Sokratic principles to 
Sokrates’ obligation to Athens and her laws, it is not easy to see how 
this change of tack would be successful.40 
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The first point that the Laws make is that if Sokrates attempts to 
evade his sentence he would be destroying both the city and the laws 
it is built upon (50a9-b2).41 This seems rather strong. But the key thing 
to remember, as Andrew Barker and others have stated, is that this is 
not a consequences argument. The Laws are not really claiming that if 
Sokrates disobeys them that Athens will be destroyed, indeed, such a 
claim would be quite ridiculous. The point is that by disobeying the 
laws, Sokrates will not destroy Athens as such, but only in respect to 
the sense that to break laws and undermine the judicial process is an 
attack on an important principle of the Athenian state – it is not an 
actual attack on the city itself but on an ideal: that Athens is a city 
founded upon a justice system. 
 
Krito is not convinced by the above argument (50a9-b2); he still holds 
that if the verdict against Sokrates is unjust then that is all the 
motivation Sokrates needs in trying to evade his sentence, the laws of 
Athens be damned (50b10-50c3). Sokrates therefore switches back to 
his main point, first raised at 49e9-50a4, and therefore he will now 
demonstrate to Krito the nature of the agreement between himself 
and Athens as both a citizen and a philosopher. As John B. Morral 
puts it:  
 
the dialogue raises the problem with which Plato was to wrestle in varying 
forms and with varying degrees of success throughout his entire 
philosophical career. How could the wholehearted pursuit of truth by the 
44 
 
philosopher square with his obligation to be a good and fully active 
citizen?42  
 
 
As a citizen of Athens and as a human being, Sokrates cannot find 
fault with those laws upon which both his civic identity and his 
existence depend. It is because of the city and its laws that Sokrates 
has lived and enjoyed the benefits of citizenship, and on account of 
which he was reared and received his education (I do not think 
Sokrates is being ironic here, 50d8; 50e2). And not only did Sokrates 
choose to remain in Athens he was also content to beget and rear his 
children in the city, and he also passed over the chance of leaving 
Athens at his trial, refusing exile as his counter penalty (52b11-c6). 
The relationship between the city and Sokrates is like that between a 
father and son; the relationship is not based on equality, and since the 
city has provided so much for him, Sokrates has no right to disregard 
its laws and hence the city itself. Indeed, the reverence and respect 
one ought to hold to one’s city is even greater than that shown to 
one’s parents and ancestors (50d9-c6, cf. Laws 804d7-8).  
    
Moreover, as the Laws point out, all citizens have the right and 
recourse to persuasion (Crito 51c1), and where this has failed (as it 
had when Sokrates failed to persuade the jury at his trial),43 one must 
suffer whatever consequences the city sees fit (51b5). And, if this is 
not to a citizen’s liking, they could have taken up residence elsewhere 
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(51d2-11, the implication being that Sokrates was aware of this but 
chose to stay anyway; he took his chances like every other Athenian). 
But if a citizen chooses to stay this means, necessarily, that a citizen is 
happy with the way his city is governed. And, in a democracy like 
Athens, a citizen has some opportunity to affect policy, or, if charges 
are brought against him, to defend himself in court. The choice is 
simple: persuade or obey (51e1-52a4).   
 
Now the Laws move from these general comments about the duties 
that a citizen has to his city and to its laws to Sokrates’ own case, 
which, as we will see, seems to commit him to an even greater 
obligation to the city than his fellow citizens (52a5-8).  
 
Σώκρατες, μεγάλα ἡμῖν τούτων τεκμήριά ἐστιν, ὅτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς 
ἠρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἁπάντων 
διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις εἰ μή σοι διαφερόντως ἤρεσκεν, καὶ οὔτ᾽ 
ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώποτ᾽ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθες, ὅτι μὴ ἅπαξ εἰς Ἰσθμόν, 
οὔτε ἄλλοσε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μή ποι στρατευσόμενος, οὔτε ἄλλην 
ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσω πώποτε ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι, οὐδ᾽ ἐπιθυμία σε 
ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδὲ ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς σοι ἱκανοὶ 
ἦμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις (Crito 52b1-11)x 
 
 
 
By refusing exile at his trial and throughout his life, Sokrates has 
committed himself to the city and to its laws (52c6-d7). Sokrates has 
                                                 
x ‘Socrates, we have strong evidence that we and the city pleased you; for 
you would never have stayed in it more than all other Athenians if you had 
not been better pleased with it than they; you never went out from the city to 
a festival, or anywhere else, except on military service, and you never made 
any other journey, as other people do, and you had no wish to know any 
other city or other laws, but you were contented with us and our city’ (trans. 
Harold North Fowler p.183).   
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grown old in Athens, with all the ‘wisdom’ that his years suggest, 
and yet he made no attempt to leave Athens for another city, not even 
the most praised Sparta or Krete, so to leave now would seem 
ridiculous (52e2-7). Indeed, he has spent even more time in the city 
than the lame and the blind: ‘οὕτω σοι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων 
Ἀθηναίων ἤρεσκεν ἡ πόλις τε καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὅτι’ (53a3-
5).xi 
    
The Laws round off their argument by speaking about exile more 
explicitly.44 Other well-governed poleis that Sokrates might flee to, 
such as Thebes or Megara, would look upon him as an enemy (53b6). 
Moreover, if Sokrates’ friends helped him they would run the risk of 
being exiled themselves.45 How could Sokrates claim to speak for 
justice in these cities when his very presence would contradict him 
(53b6-c5)? How, when he has fled Athens and evaded his sentence, 
could Sokrates claim to care about justice; and what kind of 
discourses would he engage in? He could say nothing, or else he 
would risk his words contradicting his deeds (53c9-13). What about 
more lawless lands, Thessaly for example, how would they receive 
Sokrates?46 Would he be respected or appreciated? Not likely. He 
would be a virtual slave, whose intellect would be neither welcome 
nor tolerated (53c5-d9); he would spend his time feeding his belly 
                                                 
xi ‘So much more than the other Athenians were you satisfied with the city 
and evidently therefore with us, its laws’ (trans. Harold North Fowler 
p.185).    
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rather than his mind (53e7-54a1).47 As Weiss rightly points out,48 the 
Laws force home to Krito just what exile would be like for a man like 
Sokrates, both as a philosopher and as a citizen of Athens.49 
 
If leaving Athens would hinder Sokrates’ philosophical mission then 
it is clear that in some sense his ability to conduct philosophy is 
dependent on his Athenian citizenship, or, at the very least, on his 
being a citizen as such. Indeed, being an Athenian citizen would 
certainly have had extra benefits for Sokrates the philosopher, as not 
only was Athens the cultural centre of Greece, but it gave him, up 
until the moment of his death, the chance to converse freely and 
openly with citizen and foreigner alike, as Richard Kraut puts it: ‘the 
freedom Athens gave its citizens…is the very thing that made 
Socrates prefer it to any other legal system.’50 And it was partly 
because of this freedom that Sokrates was content to remain in 
Athens. 
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§3 
 
The Exile Theme in the Republic and the Phaedrus 
 
Sokrates’ refusal to compromise, to renounce philosophy, and to 
become, at least according to his accusers’ conception, a ‘good 
citizen’, did not mean that he was willing to unjustly disobey the laws 
of Athens. Sokrates remained true to both Athens and his 
philosophical mission. Sokrates is unjustly convicted, but insofar as 
he recognises this and yet is still willing to abide by the court’s 
decision, this shows a level of commitment to his polis that throws 
Meletos’ philopolis into the shade.  
 
This commitment is both to the city in which he was born and to his 
fellow citizens and also in a sense to the city as an abstract ideal. 
Sokrates’ loyalty is to that which is stable and enduring; his loyalty is 
not, perhaps, to the Athens of Meletos but to what Athens could 
become: a polis founded upon true justice.   
 
It is then as a citizen of Athens that Socrates examines the lives of others. 
And since all citizens share a common life, the examination of one's own life 
is also an examination of the life of the city. Only in this way and in this 
context is it possible for philosophy and politics to be reconciled without 
compromise; giving philosophy a new subject matter, the polis, and making 
the highest norms and laws of political action the chief problem of 
philosophy. While this is true, it is also one-sided. For Socrates is not just a 
citizen. Nor does he owe everything to Athens. The polis and laws gave him 
all the good things they could, but they could not give him everything. (His 
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daimon owes nothing to the polis.) Nor are the laws of Athens to which he 
offers such unconditional obedience simply the laws of contemporary 
Athens. Rather they are idealizations of an abstract archaic law. It is to this 
idea of law and of Athens that Socrates offers his obedience. And by making 
this law holy and the embodiment of wisdom, tradition, and the will of the 
gods, he implicitly condemns any legal practices that depart from it. Thus in 
the very process of being a good citizen of Athens, Socrates shows the 
corruptness of the city.51  
 
 
For the philosopher in the ideal polis there is no alternative to 
obedience. The philosopher ruler returns to the city because he owes 
his very existence to it, but political activity, as with Sokrates, is not 
his true concern. Their training and education, however (Republic 
520b7), coupled with their lack of ambition, make the philosopher 
rulers the only possible candidates for leadership, and, despite what 
they actually desire (519c8-520a4), ruling is central to their purpose. 
Sokrates also owes his existence to Athens, and, as far as he can, he 
fulfils his obligations, and he too rejects political ambition, for such a 
career, if it had been earnestly followed, would have been fatal 
(Apology 31d9-31e1), hence: ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι 
μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον 
σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν (32a1-3).xii Indeed, it 
appears as though a full and proper exercise of one’s citizenship is 
impossible for a philosopher in the imperfect polis. 52   
 
                                                 
xii ‘A man who really fights for the right, if he is to preserve his life for even a 
little while, must be a private citizen, not a public man’ (trans. Harold North 
Fowler p.115). 
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In book 6 of the Republic Sokrates and Adeimantos discuss why, 
generally, those who have the greatest philosophical potential end up 
abandoning this calling and turn instead to the affairs of state 
(Republic 494a10-495c6). The very qualities that constitute the 
philosophical nature when combined with bad rearing cause these 
young men to become exiled from philosophy,53 hence: ‘Οὗτοι μὲν δὴ 
οὕτως ἐκπίπτοντες, οἷς μάλιστα προσήκει, ἔρημον καὶ ἀτελῆ 
φιλοσοφίαν’ (495b8-c1).xiii With her true parents in exile philosophy 
becomes orphaned (495c3), and with the way now clear, a gang of 
squatters move into her territory, the sophists,54 peddling their cheap 
recycled wisdom (495c8-e1). The love of fame, honour and glory, the 
whims and fancies of hoi polloi, the conventional claptrap of the 
Sophists, all combine to make it impossible for the young philosopher 
to emerge (412e2-414a5).  
    
However, a small group of genuine philosophers remain 
uncorrupted, and there are five conditions which make their survival 
possible: (1) when a well reared and noble character is kept in check 
by exile (a reference to Dion perhaps?); (2) when a great soul is reared 
in a small city, and looks beyond its narrow borders to something 
more; (3) when other men come to it from other arts (Plato possibly); 
(4) the example of Theages (mentioned in the Apology at 33e9), whose 
                                                 
xiii ‘So these men, for whom philosophy is most suitable, go thus into exile 
and leave her abandoned and unconsummated’ (trans. Allan Bloom p.175).  
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bodily aliments prevented him from being exiled from philosophy,55 
and lastly; (5) the Sokratic daimon (496a10-496e2). Philosophy (the 
love or desire for wisdom), then, can exist without the ideal 
conditions of the ideal city, provided that the philosopher does not 
seek political office (592a1-592b4). In Athens, or indeed any city, the 
philosopher can never be the best citizen and can never excel in the 
political field.  
 
καὶ τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων οἱ γενόμενοι καὶ γευσάμενοι ὡς ἡδὺ καὶ 
μακάριον τὸ κτῆμα, καὶ τῶν πολλῶν αὖ ἱκανῶς ἰδόντες τὴν μανίαν, καὶ 
ὅτι οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν περὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πράττει οὐδ’ 
ἔστι σύμμαχος μεθ’ ὅτου τις ἰὼν ἐπὶ τὴν τῷ δικαίῳ βοήθειαν σῴζοιτ’ ἄν, 
ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ εἰς θηρία ἄνθρωπος ἐμπεσών, οὔτε συναδικεῖν ἐθέλων οὔτε 
ἱκανὸς ὢν εἷς πᾶσιν ἀγρίοις ἀντέχειν, πρίν τι τὴν πόλιν ἢ φίλους ὀνῆσαι 
προαπολόμενος ἀνωφελὴς αὑτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν γένοιτο—ταῦτα 
πάντα λογισμῷ λαβών, ἡσυχίαν ἔχων καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττων, οἷον ἐν 
χειμῶνι κονιορτοῦ καὶ ζάλης ὑπὸ πνεύματος φερομένου ὑπὸ τειχίον 
ἀποστάς, ὁρῶν τοὺς ἄλλους καταπιμπλαμένους ἀνομίας, ἀγαπᾷ εἴ πῃ 
αὐτὸς καθαρὸς ἀδικίας τε καὶ ἀνοσίων ἔργων τόν τε ἐνθάδε βίον 
βιώσεται καὶ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτοῦ μετὰ καλῆς ἐλπίδος ἵλεώς τε καὶ 
εὐμενὴς ἀπαλλάξεται (Republic 496c5-e3)xiv 
 
 
                                                 
xiv ‘Now the men who have become members of this small band have tasted 
how sweet and blessed a possession it is [philosophy]. At the same time, 
they have seen sufficiently the madness of the many, and that no one who 
minds the business of the cities does virtually anything sound, and that 
there is no ally with whom one could go to the aid of justice and be 
preserved. Rather – just like a human being who has fallen in with wild 
beasts and is neither willing to join them in doing injustice nor sufficient as 
one man to resist all the savage animals – one would perish before he has 
been of any use to city or friends and be of no profit to himself or others. 
Taking all this into the calculation, he keeps quiet and minds his own 
business – as a man in a storm, when dust and rain are blown about by the 
wind, stands aside under a little wall. Seeing others filled full of lawlessness, 
he is content if somehow he can live his life here pure of injustice and 
unholy deeds, and take his leave from it graciously and cheerfully with fair 
hope’ (trans. Bloom p.176).  
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This man, who is content to live his life free from injustice and 
impiety, is quite possibly Sokrates (or more likely Plato). But living 
such a life is not enough; so much more could be achieved if someone 
like Sokrates lived in a city sympathetic to philosophy (497a3-5). 
Since there is no city worthy of the philosophical nature (497b1-2), 
then the philosopher must ‘mind his own business’ (496c11) or suffer 
the consequences. The antagonism between Sokrates and Athens is 
paradigmatic of the awkwardness between the philosopher and his 
city; the philosopher needs the city (if only to philosophise) whilst the 
city will never accept the authority of philosophy (488a2-489a2).56  But 
there is more to it than this, however.  
 
Sokrates’ attachment to polis life is briefly sketched out in the 
Phaedrus. Here we find that Sokrates’ love for the polis and his 
commitment to philosophy are closely associated: ‘φιλομαθὴς γάρ 
εἰμι· τὰ μὲν οὖν χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα οὐδέν μ᾽ ἐθέλει διδάσκειν, οἱ 
δ᾽ ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἄνθρωποι. σὺ μέντοι δοκεῖς μοι τῆς ἐμῆς ἐξόδου τὸ 
φάρμακον ηὑρηκέναι’ (Phaedrus 230d4-7).xv To Phaedrus, Sokrates 
acts like a stranger when outside the city walls (230c8-d3, as he does 
in the court room, Apology 17d1-18a7; cf. Theaetetus 173d1-4), and 
Sokrates confesses that he only follows him out of the city because of 
what he hopes to learn (Phaedrus 230e1). As a lover of learning 
                                                 
xv ‘I am, you see, a lover of learning. Now the people in the city have 
something to teach me, but the fields and trees won’t teach me anything’ 
(trans. Walter Hamilton p.26).  
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Sokrates is not bound to the city, whether it is Athens or any other, but 
to men (243d4). Does this suggest that philosophy can transcend the 
polis?  
 
In a limited sense perhaps it does. But Sokrates’ brief absence from 
the city is possible and tolerable only insofar as he can continue 
philosophising. Sokrates’ love for philosophy is greater than his love 
for his city. Sokrates’ trip outside the city walls in the Phaedrus is akin 
to his trip to the Piraeus in the Republic: in both cases philosophy is 
seen as residing beyond Athens. However, philosophy cannot remain 
in exile indefinitely; philosophy must reclaim the city (Republic 
473c11-e4, 499c6-d6), since, ultimately, it must reclaim mankind. 
Philosophy and the life of justice ought not to be alienated from the 
city, even if, as Plato thought, contemporary political and social trends 
made this almost inevitable.  
    
For the most part, nevertheless, the dialogues present us with a 
picture of philosophy that is firmly rooted in Athens and Athenian 
cultural life.57 However, it is an Athens of the past; it is Sokrates’ 
Athens. This enables Plato to say so much more, and to state fully the 
quarrel between the philosopher and the imperfect society; it allows 
each side to slug it out in a bloodless though not insignificant contest. 
However, a more drastic measure may be required in order to turn a 
city towards virtue; a city where Sokratic education becomes an 
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institution, and where the philosopher’s word is final. Before we 
come to that, however, we need to look in some detail at Sokratic 
education, and it is to this subject that I shall now turn.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Sokratic Education 
 
παρακαλοῦμέν σε, ὃ καὶ παρεκαλέσαμέν ἤδη, χρῆσαι σεαυτὸν 
ὁλοκλήρως τῇ συνηγορίᾳ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ ταῖς παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ 
ἐγγινομέναις τῇ διανοίᾳ σου ὁρμαῖς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ σύστασινi 
 
 
The subject of this chapter is Sokratic education. What do I mean by 
‘Sokratic’ education? Very broadly, when I refer to Sokratic education 
I refer to Sokrates’ engagement with educational questions in the 
dialogues. And more explicitly, I refer to Sokrates’ principal 
educational aims and method as Plato presents them in the dialogues. 
The principal method of Sokratic education is the combination of 
elenkhos and exhortation, and its principal aim is to get people to care 
for their souls. Sokratic education, moreover, is largely defined by its 
concern with a key set of ethical questions: What is virtue? Is virtue 
teachable? How should one live?  
 
The inquiry into virtue, happiness, and ‘moral’ culture generally, is 
seen as valuable in its own right, but importantly it is also seen as 
                                                 
i ‘…we urge you, as we have urged you before, to devote yourself entirely to 
the advocacy of the truth, and to those impulses which are implanted by 
God in your soul for the establishment of good’ (Saint Basil, Letter VII, trans. 
Roy. J. Deferrari, slightly adapted, p.47).  
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being of direct benefit both to the inquirer and those whom he or she 
engages with.  
 
Another notable feature of Sokratic education is the peculiar nature of 
its teacher pupil relationship. Any educative endeavour requires a 
certain degree of communication between a supposed expert and a 
(hopefully) willing pupil, who, talent and perseverance withstanding, 
might just learn something. In ancient Greece the teacher might be a 
schoolmaster, a male parent or relative, an epic poet or dramatist, or, 
as was increasingly the case as the 5th Century B.C. progressed, a 
sophist. All of these teachers might, in some sense, claim to be able to 
teach virtue. Not so Sokrates. Although his life was dedicated to 
learning, he did not claim to be able to teach virtue. This is an 
astonishing assertion but, as we shall see, a necessary first step in the 
Sokratic project. Sokrates, perhaps unlike anyone before him, refused 
the mantle of a teacher of virtue because he felt no shame in admitting 
his ignorance. To sum up, and to anticipate much of what I will go on 
to say in this chapter, Sokratic education is non-institutional, 
inclusive, free, but it comes with no guarantees, no promises of 
wealth, success, or even honour, at least in the conventional sense; it 
is painful, at times disheartening, but, according to Sokrates, it is the 
only possible anthrōpōn epimeleia.  
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To reiterate, Sokratic education is something that Plato attributes to 
Sokrates, or rather, and to state the matter more accurately (and 
cautiously), it is something that the character of Sokrates is shown to 
practise and endorse in certain dialogues. Nevertheless, I see the aims 
of Sokratic and Platonic education as being the same: care of the soul.1 
Therefore, even though I restrict the term ‘Sokratic education’ to 
Sokrates’ pedagogical method in the dialogues, I am not suggesting 
that there is any fundamental difference between its central tenets and 
those that we find in Platonic education,2 or indeed any essential 
difference between Sokrates’ educational method in the dialogues and 
Plato’s educational method as a writer of dialogues.  
 
I will begin, in section one, by saying a few words about education in 
ancient Athens and the cultural context into which Sokratic teaching 
is set in the dialogues. Then, in section two, I shall discuss exhortation 
(parakeleuma), elenkhos, and epimeleia or care of the soul, their 
relationship with each other and the role that they play in Sokratic 
education.  
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§1 
 
Teaching Virtue in Athens 
 
Whatever we make of the authenticity of the Clitophon, we find 
within it a clear presentation of Plato’s main concern with the way 
that education was conceived by his fellow Athenians. The Athenians 
regarded their education, which for the most part consisted of 
gymnastics, mousikē (a term we shall discuss shortly), and grammar, 
to be a complete education in virtue, which, the complaint runs in the 
Clitophon, it is clearly not. Therefore: ‘πῶς οὐ καταφρονεῖτε τῆς νῦν 
παιδεύσεως οὐδὲ ζητεῖτε οἵτινες ὑμᾶς παύσουσι ταύτης τῆς 
ἀμουσίας’ (Clitophon 407c4-6).ii But why did the Athenians think that 
their educational system was adequate for creating virtuous people? 
and, more crucially, what did they mean by virtue (aretē)?3   
 
For the Greeks the purpose of education was to foster those traits and 
potentialities that would best enable a person to fulfil their duty to 
their polis, whether this meant participating in political decisions or 
fighting in wars. Hence, differently constituted societies had different 
educational objectives, as with Athens and Sparta for example.4 But in 
all cases, it seems, the general aim of education was to produce 
                                                 
ii How is it that you do not condemn this present mode of education nor 
search for teachers who will put an end to your lack of culture [mousikē]?’ 
(trans. Michael Richard Hart).  
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virtuous citizens. To be an Athenian citizen was to be an active5 
member of the polis.6 The Athenian citizen had, first and foremost, an 
obligation to the laws of his city,7 but he also had certain rights and 
privileges that clearly distinguished him from non-citizens.8 It was in 
the political field9 that the benefits of Athenian citizenship could most 
clearly be seen: the right to hold office and to participate in the 
judicial process.10 With Athens, as with other Greek poleis, citizenship 
was inextricably bound up with the political constitution of the 
polis.11 To be an Athenian citizen meant that one was, at least 
formally, a democratic citizen.12  
 
The existence of character or ‘moral’ education as a distinct discipline, 
or, in the case of school curricula, as a taught subject, is not 
something that the Greeks would have recognised. This has a lot to 
do with the way in which the Greeks generally thought about 
education. The nature of the Greek polis, as R. L. Nettleship remarks, 
meant that ‘the influence of personal character upon society and 
politics was more direct and unmistakable than it can be in the vast 
organization of a modern nation, where the members at the 
circumference may be almost unconscious of their connexion with the 
centre.’13 Education, then, was always based upon a conception of 
character,14 and its form, content, and execution was driven almost 
exclusively by this:15 the Greeks, as Werner Jaeger observes: ‘were the 
first to recognize that education means deliberately moulding human 
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character in accordance with an ideal.’16 Again as Jaeger says: 
‘education is such a natural and universal function of society that 
many generations accept and transmit it without question or 
discussion’;17 paideia is not simply ‘education’ as in ‘schooling’; its 
meaning is much broader: it refers to a person’s assimilation into a 
culture.18  
    
As William Barclay states, for the Greeks ‘education ‘was the 
birthright of the child, and an essential part of anything which could 
be called civilisation.’19 However, education in Athens in the 5th and 
4th Centuries B.C. was poorly regulated.20 Attendance at schools was 
not enforced, and the quality and duration of a child’s education was 
dependent upon the financial situation of his parents. Education was 
restricted to boys; girls received no formal education in Athens. 
Education for boys, at Athens for example, consisted mainly of 
mousikē, gymnastics, and reading and writing, and usually took place 
in schools.21 Boys were sent to the grammatistēs, the kitharistēs and the 
paidotribēs, to be taught letters, mousikē and physical training 
(gumnastikē) respectively,22 as we learn, for example, in Plato’s 
Protagoras.23  
 
But what could Greek parents expect their children to learn from 
such a rudimentary education? On the one hand, an education of this 
sort instilled harmony of movement and speech, and on the other, it 
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introduced the child, through recitals and grammar, to the myths, 
rituals and heroic figures which would go on to form an essential role 
in their lives.24 Mousikē, a term that is nigh impossible to translate, 
which was partly concerned with musical training (singing and 
playing the lyre) and part cultural study, formed the bedrock of a 
young Athenian’s liberal education (cf. Protagoras 338e7-339a2, ἐγὼ 
ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν. δεινὸν εἶναι: ἔστιν 
δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι συνιέναι ἅ τε 
ὀρθῶς πεποίηται καὶ ἃ μή, καὶ ἐπίστασθαι διελεῖν τε καὶ 
ἐρωτώμενον λόγον δοῦναι).iii 
 
The poets, especially Homer, exerted a powerful influence over Greek 
education.25 From an early age boys would learn about the great 
heroes, about their exploits and their virtues. It was within their 
cultural-musical education (mousikē) that children were introduced to 
the poets and the great heroes. Homer was seen as an educator,26 as 
were many other poets.27 Poetry was considered didactic; and the 
Iliad and the Odyssey contain a heroic code and ideal and, at the same 
time, a tragic presentation of human striving and achievement.28 
 
                                                 
iii‘ I consider…that the greatest part of a man’s education is to be skilled in 
the matter of verses; that is, to be able to apprehend, in the utterances of the 
poets, what has been rightly and wrongly composed, and to know how to 
distinguish them and account for them when questioned’ (trans. W. R. M. 
Lamb pp.183-185).   
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The educational import29 of the Iliad and the Odyssey may not be easy 
for us to appreciate, however these works provided the Greeks with 
not only a heroic ‘history’ but a model of heroic action and speech,30 
and as such it gave them two of their greatest and most paradigmatic 
heroes, Akhilleus and Odysseus.31 However, the Greeks of the 5th and 
4th Centuries B.C. were not Homeric in the proper sense of the word. 
In the main, Homer’s poems depicted a tribalistic, feudal world, a 
world of warlords and chieftains. This was a time before democracy, 
where the power of authority stemmed not so much from written law 
but from divine sanction and brute force.  
 
However, the fascination that the Greeks had with Homer’s poems 
hinged not on a total identification with the heroes within them but 
on the central ethical message that the poems were thought to 
contain: ‘αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων’ (Iliad 
VI.208). Excellence or ‘being the best’ could be reduced to two human 
spheres, words and deeds, hence the Homeric ‘maxim’: ‘μύθων τε 
ῥητῆρ᾽ ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων’ (Iliad IX.443).32 Excelling in 
words and deeds was the Greek ideal, therefore, and between them 
Akhilleus and Odysseus shared all that was considered to be the 
most excellent. This ideal may have been problematic, even 
ambiguous, but it epitomized what the Greeks praised most highly: 
rhetorical skill and martial prowess. 
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Exhortation was implicit in the study of mousikē, and seems to have 
been used as a way of transmitting values from one generation to the 
next, as we learn in Protagoras at 322e4-326a4. It might seem rather 
incongruous for a 4th Century B.C. Greek boy to seek to emulate Aias 
or Diomedes, but what they would be seeking to emulate, as we have 
already indicated, is not the specific achievements of such heroes but 
the virtues that they typified.33 
    
Gymnastics has its obvious uses: basic physical training, grace and 
poise, and athleticism; these could be all called upon in times of civic 
emergency, and frequently were. Traditionally, the ‘basic Greek 
education,’ if one can call it such, was geared towards ‘the soul and 
the body’34 rather than economic factors. Indeed, the notion of ‘utility’ 
was an ‘anathema to the cultured Greeks’; as Barclay says: ‘anything 
which enables a man to make money is necessarily an ungentlemanly 
thing; and anyone engaged in making money is ipso facto unfit to be a 
citizen.’35 Education, therefore, was not for the Greeks simply the 
transmission and preservation of facts and figures,36 it was concerned 
almost exclusively with the creation and promotion of a conception of 
human character; to be educated is not merely to learn but to become; 
as Kant puts it: ‘Man can become man through education only. He is 
only what education makes him.’37 From the 5th Century B.C. 
onwards, in Athens at least, ‘traditional education’ of this kind could 
be supplemented. The Sophists, not only to Plato’s disapproval, 
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provided a ‘higher education,’ one that advanced and refined their 
pupils’ linguistic and argumentative powers.38 Protagoras taught his 
pupils to excel in words and deeds, and by this he meant in the affairs 
of the city; in Sokrates’ words he claimed to be able to make people 
better citizens.39  
 
One’s definition of a ‘better citizen’ will depend, generally speaking, 
on the demands of citizenship and the nature of the polis and its 
politeia. In a sense, sophistic training filled the void left by the lack of 
formal training in citizenship in Athens. Indeed, the only institution 
that provided anything like citizenship training was the ephēbeia. 
Initially this had been little more than a cadet force, where young 
Athenians were enlisted to defend Athens’ borders, but by 335 B.C. 
this institution, possibly as the result of the Macedonian threat from 
the north, came to include a stronger educational component.40  
 
The ephēbeia aside, however, within mainstream education there were 
no specific courses of study devoted to citizenship. Civic education 
was provided for ‘on the job’ so to speak, and any specific skills that 
would help a young man to achieve success as a citizen were the 
responsibility of the family, friends, and in some cases, lovers.41 Their 
education, as we have said, was liberal, its purpose was precisely to 
avoid specifics and to train body and ‘mind’ according to the mores 
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of the previous generation, to instill good character, and to leave 
everything else to providence. 
 
Going back to our initial two questions, the Athenians thought that 
their educational measures were adequate for the creation of virtue 
because first and foremost the whole point of education for them was 
to a make a potential Athenian become an actual Athenian; and the 
teaching of virtue was not considered to be a difficult matter. Distinct 
virtues, such as courage and temperance, were not seen to work 
independently of the civic framework and the duties and obligations 
of citizenship. Therefore, the virtues that education were thought to 
inculcate were seen primarily through the prism of citizenship and 
the needs of the polis. That, at least, was the idea. There was in fact a 
great deal of tension between notions of virtue as such and the idea, 
relatively new in the first part of the 5th Century B.C., that virtues 
ought to be civic, if not in origin, then at least in application.42  
 
However, despite the fact that the Athenians were fairly confident in 
their ability to teach the younger generation how to become good 
citizens (although by the end of the 5th Century B.C. that confidence 
was on the wane), we should be under no illusion about the 
complexity of Greek ethics at this time, nor underestimate the level of 
confusion that existed regarding the nature of virtue.43  
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As Athens expanded, both politically and culturally, and the demand 
grew for a more professional approach to citizenship education, this 
mixture of confidence and confusion proved fertile ground for the 
sophists. As we see in Aristophanes, however, sophistic education 
was seen as a major threat to traditional pedagogy and its notion of 
the kaloagathos.44 However, the threat was seen to come not only from 
the sophists, who, for the most part, were foreigners, but from one of 
their own, Sokrates. 
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§2 
 
Parakeleuma, Elenkhos, and Epimeleia 
 
οἷον, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ποιεῖς ἡγούμενος, εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα σὲ ἐλέγχω, ἄλλου τινὸς 
ἕνεκα ἐλέγχειν ἢ οὗπερ ἕνεκα κἂν ἐμαυτὸν διερευνῴμην τί λέγω, 
φοβούμενος μή ποτε λάθω οἰόμενος μέν τι εἰδέναι, εἰδὼς δὲ μή. καὶ νῦν 
δὴ οὖν ἔγωγέ φημι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, τὸν λόγον σκοπεῖν μάλιστα μὲν 
ἐμαυτοῦ ἕνεκα, ἴσως δὲ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων: ἢ οὐ κοινὸν οἴει 
ἀγαθὸν εἶναι σχεδόν τι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, γίγνεσθαι καταφανὲς ἕκαστον 
τῶν ὄντων ὅπῃ ἔχει; (Charmides 166c8-d7)iv 
 
 
In the early dialogues Sokrates is often directly engaged with 
questions about the nature of particular virtues or excellences (aretai). 
Plato’s early works, however, are not merely ‘definitional’ dialogues, 
whose chief purpose is to delineate the meaning of ethical terms.45 In 
fact, as scholars are now becoming increasing aware 
 
the goal of the dialogical Socratic method is fundamentally of an educative 
and ethical nature and only secondarily and indirectly of a logical and 
epistemological nature. Socratic dialectic aims at exhorting man to virtue. It 
aims at convincing human beings that the soul and the care of the soul are 
the maximum good for man. It aims at purifying the soul by basically testing 
it precisely through questions and answers in order to liberate it from errors 
and to dispose it towards the truth.46  
 
                                                 
iv ‘How can you think, I said, if my main effort is to refute you, that I do it 
with any other motive than that which would impel me to investigate the 
meaning of my own words – from a fear of carelessly supposing at any 
moment, that I knew something while I knew it not? And so it is now: that is 
what I am doing, I tell you. I am examining the argument mainly for my 
own sake, but also, perhaps, for that of my other intimates. Or do you not 
think it is for the common good, almost, of all humans, that the truth about 
everything there is should be discovered?’ (trans. W. R. M. Lamb, slightly 
adapted, p. 55).   
71 
 
To exhort, of course, is not to teach, still less to teach virtue. But 
granted that virtue can be taught, who and where are its teachers? 
This is a key problem in Sokratic education. It seems to Sokrates that 
virtue is a kind of knowledge, and yet this is nowhere demonstrated, 
that is to say, there are no teachers who are able to impart this 
knowledge, virtue. Hence, the conclusion runs, virtue cannot be 
knowledge because a primary feature of knowledge is that it is 
communicable. Nevertheless, and despite the aporia that is a common 
feature of the early dialogues, Sokrates continues to exhort people to 
pursue virtue and therefore to find the moral expert. 
 
When Sokrates urges people to find a true expert, as he does in the 
Laches (201a2-b5), he is not to asking them to abandon him, or to take 
him to be the expert; the exhortation ‘find a teacher of virtue’ is not 
ironic. By telling people to seek out the expert he is inviting them to 
join him on his mission. But how does Sokrates accomplish this?  
 
In a society in which most people (and especially ‘moral’ 
conservatives) would be convinced that they know what the virtues 
are (Meno 93a2-3; Apology 24c10-25a9), and that they either possess 
virtue themselves or are committed to pursuing it (without, of course, 
really knowing what virtue is), and that they are in a position to teach 
others the same virtue, how is it sensible to try and get people to 
spend any time trying to find someone who can tell them what they 
72 
 
already know? Simple: show them that they are ignorant about what 
virtue is and that as a consequence they are not in fact virtuous, and, 
assuming that they still want to be virtuous, state the obvious and 
say: ‘find a teacher of virtue!’  
 
Exhortation and elenkhos are at the heart of Sokratic education and 
between them they constitute the principal method by which 
Sokrates pursues his main pedagogical aim: the care of the soul.47 As 
we saw earlier, exhortation was common in traditional education, 
particularly in mousikē, and was an important moral-educative 
device. To exhort a person is to induce an action or course of action, 
to ‘persuade, press upon or win over’ (Peithō). The Greek verb 
Protrepō means, for example, ‘to urge forward.’ Exhortation is 
common in any rudimentary form of ethical system, and amounts to 
little more than recommending a person to act in such and such a 
way or be like such and such a person, or, in more abstract terms, to 
‘be brave’, i.e., to be one thing rather than another. Homer’s Iliad is 
full of such exhortations (II.188-210; 244-264; III.38-75; IV.234-250; 
255-400; 401-418; IX.432-605; XIII.274-294). In Homer’s poems 
exhortation is often combined with rebuke and admonishment, and 
often its function is largely to persuade, in particular by appealing to 
a person’s sense of honour or pride. It is a basic and rather rough and 
ready form of moral education.48 However, its use in the Iliad is 
largely corrective, and is therefore not specifically a method for 
73 
 
teaching ‘virtue’ but rather it is a rhetorical device for correcting 
deviant views or behaviour (Aias’ speech to Akhilleus in book 9 of 
the Iliad is a fine example of this, IX.624-642).49 
    
In the Apology we learn that Sokrates spent the majority of his adult 
life exhorting his fellow Athenians to virtue, and, according to the 
Clitophon, his ‘teaching’ is restricted to the use of exhortation 
(parakeleuma, parainesis). Clitophon is deeply critical of Sokrates’ 
apparent unwillingness to move beyond merely hortatory 
(protreptikos) statements, no matter how laudable they may be, and 
actually teach people how to be virtuous.50 It is all very well telling 
people that they ought to pursue justice (for example), complains 
Clitophon, but what we want to know is how we are to become just. 
Indeed, Clitophon goes as far as to say that Sokrates’ method (as he 
understands it) is a positive hindrance in the pursuit of virtue: ‘μὴ 
μὲν γὰρ προτετραμμένωι σε ἀνθρώπωι ὦ Σώκρατες ἄξιον εἶναι 
τοῦ παντὸς φήσω, προτετραμμένωι δὲ σχεδὸν καὶ ἐμπόδιον τοῦ 
πρὸς τέλος ἀρετῆς ἐλθόντα εὐδαίμονα γενέσθαι’ (Clitophon 410e5-
8).v 
 
                                                 
v ‘For I will maintain, Socrates, that for a man who isn’t yet persuaded by 
your exhortations you are worth the world, but for someone who is you’re 
actually almost a stumbling-block for reaching complete virtue and so 
becoming truly happy’ (trans. S. R. Sling, Plato: Clitophon, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.259, slightly adapted).  
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However, I would suggest that far from amounting to a serious 
critique of the Sokratic method or more particularly of his use of 
exhortation, the Clitophon actually helps us to draw out more clearly 
the distinction between an unreflective form of exhortation, which is 
almost certainly the target of the author’s criticism, and the kind that 
we see Sokrates use in the dialogues. Indeed, if one looks to the 
dialogues then one sees that Sokrates wastes little time in explicit 
exhortation. The main problem with exhortation of this sort is that it 
is entirely uncritical, like the exhortations one finds in poetry it does 
not tell people why they must be virtuous and still less what virtue is. 
Indeed, questions such as these would render explicit exhortation 
impotent. How can one exhort a person to be just if one does not 
know what justice is?51 
 
Therefore, Sokratic education must include a feature that gets people 
to question whether they do indeed understand what the virtues are, 
and this is the elenkhos.  In the Laches we are given an example of just 
this procedure. Ostensibly concerned with defining courage (andreia), 
the Laches is more interested in the nature of Sokratic education, and 
in particular how it differs from its two main rivals, traditional and 
sophistic education.  
 
In the Laches, Lysimakhos and Melesias call upon Nikias, Lakhes, and 
Sokrates to give educational advice in respect to their sons, Aristeides 
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and Thukydides. That Lysimakhos and Melesias feel compelled to 
ask others for advice on how to raise their sons is revealing. 
According to the Meno, and with obvious irony, we are told that 
Lysimakhos and Melesias had received the finest education that 
Athens could offer, and yet despite this neither was able to excel their 
neighbours in virtue let alone match the achievements of their 
famous fathers.52 However, in the Laches both men complain of how 
their fathers did not properly attend to their education, and do not 
want the same fate to befall their own sons.  
 
However, as poorly educated men themselves, neither Lysimakhos 
nor Melesias feel sufficiently confident in their judgement to be able 
to take make the important decisions regarding their sons’ further 
education. This speaks volumes about the education that the boys 
have already received; it is clear that neither father thinks that it was 
sufficient to enable their children to become virtuous. 
 
Importantly, however, Lysimakhos and Melesias are painfully aware 
of their own shortcomings (an important first step in one’s 
susceptibility to Sokratic education), and concerned that their sons 
will turn out more like them than their more illustrious fathers they 
are motivated to call upon ‘expert’ advice. Therefore, despite their 
own experiences both men retain some hope that there could be an 
educational solution. 
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This solution comes in the form of hoplomakhia (literally ‘fighting in 
armour’), a new form of military training pioneered by Stesilaus 
(Laches 183c9). Therefore, Lysimakhos and Melesias invite Nikias and 
Lakhes to watch this new training technique, to see if they think it 
would be suitable for their sons.  
 
Both Nikias and Laches are all too ready to give their advice. As 
something of an educational progressive, Nikias has no doubt that 
hoplomakhia would be of educational benefit, and that, among other 
things, it would be useful for the inculcation of andreia (181d10-
182d6).53 Lakhes, however, holds a more traditional view of warfare, 
and hence of the nature of courage; and he does not think therefore 
that fighting in armour would be of much value (182d8-184c8).54 
Much of their response to the question of the usefulness of 
hoplomakhia is based on their attitudes towards educational expertise 
but more particularly on their differing understanding of the nature 
of courage.  
 
Since Nikas and Lakhes are at odds in respect to the efficacy of 
hoplomakhia, at the request of Lysimakhos, they now look to Sokrates 
to cast the deciding vote. Typically, of course, Sokrates will have none 
of it; this matter cannot be settled by vote, by majority approval, but 
only by the expert (184d5-e9).  
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The first thing to establish is the nature of educational expertise. 
Nikias is confused: is not the question in hand whether hoplomakhia 
ought to be learned or not? Fighting in armour, however, is only a 
means to an end; and it is the end that the educator must keep 
constantly in mind (185d1-3).  
 
For Sokrates the present discussion, in the broadest sense, is 
concerned with an accomplishment that is studied for the sake of 
young men’s souls (185d9-e1). In order to know whether fighting in 
armour is valuable one must first understand the nature and needs of 
the soul. So which of the present company is skilled in the ‘treatment’ 
of the soul (therapeia, 185d9; 185e3)? What Sokrates is asking, 
although he has yet to make this explicit, is which of them has any 
knowledge of virtue.  
 
Sokrates, of course, denies that he has any knowledge of virtue and 
therefore also denies that he has any educational expertise. 
Nevertheless, and with characteristic irony, he is willing to admit that 
Nikias or Lakhes may well do so, and therefore if this is the case, he 
would like them to tell him who they learned it from, or, if they came 
to this knowledge independently, to give him a display of their 
knowledge (186c6-187b8). Sokrates is asking Nikias and Lakhes to 
subject themselves to Sokratic examination.55  
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Behind Sokrates’ questioning of Nikias and Lakhes, and behind the 
Sokratic elenkhos as such, is an attack on two common assumptions 
that are often held by Sokrates’ interlocutors: (1) the interlocutors’ 
belief that they have been taught virtue; and (2) that they in turn have 
taught (or could teach) others to be virtuous. In order to undermine 
these assumptions, Sokrates has to show his interlocutors that they 
have no understanding of virtue. And, if that is shown, then they can 
no longer safely assume that they have been taught virtue or taught 
others to be virtuous (189d4-190b1). At the end of the Laches, no 
satisfactory definition of andreia is agreed upon. Therefore, the only 
remaining course of action, declares Sokrates, is for all of them to 
urgently seek out a teacher of virtue (201a2-b5). 
    
Superficially at least, Sokratic elenkhos bears some similarity with 
sophistic eristics, the art of refutation (much to Sokrates’ expense). In 
the Euthydemus, however, the only other dialogue that deals 
specifically with exhortation, the difference between eristic and 
Sokratic styles of ‘refutation’ is carefully distinguished.56  
 
In the Euthydemus the young brothers, Euthydemos and 
Dionysodoros, who at 273d8-9 claim to be able to teach virtue, are 
challenged by Sokrates to give a demonstration of this power: 
τουτονὶ τὸν νεανίσκον πείσατον, ὡς χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἀρετῆς 
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ χαριεῖσθον ἐμοί τε καὶ τουτοισὶ πᾶσι (275a5-7, 
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dynamis cf. 274d2).vi The brothers are only too happy to oblige 
Sokrates, and they proceed to examine Cleinias, who is to be the 
target of their wisdom. We should note, however, that the brothers’ 
indifferent tone is an indication of the fact that they will not be 
faithful to the remit that Sokrates has set for them. The brothers will 
not exhort Cleinias to virtue but will instead subject him to verbal 
trickery (278c6-7). In response to Euthydemos and Dionysodoros’ 
examination of Cleinias, Sokrates delivers his own protreptic display.  
 
Sokrates begins with this axiom: that all human beings wish to fare 
well (eu prattein). Then he asks: how does one fare well? The answer 
is: by possessing many good things (polla kagatha). The next question, 
inevitably, is: which things are good? Such things as wealth, health, 
good birth, talent, honour, and, moreover, sophrosunē, andreia, 
dikaiosunē, and, of course, wisdom. The greatest good, however, is 
good fortune, which, it turns out, is nothing other than wisdom. 
Having thus established (with a little too much ease and with some 
humour) that wisdom is the greatest good Sokrates takes Cleinias 
through his main argument, the main points of which can be listed 
thus: 
 
 
                                                 
vi ‘You are to persuade this young man here he ought to pursue wisdom and 
practise virtue, and by doing so you will oblige both me and all these 
present’ (trans. Michael Richard Hart).  
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1. Good (things) must be beneficial  
2. Beneficial things must be used and not merely possessed 
3. Knowledge determines correct usage 
4. Other goods (those other than wisdom) are only beneficial when 
combined with wisdom 
5. Other goods are harmful if they are not accompanied by wisdom 
but by ignorance 
6. Wisdom is good; ignorance is bad.   
7. Wisdom is teachable  
 
Conclusion: (given that everyone wishes to fare well and that wisdom 
is the greatest good and is teachable) wisdom should be pursued 
(278e5-282d5). Sokrates then says to Dionysodorus and Euthydemus: 
‘οἵων ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν προτρεπτικῶν λόγων εἶναι, τοιοῦτον, ἰδιωτικὸν 
ἴσως καὶ μόλις διὰ μακρῶν λεγόμενον’ (282d8-10).vii  
 
Sokrates has not unearthed any important truths here, all he has done 
(and despite what he says, in a very truncated form), is to place 
Cleinias in a position where he is able to state his wish to become 
wise. Whether Cleinias will go on to pursue wisdom is another 
matter. (The same thing happens to Charmides in the eponymous 
dialogue, Charmides 176a6-b5).57 
                                                 
vii ‘That is my illustration of what I desire a hortatory argument [protreptikōn 
logōn] to be – rough and ready, perhaps, and expressed at laborious length’ 
(trans. W. R. M. Lamb p.417).  
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To exhort, unlike what we hear in the Clitophon, is not merely to urge 
people to be virtuous; it constitutes an inquiry into the very nature of 
virtue itself.58 In the case of Cleinias, much work still has to be done, 
but the groundwork, at least, has been laid. Sokrates has begun the 
process of turning Cleinias away from material concerns and towards 
a concern for virtue,59 and, therefore, towards a concern for his own 
soul.60 
 
The exhortation ‘care for your soul’ is implicit within the elenkhos.61 
Hence we come back to this phrase (Laches 185d9-e5; Protagoras 
312cb7-313c3; Charmides 156b1-157c6; Alcibiades I 132c1-2; Phaedo 
82d2-3, Apology 30a2-b5; Clitophon 410d8-9).62 It is not until the 
Republic that we really understand what this means in practice. Just 
quite what the average Athenian would have thought of such an 
exhortation is unclear. In terms of the Apology, ‘care for your soul’ is 
an exhortation that is loaded with meaning and with a plea to change 
one’s life radically. It does not merely say ‘act like this’, ‘do that’, it 
says, ‘give your life to the pursuit of wisdom and virtue,’ and that 
philosophy is more important than life precisely because without it 
one cannot live well, one cannot be eudaimon. However, as Francisco J. 
Gonzalez states: ‘Socrates is claiming, not that elenctic examination in 
search of virtue promises to produce a great good for us, but rather 
that it is itself our greatest good.’63  
 
82 
 
Sokrates’ alternative education is going to rest therefore not on 
explicit exhortation, which is problematic and practically useless, but 
on the implicit exhortation embedded within the elenkhos. The point 
of the elenkhos thus understood is to get people to the stage where 
the care of their souls is their paramount concern; the actual ‘caring of 
the soul’ is achieved through philosophy, through gaining (or trying 
to gain) wisdom and hence virtue (Apology 20d7-23b9; 28e6-7; 29d3-
30b5; 36c5-11). 
 
Returning briefly to the Laches, we are given a characterisation of the 
fundamentally ethical orientation of Sokratic education:  
 
ὃς ἂν ἐγγύτατα Σωκράτους ᾖ [λόγῳ ὥσπερ γένει] καὶ πλησιάζῃ 
διαλεγόμενος, ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ περὶ ἄλλου του πρότερον 
ἄρξηται διαλέγεσθαι, μὴ παύεσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου περιαγόμενον τῷ λόγῳ, 
πρὶν <ἂν> ἐμπέσῃ εἰς τὸ διδόναι περὶ αὑτοῦ λόγον, ὅντινα τρόπον νῦν τε 
ζῇ καὶ ὅντινα τὸν παρεληλυθότα βίον βεβίωκεν: ἐπειδὰν δ᾽ ἐμπέσῃ, ὅτι 
οὐ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀφήσει Σωκράτης, πρὶν ἂν βασανίσῃ ταῦτα εὖ τε καὶ 
καλῶς ἅπαντα (Laches 187e5-9-)viii  
 
 
This, of course, is what happens in the Laches. Initially the discussion 
was about the educational efficacy of fighting in armour, and in 
particular whether this was a useful pursuit for the young. However, 
                                                 
viii ‘Whoever comes into close contact with Socrates and has any talk with 
him face to face, is bound to be drawn round and round by hm in the course 
of the argument – though it may have started at first on a quite different 
theme – and cannot stop until he is led into giving an account of the manner 
in which he now spends his days, and of the kind of life he has lived 
hitherto; and when once he has been led into that, Socrates will never let him 
go until he has thoroughly and properly put all his ways to the test’ (trans. 
W. R. M. Lamb p.37).  
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by the end of the dialogue the focus has turned away from just the 
young people in question and towards the whole party; and the 
subject under discussion is no longer fighting in armour but with life 
and how it should be lived.  
 
Sokratic education is, however, problematic, not just in respect to 
what it claims and the manner in which it proceeds but also in respect 
to what it opposes. It opposes received notions about virtue and 
about the status of teachers. By questioning conventional educational 
practices, Sokrates also undermines faith in the vivacity of his ethical 
tradition (even more so than the Sophists). If virtue cannot be taught 
in Athens, if no Athenian can be good (agathos), then what hope is 
there for the future? If Sokratic education is seen a rival to the 
standard pedagogies, and it came without any pretensions to 
wisdom, then it must be seen as dangerous and corrupting. 
Philosophers can quibble all they like about the meaning of ethical 
terms, an Athenian might say, but we must retain and promote some 
form of civic virtue, and the old notion of the kaloagathos must remain 
unscathed. If traditional education is attacked then so is the polis, 
such was the importance of paideia to the Greeks.64 
 
As we saw in the last chapter, Sokrates saw himself as a benefactor. 
His divine, educative mission, to goad Athens from its slumber, was 
nothing other than an attempt to turn the whole of the polis away 
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from material concerns and towards virtue. Uniquely, Sokratic 
education is supposed to have a positive effect even without claiming 
to teach virtue.65 Can a society that values virtue support such a 
programme? Can a polis like Athens admit that its conception of 
virtue is almost without ground and take up, as the philosopher 
would ask, the search for true virtue? Sokrates can only do so much 
to recommend his alternative educational programme, and, for the 
most part, his power to convert his fellow citizens towards his view 
of virtue is greatly diminished because of the counter-influence of 
traditional education. This is not just a problem that Sokrates faces in 
the dialogues but also one that Plato faces in writing them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Cf. Kenneth Seeskin, Dialogue and Discovery: A Study in Socratic Method, New York: 
Sate University of New York Press, 1987 (p.90). 
2 However, Sokratic education is not merely a stage in Plato’s development of a theory 
of education (although it is certainly that), one that is superseded or rejected. On this 
reading, in the fictional world of the dialogues, Sokrates is an exponent of ‘Platonic’ 
education.  
3 We shall see that the answers to these two questions are closely related, and that 
Sokrates’ scepticism regarding the possibility for the teaching of virtue is bound up 
with his more general concerns about his contemporaries’ view on the coextensive 
nature of virtue and the particularities of Athenian citizenship.  
4 Aristotle, Politics 1337a11-20. 
5 ‘For the classical period, it is difficult to talk about a purely “passive” meaning of 
Politeia, that is, as an abstract legal status, because Greek citizenship was defined by 
the active participation of the citizen in public life’ (Philip Brook Manville, The 
Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, 
p.5). 
6 ‘In short, citizenship was membership in the Athenian polis, with all that this 
implied – a legal status, but also the more intangible aspects of the life of the citizen 
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particular, one might expect freedom and equality – the hallmarks of the Athenian 
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respect for social hierarchy; the assembly is to direct Athenian policy, yet individuals 
members may be inexperienced, uneducated, unused to responsibility’ (Cynthia 
Farrar, The Origins of Democratic Thinking: The Invention of Politics in Classical Athens, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p.27).  
11 ‘The absence of property qualification for the exercise of citizenship rights was a 
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Gonzalez, “The Socratic Elenchus as Constructive Protreptic,” Does Socrates Have A 
Method? Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato’s Dialogues and Beyond, ed. Gary Alan Scott, 
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presumably being a factor); (2) and it is, therefore, following the liberal conception of 
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the formation breaks and a hoplite is forced to fight independently. This is a rather 
Homeric notion, and is not strictly speaking in keeping with the ethos of hoplite 
battle and the close order of the phalanx (a point with Lakhes picks up on later); (5) 
another benefit is that it leads to other related skills; it is seen by Nikias as a stepping 
stone to other techniques associated with warfare; (6) and, most crucially, it makes a 
person ‘bolder and braver (andreios)’ in war; (7) and finally, it makes the hoplite look 
more impressive in battle, and therefore more terrifying (providing, as Lakhes says, 
he doesn’t end up making a fool out of himself). 
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really the way for young men to be spending their time if they want to acquire the 
qualities of the elder Thucydides and Aristeides’ (T. H. Irwin, “Common Sense and 
the Socratic Method,” Method in Ancient Philosophy, ed. Jyl Gentzler, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998, p.39). Lakhes’ first point is not particularly strong. If, he says, 
hoplomakhia were an accomplishment, then surely the Spartans would have taken 
notice of it and employed it, but since they have not, and the supposed experts in 
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account. However, the Spartans would be the last people on earth to take anyone’s 
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283a-284c). Therefore, just because it is not employed by the Spartans it does not 
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seen such an expert with his own eyes, and he struck him as a ridiculous figure – if 
the expert could expose himself to ridicule in this way then god help his pupils. 
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and not the expertise. 
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befitting an amateur follower of Sokrates, does know what to expect (and he shows 
courage therefore, since he ‘dares’ to go into battle against Sokrates). Nikias’ 
willingness to submit to the Sokratic method has a touch of arrogance behind it, and 
not without merit, for, as we will see, Nikias thinks he has a secret weapon. Lakhes, 
however, is not well acquainted with Sokrates or his method of questioning (so much 
for his earlier recommendation we might say!). But as long as Sokrates’ words 
conform to his deeds he is happy to proceed. Indeed, Lakhes does not know what 
this will entail. Sokrates may have been forced to retreat from Delium, but he will not 
retreat from Nikias or Lakhes, on the contrary, it is they who will be forced to give 
way (Lakhes will not be able to remain at his post). It is telling that it is Nikias who is 
the more prepared of the two generals, and that Lakhes is at a disadvantage, for that 
is in keeping with both their views on the impact that skill and forethought have 
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56 This dialogue, as Sling points out, is not a protreptic dialogue, but a dialogue about 
protreptic (Sling, Plato: Clitophon, p.148). 
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57 ‘ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί᾽, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ᾽ εἰ ἔχω οὔτ᾽ εἰ μὴ ἔχω: 
πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἰδείην ὅ γε μηδ᾽ ὑμεῖς οἷοί τέ ἐστε ἐξευρεῖν ὅτι ποτ᾽ ἔστιν, ὡς φῂς σύ; 
ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι, καὶ ἐμαυτόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάνυ οἶμαι δεῖσθαι 
τῆς ἐπῳδῆς, καὶ τό γ᾽ ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐπᾴδεσθαι ὑπὸ σοῦ ὅσαι ἡμέραι, ἕως ἂν 
φῇς σὺ ἱκανῶς ἔχειν.’ (‘Why, upon my word, Sokrates, I do not know at all whether 
I have it or have it not [temperance]. For how can I know, when even you two are 
unable to discover what this thing is? So you say, but of this you do not at all 
convince me; and I quite believe, Sokrates, that I do need the charm, and for my part 
I have no objection to being charmed by you every day of my life, until you say I 
have had enough of the treatment’ (trans. W. R. M. Lamb p.89).  
58 ‘He [Plato] reduces the true Socratic method to two main devices: exhortation 
(protrepikos) and examination (elenchos). Both are couched in the form of questions. 
The question-form is a descendant of the oldest type of parainesis, or encouragement, 
which we can trace back through tragedy to the epic’ (Werner Jaeger, Paideia: the 
Ideals of Greek Culture, Volume II: In Search of the Divine Centre, trans. Gilbert Highet, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1945, p.37). 
59 ‘Elenchus is precisely the means by which Socrates attempts to turn the Athenians 
away from their excessive concern with material goods to a concern for virtue. 
Through its ability to expose their ignorance, the elenchus is the most effective means 
of persuading the Athenians to look after their souls. Both Clitophon’s critique of 
Socrates’ practice and Socrates’ own reflection on this practice in the Apology are 
therefore not in conflict with what Socrates does in other dialogues: both simply 
make explicit what is only implicit elsewhere: the protreptic function of the elenchus. 
Socrates indeed “merely exhorts,” but his primary means of exhortation is the 
elenchus’ (Francisco J. Gonzalez, “The Socratic Elenchus as Constructive Protreptic,” 
Does Socrates Have A Method? Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato’s Dialogues and Beyond, 
ed. Gary Alan Scott, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002 
(pp.166-167). 
60 Roslyn Weiss, “Socrates: Seeker or Preacher,” A Companion to Socrates, ed. Sara 
Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, p.249. 
61 Sling, Plato: Clitophon (pp.144-145). 
62 It is clear from the Apology that what Sokrates is primarily exhorting people to do is 
to care for their souls (is that done through philosophy?) – ‘for I go about doing 
nothing else than urging you (peithōn), young and old, not to care for your persons or 
your property more than for the perfection of your souls ’ (30a8-b1, trans. W. R. M. 
Lamb p.109). We get a glimpse of what this means later at 36c5-9: ‘For I tried to 
persuade (peithein) each of you to care for himself and his own perfection in goodness 
and wisdom rather than for any of his belonging’ (trans.W. R. M. Lamb p.129). 
63 ‘Socrates makes the boy [Clinias] dialectical by doing nothing more than turning 
him towards the pursuit of wisdom and virtue. The benefit here is accomplished 
entirely through protreptic or exhortation’ (Gonzalez, “The Socratic Elenchus as 
Constructive Protreptic,” p.177, cf. p.180). 
64 ‘Education is such a natural and universal function of society that many 
generations accept and transmit it without question or discussion: thus the first 
mention of it in the literature is relatively late. Its content is roughly the same in 
every nation – it is both moral and practical. Its consists partly of commandments 
like Honour the gods, Honour thy father and mother, Respect the stranger; partly of ancient 
rules of practical wisdom and prescriptions of external morality; and partly of those 
professional skills and traditions which (as far as they are communicable from one 
generation to another) the Greeks named technē’ (Werner Jaeger, Paideia: the Ideals of 
Greek Culture, Volume I: Archaic Greece, The Mind of Athens, trans. Gilbert Highet, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1945, p.3). 
65 Sokrates’ seeming scepticism was confused with Sophistic relativism.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Character Education 
 
Education is the tendency of one man to make another just like himself1 
 
As we learn in the Republic, both through the course of the argument 
and through the example of Sokrates and his interlocutors, 
philosophy or the pursuit of wisdom requires a very distinctive 
character, a person who is both thoughtful and dogged, a person who, 
although not strictly speaking virtuous, has the necessary qualities or 
dispositions that, providing they have a reasonable amount of 
intelligence, may become so. In the ideal polis of the Republic this is 
only possible once the guardians have received their character 
education, for it is this which makes it possible for some of them to go 
on to become philosopher rulers.   
 
Therefore, even though for Plato philosophy may be largely an 
intellectual pursuit, requiring a certain attitude to learning, it is also 
one that requires not merely character but ‘good character,’ and this 
applies to the philosopher no matter where he may find him or 
herself. But can a meaningful notion of character be taught and 
developed in imperfect societies?  
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For Plato it depends not only on the form and content of education 
but also on its medium; in a society like 4th Century B.C. Athens or 
21st Century A.D. England moral or character education can only be 
effective, Plato would seem to suggest, if it operates entirely as a 
private enterprise. Importantly, however, it would also require that 
the centrality of character and virtue and their relationship with the 
soul is taken seriously.  
 
Despite the re-emergence of virtue ethics,2 the language of virtues 
and character is largely absent from contemporary moral education, 
especially in the United Kingdom. This, as we saw in the 
Introduction, is due to various factors, not least the inability in a 
diverse society to come to a common agreement as to what sort of 
conception of good character should be promoted.  Before a society 
can even think of educating character it must know precisely what it 
is seeking to educate. Virtue terms can be found in the National 
Curriculum, in subjects such as PSHE and Citizenship Education, but 
they are introduced with little critical reflection, and they play no 
significant role in the aims and objectives of these subjects and how 
they are taught. For us, unlike the Greeks, ‘good character’ is a rather 
nebulous term.   
 
As I discussed in Chapter Two, a Spartan or an Athenian would have 
had a reasonably clear understanding of good character; and it was 
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one that was almost exclusively framed within the context of 
citizenship. The inclusivity of ancient societies such as classical 
Athens and Sparta, and the relatively small size of such communities, 
meant that individuals could be more confident in their ability to 
define good character.  
 
Today, however, we tend to resist national stereotypes, and we 
would not, in the post-war period at least, be comfortable with 
talking about a ‘British type.’ The difficulty that we have in speaking 
about what it means to be British has little to do with political 
correctness, but rather with the British citizen’s genuine struggle to 
define his or her national and cultural identity. The call for a debate 
on the issue of national identity and ‘Britishness’ by the previous 
government has done little to address the problem; indeed, perhaps 
the days where one could speak about distinctively ‘British virtues’ 
(tolerance and fair-play for instance) are over, and perhaps with good 
reason:  ‘the idea that there were antique virtues which will generally 
be accepted and which can be recaptured is naïve, but common, in 
middle-aged and elderly individuals and civilizations.’3  
 
In light of this, as Peter McPhail argued over thirty years ago, maybe 
it would be better to stay away from the notion of character, being as 
it is largely unmanageable and, to some degree, redundant, and 
adopt a new approach to moral education where the chief focus is 
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with what kind of world our children are to live in and what 
conditions make for a happier, healthier, and more fulfilling life.4 This 
is, in fact, the position that moral education finds itself in today. 
However, the language and goals that McPhail endorses are in no 
way inconsistent with a ‘moral’ vocabulary that includes a term like 
‘character.’ However, and even before getting into what we 
understand as ‘good’ character, the term ‘character’ itself and the 
ways in which it can be used must be made clear.  
 
The best way into this issue is to make a series of distinctions, and 
here I follow R. S. Peters’ excellent analysis from his Moral 
Development and Moral Education.5 Peters identifies three ways in 
which we can speak about character. First, there is the common, ‘non-
committal’ use of character, that is, as a term that we use to refer to 
the ‘sum total’ of a person’s character traits. Second, we can speak of 
‘character types,’ by which ‘some distinctive pattern of traits is 
indicated or some distinctive style in which the traits are exhibited,’ 
the spirited type for example. Third, we can say that a person ‘has 
character,’ and this refers not to specific traits or groups of traits but 
to a certain strength of character: ‘when we talk of a person’s character 
a trait like honesty springs to mind; but when we speak of a man as 
having character, it is something like integrity, incorruptibility or 
consistency.’6 Hence: 
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Character-traits, in the first and non-committal sense of character, could be 
merely the imprint of the social code on a man. Such a man, like the 
Spartans, could behave consistently in a particular social group; but when he 
went abroad he would fall an easy victim to the corrupting influences of 
potentates, priests and profligates…But a man who has character, in this 
third sense, would have developed his own distinctive style of rule-
following. This would involve consistency and integrity.7 
 
 
The foundation of character, says Kant, ‘consists in the firm 
resolution of the will to do something, and then in the actual 
execution of it.’8 Virtue, for Kant, was closely linked to this idea that 
character was in some sense a propensity to direct one’s will towards 
the enactment and completion of moral duties: ‘virtue is the strength 
of a human being’s maxims in fulfilling his duty.’9 James Davison 
Hunter, as we saw in the Introduction, defines character (or ‘good 
character’) in much the same way. ‘Good character’ is synonymous 
with, for the majority of people, and scholars like Hunter, the term 
‘having character’, that is, in the sense of Peter’s rule-following 
person of integrity. As Hunter points out, this is how Plato 
understands the kind of role that good character plays in the ideal 
polis. Indeed, Plato sees moral education as having to accommodate 
all three of these senses of character.  
 
In this chapter, ‘Good character’ (which Plato has various ways of 
expressing) means, for the person whom I understand as using it, 
‘virtuous’.10 It remains the case, of course, that for Plato ‘good 
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character’ and virtue are not identical to ‘good character’ and virtue 
for, say, Kephalos or Thrasymakhos.  
 
Outside of the ideal polis, however, character education of the sort 
envisioned in the Republic would, in its entirety, be impossible. For in 
the perfect community character education has a focus and 
singularity of purpose that moral education in modern schools 
cannot have, and it also has the benefit of having no rivals: it is run in 
the state for the state. But what of the dialogues, could these not 
serve, in perhaps a greatly reduced sense, to train a person’s character 
and to make them the kind of person that would pursue virtue? 
Considering the age of Plato’s audience, this is unlikely. Character is 
formed early in a person’s life. And whilst it is true that Plato seems 
to see character, as with everything else, as subject to change, he 
would see fundamental changes in an adult’s character (a change 
from tyrannical to philosophical for example) as being improbable.11  
 
However, and as I shall discuss at the end of this chapter, it is not so 
much that the dialogues function to train a person’s character 
(although in a limited capacity this may remain a possibility) but 
rather to test it, as Sokrates himself tests the character of his 
interlocutors through his discussions with them. Before that, 
however, I shall begin in the first section by exploring the role that 
character plays in the overall shape and argument of the Republic. In 
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section two, I shall discuss Plato’s character ideal – the thoughtful yet 
dynamic philosopher – before moving on in section three to examine 
how, in the educational programme of the guardians, Plato thinks 
that such a character could in principle be created.  
 
§1 
 
Character Themes in the Republic 
 
In Greek there are numerous terms that can be used when speaking 
about character, disposition, and habit.12 Plato generally (but not 
exclusively) employs words such as τρόπος, sometimes translated as 
‘character’, ‘manner’ or ‘way,’ depending on the context, ἦθος to 
denote ‘character’ or, occasionally, ‘disposition,’ ἔθος to mean habit, 
and ἕξις meaning ‘condition’ (usually in the context of the condition 
of the soul) or, again, and more typically, ‘disposition.’ The word 
τρόπος is used 13 times (in the sense which we are interested in), 
ἦθος, by far the most common, appears 33 times, ἔθος, far less 
regular, 8 times, and lastly ἕξις, which makes an appearance 10 times 
(the use of words that denote character traits is far more numerous).13 
    
This in itself, of course, means very little. But what we shall find is 
that Plato pays close attention to character terms in the Republic, and 
this is because of the close relationship between character and soul.14 
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This relationship between character and soul is not only very close 
but it is also rather problematic. I shall have more to say about this in 
Chapter Five. All I wish to do in this section, before proceeding to 
discuss Plato’s ideal character, is to make a few brief points 
concerning the relationship between character and soul in the 
Republic as well as to show how the subject of character, just as much 
as that of the soul (indeed, the two complement each other), plays an 
important role in the overall ethical framework of the dialogue. I 
understand the ethical and educative framework of the Republic to be 
dominated by (but not limited to) an examination of human virtue 
and the chief human virtue in particular, that is, dikaiosunē (justice). 
And it is within this context, i.e., in Plato’s examination of human 
virtue, that character plays a significant role. One of Plato’s concerns 
in the Republic, I would argue, is to try and make the relationship 
between character/character traits and the soul/faculties more 
explicit. Plato does this primarily in order to show that character is 
subordinate to the condition of the soul and its faculties and that a 
full understanding of character is dependent upon a full 
understanding of the soul. To educate character, therefore, one must 
first understand the nature of the soul.  
    
The subject of character, and specifically good and bad character, is 
raised at nearly every level of the argument right through the Republic 
(effectively ending in book 10 at 621c6); and even though some 
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scholars have noted its importance it is generally overlooked.15 I. M. 
Crombie is the only one, to my mind, who has not only understood 
its relevance to eudaimonia, but also, and by implication, its relevance 
to justice. According to Crombie, the Republic’s central question ‘what 
is justice?’ is 
 
an attempt to achieve insight into the pattern of character the value of which 
has been implicitly recognised by common morality in the application of the 
laudatory expression ‘just’ to those men who tend to behave in characteristic 
ways, and that the purpose of asking the question is to put himself into the 
position in which he can decide what precisely the pattern of character is 
which deserves to be valued in this way.16 
 
 
I think this view is broadly correct.17 However, as C. D. C. Reeve 
suggests, there is more going on here. For Reeve the challenge that 
Kephalos poses to Sokrates is this: that a man can appear to be 
virtuous without having ever studied philosophy, and hence without 
actually knowing, at least for Sokrates, what the virtues are.18  
 
It is a problem that is raised at various times in the dialogue, most 
memorably in the myth of Er. Here, Plato revisits the notion of the 
decent (epieikeia) man, a man, as we shall see, like Kephalos, who has 
lived a ‘virtuous’ life without philosophy, and precisely because of his 
lack of philosophical insight, chooses to be reincarnated as a tyrant (a 
clear indication that a conventionally ‘virtuous’ person, no less than 
the unconventional, would see such a life as appealing). One’s notion 
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of what constitutes good character will shape one’s view about what 
justice is and what the parameters of just actions are.  
 
It is Kephalos who first raises the issue of character (tropos) early on 
in book 1 of the Republic (329d4).19 Character, says Kephalos, is useful 
in respect to those matters ‘πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους’ (329d3).i Moreover, 
Kephalos argues that character is the most pertinent factor in respect 
to whether one is able to bear the miseries of old age (329d4). If one is 
‘κόσμιοι καὶ εὔκολοι,’ then, like Sophokles perhaps, one is more able 
to come to terms with the burdens of old age. However, the 
usefulness of good character is not restricted to the elderly; it is 
decisive for all the stages of a person’s life (330d7-8).  
 
Indeed, it is through this discussion of character that the theme of 
justice is introduced. The just man (the one who is honest and repays 
his debts), is a man of decent (epieikeia) character; a man who uses his 
wealth sensibly, and lives an orderly and well mannered life. 
Kephalos’ understanding of what it means to be just is framed solely 
in terms of what he thinks of as good character.20 The deficiency of 
Kephalos’ position is quite clear. Despite what he says about the kind 
of character that is likely to be just and avoid wrongdoing, it is clear 
that, according to Kephalos, poverty would impinge on the ἐπιείκής 
                                                 
i ‘that concern relatives’ (trans. Bloom p.5). 
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person’s ability to refrain from injustice: the ἐπιείκής person is not 
self-sufficient in respect to his capacity to be just. 
 
The ἐπιείκής person, in the figure of Kephalos, has been found 
wanting in respect to his understanding of justice and to his 
argumentative powers; and although Polemarkhos attempts to rescue 
his father’s definition, he too is eventually refuted. Now is the time 
for a more robust contribution to the question of the nature of justice, 
one given by a more uncompromising individual, Thrasymakhos.21 
 
The polite exchange between Sokrates and Polemarkhos enrages 
Thrasymakhos, who is used to people forcing their views on others; 
argument for him is combative like his temperament.22  Therefore, 
and with conduct hardly becoming of a ἐπιείκής man, Thrasymakhos 
pounces: ‘ὑμᾶς πάλαι φλυαρία ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες; καὶ τί εὐηθίζεσθε 
πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑποκατακλινόμενοι ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς;’ (336c1-2).ii 
 
The term εὐήθεια, used here for the first time, is Thrasymakhos’ 
contribution to the development of the theme character in the 
dialogue. The word εὐήθεια literary means ‘well disposed’ or ‘good-
natured’ but in the above context, as was fairly common, the meaning 
is closer to ‘foolish’, ‘naïve’ or ‘innocent.’23 For Thrasymakhos the 
                                                 
ii ‘What is this nonsense that has possessed you for so long, Sokrates? And why do 
you act like fools making way for one another?’ (trans. Bloom p.13). Compare with 
Critias’ impatience in the Charmides 162c1-7.  
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εὐήθης man is the just man, a good-natured fool like Kephalos or 
Polemarkhos. The discussion between Sokrates and Polemarkhos was 
altogether too polite for Thrasymakhos’ liking, but it is the manner of 
Sokrates’ victory over Polemarkhos that so annoys the sophist. 
Sokrates’ refusal to answer questions himself, his characteristic irony, 
are all methods, so Thrasymakhos has it, of gaining an unfair (and 
unjust) victory over an innocent and inexperienced opponent.24  
 
It is clear from what follows, however, that Thrasymakhos actually 
endorses such behaviour. The unjust man has no scruples; in 
Thrasymakhos’ polis men like Polemarkhos would receive some 
pretty rough treatment.25 In the revolution of ethics that 
Thrasymakhos is proposing, simple, noble character would be swept 
aside:26  
 
δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄντι, τοῦ κρείττονός τε 
καὶ ἄρχοντος συμφέρον, οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος 
βλάβη, ἡ δὲ ἀδικία τοὐναντίον, καὶ ἄρχει τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐηθικῶν τε καὶ 
δικαίων, οἱ δ' ἀρχόμενοι ποιοῦσιν τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον κρείττονος ὄντος, 
καὶ εὐδαίμονα ἐκεῖνον ποιοῦσιν ὑπηρετοῦντες αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ οὐδ' 
ὁπωστιοῦν (Republic 343c3-d1)iii 
 
 
                                                 
iii ‘Justice and the just are really someone else’s good, the advantage of the 
man who is stronger and rules, and a personal harm to the man who obeys 
and serves. Injustice is the opposite, and it rules the truly simple and just; 
and those who are ruled do what is advantageous for him who is stronger, 
and they make him whose whim they serve happy but themselves not at all’ 
(trans. Bloom p.21).  
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If Sokrates cannot grasp this, if he cannot understand this reality, 
then he too, like the just man, is εὐήθεια.27 The just man 
inadvertently serves the unjust, in so far as the unjust man exploits 
every situation to his advantage.28 The just man, on the contrary, 
‘gives way,’ and hence he loses out in every respect, both in public 
(πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, 343d7) and private (οἰκείοις, 343e3). The political 
manifestation of the unjust man, injustice on a polis wide scale, is 
tyranny:29 ‘ἣ οὐ κατὰ σμικρὸν τἀλλότρια καὶ λάθρᾳ καὶ βίᾳ 
ἀφαιρεῖται, καὶ ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια καὶ ἴδια καὶ δημόσια, ἀλλὰ 
συλλήβδην’ (344a8-344b1).iv  
  
Unsurprisingly, therefore, Thrasymakhos rejects Kephalos’ account of 
a person’s motivation in being just, ‘οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα ἀλλὰ 
τὸ πάσχειν φοβούμενοι ὀνειδίζουσιν οἱ ὀνειδίζοντες τὴν ἀδικίαν’ 
(344c3-4).v It is not fear of what happens to one’s soul (or to oneself 
after death), but what might happen to one here and now and the 
consequences of human punishment. The just person refrains from 
injustice because he fears the earthly consequences.30  
 
In the polis of good men (πόλις ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, 347d2),31 Sokrates 
reintroduces the ἐπιείκεια man (347c6),32 who is now identified with 
                                                 
iv ‘Which by stealth and force takes away what belongs to others, both what 
is sacred and profane, private and public, not bit by bit, but all at once’ 
(trans. Bloom p.22).   
v ‘For it is not because they fear doing unjust deeds, but because they fear 
suffering them, that those who blame injustice do so’ (trans. Bloom p.23).  
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the reluctant ruler. Thrasymakhos maintains that the just person is a 
good-natured fool (348c10), while the unjust person is a sound 
counsellor (εὐβουλίαν, 348c10), and not κᾰκοήθεια (of bad 
character)33 as Sokrates naturally supposes (348d1). Sokrates has a 
challenge on his hands (348e4-6). The ἐπιείκεια man like Kephalos 
does not seek to have more than his fair share, unlike the unjust man, 
who is characterised by his πλεονεξία (349b-350c). In any case, 
anyone who does not look after their own interests is εὐήθεια or, in 
modern parlance, a loser (349b5). 
 
However, it is Thrasymakhos who is shown to be the fool we might 
say, when he blushes in shame at his defeat (350d4). Thrasymakhos 
has shown himself to be naïve in argument; he was unable to compete 
with Sokrates, therefore the just fool got the better of the unjust man. 
Henceforth, Thrasymakhos mocks the Sokratic style (350e2-8), as he 
did at 336bc1-d6.  
 
The course of the argument, however, is ultimately unsatisfactory; it 
is not enough to refute Thrasymakhos,34 since Sokrates admits that he 
is still in the dark about what justice is, in such a case: ‘σχολῇ 
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εἴσομαι εἴτε ἀρετή τις οὖσα τυγχάνει εἴτε καὶ οὔ, καὶ πότερον ὁ 
ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐκ εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν ἢ εὐδαίμων’ (354c2-4).vi  
 
Glaukon picks up Thrasymakhos’ comparison between the perfectly 
unjust man (τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν, 344a4) and the just man in the 
strongest sense, that is, when considered without external benefit 
(360e1-361d4). The perfectly unjust man (τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν, 
361a7) gets the benefits of a just reputation, while the just man (also 
following the Thrasymakhean pattern) is ‘ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον’ 
(361b7).vii 
 
Despite their robust attack on justice neither Glaukon nor 
Adeimantos is convinced that injustice is superior, and if Sokrates 
was not sure of their character35 he might, through the power of their 
arguments, be led to think otherwise (368b1-4). Taking this as his cue, 
Sokrates begins his defence of justice. 
 
It is, perhaps, too late for the likes of Kephalos (or for Polemarkhos, 
who is very much his father’s son), who, at his age and with his lack 
of sophistication, is unlikely to either understand or countenance the 
theory of human virtue that Sokrates will go on to outline. Kephalos’ 
                                                 
vi ‘So long as I do not know what the just is, I shall hardly know whether it is 
a virtue or not and whether the one who has it is unhappy or happy’ (trans. 
Bloom p.34).  
vii ‘simple and noble’ (trans. Bloom p.39). Cf. 348b8-d9. 
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decent but unphilosophical life has not made him the ideal 
participant in Sokratic inquiry or education.36 What Sokrates needs 
are younger, more philosophically minded men, young men, 
moreover, with not only an ability to learn but with ambition, men 
who are both spirited and philosophical. But what is it about these 
characteristics, especially spiritedness, which makes them so 
important for the pursuit of virtue? 
 
§2 
 
Warp and Woof: The Fabric of Good Character 
 
οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις οὔτ᾿ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἀνδρίαν 
ἀκολουθοῦσαν τοῖς ἀγριωτάτοις, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῖς ἡμερωτέροις καὶ 
λεοντώδεσιν ἤθεσιν (Politics 1338b17-20)viii 
 
γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, ἀγριώτατον ἡμερωτάτῳ (Sophist 231a6)ix 
 
The ideal guardians of the soon to be ideal polis must possess two 
key characteristics, those qualities that in combination will make 
them best able to perform their job. The guardians, states Sokrates, 
must be both philosophical and spirited, both gentle and harsh (Republic 
376c3-5). Why does Sokrates see the combination of these qualities in 
                                                 
viii ‘For neither in the lower animals nor in the case of foreign races do we see 
that that courage goes with the wildest, but rather with the gentler and lion-
like temperaments’ (trans. H. Rackham p.624). 
ix ‘…and a wolf is very like a dog, the wildest like the tamest of animals’ 
(trans. Harold North Fowler p.317).  
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particular as being important? Indeed, Glaukon’s puzzlement is not 
at all surprising (375e8-376a1). However, on the surface Sokrates’ 
reasoning is quite simple. As both soldiers and ‘peace-keepers’ the 
guardians must be trained to respond, almost by instinct, in the 
appropriate way to friends and enemies.37 Far from being the 
ferocious beasts that Aristotle claims them to be,38 these noble 
puppies will be the ideal hoplites, peaceable at home and 
indefatigable on the battlefield (375a1-2; 375d6-e2; 375c1-3). As 
Sokrates observes at 375c4-6, however, it is extremely difficult to 
successfully combine in the same person these apparently contrary 
qualities.  
 
A concern of Plato’s in the Republic, we might say, and one that forms 
much of the sub-text to the education of the guardians, is with the 
creation of individuals who are neither too Spartan nor too Athenian,39 
but who must somehow embody the best of both (and reject the 
worst of both).40 This ‘Athenian-Spartan blend’41 will have the 
requisite physical attributes and a positive attitude towards 
philosophy and learning (376b10-c5). The paradigm, as we learn in at 
543a4-6, is with guardians who excel at both philosophy and war.42 
Therefore, the implicit background in books 2 and 3 of the Republic is 
Plato’s observations and reservations about the Spartan43 and 
Athenian societies and, in particular, their systems of education.44 
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The main problem with the Spartan type regime is its fear of wisdom 
and its predilection for war (547e1-548a2). Although training one’s 
citizens for war is, for any polis, undoubtedly useful, if it is pursued 
too rigorously it is apt to make its people overly savage (the Spartans 
were, for instance, notoriously brutal to their slave population, the 
Helots, 375b9-10).45 Where the Spartan type does get top marks is 
with his tameness to his fellow citizens and his obedience to his rulers 
(548e4-549b3).46 The Spartan type is ‘φίλαρχος δὲ καὶ φιλότιμος, οὐκ 
ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγειν ἀξιῶν ἄρχειν οὐδ’ ἀπὸ τοιούτου οὐδενός, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ 
ἔργων τῶν τε πολεμικῶν καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ πολεμικά, 
φιλογυμναστής τέ τις ὢν καὶ φιλόθηρος’ (549a4-6).x However, this 
alone is not enough. The problem stems, as always with Plato, with 
education.47 The Spartan education is one of force; they neglect music 
and philosophy, preferring to rely almost exclusively on gymnastics 
(548b6-c1),48 hence the most distinctive feature of Spartan life is its 
love of honour and victories (548c6).49 The Spartiate is still a lover of 
music and hearing, as Plutarch confirms,50 but he is adept at neither.51 
 
While it is said that the Spartan type regime is a mixture of good and 
bad (548c3),52 Sokrates’ account of democratic Athens, however, is 
largely negative, sometimes perversely so. If the guardians must also 
be part Athenian then what part does Sokrates have in mind? The 
                                                 
x ‘A lover of ruling and of honor, not basing his claim to rule on speaking or 
anything of that sort, but on warlike deeds and everything connected with 
war; he is a lover of gymnastic and the hunt’ (trans. Bloom p.226).  
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Spartans were not a philosophical people,53 and that is precisely what 
the guardians must be (375e8-9),54 and this naturally leads us to think 
that it will be Athens that will supply this vital ingredient.  
 
However, democracy and the democratic man are hardly 
characterized by Sokrates as having an excessively philosophical pre-
disposition. Rather, democratic Athens and the democratic man are 
characterized by their love of freedom, free speech, and license 
(exousia), according to which each person is free to live their personal 
lives as they wish (557b4-8). Due to this, and the variety of people 
who occupy it, democracy appears to be the fairest regime (557c1-10). 
And because it contains all the species of regimes, it is, rather 
ironically, the perfect place in which to organize, and perhaps 
establish, a polis (557d1-e, an indication, perhaps, that the Kallipolis 
would be realised in a democracy).55  There is one sense in which the 
Athenian resembles the philosopher, and that is in respect to their 
unquenchable thirst for sights and sounds, as we learn in book 5 
(476b2-4). We also learn at 435e5-436a1, and with some irony, that the 
Athenians are noted for their love of learning. 
 
At 561b9-d10 we get this picture of the Athenian type: he is a man of 
many desires, sometimes drinking and listening to the aulos, 
sometimes abstaining from alcohol and going to the gymnasium, 
sometimes remaining idle, and sometimes engaging in philosophy or 
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politics, sometimes admiring the soldier, sometimes the business 
man.56 This is, in part, a caricature of the Athenian gentleman, and 
particularly of the Athenian ideal endorsed by Perikles.57 Of course 
what Plato does here is to make the Athenian character distinct in its 
indistinctness; to be an Athenian is, in effect, to demonstrate the 
qualities of all peoples. In terms of character, the Athenian is a jack of 
all trades and master of none.58 But it is precisely this flexibility that 
interests Plato. The Athenian is the woof to the Spartan warp. What 
the Athenian character can also offer is an antidote to Spartan 
aggression; it also offers a greater breadth of mind and willingness to 
learn.59 The Athenian is not philosophical as such but does have 
certain qualities that, given the right tutelage, could be turned 
towards a more noble cause.  
 
It is not only in the Republic that Plato shows this fascination with this 
type of character. In the Statesman and the Laws the Sparthenian (as we 
might call him) makes a return.   
 
The weaving analogy of the Statesman (introduced at 279a7-b7) 
reinforces what in the Republic is only hinted at.60 The fundamental 
opposition (the warp and woof of human dispositions which the 
statesman must weave together) in the Politicus is between ἀνδρεία 
and σωφροσύνη and their associated character traits (305b1-311c8; 
306c9-b2). Broadly speaking, there are two types of people or 
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character, the quick and acute and the gentle and orderly (306c7-307c7). 
Each type has its own set of traits, the quick or acute type is typically 
quick of body, soul (psukhē), and voice; it is on the basis of these traits 
that a person is commonly called courageous (andreios). The gentle or 
orderly type is more restrained and cautious in his actions, he is the 
model of decorum. To possess these traits is an indication of 
temperance (sōphrosunē).  
 
These traits, and the actions that typically follow from them, 
however, are often praiseworthy, but not always. To a degree, 
quickness to rage may be desirable on the battlefield, but not so in a 
domestic argument. Conversely, the gentle man’s approach to a 
minor dispute is laudable, but gentleness in defending one’s home 
and hearth against a deadly threat could be considered perverse. 
Therefore, each of these types, in respect to the strength of their traits, 
has their own failings or vices. The quick or acute type can be too 
quick and too hard; such people are prone to violence and madness; 
and the gentle type is liable to be cowardly, slow, and sluggish (A 
similar opposition between the quick and the slow is explored in the 
Charmides, 159b1-160d2). Those who incline towards orderliness tend 
to mind their own business perhaps a little too much (αὐτῶν 
πράττοντες, Statesman 307e4).61 Hence, the meeker aspects of the 
gentle type can lead the state from freedom to slavery (308a1-2). And 
in turn, the aggressive tendencies of the quick type can lead the state 
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into either war or internal slavery. In both cases, the result is, as it is 
for the ideal polis of the Republic, tyranny. The job of the statesman is 
to weave the woof and the warp of human character; to eliminate 
excess and deficiency.62  
 
In the Laws, and again with the same concern in mind, the Athenian 
declares: ‘θυμοειδῆ μὲν δὴ χρὴ πάντα ἄνδρα εἶναι, πρᾷον δὲ ὡς ὅτι 
μάλιστα’ (Laws 731b3-4).xi The good man, the Athenian says, is both 
spirited and gentle (731d7-8).63 Again employing the weaving 
analogy to describe the ideal character type, the Athenian states:  
 
καθάπερ οὖν δή τινα συνυφὴν ἢ καὶ πλέγμ᾽ ἄλλ᾽ ὁτιοῦν, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν 
αὐτῶν οἷόν τ᾽ ἐστὶν τήν τε ἐφυφὴν καὶ τὸν στήμονα ἀπεργάζεσθαι, 
διαφέρειν δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τῶν στημόνων πρὸς ἀρετὴν γένος—ἰσχυρόν 
τε γὰρ καί τινα βεβαιότητα ἐν τοῖς τρόποις εἰληφός, τὸ δὲ μαλακώτερον 
καὶ ἐπιεικείᾳ τινὶ δικαίᾳ χρώμενον (734e4-735a2)xii 
 
 
Returning to the Republic, this tension between philosophical and 
spirited is also played out in the discussion between Sokrates and 
Thrasymakhos, and provides the main sub-text to their conflicting 
views on justice. After Thrasymakhos succumbs to Sokrates’ 
argument, his initial savagery is quelled (cf. Republic 336b1-8); where 
                                                 
xi ‘Every man ought to be at once passionate and gentle in the highest 
degree’ (trans. R. G. Bury p.337). Cf. 645a5-b1. 
xii ‘Now it is impossible, when dealing with a web or any piece of weaving, 
to construct the warp and the woof from the same stuff: the warp must be of 
a superior type of material, decent and just in character, while the woof is 
softer and suitably workable’ (trans. Michael Richard Hart).  
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previously he had been angry he has now become gentle (Republic 
354a9-10).64 
 
However, Plato’s fascination with this character ideal runs even 
deeper, and finds its source not merely in the political struggle 
between Athens and Sparta but also, and originally, in Homer’s 
Iliad,65 and in particular with Akhilleus, the poem’s most outstanding 
warrior.66 Akhilleus received a specialised education suited to the 
type of life he was expected to live, which even extended to his diet.67 
Akhilleus was reputedly fed on lions’ and bears’ entrails and honey, 
in order to give him strength, courage and gentleness. But this 
education, far from helping to create a well-balanced character, seems 
to have created a man of violent extremes.68 Akhilleus’ revenge 
driven aristeia,69 his treatment of Hektor’s body, the human 
sacrifices,70 and his lack, at times, of humanity,71 all point to an 
excessive harshness and self-centredness. But at other times he is a 
model of decorum, grace and friendliness.72 It appears, therefore, that 
Kheiron’s tutelage failed,73 as for that matter did Phoinix’s.74 The 
rulers (or founders) of the ideal polis cannot afford to make the same 
mistake with the education of the guardians. 
 
Akhilleus was corrupted by his education, but Sokrates, despite 
having had a traditional Athenian education, remained unscathed 
(Crito 50d8; 50e2). According to the Republic, Sokrates was saved by 
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his daimon, and also by, we might say, divine providence (496a10-
496e2). Whatever virtue Plato portrays Sokrates as having, he does 
not seem to have gained this virtue through any organised system of 
education. Sokrates’ mission was, it is true, foisted upon him by the 
Delphic oracle, but his desire to know (which was presumably 
already present) is one that appears to have developed within him 
spontaneously. Sokrates’ interlocutors, those from whom he wishes 
to learn, become not his teachers but, whether they would all 
acknowledge this or not, his fellow students in the search for wisdom 
(but not always with good grace).  
 
In the ideal polis the key to creating a well-balanced individual (and, 
moreover, a virtuous one), is the correct combination of mousikē and 
gymnastics. More than this, as we shall see in the next section, it 
requires a thorough overhaul of this traditional education. 
  
§3 
 
Character Education in the Ideal Polis and Beyond 
 
Λόγου […] μουσικῇ κεκραμένου· ὃς μόνος ἐγγενόμενος σωτὴρ ἀρετῆς 
διὰ βίου ἐνοικεῖ τῷ ἔχοντι (Republic 549b5-7)xiii 
 
                                                 
xiii ‘Argument mixed with music […] it alone, when it is present, dwells 
within one possessing it as a saviour of virtue throughout life’ (trans. Bloom 
p.226).  
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The educational system described in the Republic has two interrelated 
stages.75 The early stage described in books 2 and 3 is an education in 
guardianship and, as Julia Annas observes, is more akin to what we 
might call today ‘moral education,’76 and as such it appears to be 
exclusively geared towards the training of character (ēthos). The next 
stage of education, the higher education of the philosopher rulers 
outlined in book 7, is broadly an education in philosophy and truth.77 
In consequence the second stage includes an extensive range of 
academic subjects, such as mathematics, geometry, and, of course, 
dialectic.78 Here, however, I wish only to concentrate on the 
guardians’ character education.  
 
The character education of the guardians is composed of two main 
subject areas, mousikē and gumnastikē (Republic 376e5);79 and it is this 
complementary education that will help to create the aggressive yet 
philosophically minded guardians. Although the value of the latter is 
more readably intelligible than that of the former, it will be mousikē 
that will form the most essential component of the young guardians’ 
education.  
 
From an early age, mostly through their ‘musical’ education and 
training, every Athenian was subjected to a wide range of mythoi. 
Today we would call such tales ‘fictional,’ but the truth of these tales, 
whose subject matter ranged from stories about the birth of the gods 
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to the exploits of the great heroes, was rarely disputed (I shall come 
back to this in the next chapter). However, even though skepticism80 
became, at least among the intellectual elite, more common as the 5th 
Century B.C. progressed, for the majority, as with Kephalos, these 
tales remained an important part of their cultural and, crucially, 
historical and ‘national’ identity. And this is something that in the 
Republic Sokrates is keen to exploit.  
    
The peculiar power of myth is found, in part, in musical performance. 
But Sokrates’ first concern is with the content of traditional tales. The 
guardians must be pious and courageous and, claims Sokrates, the 
content of myth is hardly conducive to either of these.81 The gods 
were thought of as being the highest, and most blessed of beings 
(something that Sokrates does not dispute), but despite this they were 
also vicious, self-serving, and, to put it politely, inordinately lusty.82 If 
Zeus is the father of the gods,83 and, in a special sense, of Man, then 
he is a very harsh father indeed. How can we expect children to show 
respect for their parents when Zeus failed to do so (Republic 378b1-3)? 
As C. M. Bowra puts it: ‘a people gets the gods which it deserves,’84 
and for the ideal polis, nothing short of ideal gods will do. This will 
mean that ‘theology,’ so long the province of poets and, to a lesser 
extent, priests and their oracles, must now become a major concern 
for the philosopher.85   
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Sokrates cannot supplant the gods as the chief objects of worship,86 
even in the ideal polis, but what he can do is to insist that if they are 
worshiped, and that if they are to be called gods at all, that they be 
good (agathos, 391d3-6). Now, that the gods are good would not be 
contested,87 but Sokrates is using the term ‘good’ in a highly 
specialised sense (379b1-380c4).88 If the gods are to be worshiped, 
then they must be beyond reproach. The traditional tales, therefore, 
can only be retained if they are suitably modified as to represent the 
gods as being good, perfect, and paradigms of truth (380d1-382c3). 
The gods are not devious shape-changers; they are, like the eidē 
(Republic 380e1), immutable and incorruptible, models of truth and 
stability (380d1-383a4).89 This early education in truth and philosophy 
is crucial, not least because for most of the guardians it is all that they 
will receive. All the guardians, however, whether they go on to 
become philosopher rulers or not, must receive this philosophical 
primer.90 
 
The next stage of their ‘musical’ education is designed to make the 
guardians brave (386a3-5). In order to make a person brave, Sokrates 
states, one has to make them unafraid of death (like Sokrates)91 and 
he intends to accomplish this by banning the terrifying stories about 
the underworld, common in Homer, because they are likely to induce 
in the guardians an over fondness for life.92 Of course, and as we 
learn in the Phaedo for instance, the willingness to die (or not to hang 
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on to life at any cost) is a key attitude of the philosopher. But why 
would a rejection of such stories make a person brave?  
 
In order to see what Sokrates is getting at we have to understand that 
his primary concern is actually to do with the account of the human 
soul that is contained within Homer’s poems, the kind of conception 
that is held by Kephalos and his ilk. 
 
In Homeric thought the soul (psukhē) is dormant in the living 
organism and upon death leaves the body and ‘travels’ to Hades and 
continues to exist as a witless, gibbering shade (cf. Odyssey 24.1-10).93 
In addition to the soul there are certain intellectual and emotional 
faculties, which are located in the body, either the midriff, the heart 
or the lungs.94 According to conventional belief, however, the 
intellectual and emotional faculties do not survive the death of the 
body and nor were they in any way related to the soul. The Greek 
afterlife was not, if the poets are to believed, a very pleasing 
prospect.95  
 
Plato’s concern, however, is more with the philosophical implications 
of the Homeric conception of the soul and the affect that it will have 
on the intellectual development of the guardians rather than with 
Greek ‘theology.’ A central tenet of the philosopher (as Plato 
understands him) is that the soul is rational, and that whatever may 
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happen to the body the soul is immortal and continues to be, as it was 
in life, an active faculty. The guardians, regardless of whether they 
become philosopher rulers, must get used to this idea.  
 
What the guardians require, in addition to their resolve in the face of 
death and belief in the immortality of the soul, is sōphrosunē (Republic 
389d8-e9; 390d1-6). Unfortunately, as we have already seen, this is 
not a trait that is common to the hero of Greek myth and poetry. Only 
Odysseus, who Sokrates himself cites, displays anything like the type 
of self-control required of the guardians (and only then after a life of 
hardship had shown him the error of his ways).96 
 
Odysseus, however, is the exception to the rule; most heroes, and 
Akhilleus in particular, are not noted for their self-control. Indeed, in 
respect to Akhilleus, who is clearly Sokrates’ main target here (and 
for good reason), he identifies eight heroic vices: sorrow, excessive 
displays of mirth, lying to one’s superiors, insolence, intemperance, 
greed, impiety, and cruelty (387d1-388d10; 388e6-389b1; 389b2-d7; 
389e9-390a3; 390a5-c9, 391d1; 390d7-391a1, 391c5; 391a3-b5, 391d2-3; 
391b6-8). These vices are distinctly un-Sokratic,97 and, more 
particularly, unbecoming for guardians of the ideal polis.98 
 
In a sense the paradigm is Sokrates himself. Sokrates’ disdain of 
wealth and material possessions, his easy temper and his almost 
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super human ability to bear punishment easily and restrain his 
emotions,99 certainly fits the model set out for the guardians. 
However, there is some irony in Sokrates’ condemnation of 
Akhilleus. In the Apology Sokrates is charged with precisely what he 
is now charging Akhilleus, of impiety and corrupting the young.100 
The charges against Sokrates, of course, arise from a misconception, 
but what of Sokrates’ charges against Akhilleus?101 Sokrates is a little 
unfair to Akhilleus,102 but in a sense and within the context of the 
guardians’ education this is understandable. Akhilleus is the 
paradigmatic Greek hero, young, aggressive, noble, and loyal (to his 
friends), and this, much more than anything else, makes him an ideal 
target for Sokrates. As Allan Bloom says: ‘Socrates brings Achilles to 
the foreground in order to analyse his character and ultimately to do 
away with him as the model for the young.’103  
 
Having dealt with the presentation of gods and heroes in epic and 
dramatic poetry, Sokrates moves on to the presentation of ‘human 
beings:’104  
 
οἶμαι ἡμᾶς ἐρεῖν ὡς ἄρα καὶ ποιηταὶ καὶ λογοποιοὶ κακῶς λέγουσιν περὶ 
ἀνθρώπων τὰ μέγιστα, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἄδικοι μὲν εὐδαίμονες πολλοί, δίκαιοι δὲ 
ἄθλιοι, καὶ ὡς λυσιτελεῖ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἐὰν λανθάνῃ, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη 
ἀλλότριον μὲν ἀγαθόν, οἰκεία δὲ ζημία· καὶ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ἀπερεῖν 
λέγειν, τὰ δ’ ἐναντία τούτων προστάξειν ᾄδειν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν 
(Republic 392b1-5)xiv 
                                                 
xiv ‘I suppose we’ll say that what both poets and prose writers say 
concerning the most important things about human beings is bad – that 
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Sokrates is talking about poetry and prose, and hence about poets 
and sophists. In book one Sokrates had silenced Thrasymakhos 
(354a8); in the ideal polis the sophist will be silenced permanently: 
the sophist will play no role in the education of the guardians. 
Indeed, the subject of justice (dikaiosunē) will not be, as it was for 
Sokrates and Thrasymakhos, a matter for dispute. However, at this 
stage in the argument, prior to the definition of justice that he will 
offer in book 4, Sokrates is unwilling to disclose what kind of 
speeches about human beings will be permitted (392c1-4).105  
 
After having dealt with ‘what must be said,’ Sokrates moves on to 
style (lexis): ‘ὡς λεκτέον παντελῶς ἐσκέψεται’ (392c6).xv Sokrates is 
now moving into the realm of artistic performance therefore his 
concern is going to be with imitation (mimēsis).106 I shall not say too 
much about that here, since I will be discussing imitation and its role 
in the guardians’ education in Chapter Five.  
 
Sokrates divides narrative (diēgēsis) into three kinds: simple (non-
imitative, reported speech for example), imitative (tragic drama), and 
a mixture of both (narrative with both imitative and non-imitative 
                                                                                                                   
many happy men are unjust, and many wretched ones just, and that doing 
justice is profitable if one gets away with it, but justice is someone else’s 
good and one’s own loss. We’ll forbid them to say such things and order 
them to sing and to tell tales about the opposite of these things’ (trans. 
Bloom p.70).  
xv ‘How it must be said’ (trans. Bloom p.71).  
121 
 
parts, Republic 392d6-7, such as Homer’s Iliad). Initially it appears as 
though the guardians are not to be skilled in any form of imitation 
since their primary function is guarding the polis. But at 395c3-5 we 
learn that imitation will be permitted, as long as it is imitation of 
men107 who are courageous, moderate, holy, free, and ‘τὰ τοιαῦτα 
πάντα’ (395c5).xvi Indeed, imitation is an important device for 
formulating character. Taking on good roles, imitating good models 
(the actions or deeds of noble men), is a way of habitualising 
behaviour and hence of building character.  
 
Plato clearly sees the guardians’ character education as beginning 
quite early in their lives, perhaps as early as seven years old. But how 
does this education work? The idea, as we saw, is that character is 
formed through the imitation of certain kinds of behaviour. But why 
would imitating behaviour help to formulate character? On the 
surface the answer is simple: the imitation of behaviour helps to 
create certain dispositions or traits of character. The hope is that by 
continually imitating the right kinds of behaviour a person will 
become habitualised to them: imitation creates habits of behaviour.  
 
Eventually, a person is no longer imitating, that is, copying 
behaviour, but just behaving in the right way by a kind of instinct. 
But since instinct is not rational, at some point habits have to be 
                                                 
xvi ‘…everything else of the sort (trans. Bloom p.74).  
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rationally justified. By that juncture, however, the behaviour in 
question is a habit, and habits are hard to break. Habits seem to have 
nothing to do with choice: habits are not chosen; they are formed 
through unreflective repetition. Of course, if reasons are eventually 
given to justify a person’s habits, and those habits are ‘good’, as Plato 
has in mind with the guardians, the problem is largely illusory. Still, 
the idea is this: that one becomes virtuous (or at the very least one 
develops the dispositions that will allow one to become so) through 
the formulation of habits via imitation. One becomes of good 
character by acting like people of good character do. However, if, for 
example, a child acts like a just person, what is to stop one from 
calling that child just? The classic formulation of this problem is first 
found in Aristotle: 
 
Ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας 
δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια 
καὶ σώφρονα, ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ 
καὶ τὰ μουσικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί (Nicomachean Ethics 1105a17-
20)xvii 
 
 
In his response to this problem, Aristotle begins by exploring this 
analogy between the actions of the artisan and the actions of the 
virtuous agent. In the case of the arts, it is possible for a person to 
                                                 
xvii ‘A difficulty may however be raised as to what we mean by saying that in 
order to become just men must do just actions, and in order to become 
temperate they must do temperate actions. For if they do just and temperate 
actions, they are just and temperate already, just as, if they spell correctly or 
play in tune, they are scholars or musicians’ (trans. H. Rackham pp.83-85).  
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perform an action correctly out of chance or through prompting. In 
the example Aristotle uses, for a person to be actually called a 
grammarian, that person must act in the way a grammarian does, 
that is, through knowledge of grammar (this idea is similar to but not 
identical with Thrasymakhos’ faultless ruler, Republic 340c7-9). But 
the arts, states Aristotle, are not analogous to the virtues because the 
nature of their ‘productions’ is quite different. The merit of a pot 
(although owing its existence and quality to the potter) resides in the 
pot alone – we do not judge the value of a pot as a pot by reference to 
the potter.  
 
With the ‘products’ of virtue  – the just or temperate action – they can 
only be called just or temperate if the agent (1) acts with knowledge, 
(2) having deliberately chosen the act and chosen it for its own sake, 
(3) and when that action arises at the same time from a fixed and 
permanent disposition of character. To be an artisan, argues Aristotle, 
requires the presence of knowledge, whereas for the virtues 
knowledge alone is not sufficient to make an action virtuous without 
the other two conditions being in operation. The only way for a 
person to have the right dispositions of character, from which 
virtuous actions can spring, is by developing the right habits (as Plato 
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phrases it: ‘κυριώτατον γὰρ οὖν ἐμφύεται πᾶσι τότε τὸ πᾶν ἦθος 
διὰ ἔθος’, Laws 792e1-2).xviii  
 
There is simply no other way for a person to become virtuous other 
than by first (and at least) mimicking virtuous acts in order to become 
habitualised to them (Nicomachean Ethics 1105a21-b5; cf. 1103b14-25). 
Of course, reason and deliberation must eventually be added – but 
without the right character, reason and deliberation could not gain 
any purchase. Reason cannot alter character, hence character must be 
instructed according to a rational plan – a system of education – prior 
to the instruction of the intellectual faculties, which in turn will, 
hopefully, come to justify why a person has and will continue to act. 
This diagram illustrates the various stages of character education as 
Aristotle understands it: 
 
Imitative acts become habitual acts – creates dispositions 
Dispositions become fixed 
Reason and deliberation are added 
Virtuous acts 
 
Plato never makes any of the above explicit in his works, although he 
seems, despite being slightly freer with the way that he uses certain 
                                                 
xviii ‘For because of the force of habit, it is in infancy that the whole character 
is most effectually determined’ (trans. R. G. Bury p.19).  
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terms, to have something very similar in mind with the character 
education of the guardians. Despite the fact that Plato does not 
systematically lay out the relationship between habit and character in 
his dialogues, in various places in the Republic we are given a clue as 
to the importance he gives to habit and how it contributes to 
character formation.  
 
The practice of imitation is fundamental to the formation of habits: ‘ἢ 
οὐκ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι αἱ μιμήσεις, ἐὰν ἐκ νέων πόρρω διατελέσωσιν, εἰς 
ἔθη τε καὶ φύσιν καθίστανται καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ κατὰ 
τὴν διάνοιαν’ (Republic 395d1-4).xix 
 
The polis is just, in part, through the dispositions of its classes (435b7). 
The dispositions that Sokrates has in mind here, presumably, are 
meant to be those that will ensure that each class performs its own 
function. Indeed, the dispositions of all people seem in some way to 
be related to the role they play in society: ‘ὅτι γε τὰ αὐτὰ ἐν ἑκάστῳ 
ἔνεστιν ἡμῶν εἴδη τε καὶ ἤθη ἅπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει’ (435e1-3).xx 
 
The soul and the body have their own dispositions – those inculcated 
through education. Moreover, the habits associated with virtue, and 
                                                 
xix ‘Or haven’t you observed that imitations, if they are practiced continually 
from youth onwards, become established as habits and nature, in body and 
sounds and in thought?’ (trans. Bloom p.74).  
xx  ‘The very same forms and dispositions as are in the city are in each of us’ 
(trans. Bloom p.114).  
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the ‘health’ it signifies, are ranked higher than the health of the body 
(585a9-b6); the dispositions of the body should fall in line with those 
of the soul (591b1-9).  
 
A disposition for Plato is: the way that the soul or the body works 
that is responsible for our actions (a pre-disposition) – when the soul 
or the body is working well – hence producing good actions – we can 
speak of the soul or the body as having virtue.  
 
The virtues of the body (ἀρεταὶ…τῶν τοῦ σώματος) are created by 
habit (ethos) and practice (518d7-e2). What are these bodily virtues? It 
seems unlikely that Sokrates has any of the ‘cardinal’ virtues in mind 
here, since they are, in the Republic at least, expressive of psychic 
harmony, that is, the correct functioning and relation of the three 
parts of the soul. Perhaps, then, we should understand the bodily 
virtues as being expressive of physical harmony. This is only partly 
true however. A bodily virtue is perhaps not a virtue in the true sense 
– indeed, how could it be? – but rather some excellence of the body 
which is sympathetic or complementary to the virtues of the soul or is 
in some way reflective of them.  
 
Does this mean that character education only attends to the bodily 
virtues? This next passage may help to clarify the matter. Sokrates, 
speaking about the guardians’ musical instruction, says:  
127 
 
ἔθεσι παιδεύουσα τοὺς φύλακας, κατά τε ἁρμονίαν εὐαρμοστίαν τινά, 
οὐκ ἐπιστήμην, παραδιδοῦσα, καὶ κατὰ ῥυθμὸν εὐρυθμίαν, ἔν τε τοῖς 
λόγοις ἕτερα τούτων ἀδελφὰ ἔθη ἄττα ἔχουσα, καὶ ὅσοι μυθώδεις τῶν 
λόγων καὶ ὅσοι ἀληθινώτεροι ἦσαν (Republic 522a4-8)xxi 
 
 
Mousikē, then, does not educate by knowledge but by habit, and by 
this I think we can take Sokrates as meaning: ‘creating dispositions of 
character through imitation’, that is, through imitating good or 
harmonious models of behaviour contained in certain myths or in 
‘speeches of a truer kind’ (what Sokrates might mean by ‘speeches of 
a truer kind’, I shall consider in the next chapter). In some sense, 
therefore, mousikē must attend to virtues of character, and hence 
indirectly and incompletely to the soul itself. To restate: character 
education does have an impact on the soul – but only on those parts 
that are essentially mortal in nature.  
 
So, even though, as we learn in book 10, the soul can become 
educated in its habits (which I take to mean some sort of character 
education, 606a9), more ideally it must become educated in reason. A 
similar contrast is drawn a few pages later where Sokrates makes a 
distinction between those who participate in virtue by habit and 
those who participate in virtue by philosophy (619c8-d1). In this, 
                                                 
xxi ‘It educated the guardians through habits, transmitting by harmony a 
certain harmoniousness, not knowledge, and by rhythm a certain 
rhythmicalness. And connected with it were certain habits, akin to these, 
conveyed by speeches, whether they were tales or speeches of a truer sort’ 
(trans. Bloom p.200).  
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Plato and Aristotle would seem to agree: it is only the ‘moral’ (ēthikos) 
virtues that are educated through habit. However, even though taken 
alone character education cannot create ‘soul virtues’, without it, no 
matter what the additional education, and contrary to popular belief, 
a person cannot attain the necessary character traits or dispositions 
that will make virtue a possibility. As Aristotle puts the matter in one 
of his more Platonic moods:  
 
οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες 
οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιόν τι ποιοῦντες 
τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἳ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ᾽ οὐδὲν 
τῶν προσταττομένων. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἕξουσι τὸ σῶμα οὕτω 
θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ᾽ οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες (Nicomachean 
Ethics 1105b13-18)xxii 
 
 
Sokrates’ discussion of gumnastikē is intended to be complementary to 
his discussion of mousikē, and as a consequence he is interested not so 
much with the practical aspects of physical training but with how 
such training could be useful for the further development of 
character. What is called for is a ‘απλῆ που καὶ ἐπιεικὴς 
γυμναστική’ (Republic 404b7)xxiii not the type that is currently 
associated with athletic training,108 but one that will suit the dual 
                                                 
xxii ‘The mass of mankind, instead of doing virtuous acts, have recourse to 
discussing virtue, and fancy that they are pursuing philosophy and that this 
will make them good [spoudaioi] men. In so doing they act like invalids who 
listen carefully to what the doctor says, but entirely neglect to carry out his 
prescription. That sort of philosophy will no more lead to a healthy state of 
soul than will the mode of treatment produce health of body’ (trans. H. 
Rackham p.87).  
xxiii ‘Simple and decent gymnastics’ (trans. Bloom p.83).  
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purpose of guardianship: philosophy and war (525b7; 404a1-6). 
Sokrates’ theory of physical education rests on this principle: ‘ψυχὴ 
ἀγαθὴ τῇ αὑτῆς ἀρετῇ σῶμα παρέχειν ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστον’ 
(403d2-3).xxiv As a consequence, Sokrates’ chief concern in his account 
of gumnastikē is not with the body at all, but with the soul.109  
 
In the Timaeus the relationship between the body and soul is also 
discussed (87c1-88c7). Every living creature is a compound of body 
and soul, the quality of each having a direct impact on the other; and 
ideally there should be a harmony between the body and the soul. If 
the soul is more powerful than the body, whether in the expression of 
its passions or in its intellectual pursuits, the body suffers ill health. 
And conversely, when a strong body is united with a weak intellect, 
the desires of the former overwhelm those of the latter, making the 
person dull-witted, forgetful, and ignorant. In respect to these two 
evils, physical weakness and ignorance, there is only one remedy:  
 
μήτε τὴν ψυχὴν ἄνευ σώματος κινεῖν μήτε σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς, ἵνα 
ἀμυνομένω γίγνησθον ἰσορρόπω καὶ ὑγιῆ. τὸν δὴ μαθηματικὸν ἤ τινα 
ἄλλην σφόδρα μελέτην διανοίᾳ κατεργαζόμενον καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος 
ἀποδοτέον κίνησιν, γυμναστικῇ προσομιλοῦντα, τόν τε αὖ σῶμα 
ἐπιμελῶς πλάττοντα τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνταποδοτέον κινήσεις, μουσικῇ καὶ 
πάσῃ φιλοσοφίᾳ προσχρώμενον, εἰ μέλλει δικαίως τις ἅμα μὲν καλός, 
ἅμα δὲ ἀγαθὸς ὀρθῶς κεκλῆσθαι (Timaeus 88b8-c7)xxv 
                                                 
xxiv ‘A good soul by its own virtue makes the body as good as it can be’ 
(trans. Bloom p.82).  
xxv ‘Neither to exercise the soul without the body nor the body without the 
soul, so that they may be evenly matched and sound of health. Thus the 
student of mathematics, or of any other subject, who works very hard with 
his intellect must also provide his body with exercise by practising 
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So, against the dominant view, and returning to the Republic, both 
music and gymnastics are said to be ‘ἀμφότερα τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκα τὸ 
μέγιστον καθιστάναι’ (Republic 410c4),xxvi this being the case, both 
are necessary conditions for guardianship, and both are equally 
important. Engaging in too much gymnastics at the expense of music, 
or too much music at the expense of gymnastics, creates an 
imbalanced individual: in the former case, the person is apt to be too 
harsh, and in the latter, too soft (410c6-d2).  Indeed, it is the neglect of 
mousikē that is the hallmark of degenerate societies, and is in part 
responsible for the demise of the ideal polis (546d7-9).  
 
Good character, in the first instance, depends upon the correct 
application of mousikē, and this is just as true in a tyranny as it is in 
the ideal polis. In the imperfect society, with its corrupting culture 
and cultural education, good character as Plato understands it cannot 
perhaps be taught, and certainly not taught by state institutions. 
Sokratic education, as we saw in Chapter Two, can be seen as an 
attempt to counter-act traditional education, and as such it operates, 
as I would argue the dialogues do, not only as an alternative paideia, 
which is critical, ironic, and even sceptical, but also as an alternative 
mousikē.  
                                                                                                                   
gymnastics; while he who is diligent in moulding his body must in turn, 
provide his soul with motion by cultivating music and philosophy in 
general, if either us to deserve to be called truly both fair and good’ (trans. R. 
G. Bury p.241).  
xxvi ‘…established both chiefly for the soul’ (trans. Bloom p.89).  
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Could, therefore, Plato have envisioned the dialogues as having been 
used in such a way as to educate character? Perhaps, and in addition 
to the difficulties discussed at the start of this chapter, such a task, in 
Athens, for example, would have been problematic because every 
child was subjected to traditional education and hence would already 
be corrupted by the time they came upon the dialogues (or entered 
Plato’s academy). For an unknown few this corruption would have 
perhaps been limited by their superior natures, and therefore Plato 
might have retained some hope that for this audience (presumably 
quite small) the dialogues would have helped to build upon an 
already existing, though underdeveloped, nobility of character.  
 
A person’s response to the dialogues, I would argue, is for Plato an 
indication of their attitude towards philosophy as well as their 
potential for becoming a philosopher.  
 
In book 3 of the Republic, Sokrates outlines the procedure for deciding 
which of the guardians will become the rulers of the ideal polis – the 
philosopher rulers of book 5. The rulers of the ideal polis must be 
those who can stick to this principle: that they will devote their lives 
to doing what they judge to be in the best interest of the community 
and never to act against it (412d7-e3, 413c5-8). Only those guardians 
who will never reject this principle will be chosen as rulers; and in 
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respect to this all the guardians will be subjected to three tests (413e7-
414a2).  
 
The first test is designed to induce the guardians to involuntarily 
reject the principle (this rejection is called ‘involuntary’ because no 
one, and especially not the guardians, would ever wish to be relieved 
of such a principle). As such, the guardians will be subjected to 
‘witchcraft,’ by which Sokrates presumably means sophistry; the 
educators of the ideal polis will try to persuade the guardians that 
truth is falsehood and that good is evil (412e3-413c4). 
 
With the second test (413c8-d2), the guardians are to be set a number 
of tasks. What tasks does Sokrates have in mind? On the face of it this 
test seems no different from the last, since Sokrates is concerned with 
seeing whether the guardians can be misled or deceived into 
forgetting the principle. However, I think we could understand these 
tasks as those which are somehow relevant to the thumos. If the first 
test is designed to test the guardians’ calculating faculty, then 
perhaps the second test is designed to test that aspect of themselves 
which is concerned with honour, and the honour in ruling in 
particular.  
 
Understanding these tests as being designed specifically to assess the 
guardians’ souls seems partly justified when we look at the third test. 
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The aim of the third test is to see if the guardians will abandon the 
principle based on fear and pleasure, and therefore this test is focused 
on the appetitive and spirited ‘parts’ of the soul. Taken together, 
these tests seem to be designed to ascertain which guardians have the 
ability to become rulers rather than philosophers, since their purpose 
seems to be restricted to testing their attitude towards the well-being 
of the state. This is not quite the case however. It will be the rulers’ 
grasp of the truth that makes them able to adhere to the principle, 
and therefore it is philosophy that makes them able to judge and act 
on behalf of their community. It is not the ability to rule in other 
people’s interests that makes a person an ideal ruler but rather it is a 
person’s grasp of the truth that makes them ideal rulers. Ruling is, in 
a sense, a consequence of knowledge. 
 
Outside the ideal polis the principle: that one does what is the best 
interest of one’s community, can be interpreted in many ways, and 
not all of them favourable. I would argue, however, it is a principle 
that Plato has Sokrates exemplify, and it is also one which he sees as 
fundamental to the pursuit of philosophy and therefore to his own 
philosophical project in writing the dialogues. This, however, does 
not mean that for Plato the philosopher must seek political office in 
conventional societies, but only that, as a citizen, although largely in a 
private capacity, the philosopher will seek the well-being of his 
fellow citizens, whether they like this or not. 
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nobility of manner’, trans. R. G. Bury p.273). However, the most important quality of 
the tyrant’s ψυχῇ is sōphrosunē (710a3; 709e7-710a2), which is hardly a virtue that one 
would associate with Akhilleus. But that would be a simplification. A great deal of 
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mean, apparently, that the best state would arise from a tyranny, when it has a first-
rate lawgiver and a virtuous tyrant, and these are the conditions under which the 
change into such a state could be effected most easily and quickly…’, trans. R. G. 
Bury, slightly adapted, p.275). The young, bold but importantly self-controlled 
τύραννος is, with the backing of the experienced lawgiver ideally placed to quickly 
(710b2, 711c5) affect the necessary changes in society: ‘οὐδὲν δεῖ πόνων οὐδέ τινος 
παμπόλλου χρόνου τῷ τυράννῳ μεταβαλεῖν βουληθέντι πόλεως ἤθη, 
πορεύεσθαι δὲ αὐτὸν δεῖ πρῶτον ταύτῃ, ὅπῃπερ ἂν ἐθελήσῃ, ἐάντε πρὸς ἀρετῆς 
ἐπιτηδεύματα, προτρέπεσθαι τοὺς πολίτας, ἐάντε ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον, αὐτὸν πρῶτον 
πάντα ὑπογράφοντα τῷ πράττειν, τὰ μὲν ἐπαινοῦντα καὶ τιμῶντα, τὰ δ᾽ αὖ πρὸς 
ψόγον ἄγοντα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον ἀτιμάζοντα καθ᾽ ἑκάστας τῶν πράξεων’ 
(711b4-c3, ‘The fact that a tyrant, when he decides to change the moral habits of a 
state, needs no great efforts not a vast length of time, but what he does need is to lead 
the way himself first along the desired path, whether it be to urge the citizens 
towards virtue’s practices or the contrary; by this personal example he should first 
trace out the right lines, giving praise and honour to these things, blame to those, and 
degrading the disobedient according to their several deeds’, trans. R. G. Bury, 
slightly adapted, p.277). The motif of quickness combined, of course, with temperance 
(712a6) appears to be central. The swiftness with which the changes could occur 
given the right conditions is at the forefront of the Athenian’s mind. Decisiveness is 
the key to social reform. The illusion that the τύραννος is in charge is a necessary 
one. The question about the supremacy of law, which in both the Politicus and the 
Laws takes its departure from a μύθος (Laws, 713a6, and in the Politicus, μύθος, 
268e3), the so called ‘age of Kronos’, is raised from the perspective (also evident in 
the foundation myth of the Republic, 415a1-c8) of the absolute necessity of fostering 
the divine element within ourselves (‘ἀλλὰ μιμεῖσθαι δεῖν ἡμᾶς οἴεται πάσῃ 
μηχανῇ τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ Κρόνου λεγόμενον βίον, καὶ ὅσον ἐν ἡμῖν ἀθανασίας ἔνεστι, 
τούτῳ πειθομένους δημοσίᾳ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τάς τ' οἰκήσεις καὶ τὰς πόλεις διοικεῖν, τὴν 
τοῦ νοῦ διανομὴν ἐπονομάζοντας νόμον’, Laws 713e6-714a2, ‘And it deems that we 
ought by every means to imitate the life of the age of Cronos, as tradition paints it, 
and order both our homes and our states in obedience to the immortal element 
within us, giving to reason’s ordering the name of “law”’, trans. R. G. Bury p.287), a 
divine element which is perhaps most indicative of Akhilleus and Sokrates. 
However, the divine element needs the proper nurture and education. Homer too, it 
seems, associates quickness with boldness and also disaster and violence Moving on 
to the central premise of the Iliad, Akhilleus acts first, calling an assembly in order to 
discover the reason for Apollo’s displeasure (τῇ δεκάτῃ δ᾿ ἀγορὴν δὲ καλέσσατο 
λαὸν Ἀχιλλεύς, Iliad I.54, ‘…on the tenth [day] Achilleus called the people to 
assembly’, trans. Lattimore p.60). Naturally the πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς speaks first 
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(he speaks first because he called the assembly). He is quick to reassure Kalkhas and 
instil him with θάρσησε: ‘Tὸν δ᾿ ἀπαμειϐόμενος προσέφη πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς 
(Iliad I.84, ‘Speak, interpreting whatever you know, and fear nothing’, trans. 
Lattimore p.61). Latacz puts it like this ‘we see Akhilleus as the intrepid protector of 
the weak, but also as impulsively quick to take on weighty personal obligations’ 
(Joachim Latacz, Homer: His Art and His World, trans. James P. Holoka, Michigan: 
Michigan University Press, 1996, p.96); and is the first to confer the misplaced anger 
of Agamemnon, ‘Μὴ δ᾿ οὕτως ἀγαθός περ ἐὼν, θεοείκελ᾿ Ἀχιλλεῦ, κλέπτε νόῳ, 
ἐπεὶ οὐ παρελεύσεαι οὐδέ με πείσεις’ (Iliad I.130-131, ‘Not that way, good fighter 
though you be, godlike Achilleus, strive to cheat, for you will not deceive, you will 
not persuade me’, trans. Lattimore p.62). He was, perhaps, too quick, too 
predominant, when the ποδάρκης δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς declared earlier ‘Ἀτρεΐδη κύδιστε, 
φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων, πῶς γάρ τοι δώσουσι γέρας μεγάθυμοι Ἀχαιοί; οὐδέ τί 
που ἴδμεν ξυνήϊα κείμενα πολλά’ (Iliad. I.120-123, ’Son of Atreus, most lordly, 
greediest for gain of all men, how shall the great-hearted Achaians give you a prize 
now?’, trans. Lattimore ibid). The result is a switch of responsibility from 
Agamemnon to Akhilleus. Initially the Akhaians suffered (Iliad I.47-52), but at least 
‘αἰεὶ δὲ πυραὶ νεκύων καίοντο θαμειαί’ (Iliad I.52, ‘The corpse fires burned 
everywhere and did not stop burning’, trans. Lattimore p.60) but compared to the 
next crisis it was nothing (‘ἣ μυρί᾿ Ἀχαιοῖς ἄλγε᾿ ἔθηκε, πολλὰς δ᾿ ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς 
Ἄϊδι προΐαψεν ἡρώων, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἑλώρια τεῦχε κύνεσσιν οἰωνοῖσί τε πᾶσι’, Iliad. 
I.2-6). Akhilleus’ disobedience, necessitated somewhat by the shoddy leadership of 
Agamemnon, causes a division, Zeus’ will aside, which underscores the whole piece. 
The Akhaians have a low-key civil war. Whatever the Homeric merits of Akhilleus’ 
actions, or indeed Agamemnon’s, it is, for Plato, a clear case of ‘disharmony’, or to be 
more precise in this case, of an overweening boldness and quickness to temper, as 
the Stranger of Plato’s Politicus puts it: ‘Παιδιὰ τοίνυν αὕτη γέ τις ἡ διαφορὰ 
τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν εἰδῶν˙ περὶ δὲ τὰ μέγιστα νόσος ξυμβαίνει πασῶν ἐχθίστη 
γίγνεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν’ (307d7-9, ‘Now this opposition of these classes is mere 
child’s play; but when in affects the most important matters it becomes a most 
detestable disease in the state’ (trans. W. R. M. Lamb p.183). This sentiment is very 
reminiscent of the Republic at 424d4 (‘ὡς ἐν παιδιᾶς γε μέρει καὶ ὡς κακὸν οὐδὲν 
ἐργαζομένη’). If we now turn to Hektor we can develop this further. As a defender 
Hektor may appear to be a more sympathetic character than Akhilleus. But perhaps 
in Hektor the polarity of harsh and gentle is even more evident. Aias says of Hektor 
‘οὐ μὰν ἔς γε χορὸν κέλετ᾽ ἐλθέμεν, ἀλλὰ μάχεσθαι’ (Iliad XV.507-508, ‘He is not 
inviting you to come to dance. He invites you to battle’ (trans. Lattimore p.323). This 
is somehow very appropriate for Hektor. Perhaps like no other, Hektor who, on the 
one hand is ‘μεγάθυμος’ (Iliad XV.440), and on the other hand has tender moments 
with wife and child (Iliad VI.395-500), embodies the peculiar affect of war. It is a 
dichotomy that every soldier faces and is painfully aware of:   
πάντων μὲν κόρος ἐστὶ καὶ ὕπνου καὶ φιλότητος 
μολπῆς τε γλυκερῆς καὶ ἀμύμονος ὀρχηθμοῖο, 
τῶν πέρ τις καὶ μᾶλλον ἐέλδεται ἐξ ἔρον εἷναι 
ἢ πολέμου· Τρῶες δὲ μάχης ἀκόρητοι ἔασιν 
(Iliad XIII.636-640) 
‘Since there is satiety in all things, in sleep, and love making, in the loveliness of 
singing and the innocent dance. In all these things a man will strive sooner to win 
satisfaction than in war; but in this the Trojans cannot be glutted’ (trans. Lattimore 
p.288). 
There is the sense that one cannot have both gifts; that martial qualities are distinct 
from qualities associated with peace,  
ἄλλῳ μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκε θεὸς πολεμήϊα ἔργα,  
ἄλλῳ δ᾽ ὀρχηστύν, ἑτέρῳ κίθαριν καὶ ἀοιδήν 
(Iliad XIII.730-731) 
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‘To one man the god has granted the actions of warfare, to one to be a dancer, to 
another the lyre and the singing’ (trans. Lattimore pp.290-291).  
If we contrast the domestic circumstances of Hektor and Akhilleus we shall find the 
obvious dissimilarities63 but we shall also see a fair degree of parity. As C. M. Bowra 
puts it: ‘The strength of the contrast is between the natural, sympathetic humanity of 
Hector and the remote, terrifying magnificence of Achilles’ (C. M. Bowra, Homer, 
London: Duckworth, 1972, p.115). It must be pointed out that both men made their 
homes within and from the perspective of war (both, even, conceiving children). 
Home comforts are even more important in times such as theirs. However, the 
concerns of Hektor are of a different order to those of Akhilleus. As a defender 
Hektor has it all to lose, as an attacker Akhilleus can only gain. Again, this misses the 
point. We must only consider the kind of home that Akhilleus made for himself (Iliad 
XXIV.447-455), with which he shared with his beloved Patroklos (and Briseis).  Even 
Akhilleus had his gentler side (‘τῇ ὅ γε θυμὸν ἔτερπεν, ἄειδε δ᾽ ἄρα κλέα ἀνδρῶν’, 
Iliad IX.186, ‘With this [singing and player the lyre] he was pleasuring his heart, and 
singing of men’s fame’, trans. Lattimore p.203) and perhaps this is why it is best not 
to portray Akhilleus as the paradigmatic fighting man (I would say that this ‘title’ is 
better suited to Aias). 
64 Thrasymakhos’ gentleness is only a conceit however, like that of the newly 
established tyrant (Republic 566e4). 
65 When one reads book 10 of the Iliad one cannot help being struck by both the way 
in which Odysseus and Diomedes, in terms of their respective abilities, the cunning 
intelligence of Odysseus and the fierce spiritedness of Diomedes, carry out their grim 
mission and the methods of characterisation that Homer employs. I admit that I am 
reading Plato’s psychological theories on to Homer, but there is, surely, still the 
question (undoubtedly legitimate) as to the degree to which Plato was perhaps led, 
partially of course, in forming his beliefs regarding the soul through his exposure to 
and assimilation of the poets. After Nestor’s speech (ὦ φίλοι οὐκ ἂν δή τις ἀνὴρ 
πεπίθοιθ᾽ ἑῷ αὐτοῦ θυμῷ τολμήεντι μετὰ Τρῶας μεγαθύμους ἐλθεῖν…, X.203), 
the assembly is silent until Diomedes says: ‘Νέστορ ἔμ᾽ ὀτρύνει κραδίη καὶ θυμὸς 
ἀγήνωρ ἀνδρῶν δυσμενέων δῦναι στρατὸν ἐγγὺς ἐόντων Τρώων’ (X.219).  
   Diomedes chooses Odysseus as his companion, not only because ‘οὗ πέρι μὲν 
πρόφρων κραδίη καὶ θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ ἐν πάντεσσι πόνοισι’ (X.244-245) and, of 
course, his association with Athene but also because ‘ἐπεὶ περίοιδε νοῆσαι’ (X.246-
247). And whilst Odysseus prays to Athene in his accustomed way (X.277), 
Diomedes offers a prayer to Atrytone (‘unwearied,’ X.284), symbolising, perhaps, the 
dual aspect of intelligence and spirit that coalesces with the combination of Odysseus 
and Diomedes. Aided by Athene, Diomedes (ἐπαΐσσων and κρατερὸς) captures 
Dolon (X.365-370). Odysseus (πολύμητις) calms the petrified Dolon with a necessary 
falsehood (X.382-383). Dolon’s folly, it seems, is the result of his own θυμὸς (and his 
greed: ἦ ῥά νύ τοι μεγάλων δώρων ἐπεμαίετο θυμὸς ἵππων Αἰακίδαο δαίφρονος) 
and, so he claims, the ‘deceptions’ of Hector (πολλῇσίν μ᾽ ἄτῃσι παρὲκ νόον 
ἤγαγεν Ἕκτωρ, X.391-392). The lone figure of Dolon, both cowardly and, unlike 
Odysseus (πολύμητις, X.400) sorely lacking in counsel, never stood a chance. 
Diomedes’ responses to Dolon are on the whole hostile and serve to preface his 
wanton violence against Rhesus and his personal guard. Odysseus, in contrast, is 
measured, eliciting vital information from Dolon to ensure the success of the mission.  
   Towards the end, however, Odysseus struggles to bring Diomedes to heel (even 
whistling to the belligerent Diomedes, X.503). Diomedes is ‘divided in his mind’ 
(X.504), whether to steal more treasures or slaughter more Thracians (which would 
indicate for Plato typical Spartan vices). Diomedes’ indecision forces the intervention 
of Athene (X.505-515). The mission, however, is a success, but perhaps only just, 
highlighting the precarious nature of the alliance between reason and spirit, even with 
exemplars such as Odysseus and Diomedes.  
   The Rhesus, which, on the whole, only resembles book 10 superficially, contains 
similar concerns regarding the heroic character. Aeneas expresses his wish to Hector 
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that he ‘could make plans [εὔβουλος] as well as you can fight’, continuing ‘But so it 
is: the same man cannot well be skilled in everything; each has his special excellence, 
and yours is fighting, and it is for others to make good plans [βουλεύειν καλῶς], not 
you’ (105-108). Mostly interesting is the period between 565 and 595. Here the 
cautious nature of Odysseus is contrasted with Diomedes’ eagerness. However, and 
with a typically Euripidean twist, our heroes falter; Odysseus convinces Diomedes to 
head back, and it is only by a quite different intervention from Athene that the heroes 
return to their mission. 
66 Iliad 1.412. 
67 Apollodoros, Library III.13.6, Philostratos, Eikones 341k.16-342k.25.  
68 Hobbs calls him ‘the archetypal exemplar of the thumos gone awry’ (Angela Hobbs, 
Plato and the Hero: Courage, Manliness and the Impersonal Good, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006, p.199).  
69 Akhilleus’ aristeia begins in book 20: 
 ‘αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς 
Ἕκτορος ἄντα μάλιστα λιλαίετο δῦναι ὅμιλον 
Πριαμίδεω· τοῦ γάρ ῥα μάλιστά ἑ θυμὸς ἀνώγει 
αἵματος ἆσαι Ἄρηα ταλαύρινον πολεμιστήν’  
(Iliad XX.75-79).  
70 Iliad XXIII.22-23.  
71 Aiskhylos, Myrmidones, fragment 59 (131), ‘τάδε μὲν λεύσσεις, φαίδιμ’ ‘Αχιλλεῦ, 
δοριλυμάντους Δαναῶν μόχθους, οὒς [προπεπωκὼ] εἴσω κλισίας [θάσσεις].’ 
72 He receives Agamemnon’s messengers with good grace (Iliad I.334), as he does the 
Embassy (Iliad. IX.196), which finds him relaxing and playing the lyre (Iliad IX.189-
190), and he behaves reasonably well towards Priam (Iliad XXIV.471-670).  
73 Republic 391c2. Cf. Epinomos 989b6-c3. 
74 Phoinix no longer has any influence over Akhilleus: 
‘φοῖνιξ ἄττα γεραιὲ διοτρεφὲς οὔ τί με ταύτης 
χρεὼ τιμῆς· φρονέω δὲ τετιμῆσθαι Διὸς αἴσῃ, 
ἥ μ᾽ ἕξει παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν εἰς ὅ κ᾽ ἀϋτμὴ 
ἐν στήθεσσι μένῃ καί μοι φίλα γούνατ᾽ ὀρώρῃ.  
ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω, σὺ δ᾽ ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῇσι· 
μή μοι σύγχει θυμὸν ὀδυρόμενος καὶ ἀχεύων 
Ἀτρεΐδῃ ἥρωϊ φέρων χάριν· οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ 
τὸν φιλέειν, ἵνα μή μοι ἀπέχθηαι φιλέοντι. 
καλόν τοι σὺν ἐμοὶ τὸν κήδειν ὅς κ᾽ ἐμὲ κήδῃ·  
ἶσον ἐμοὶ βασίλευε καὶ ἥμισυ μείρεο τιμῆς’ 
(Iliad IX.607-616). 
But why this double tutelage? According to C. J. Mackie: ‘Chiron and Phoenix 
together help to reveal different aspects of his personality, different skills and 
impulses that motivate him during the war at Troy. To have a single teacher like 
Phoenix, who is a kind of generic old man figure, would do little justice to a unique 
warrior like Achilles. The separation and isolation of Achilles from the other 
Achaean princes, and some of the special features of his person require special 
characteristics reaching back into his childhood, and for this reason Chiron is never 
excluded entirely from the poem. The complete suppression of Chiron's name would 
leave Achilles with a background very much the same as the other princes, 
something which would scarcely be appropriate for such a warrior figure’ (C. J. 
Mackie, “Achilles’ Teachers: Chiron and Phoenix in the ‘Iliad’,” Greece & Rome, 
Second Series, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1997, p.4).  
75 Christopher Gill, Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy: The Self in 
Dialogue, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996 (p.267).  
76 Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981 
(p.83). Cf. Richard Lewis Nettleship, The Theory of Education in Plato’s Republic, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935 (p.44). 
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77 This stage of education covers a period of time, which for us would include 
primary, secondary and higher education, terminating when the guardians reach 
twenty years of age. However neither stage has any specific elements or courses of 
study devoted to statesmanship or politics as we would understand these terms.  
78 There are two noticeable omissions from the guardians’ education, weapons 
training and grammatistikē (reading and writing). To my mind there must be some 
sound philosophical reason why these are omitted. In the case of training for war 
perhaps there is just very little that is philosophically pertinent to say. The most 
important thing is courage rather than skill with arms (cf. Laches 182d-184c). The 
omission of grammatistikē does require clarification. It would perhaps be odd to hear 
Sokrates speak about reading and writing. Sokrates is more concerned with good 
speech rather than the ability to read and write well. The ability to read and write is 
not required for guardianship or philosophy. This is also clearly a hit against 
Athenian and Spartan preoccupations.   
79 As it is in the Laws (795d8-9). 
80 C. M. Bowra, The Greek Experience, London: Cardinal, 1973 (pp.73-78). See 
Thukydides, Peloponnesian War 1.11. 
81 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, 
trans. P. Christopher smith, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980 (p.43). 
82 Euripides, Ion 446-448.  
83 Not necessarily literarily, but in the sense of the being the eldest and most 
powerful. See Walter Burkert’s Greek Religion, trans. John Raffan, Oxford: Blackwell, 
1987 (p.129).  
84 Bowra, The Greek Experience (p.55).  
85 The depiction of the gods in Greek literature, throughout the classical era, is 
entirely consistent with received religious ideas and practice. There were critics of 
course, but in the main, and following the enormously popular poems of Homer and 
Hesiod, the majority never sought to challenge established religion. But we should 
not see Sokrates’ critique of Homer as being a challenge to religion as such, still less to 
‘state religion,’ rather, his concern was with certain ethical implications that he 
thought could be drawn from the portrayal of the gods and the heroes in poetry. 
86 Bowra, The Greek Experience (p.71).  
87 Since ‘good’ was synonymous with ‘best.’  
88 For the ‘ordinary,’ 5th Century B.C. Greek conception of ‘agathos’ see Arthur 
Adkins’ Merit and Responsibility, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960 (pp.231-232).  
89 According to Bloom ‘it would seem necessary to infer that the warriors are not to 
be wise and that the beliefs about the gods are their substitute for wisdom. Those 
beliefs about the gods are a nonphilosophic equivalent of knowledge of the whole’ 
(“Interpretative Essay,” in The Republic of Plato, New York: Basic Books, 1991, p.352), 
but as he also says ‘the gods are a prefiguration of the ideas which are known to the 
philosophers. The man who believes in these gods, while loving the city and justice, 
will not hate and consider impious the philosopher who teaches the ideas’ (ibid p.353).  
90 Sokrates intends that the power, mystery and persuasiveness of myth be fully 
exploited in the ideal polis. But since the accuracy of myths cannot be fully 
determined all one can do is to make them as truthful as possible (Republic 382d2). 
This, in a sense, is how Plato uses myth in his dialogues; far from being an alternative 
to intellectual vigour, Plato sees myth as ancillary to philosophical truth, succeeding, 
perhaps, where the unadorned truth itself might fail. In certain circumstances, myth 
makes the truth more digestible, and, for some, more persuasive. I shall return to 
these themes in Chapter Four. On Plato’s use of myth, see Diogenes, Lives of Eminent 
Philosophers, III.80. 
91 Apology 28b5-10.  
92 Wilkins, National Education in Greece in the fourth Century before Christ (p.63).  
93 ‘Man is a living creature, conscious of himself and intelligently active, only so long 
as the psyche remains within him. But it is not the psyche which communicates its 
own faculties to man and gives him capacity for life together with consciousness, will 
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and knowledge. It is rather that during the union of the psyche and the body all the 
faculties of living and acting lie within the empire of the body, of which they are 
functions. Without the presence of the psyche, the body cannot perceive, feel, or will, 
but it does not use these or any of its faculties through or by means of the psyche. 
Nowhere does Homer attribute any such function to the psyche in living man: it is, in 
fact, only mentioned when its separation from the living man is imminent or has 
occurred. As the body’s shadow-image it survives the body and all its vital powers’ 
(Rohde, Psyche, pp.5-6).  
94 Ibid p.30; Richard Broxton Onians, The Origins of European Thought, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1954 (p.24). 
95 K. J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle, Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1974 (pp.243-246).  
96 Republic 620c2-d2. Cf. Odyssey 7.311-315. 
97 ‘If Achilles is the model, men will not pursue philosophy, that what he stands for is 
inimical to the founding of the best city and the practice of the best way of life. 
Socrates is engaging in a contest with Homer for the title of teacher of the Greeks – or 
of mankind. One of his principal goals is to put himself in the place of Achilles as the 
authentic representation of the best human type’ (Allan Bloom, “Interpretative 
Essay,” p.354).    
98 This concern with the ethical content of myth, and by implication poetry, does not 
originate with Plato. In fact, such concerns could be as old as poetry itself. And yet, if 
Aristophanes is to be believed, one of the purposes of the poet, dramatic, comedic or 
otherwise, is to teach: 
‘Εὐριπίδης 
πότερον δ᾽ οὐκ ὄντα λόγον τοῦτον περὶ τῆς Φαίδρας ξυνέθηκα; 
Αἰσχύλος 
μὰ Δί᾽ ἀλλ᾽ ὄντ᾽: ἀλλ᾽ ἀποκρύπτειν χρὴ τὸ πονηρὸν τόν γε ποιητήν, 
καὶ μὴ παράγειν μηδὲ διδάσκειν. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ παιδαρίοισιν 
ἔστι διδάσκαλος ὅστις φράζει, τοῖσιν δ᾽ ἡβῶσι ποιηταί. 
πάνυ δὴ δεῖ χρηστὰ λέγειν ἡμᾶς. 
Εὐριπίδης 
ἢν οὖν σὺ λέγῃς Λυκαβηττοὺς 
καὶ Παρνασσῶν ἡμῖν μεγέθη, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ χρηστὰ διδάσκειν, 
ὃν χρῆν φράζειν ἀνθρωπείως; 
Αἰσχύλος 
ἀλλ᾽ ὦ κακόδαιμον ἀνάγκη 
μεγάλων γνωμῶν καὶ διανοιῶν ἴσα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα τίκτειν. 
κἄλλως εἰκὸς τοὺς ἡμιθέους τοῖς ῥήμασι μείζοσι χρῆσθαι: 
καὶ γὰρ τοῖς ἱματίοις ἡμῶν χρῶνται πολὺ σεμνοτέροισιν’ 
(Frogs 1053-1061) 
‘Euripides: And did I invent the story of Phaedra? 
Aeschylus: No, no, such things do happen. But the poet should keep quiet about 
them, not put them on the stage for everyone to copy. Schoolboys have a master to 
teach them, grown-ups have the poets. We have a duty to see that what we teach 
them is right and proper. 
Euripides: And you think that the right and proper way to teach them is to write 
your kind of high-flown Olympian language, instead of talking like a human being? 
Aeschylus: My poor dear fellow, noble themes and noble sentiments must be 
couched in suitably dignified language. If your characters are demi-gods, they 
should talk like demi-gods – and, I might add, they should dress like demi-gods’ 
(trans. David Barrett p.195). 
99 Phaedo 117c2-e1. 
100 Euthyphro 2c2-3d2, Apology 24b2-c1.   
101 The absence of Akhilleus in the myth of Er is understandable. It is not, as Bloom 
has it, an indication of Plato’s rejection of the Akhillean model: ‘Achilles no longer 
exists, alive or dead, in the new poetry or the new Socratic world’ (Bloom p.436). 
143 
 
                                                                                                                   
However, Akhilleus is absent precisely because for Plato he is, metaphorically 
speaking, still alive in the Sokratic ideal. The charges brought against Sokrates seem 
to bear this out, and perhaps indicate the tension between the Akhillean and the 
Sokratic within the man himself. 
102 Bloom, “Interpretative Essay” (p.356) 
103 Ibid p.354. 
104 Republic 392b1, anthrōpos.  
105 This clearly distinguishes Sokrates from the sophists, who were, according to 
Plato, never shy in giving their ‘opinions’ about virtue.   
106 Since Sokrates has already censored the depiction of the heroes in poetry, his 
qualms about the affects of imitation seem rather puzzling. 
107 Cf. Hobbs, Plato and the Hero (p.13). 
108 Athletes, as we learn from the Iliad (XXIII.667-671), were not famed for their 
military prowess.   
109 ‘Socrates’ comments on his educational proposals tell us that the purpose of 
combining physical and cultural training is not what is commonly supposed – 
physical training for the good of the body, cultural training for the good of the soul. 
On the contrary the good of the soul is the end of both kinds of training. Cultural 
education is designed to strengthen the rational element, physical training to 
strengthen the spirited, and the balance of the two types of training is designed to 
balance the two elements so that a man becomes neither too zealous a lover of 
culture at the expense of spirit nor too zealous a follower of honour at the expense of 
wisdom’ (I. M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato’s Doctrines: 1. Plato on Man and 
Society, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962, p.92). 
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Chapter Four 
 
Teaching Virtue in the Cave 
 
Πρὶν δέ γε ἀρετὴν ἔχειν, τὸ ἄρχεσθαι ἄμεινον ὑπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος ἢ τὸ 
ἄρχειν ἀνδρί, οὐ μόνον παιδί (Alcibiades I 135b7-8)i 
 
 
Οὐκοῦν ἵνα καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ ὁμοίου ἄρχηται οἵουπερ ὁ βέλτιστος, 
δοῦλον αὐτόν φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι ἐκείνου τοῦ βελτίστου καὶ ἔχοντος ἐν 
αὑτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἄρχον, οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῇ τοῦ δούλου οἰόμενοι δεῖν 
ἄρχεσθαι αὐτόν, ὥσπερ Θρασύμαχος ᾤετο τοὺς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ’ ὡς 
ἄμεινον ὂν παντὶ ὑπὸ θείου καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκεῖον 
ἔχοντος ἐν αὑτῷ, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξωθεν ἐφεστῶτος, ἵνα εἰς δύναμιν πάντες 
ὅμοιοι ὦμεν καὶ φίλοι, τῷ αὐτῷ κυβερνώμενοι…Δηλοῖ δέ γε […] καὶ ὁ 
νόμος ὅτι τοιοῦτον βούλεται, πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει σύμμαχος ὤν· καὶ ἡ 
τῶν παίδων ἀρχή, τὸ μὴ ἐᾶν ἐλευθέρους εἶναι, ἕως ἂν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἐν 
πόλει πολιτείαν καταστήσωμεν, καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπεύσαντες τῷ 
παρ’ ἡμῖν τοιούτῳ ἀντικαταστήσωμεν φύλακα ὅμοιον καὶ ἄρχοντα ἐν 
αὐτῷ, καὶ τότε δὴ ἐλεύθερον ἀφίεμεν (Republic 590c9-d-6; 590e1-591a3)ii 
              
                                            
It is a case of ‘either or’: either we submit to the wise rule of others or 
we become wise ourselves, and govern our lives accordingly. 
                                                 
i ‘But before one acquires virtue it’s better to be ruled by somebody superior 
than to rule; this applies to men as well as boys’ (trans. D. S. Hutchinson 
p.595).  
ii ‘In order that such a man also be ruled by something similar to what rules 
the best man, don’t we say that he must be the slave of that best man who 
has the divine rule in himself? It’s not that we suppose the slave must be 
ruled to his own detriment, as Thrasymachus supposed about the ruled; but 
that it’s better for all to be ruled by what is divine and prudent, especially 
when one has it as his own within himself; but, if not, set over one from 
outside, so that insofar as possible all will be alike and friends, piloted by the 
same…and the law […] as an ally of all in the city, also makes it plain that it 
wants something of the kind; and so does the rule over the children, their 
not being set free until we establish a regime in them as in a city, and until – 
having cared for the best part in them with the like in ourselves – we 
establish a similar guardian and ruler in them to take our place; only then, 
do we set them free’ (trans. Bloom p.273).  
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However, the education of character is not enough to ensure personal 
autonomy, only philosophy can achieve this.1 The task of philosophy is 
freedom.2 But how does philosophy set one free and what does it set 
one free from? It sets us free from our belief that we possess 
knowledge and it does so by leading us towards that which we do not 
know, the truth (cf. Meno 84b7-c2). As a process of liberation, 
philosophy is the only means of attaining happiness.  
    
As I shall discuss in the first section, the Republic is the only dialogue 
where philosophy is seen as being endorsed by a state, where true 
virtue is taught, and the philosopher becomes the ruler. Sokrates’ 
education in speech begins in book 2 at 376d10 and ends in book 7 at 
540d9,3 in between the ideal polis is constructed, justice is snared,4 
and the philosopher is established as the ruler. Only 7 Stephanus 
pages later, however, the ideal polis is sliding into ruin (545d5). By 
the end of book 8 the ideal polis has vanished completely, and in its 
place, tyranny. I would suggest therefore, that Plato’s faith in the 
educational system that he outlines in the Republic is tempered by a 
deep pessimism. Although the educational proposals are thought to 
be sufficient for the creation of the kinds of people who will make an 
approximation of the ideal polis possible, no level of education can 
prevent a perishable entity from perishing. Not even the philosopher 
rulers can govern by reason alone, and, even if they could, nature has 
her own processes which cannot be thwarted (546a1-6). Rather like 
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Diotima, all the philosopher ruler can do is to put off the inevitable.5 
In the long term, education is a struggle against nature, a struggle 
that education can never win.  
 
For the philosopher, however, the ideal polis remains, in principle, 
intact, and he buries the lessons that he drew from its realisation, i.e., 
the nature of justice, deep into his breast. As I shall argue in section 
two, this does not stop the philosopher from trying, as with Sokrates, 
despite the failure of the ideal polis (and in spite of its non-existence), 
to exhort his fellow cave dwellers to care for their souls and to 
practice philosophy, and, in particular, his former colleagues, the 
victory-loving auxiliaries, who are now in charge, men such as 
Alkibiades and the corrupt band of ‘wise’ men who follow in their 
train, men like Thrasymakhos. But will these men listen? Can they 
listen?6 In the final section of this chapter, I shall begin to detail 
Plato’s solution to the problem of teaching virtue in a constantly 
changing moral culture, Platonic education: a process which is 
specifically designed to overcome the limitations of Sokratic 
education.  
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§1 
 
The Kallipoleia: Education and its Limits 
 
There is a kind of mutual competition for the common good, in which one 
man seeks to give better advice than another, or hold office better than 
another…and this is beneficial strife, faction between citizens for the public 
good (Philostratus, Life of Apollonius IV.8)7 
 
 
A fully effective moral education cannot be state sponsored in a 
democracy, or indeed in any other type of constitution, other than in 
the ideal: for virtue to be taught in a state that endorses it that state 
must be structured entirely towards that aim, the teaching of virtue. 
In his Republic, Plato imagines such a state, the ideal polis. For the 
ideal polis to become a reality, philosophers must rule. Therefore the 
first concern of the founders of the ideal polis, therefore, will be with 
a system of education that will produce not only philosophers (a hard 
enough task), but also philosophers who can rule.8 
 
The education of character is the first step in this process. All the 
guardians, as we saw in the last chapter, have to be of a certain 
character, both spirited and yet susceptible to reason. For some 
guardians, those earmarked for leadership, this initial philosophical 
training will be supplemented by an additional course of studies. The 
higher education of the philosopher rulers consists of mathematics, 
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solid and plane geometry, astronomy, harmonics, and dialectic. Since 
this is an education that is reserved for the rulers,9 we should expect 
it to be an education that will in some way be useful for the purpose 
of ruling, and ruling well. And so this is the case. However, Sokrates 
does not enumerate, as we might expect (as he does for instance in 
the Gorgias), a science of politics, but rather his focus is with 
philosophy. The task of philosophy is to turn the soul towards being 
(πρὸς οὐσία),10 and it is the above subjects, and dialectic in particular, 
which will make this possible. Philosophy is the mastery of a set of 
scientific subjects guided by the dialectical method of inquiry, the 
ultimate aim of which is knowledge of the Good.11 Possessing this 
knowledge will give the philosopher rulers an unprecedented 
advantage in the world of practical affairs (Republic 520c1-5). 
However, knowledge of the Good makes a philosopher a suitable 
ruler not because the Good is essentially a political concept but 
because whoever manages to attain knowledge of such a remarkable 
entity automatically becomes the person most qualified to rule (cf. 
Republic 484a1-d10). And yet, even with this knowledge, the 
philosopher rulers are not infallible. The ideal polis will fall.12  
 
The beginning of the end of Sokrates’ ideal polis is caused, bizarrely, 
because of an oversight by the philosopher rulers.13 The philosophers 
who rule the Kallipolis, claims Sokrates, despite being wise, and 
having had the most thorough education, will ‘οὐδὲν μᾶλλον 
149 
 
λογισμῷ μετ’ αἰσθήσεως τεύξονται, ἀλλὰ πάρεισιν αὐτοὺς καὶ 
γεννήσουσι παῖδάς ποτε οὐ δέον’ (546b2-3).iii Such children, as 
Aristotle observes, will be beyond the influence of education (Politics 
1316a8-10). This is not actually how Sokrates puts it, but the 
implication is clear enough, as we learn at 546b1-3 (ἃς ὅταν 
ἀγνοήσαντες ὑμῖν οἱ φύλακες συνοικίζωσιν νύμφας νυμφίοις 
παρὰ καιρόν, οὐκ εὐφυεῖς οὐδ’ εὐτυχεῖς παῖδες ἔσονται).iv  
 
It is clear that the smallest change in the ideal polis signals the 
beginning of the end. The change may be small but, as we shall see, 
its consequences are huge. Before I move on to that, we should ask 
how it can be that the rulers could make such an error, and in what 
sense they can be blamed for it. We have to remember that the 
philosopher rulers do not want to rule, indeed this is what makes 
them so suitable to rule, and therefore we might want to question 
their commitment to the finer points of administration and to the 
running of state institutions, such as that which controls the breeding 
programme. However, there is little suggestion that the rulers 
consciously ‘take their eye off the ball,’ but rather the suggestion is 
that it is a problem with how their knowledge is affected by material 
                                                 
iii ‘…nonetheless fail to hit on the prosperous birth and barrenness of your 
kind with calculation aided by sensation, but it will pass them by, and they will 
at some time begat children when they should not’ (my emphasis, trans. 
Bloom p.224).  
iv ‘And when your guardians from ignorance of them cause grooms to live 
with brides out of season, the children will have neither good natures or 
good luck’ (trans. Bloom ibid).  
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conditions. It is as if the application of the philosopher rulers’ 
knowledge is in some sense at the mercy of the unpredictable world 
of sensation.  
 
However, this cannot be the whole picture, otherwise we could 
imagine the rulers making nothing but mistakes, and this is not the 
picture that we are given. In fact the problem appears to be the 
philosopher rulers’ ignorance of the divine human number, 12, 960, 
000 (something which we can perhaps forgive them).14 Divine births 
can only occur during a certain period, and this period can only be 
ascertained through the knowledge of this perfect number (arithmos 
teleios, 546b5).  
  
Quite why the rulers are not invested with this most crucial piece of 
knowledge is unclear. It seems to suggest that the philosopher rulers 
are far from perfect, both in respect to the fact that they lack 
knowledge of the divine human number and also because they 
themselves (unless chance had it) are not its products. In such a case 
we fall back on divine providence, which is Plato’s preferred 
explanation for the existence of virtuous individuals (Meno 100b1-2). 
Plato’s ideal polis is therefore far from ideal, even as an 
approximation.   
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Πῶς οὖν δή, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἡ πόλις ἡμῖν κινηθήσεται, καὶ πῇ 
στασιάσουσιν οἱ ἐπίκουροι καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους τε καὶ πρὸς 
ἑαυτούς; ἢ βούλει, ὥσπερ ῞Ομηρος, εὐχώμεθα ταῖς Μούσαις εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν 
ὅπως δὴ πρῶτον στάσις ἔμπεσε (Republic 545d5-545e1)v 
 
 
Sokrates warns us not to take his account of the degeneration of the 
ideal polis too seriously (545e1-3). The transformation from 
philosophical aristocracy to timarchy is inspired by the muses15 (and 
perhaps by Homer?),16 and therefore it is not intended to be either 
historical or wholly logical (in fact the transition has elements of 
fantasy and elements of fact, and this, we might say, entirely in 
keeping with the tragic demise of the ideal polis).17 It is not only tragic 
(545e1) but it is also playful (545d7-e3), and perhaps even comic18 
(450e2; 549c2-e2), the creation of the ideal polis, one might venture, 
could only be penned by the philosopher (Symposium 223d2-6).    
 
Let us look at the first transition in detail. The cause of any change in 
a regime, claims Sokrates, comes about when faction (stasis) arises 
among the ruling classes:  
 
πειρώμεθα λέγειν τίνα τρόπον τιμοκρατία γένοιτ’ ἂν ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας. ἢ 
τόδε μὲν ἁπλοῦν, ὅτι πᾶσα πολιτεία μεταβάλλει ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος 
                                                 
v ‘Then, Glaucon, I said, how will our city be moved and in what way will 
the auxiliaries and the rulers divide into factions against each other and 
among themselves? Or do you want us, as does Homer, to pray to the Muses 
to tell us how ‘factions first attacked’’ (trans. Bloom p.223).  
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τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ στάσις ἐγγένηται· ὁμονοοῦντος δέ, κἂν 
πάνυ ὀλίγον ᾖ, ἀδύνατον κινηθῆναι; (Republic 545c9-d3)vi 
 
 
The consequence of the philosopher rulers’ failure to safeguard the 
breeding programme is the mixing of metals; this is the cause of 
faction in the ideal polis: 
 
ὁμοῦ δὲ μιγέντος σιδηροῦ ἀργυρῷ καὶ χαλκοῦ χρυσῷ ἀνομοιότης 
ἐγγενήσεται καὶ ἀνωμαλία ἀνάρμοστος, ἃ γενόμενα, οὗ ἂν ἐγγένηται, 
ἀεὶ τίκτει πόλεμον καὶ ἔχθραν. ταύτης τοι γενεῆς χρὴ φάναι εἶναι 
στάσιν, ὅπου ἂν γίγνηται ἀεί (Republic 547a1-5)vii 
 
 
Sokrates quotes Homer again (‘ταύτης τοι γενεῆς,’ see above), the 
full line running thus: ‘ταύτης τοι γενεῆς τε καὶ αἵματος εὔχομαι 
εἶναι’ (Iliad VI.211).viii The context of this quote in book 6 of the Iliad is 
the confrontation between Glaukos and Diomedes (Iliad VI.119-236).19 
After meeting each other on the battlefield, they compare 
genealogies, whereupon they discover a kinship between their two 
families, so, at Diomedes’ insistence, they exchange armour: ‘ὄφρα 
                                                 
vi ‘Let’s try to tell the way in which a timocracy would arise from an 
aristocracy. Or is it simply the case that change in any regime comes from 
that part of it which holds the ruling offices – when faction arises in it – 
while when it is of one mind, it cannot be moved, be it composed of ever so 
few?’ (trans. Bloom p.223).   
vii ‘And the chaotic mixing of iron with silver and of bronze with gold 
engenders unlikeness and inharmonious irregularity, which, once they arise, 
always breed war and hatred in the place where they happen to arise. 
Faction must always be said to be ‘of this ancestry’ wherever it happens to 
be’ (trans. Bloom p.224).  
viii ‘Such is my generation and the blood I claim to be born from’ (trans. 
Lattimore p.158).  
153 
 
καὶ οἵδε γνῶσιν ὅτι ξεῖνοι πατρώϊοι εὐχόμεθ᾽ εἶναι’ (Iliad VI.230-
231).ix  
 
However:  
 
 
ἔνθ᾽ αὖτε Γλαύκῳ Κρονίδης φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεύς, 
ὃς πρὸς Τυδεΐδην Διομήδεα τεύχε᾽ ἄμειβε 
χρύσεα χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοι᾽ ἐννεαβοίων  
(Iliad VI.234-236)x 
 
 
With the mixing of the metals complete, and with gold substituted for 
bronze, the ideal polis is no longer just. Stasis has arisen between the 
rulers and the auxiliaries. What happens next?  
 
Στάσεως…γενομένης εἱλκέτην ἄρα ἑκατέρω τὼ γένει, τὸ μὲν σιδηροῦν 
καὶ χαλκοῦν ἐπὶ χρηματισμὸν καὶ γῆς κτῆσιν καὶ οἰκίας χρυσίου τε καὶ 
ἀργύρου, τὼ δ’ αὖ, τὸ χρυσοῦν τε καὶ ἀργυροῦν, ἅτε οὐ πενομένω ἀλλὰ 
φύσει ὄντε πλουσίω, τὰς ψυχὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν ἀρχαίαν 
κατάστασιν ἠγέτην· βιαζομένων δὲ καὶ ἀντιτεινόντων ἀλλήλοις, εἰς 
μέσον ὡμολόγησαν γῆν μὲν καὶ οἰκίας κατα νειμαμένους ἰδιώσασθαι, 
τοὺς δὲ πρὶν φυλαττομένους ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ὡς ἐλευθέρους φίλους τε καὶ 
τροφέας, δουλωσάμενοι τότε περιοίκους τε καὶ οἰκέτας ἔχοντες, αὐτοὶ 
πολέμου τε καὶ φυλακῆς αὐτῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (Republic 547b2-547c3)xi 
                                                 
ix ‘So that these others may know how we claim to be guests and friends 
from the days of our fathers’ (trans. Lattimore p.159).  
x ‘But Zeus the son of Kronos stole away the wits of Glaukos | who 
exchanged with Diomedes the son of Tydeus armour | of gold for bronze, 
for nine Oxen’s worth the worth of a hundred’ (trans. Lattimore ibid).  
xi ‘Once faction had arisen…each of these two races, the iron and bronze, 
pulled the regime towards money-making and the possession of land, 
houses, gold, and silver; while the other two, the gold and the silver – not 
being poor but rich by nature – led the souls toward virtue and the ancient 
establishment. Struggling and straining against one another, they came to an 
agreement on a middle way: they distributed land and houses to be held 
privately, while those who previously were guarded by them as free friends 
and supporters they then enslaved and held as serfs and domestics; and they 
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The stasis appears to be between the rulers and the ruled, and not, as 
Sokrates stated earlier, between the rulers exclusively. But this is not 
quite right. The ruling classes have already fallen out, what we have 
now is the consequence of this, that is, a dispute about how the polis 
should be run, not between the rulers but between the rulers and the 
ruled. How does this happen? Once the rulers are no longer of one 
mind (although at this stage it is not clear in what sense) the 
producers, left to their own devices, try and impose their way of life 
on to the rulers and the city at large, and the rulers, despite having 
fallen out, attempt to maintain order and the old regime. It is not 
clear how the producers are now in a position to do this: we can only 
assume that the rulers are in open conflict (although Sokrates does 
not say this), and this allows the producers an opportunity for 
making mischief. This tension is resolved by a rather dubious 
synthesis. Private property, which was previously reserved for the 
producers, is now surrendered to the rulers, and the producers are in 
turn enslaved.20 Because the ruling class is in dissension, they are no 
longer able to ‘guard’ the lower class as they did before, they have 
little alternative other than to use force, where before deceit and 
persuasion had been sufficient. We now have something similar to 
Sparta, because the city is now divided into two, the Spartiate rulers 
and the Helot producers.21 
                                                                                                                   
occupied themselves with war and with guarding against these men’ (trans. 
Bloom pp.224-225).  
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But what becomes of the uncorrupted philosophers in the now 
corrupt, former ideal polis?22 Does the philosopher become, as 
Sokrates stated earlier in book 5, useless? The philosopher becomes 
useless only insofar as his activities are no longer seen as valuable for 
the running of the (corrupt) state. His activities remain ostensibly the 
same however, although his influence is all but eradicated. However, 
the philosopher has no obligation to the bad regime, so now, perhaps, 
he will devote himself to pure philosophy, unencumbered by political 
office – this at least is the picture we are given in the Theaetetus.  
 
Is this Plato’s ideal – the apolitical philosopher – or is it rather the 
case that, typically, the philosopher finds himself in the position 
where he is unable to contribute ‘politically’? The consummate 
philosopher of the Theaetetus has never known his way to the agora 
(Theaetetus 173d1); he does not associate meaningfully with his fellow 
citizens. He is an otherworldly figure, entirely uninterested in high 
society and party politics:  
 
μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέληθεν ἢ οἱ τῆς θαλάττης λεγόμενοι χόες. καὶ ταῦτα 
πάντ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, οἶδεν: οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν 
χάριν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει κεῖται αὐτοῦ καὶ 
ἐπιδημεῖ, ἡ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα ἡγησαμένη σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν 
(Theaetetus 173e1-5)xii 
                                                 
xii ‘Our philosopher is less aware of these matters than he is of how many 
drops there are in the proverbial ocean. In fact, he doesn’t even know that he 
doesn’t know these things. I mean, he is detached from them not because he 
is after reputation, but the truth is that only his body has taken up residence 
in the city and can be found there, while his mind disdains all these matters, 
seeing them as petty and worthless’ (trans. Waterfield p.69).  
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The philosopher is barely aware of the existence of his own 
neighbours. The philosopher spends his time studying the heavens 
and geometry, and, importantly, ethical questions about: τί δέ ποτ᾽ 
ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος καὶ τί τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει προσήκει διάφορον τῶν 
ἄλλων ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν’ (174b8-9).xiii Nevertheless, the philosopher 
can hardly be called a citizen, so little does he participate in the affairs 
of the city.  
 
The philosopher stands above evil, above the city; like the 
philosopher in the Republic, he shields himself. He remains in the 
heavens and models his soul on what he sees there; this is the 
philosopher’s only salvation (Republic 592b2-5).23  
 
But perhaps – and returning more explicitly to the deposed 
philosopher ruler – now that his official duties are over, he will be 
more ‘happy’? and, in consequence, we must understand him as 
being less ‘happy’ when he is ruling? If the answer to these questions 
is ‘yes,’ then perhaps the philosopher will be all too glad to see the 
back of the ideal polis.  
 
When Glaukon raises the objection that, by compelling the 
philosopher, after having made his ascent out of the cave, to return 
                                                 
xiii ‘What it is to be a human being? What behaviour or experiences are 
proper to just this type of being and differentiate it from all others.’  
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back to rule, this will make him less happy, Sokrates replies in much 
the same manner as he did before, by stating that his concern is not 
with the happiness of a single element of the polis but all of it; and to 
ensure that the whole polis is eudaimon, the philosopher must rule 
(519d7-520a5). This seems clear enough: the philosopher would be 
happier if he did not return to the cave, but the polis, of course, 
would suffer in his absence.  
 
I would argue, however, that the philosopher’s ruling in the ideal 
polis helps to secure his happiness. Taking the ideal polis literally, 
this seems implausible (although I argue that even in this sense the 
philosopher ruler’s happiness is partly dependent on ruling), but 
taking it as a metaphor for the functioning of the soul, it could make 
more sense. Ruling the ideal polis is akin to reason ruling over the 
body and the lower elements of the soul, the thumoeides and the 
epithuētikon. In a sense, reason would rather remain in the realm of 
the forms (especially since for Plato there is a natural affinity between 
the forms and the logistikon),24 and ignore the body and those 
elements of the soul that are not required for knowledge of the Good. 
However, the body and the lower elements of the soul cannot be 
ignored (the philosopher is still, after all, human), they must be ruled 
at all times, as to leave them to their own devices would result in 
psychic disharmony, just as to leave the auxiliaries and the working 
classes to their own devices in the ideal polis would lead to stasis. 
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The philosopher must be able to rule himself if he is going to be able 
to pursue philosophy.  
 
But surely the deposed philosopher ruler, and returning to a literal 
reading of the ideal polis, is in a better position to devote his time to 
ruling himself and therefore of maintaining his knowledge of truth 
now that he is freed from political office? Not necessarily. Now that 
the philosopher is in a society that does not look as kindly on his 
philosophical activities, and one, moreover, which is corrupt, the 
philosopher may not have things so easy, and certainly not if he 
wished to do more than merely contemplate upon truths that he 
already knows, that is to say, he would not be as ideally placed to 
help others attain that knowledge (or even make them value it). In 
such a case, perhaps, he has two choices: to be become the 
consummate philosopher of the Theaetetus – and to reject the role as 
educator – or to become Sokrates, educate and be killed for it.25 The 
choice is between radical politics or quiet acceptance and withdrawal.  
 
However, the portrait of the philosopher we are given in the 
Theaetetus is something of a caricature (and in terms of his inquiries, 
overly academic), and seems to represent the philosopher of popular 
belief rather than Plato’s ideal lover of wisdom, for – and recalling the 
Apology – even in the bad regime the philosopher cannot be apolitical, 
not by his own standards.26 But by the standards of the dominant 
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politics he remains beyond the pale, nevertheless the philosopher 
sticks to his claim, that it is he who is the true statesman (Gorgias 
521d6-8). But although in essence the philosopher in Athens, in terms 
of his personal commitment to philosophy, is identical to the 
philosopher of the ideal polis, his educative task becomes 
immeasurably harder, and, for that matter, more urgent.27 As a 
solution to society’s ills, the ideal polis is not Plato’s definitive 
answer. Indeed, with his description of the failure of the city in 
speech Plato prompts us to seek an alternative way of becoming 
virtuous.  
 
§2 
 
Teaching Virtue in a Constantly Changing Moral Culture 
 
Virtue is always in progress and yet always starts from the beginning28 
   
 
The problem of teaching virtue in a constantly changing moral 
culture rests almost exclusively with the counter-influence of non-
Sokratic education. The Sokratic and non-Sokratic educator value 
some of the same qualities in the young people that they hope to 
teach. But the non-Sokratic educator has an advantage over his 
Sokratic rival. All the Sokratic educator can offer his student is the 
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chance to become virtuous while his non-Sokratic opponent can 
guarantee ‘virtue.’ Sokratic education is both difficult and distressing. 
There are no easy answers in Sokratic education, no corners cut, and 
no end to the questions it asks: it is potentially limitless in scope and 
duration. Given this, which young person, ambitious for success, 
would choose Sokrates over Protagoras? 
 
It takes a very special individual to submit him or herself to an 
education that is so all-embracing, and one, moreover, that is largely 
condemned as useless or corrupting. Sokratic education requires a 
very special type of pupil. In the Theaetetus and the Symposium, 
perhaps more than in any other dialogues, we are given a sense of the 
relationship between the philosopher and his pupil, one which we 
might also imagine Plato as having thought would exist between the 
philosopher ruler and the trainee guardian (something which is 
strangely absent in the Republic). In the Theaetetus, we are presented 
with the ideal pupil, the young geometer and mathematician. Indeed, 
Theaetetus is the very model of the young guardian and philosopher 
ruler elect; and he shares the main characteristics of the philosopher 
that we find in the Republic (cf. Republic 503c2-7), he is both gentle and 
courageous:  
 
τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθῆ ὄντα ὡς ἄλλῳ χαλεπὸν πρᾷον αὖ εἶναι διαφερόντως, καὶ 
ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀνδρεῖον παρ᾽ ὁντινοῦν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτ᾽ ἂν ᾠόμην γενέσθαι 
οὔτε ὁρῶ γιγνόμενον: ἀλλ᾽ οἵ τε ὀξεῖς ὥσπερ οὗτος καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ 
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μνήμονες ὡς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὀργὰς ὀξύρροποί εἰσι, καὶ ᾁττοντες 
φέρονται ὥσπερ τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα πλοῖα, καὶ μανικώτεροι ἢ ἀνδρειότεροι 
φύονται, οἵ τε αὖ ἐμβριθέστεροι νωθροί πως ἀπαντῶσι πρὸς τὰς 
μαθήσεις καὶ λήθης γέμοντες. ὁ δὲ οὕτω λείως τε καὶ ἀπταίστως καὶ 
ἀνυσίμως ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τὰς μαθήσεις τε καὶ ζητήσεις μετὰ πολλῆς 
πρᾳότητος, οἷον ἐλαίου ῥεῦμα ἀψοφητὶ ῥέοντος, ὥστε θαυμάσαι τὸ 
τηλικοῦτον ὄντα οὕτως ταῦτα διαπράττεσθαι. (Theaetetus 144a3-b8)xiv 
 
 
He also resembles Sokrates, not merely physically, but also in virtue 
of his intellectual talents (Theaetetus 143e4-144a3, 155d1-8). But he is, 
at this time, unskilled in dialectic.  
 
The subject under discussion is the nature of knowledge, the most 
vital of studies for the trainee philosopher and philosopher ruler. The 
discussion in the Theaetetus represents, at one level, the long way that 
Sokrates was forced to abandon in the Republic (435c8-d5, 504b1-5), 
and perhaps we can see the inquiry into knowledge in the Theaetetus 
as a companion to Sokrates’ discussion of the philosophical education 
that he outlines for the philosopher rulers.29 Since Theaetetus has the 
potential to become a philosopher ruler, at least according to the 
criteria of the Republic, Sokrates has to convince him that knowledge 
                                                 
xiv ‘For someone to be remarkably intelligent and yet exceptionally 
unassuming, and moreover to have courage that would bear comparison 
with anyone’s – well, I would not have credited it. It’s not a phenomenon 
that I’ve seen before: such quickness, acuity and retentiveness usually go 
hand in hand with emotional instability – the image of unballasted ships 
being tossed about come to mind – and lack of control, rather than courage. 
On the other hand, the steadier ones tend to approach intellectual matters 
somewhat sluggishly, and their ballast is forgetfulness. But this lad tackles 
his lessons and research so calmly and precisely and efficiently, and in such 
an unassuming manner – like a soundless stream of liquid oil – that it’s 
amazing to find one so young setting about like that’ (trans. Waterfield 
pp.17-18). 
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is not perception, although it may be akin to perception. (And, 
perhaps, he has to show him that there are no simple answers and to 
avoid the trap that the philosopher rulers fell into).  
    
This is a task that is beyond Theaetetus’ current teacher, Theodoros, 
who is also unskilled in dialectic and is now too old to learn 
(Theaetetus 146b1-7). Despite his knowledge of science, Theodoros is 
not an adequate teacher, and he can only take Theaetetus so far 
(145a7-8). A teacher unskilled in dialectic would have no place in the 
educational institutions of the ideal polis, but he is at the forefront of 
what passes for education in Athens.  
 
The Theaetetus, like the early ‘Sokratic’ dialogues, ends in aporia, but 
Sokrates reminds us that this need not be thought of as a failure: ‘ἐὰν 
γὰρ οὕτω δρῶμεν, δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ εὑρήσομεν ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἐρχόμεθα, ἢ 
ἧττον οἰησόμεθα εἰδέναι ὃ μηδαμῇ ἴσμεν: καίτοι οὐκ ἂν εἴη 
μεμπτὸς μισθὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος’ (187b9-c2).xv But what happens if the 
Sokratic pupil is unwilling to continue, perhaps dissatisfied with his 
apparent lack of progress? It must be disconcerting to be in a position 
where one has to admit that one lacks knowledge of such essential 
matters as virtue. For Theaetetus, a young man who already seems 
                                                 
xv ‘If we carry on like this, then one of two things will happen: either we will 
find what we’re after, or we will be less inclined to think we know what we 
do not know in the slightest – and even this is a handsome reward’ (trans. 
Waterfield p.91).  
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committed to the pursuit of knowledge, this early ‘set back’ might 
prove to be a spur for additional inquires. But for someone more 
ambitious, someone for whom self-doubt on such matters cannot be 
easily countenanced, the prospect of further birth pangs might lead 
him into the arms of a less discerning midwife.  
 
In the world of Platonic drama, Sokrates’ most famous (or infamous) 
pupil is Alkibiades, the charismatic Athenian nobleman. He, like 
Theaetetus, when first acquainted with Sokrates, is a talented young 
man, intelligent, eager to learn, and, in addition, beautiful (cf. 
Theaetetus 210c9-d1). Unlike Theaetetus, however, Alkibiades is an 
unstable character; intelligent but emotionally volatile.  
 
We learn little about the exact details of Sokrates’ tutelage of 
Alkibiades in the Symposium. What we are presented with, in the 
voice of the pupil, is a humorous and often pathetic description of the 
personal dynamics between the philosopher and his student, which 
also gives us a further insight into the relationship between the 
philosopher ruler and the aspiring guardian.  
 
The contrast that Plato is drawing in the Symposium with Alcibiades’ 
encomium of Sokrates is between the lover of wisdom and the lover 
of honour: of a man governed by his reason and a man driven by his 
thumos.30 
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As a lover of the Muses, Sokrates is a musician; indeed this is how 
Alkibiades describes him in the Symposium. Sokrates is like an aulos 
player but with words (Symposium 215c1-e4, cf. Statesman 268a8-b7; 
Laches 188d4); and he, like the dialectician of the Phaedrus, is able to 
charm the souls of his audience. Sokrates’ words force Alkibiades to 
reconsider his life; with his words he tries to direct him away from 
politics and towards the philosophic life, a life like Sokrates’ 
(Symposium 216a1-b1). If Sokrates is a musician (the philosopher 
ruler) then Alkibiades is more sympathetic to gymnastics (like the 
auxiliary or corrupt guardian); this is his preferred method, and it is 
one that he uses to try to seduce Sokrates. Alkibiades relies on his 
physical appearance as Sokrates relies on the beauty and force of his 
words (217c1-5).  
 
Inside Sokrates the Silenus is something divine, something golden 
(217a1); and it is something that Sokrates is unwilling to relinquish 
(as the rulers of the Kallipolis were forced to do). They served 
together in battle, and they shared the same mess. Sokrates seems to 
embody the best of what it means to be a Greek, but his excelling is 
somehow peculiar, he is adept at both philosophy and war. He spends his 
time seeking wisdom and valour, but will accept no honour from the 
latter. In terms of honour, Alkibiades takes the rewards (219e7-221a1, 
Sokrates, like the dead philosopher ruler, receives his honours after 
his death).     
165 
 
Sokrates is something more than human; he cannot be compared to 
anyone. He is a fantasy figure, like the philosopher ruler, unique, 
untimely (221d1-5). Alkibiades, however, is a man most suited to his 
times.31  
 
The possibility of the philosopher ruler is framed within a broader 
consideration of the difficulty that philosophical education has in the 
face of its educational rivals. Alkibiades’ education is a case in point 
of course. As we learn in the Alcibiades I, the young nobleman 
received a typical Athenian education, and was, therefore, already 
damaged goods well before Sokrates’ intervention (106e3-9). In the 
imperfect society, the philosopher is either thought of as useless or 
corrupt (considering Sokrates’ trial, we might say ‘thought to be 
corrupt’). The uselessness of the philosopher is no fault of his own 
(Republic 489c2-3, cf. Statesman 259a5-7). In the imperfect constitution 
what official role can the philosopher possibly have?  
 
The counter-influence of non-Sokratic education is so strong that it 
can even corrupt a young man of such promise. What the imperfect 
society sees in the young philosopher is not his potential to become a 
philosopher, but his nascent virtues and his other qualities, such as 
wealth, social position, and beauty (Republic 491b8-c4). Indeed, the 
better the nature of a person’s soul the more thoroughly can bad 
education corrupt it (Republic 491e1-6).  
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Interestingly, it is not the sophist who is primarily to blame: his 
influence is limited, and, moreover, his teachings are really only 
reflective of the general educational culture that he himself is part of. 
It is the people on mass who corrupt the young philosopher (contra 
Meletus’ assertion in the Apology 24d2-25a9), because it is they, 
through the assembly and the law courts, and any other public 
gathering, who offer their praise and blame. A person’s private 
education (even a philosophical one) can do little against such 
opposition:  
 
ἢ ποίαν [ἂν] αὐτῷ παιδείαν ἰδιωτικὴν ἀνθέξειν, ἣν οὐ κατακλυσθεῖσαν 
ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου ψόγου ἢ ἐπαίνου οἰχήσεσθαι φερομένην κατὰ ῥοῦν ᾗ 
ἂν οὗτος φέρῃ, καὶ φήσειν τε τὰ αὐτὰ τούτοις καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ εἶναι, καὶ 
ἐπιτηδεύσειν ἅπερ ἂν οὗτοι, καὶ ἔσεσθαι τοιοῦτον; (Republic 492c4-8)xvi 
 
 
No sophist or private teacher can compete with a society that, in its 
education ‘systems,’ works consistently to corrupt the best among 
them. The difficulty of Sokratic education has never been so clearly 
stated: 
 
οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται οὔτε γέγονεν οὐδὲ οὖν μὴ γένηται ἀλλοῖον ἦθος πρὸς 
ἀρετὴν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν πεπαιδευμένον, ἀνθρώπειον, ὦ 
ἑταῖρε—θεῖον μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου: εὖ γὰρ χρὴ 
                                                 
xvi ‘How will whatever sort of private education he received hold up for him, 
and not get swept away by such praise and blame, and be carried off by the 
flood wherever it goes, so that he will call the same things beautiful or ugly 
as these people, practice what they practice, and become like them’? (trans. 
C. D. C. Reeve p.186).  
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εἰδέναι, ὅτιπερ ἂν καὶ γένηται οἷον δεῖ ἐν τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει πολιτειῶν, 
θεοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὸ σῶσαι λέγων οὐ κακῶς ἐρεῖς (Republic 492e2-493a2)xvii 
 
 
What is required, therefore, is a more robust approach against these 
corrupting educational structures; what is needed is an alternative 
learning environment, an alternative culture. And it is one which 
Plato will provide with his dialogues.  
 
§3 
 
Dialectic and Dialogue 
 
Εἰκόνες ὄντως τῶν ψυχῶν εἰσὶν οἱ λόγοιxviii 
 
The Simile of the Cave is central to our understanding of not only 
Plato’s notion of the philosopher (and the teacher) but also of what he 
saw as the main problem with contemporary Athenian culture.32 
Sokrates makes an image of our nature (phusis) in ‘παιδείας τε πέρι 
καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας’ (Republic 514a1-2).xix For Plato, as we shall see, the 
                                                 
xvii ‘You see, there is not now, never has been, nor ever will be, a character 
whose view of virtue goes contrary to the education these provide. I mean a 
human character, comrade – the divine, as the saying goes, is an exception to 
the rule. You may be sure that if anything is saved and turns out well in the 
political systems that exist now, you won’t be mistaken in saying that divine 
providence saved it’ (trans. C. D. C. Reeve ibid).  
xviii In truth words are the images of the soul’ (Saint Basil, Letter IX, trans. 
Roy. J. Deferrari, slightly adapted, p.93). 
xix ‘Its education and want of education’ (trans. Bloom p.193).  
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very quality of our existence is dependent upon the type of education 
that we have received. Such is the power that education has to shape 
our view of the world!  
    
Because of their lack of education, the prisoners in the cave are 
unable to grasp that their culture and all that they hold to be of value 
is mere illusion. But what kind of education are they lacking?33 The 
education they lack, of course, is an education in philosophy; and it is 
only through philosophy that a person can be released from the 
bondage of the shadowy world of contemporary Athens, or any polis 
for that matter.34 But what does such an education amount to? Briefly, 
for I shall return to this question throughout the chapter, to be 
educated in philosophy is to be educated in the means to be able to 
pursue wisdom. A person with this education wants to be wise, 
recognises that this will make them happy (or more happy), and, 
knowing its importance, may never be truly satisfied with any 
answer.  
 
Consequently, education, says Sokrates, is not what people think it is 
(Republic 518b6-c1). It is not, as Thrasymakhos would have it, a force 
feeding of the soul (345b3-5, cf. 344d1-4), rather it is the turning of the 
whole soul away from becoming towards being (518c7). Education is 
the art of turning around the soul (518d3-4); and the concern of the 
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educator is with how to turn a person’s soul towards the truth 
(533d3).  
 
Sokrates’ account of the release of the prisoner and this ascent out of 
the cave is, of course, partly illustrative of the effects of Sokratic 
education and the process of turning in particular. The first stage in 
this journey, and one that will be instantly recognisable to anyone 
familiar with the early dialogues, is the moment where the 
interlocutor (the prisoner) engages with Sokrates (and has his bonds 
temporarily loosened), and through Sokratic questioning, becomes 
puzzled by his own inability to get to grips with the essence of a 
particular notion or topic.  
 
This stage is frequently followed by pain, a certain mental irritation 
that comes with an inability to articulate what one still believes to be 
the case.35 In such a situation a person has two options, either turn 
back to the images on the cave wall, that is, to convention and 
received opinion, or tough it out and submit himself to further 
examination (usually out of a sense of shame or competition rather 
than a genuine desire to know). Finally, all things being well, the 
prisoner is forcibly dragged, much to his consternation, out of the 
cave into the harsh, blinding light. With the world he once knew 
behind him, the prisoner is now free to gaze upon reality, not all at 
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once, but bit by bit, from the shadows cast by objects then finally to 
Helios himself.  
 
Sokrates may well have the power to loosen a person’s bonds of 
ignorance and false conviction (at least momentarily), but does he 
have the power to lead them to the sun? Within the early dialogues at 
least, it is not clear if any of Sokrates’ interlocutors ever found himself 
in this position. In the Republic too Sokrates can only take Glaukon 
and Adeimantos so far, as far as he himself is able to go (533a1-5). The 
success of the Sokratic method, however, is contingent upon how far 
his interlocutors are willing to be freed from their former convictions. 
As we learn in the Symposium, the power that dialectic has is not 
solely in the hands of the teacher. The pupil has to display 
willingness and surrender himself to the dialectical process.36 
However, the teacher’s role in the dialectical process must receive full 
recognition:  
 
πολλοὶ ἤδη τοῦτο ἀγνοήσαντες καὶ ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι, ἐμοῦ δὲ 
καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων πεισθέντες ἀπῆλθον 
πρῳαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἀπελθόντες δὲ τά τε λοιπὰ ἐξήμβλωσαν διὰ 
πονηρὰν συνουσίαν καὶ τὰ ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ μαιευθέντα κακῶς τρέφοντες 
ἀπώλεσαν, ψευδῆ καὶ εἴδωλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, 
τελευτῶντες δ᾽ αὑτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔδοξαν ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι. ὧν εἷς 
γέγονεν Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου καὶ ἄλλοι πάνυ πολλοί: οὕς, ὅταν 
πάλιν ἔλθωσι δεόμενοι τῆς ἐμῆς συνουσίας καὶ θαυμαστὰ δρῶντες, 
ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει συνεῖναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἐᾷ, 
καὶ πάλιν οὗτοι ἐπιδιδόασι (Theaetetus 150e1-151a6, cf. Republic 496a2-3)xx 
                                                 
xx ‘Often in the past people have not been aware of the part I play: they have 
discounted me, and thought that they themselves were responsible for the 
delivery. Either of their own accord, or under the influence of others, they 
171 
 
Sokratic education is a subtle blend of persuasion and argumentation, 
requiring from the student some degree of knowledge, goodwill and 
frankness (Gorgias 487a3-4, cf. Theaetetus 171d7).37 However, none of 
these components taken alone is sufficient for turning a person 
towards philosophy. The likes of Kallikles, for example, are perhaps 
too tightly bound, held fast by their convictions, and thus can never 
be turned away from the shadowy world that they call home. Indeed, 
Sokratic education is a difficult and disquieting process.38  
 
In the early dialogues, the elenkhos is largely used in order to 
establish a person’s ignorance (although as I argued in Chapter Two 
it also has a more positive function). In the ideal polis, however, the 
principal philosophic method is not the elenkhos but dialectic.  
 
Exactly what is the relationship between the elenkhos (refutation) 
and dialectic (discourse)? This question can perhaps only be 
answered by reference to their context in the higher education of the 
philosopher rulers. 
 
                                                                                                                   
left me sooner than they ought to. Then, because they kept bad company, 
they proceeded to have only miscarriages, and they spoiled all the offspring 
I had delivered with wrong upbringing. They placed more weight on 
counterfeits and illusions than on the truth. Eventually, they gained a 
reputation for stupidity, and thought themselves stupid too. Aristides the 
son of Lysimachus was one of these people, but they were plenty of others. 
If they come back, begging and doing goodness knows what for my 
company, sometimes the supernatural sign that I get does not allow me to 
let them be with me, but in some cases it does, and these are the ones who 
make progress again’ (trans. Waterfield p.28). 
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Sokratic dialectic [Guthrie’s term for Sokratic elenkhos] practised often on 
young boys innocent of higher mathematics, led from particulars to Forms, 
but in this higher dialectic a mind already trained in mathematics, using its 
hypotheses as such and not as first principles, deals with the Forms alone, and 
by studying them in the same way, that is, in order to grasp their 
interrelations as it earlier grasped the connexions between objects of the 
various branches of mathematics...finally reaches the self-authenticating 
source of their existence and intelligibility: the Form of the Good.39    
 
 
Elenkhos could also be seen as constituting the early stage of a 
dialectical discourse, or rather, as being a stage that helps to bring 
about the possibility of a genuine discussion into the truth of a 
particular matter: before a philosophical conversation can begin those 
involved have to be willing to admit that they do not know the truth 
of that which they are searching.   
 
In the higher education of the trainee philosopher rulers, dialectic is 
the final stage in a long course of intellectual studies. From the age of 
twenty, and lasting ten years, the trainee philosopher rulers study 
mathematics, plane and solid geometry, astronomy, and harmonics 
(Republic 522a4-531bc).  
 
After this, at the age of thirty, students begin a five year course in 
dialectic. However, despite coming last, dialectic is in fact the 
loadstone of their education. All of these sciences are studied because 
of their ability to stimulate the understanding and opening up the 
possibility of acquiring knowledge of the good and the beautiful 
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(531c6); and mathematics in particular is something that is ‘ἑλκτικῷ 
ὄντι παντάπασι πρὸς οὐσίαν’ (523a2).xxi  
 
The dialogues, however, even if they can represent dialectic, are not 
examples of this method in action, and the dialogues cannot be used 
as a substitute for philosophical discussion: dialectic is spoken not 
written. 
 
According to the Phaedrus, the dialectician is the true master of 
words, and he, unlike the archetypical rhetorician, can use his 
knowledge of the human soul to full effect (Phaedrus 270c1-3). The 
dialectician’s knowledge of human nature enables him to customise 
his words according to the character of his audience (Phaedrus 271c10-
e4). Therefore, and contrary to prevailing opinion: 
 
ὡς ἐὰν μή τις τῶν τε ἀκουσομένων τὰς φύσεις διαριθμήσηται, καὶ κατ᾽ 
εἴδη τε διαιρεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα καὶ μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ δυνατὸς ᾖ καθ᾽ ἓν ἕκαστον 
περιλαμβάνειν, οὔ ποτ᾽ ἔσται τεχνικὸς λόγων πέρι καθ᾽ ὅσον δυνατὸν 
ἀνθρώπῳ (Phaedrus 273d10-e4)xxii 
 
 
The emphasis is on the persuasive power of speech rather than the 
written word, which, as we shall see, is another matter entirely 
                                                 
xxi ‘in every way is apt to drew men towards being’ (trans. Bloom p.201, 
slightly adapted). 
xxii ‘…that unless a man take account of the characters of his hearers and is 
able to divide things by classes and to comprehend particulars under a 
general idea, he will never attain the highest human perfection in the art of 
speech’ (trans. Harold North Fowler p.559). 
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(274b7-9). According to the Phaedrus writing is akin to painting: ‘καὶ 
γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης ἔκγονα ἕστηκε μὲν ὡς ζῶντα, ἐὰν δ᾽ ἀνέρῃ τι, 
σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾷ. ταὐτὸν δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι· δόξαις μὲν ἂν ὥς τι 
φρονοῦντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν, ἐὰν δέ τι ἔρῃ τῶν λεγομένων 
βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, ἕν τι σημαίνει μόνον ταὐτὸν ἀεί’ (275d4-7).xxiii 
Sokrates contrasts this illegitimate, bastard form of writing with its 
legitimate brother: ‘ὃς μετ᾽ ἐπιστήμης γράφεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ 
μανθάνοντος ψυχῇ, δυνατὸς μὲν ἀμῦναι ἑαυτῷ, ἐπιστήμων δὲ 
λέγειν τε καὶ σιγᾶν πρὸς οὓς δεῖ’ (276a5-7).xxiv Unlike the living 
breathing word, the written word is most useful as an aid for 
reminding us of what we already know, or as a source of amusement, 
both for the author and for his readers. However, such works also 
appear to have some educational value, as they can be used to 
stimulate people who might wish to follow the same path (276d1-9). 
 
Telling noble stories about justice is one thing, but serious, dialectic 
discourse about such matters is far nobler (276e5-277a5). And it is in 
this field of serious discourse that the dialectician excels. In terms of 
speech, the dialectician is able to tailor his words according to the 
                                                 
xxiii ‘For the creatures of painting stand like living beings, but if one asks 
them a question, they preserve a solemn silence. And so it is with written 
words; you might think they spoke as if they had intelligence, but if you 
question them, wishing to know about their sayings, they always say only 
one and the same thing’ (trans. Harold North Fowler p.563).  
xxiv ‘The word which is written with intelligence in the mind of the learner, 
which is able to defend itself and knows to whom it should speak, and 
before whom to be silent’ (trans. Harold North Fowler p.567). 
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needs and abilities of his audience; he is able to make simple speeches 
for simple souls for the purpose of persuasion and complex speeches 
for complex souls for the purpose of teaching (277b6-c8).  
 
Can we imagine such speeches being committed to writing, and 
perhaps, as being something we might encounter in the dialogues? 
The question is a difficult one, for even though we are told that the 
dialectician can speak and write about serious topics, providing he 
knows the truth about that which he speaks and writes (277b7-10), 
writing is still for the most part paidia (277d1).   
 
In the Statesman the method of division and classification is used in 
order to define the true nature of the statesman and the art of 
kingship. However, the Stranger also uses a story (mythos) to help 
him illustrate a point and also for the sake of amusement (paidia, 
268d9).40 Is this how Plato understands his myths to operate in the 
dialogues, as partly to illustrate a point and partly to amuse?  
 
It might be helpful here to consider more generally how the ancient 
Greeks understood myth. As early as Thukydides, myth could be 
contrasted with history (historikos), that is, with something which is 
‘exact’, ‘precise,’ or ‘scientific.’ From the same root as historikos there 
is also historeo, which, according to Liddell and Scott, means an 
inquiry ‘into or about a thing’, or indeed, ‘a person.’ History is 
176 
 
concerned with events and people in a sense that is exact, precise, or 
scientific. History, therefore, is not myth. However, we are getting 
ahead of ourselves, for the nature of myth has yet to be defined.41 
 
A myth is a narrative that includes events and people that are 
supposed to have occurred – or is always related to have occurred – 
at some time in the distance past. The question: ‘is this myth true?’ is 
a redundant one, since a myth is by its very nature immune to such a 
question. Myths belong to a period before history: myths are pre-
historic. Myths are not therefore ahistorical, indeed some myths may, 
however imperfectly, included elements of historical truth, and many 
of the things that a myth relates can be understood as having 
happened in a period of time (if not, strictly speaking, in a period of 
history). But asking whether a particular aspect of a myth may be 
‘true’ in the sense that it is more or less accurate in respect to 
something which may have happened (that a palace complex in what 
is now modern day Turkey was destroyed in a fire possibly as a 
result of being sacked by foreign forces), is not the same as to ask 
whether a myth as such is true. Even today, with our clearly defined 
boundary between history and fiction, a story can be ‘not true’ 
(Nabokov’s Bend Sinister for example), and depict a world which is 
not ours, but still be a recognisable world with recognisable 
characters striving for recognisable goals in recognisably human 
ways. So, even in respect to a piece of fiction, it is difficult to say, at 
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least in any meaningful sense, ‘it is not true,’ and with a myth even 
more so.  
 
Plato’s myths are not merely ‘stories’, as with traditional myths, they 
are true accounts. This, at least, is what we learn from the Gorgias 
(523a1-3). A myth, then, need not be opposed, in respect to the truth 
that it may contain, to a logos. Plato’s myths are, perhaps, allegorical.  
 
In the case of the closing myth of the Gorgias this does not appear to 
be the case, it seems rather that Sokrates is merely telling a true story. 
There is no hidden truth in this myth, just what is quite plainly 
stated: that all souls will be judged after death; and the same, 
perhaps, could be said of the ‘eschatological’ myths of the Phaedo and 
Republic.42  
 
Ludwig Edelstein sees two basic types of myth in the dialogues, 
historical and scientific myth and ethical myths; and he distinguishes 
their function along these lines: ‘the ethical myth [...] is an addition to 
rational knowledge; it does not take the place of rational knowledge, 
as do the historical and scientific myths.’43  
 
I am not sure how helpful this distinction is for our understanding of 
why Plato employs myth in the dialogues. In the case of the mythos of 
the Timaeus, which, as Edelstein has it, is a historical myth, it is 
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obviously vastly different from the eschatological or ethical myths of 
the Republic and the Phaedo, so much so in fact, that to identify them 
by the same name, ‘myth,’ seems perverse.  
 
We should probably only call one of Plato’s ‘myths’ a myth if it in 
some way conforms to the structure and content of a pre-existing and 
traditional tale (such as the Orphicistic myth of Er or the Golden Age 
myth of the Statesman). This is one of the reasons why we should not 
see the Timaeus story of the secret history of Athens as a myth. 
Indeed, the Timaeus story (which I shall from here on in call it) is 
always called a logos and never a myth (Timaeus 21a8; 21c7; 21a4, 8), 
albeit a strange one (20d6-7). It is a logos that Critias, as the one 
recalling it, is asked to provide evidence that it is true (21d8-9). A 
myth, in contrast, is something like the tale of Deukalion and Pyrrhas, 
that is, a traditional tale (22a8-10). Importantly, however, a myth, 
such as the Greek myth of the great inundation, can, suitably 
rationalised, be said to convey a truth (22c8-d3). Myths such as the 
tale of Deukalion and Pyrrhas only exist because of the absence of 
written records, that is, of recorded history (23a3-b4; 23c2-4). Indeed, 
compared to a logos a myth is little more than a children’s story 
(23b5-6). A myth, then, is a traditional tale which, although in a non-
allegorical sense, could be said to contain truth; a logos – other than 
in the sense of a rational discourse – is a non-traditional though 
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historical account that may be thought to be true or false given the 
available evidence.  
 
There is still the suggestion, however, that the Timaeus story, if not a 
myth, still shares some of the characteristics of a myth. It was a story 
told to Critias when he was a young boy (26b2-4); it was told verbally 
(Critias’ grandfather did not have recourse to the Egyptian archives). 
And, lastly and most importantly, the Timaeus story, and recalling the 
Statesman, gave the young Critias much pleasure and amusement 
(paidia, 26b7).  
 
Nevertheless, the Timaeus story, within the dramatic frame of the 
dialogue, is described as a logos, that is, a realistic account, and one 
that in some way could be useful for historicising or lending credence 
to a myth, the myth of the ideal polis: transporting Sokrates’ ideal 
community into the realm of fact (26c6-d4). Sokrates is quick to agree 
with this procedure, particularly in light of the fact that Critias’ logos 
is a true account and not a myth (26e2-6).  
 
But the Critias logos can have hardly have been thought of as a myth 
by Plato’s readers simply because it is not a traditional tale. What, 
then, is Plato up to here?  
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By having a logos that appears as a myth outside the context of the 
dialogue, Plato has created the first example of freely-invented prose 
fiction. But perhaps what most characterises Plato’s ‘myths’, is that 
they are, unlike philosophical logoi, unfalsifiable.  
 
In his now classic account of the nature of Platonic myth, Luc Brisson 
argues that as examples of ‘unfalsifiable discourse’ myth, as such and 
in Plato’s use of it, must be strongly contrasted with logos, not in the 
sense of ‘discourse’, because a myth can be a logos in this sense, but 
in the sense of a falsifiable discourse.44 This, of course, fits in with 
what we have already stated about myth, that it is not susceptible to 
validation.  
 
Brisson sees Plato’s uses of myth as part of his acceptance of the fact 
that not everyone is susceptible to rational arguments.  
 
He [Plato] knows very well that philosophy is restricted to a small number 
of men in society and that, in man, philosophy has recourse only to reason. 
So, to be able to convince the majority within society and, within man, to be 
able to tame emotions as powerful as pleasure and fear, the philosopher has 
recourse to the marvellous instrument of persuasion: myth.45 
 
 
Brisson’s analysis is too lengthy to be discussed in any detail here, 
however I agree with this idea that Plato uses some myths as an 
alternative method of teaching.46 For Janet E. Smith, who largely 
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agrees with Brisson, the educational function of myth differs 
according to whether the student is philosophical or unphilosophical:  
 
The most fundamental difference between them [the use of myth in 
education] is that the unphilosophic are discouraged, not to say 
prohibited...from questioning the myths, whereas the philosophic are 
encouraged to question the myths, as all else. Indeed, it is the value placed 
on the questioning which chiefly distinguishes the education of the 
philosophic from that of the unphilosophic.47 
 
 
Therefore, it is not the case that there are different types of myth, in 
Edelstein’s sense, but that educationally Plato’s myths can be exploited 
in two keys ways (of course, this is not the only possible function of 
Plato’s myths, as Smith recognises48). 
 
It is also important to note, however, that how Plato sees myth as 
functioning for the education of the guardians of the ideal polis, 
which, we might conjecture, could conform broadly to Smith’s 
division between philosophical and unphilosohical uses of myth, is 
not necessarily the same as how he sees myth as functioning in the 
dialogues (either for those taking part in the discourse or for the 
reader). The Timaeus myth is a case in point – it has a mythical quality 
(unfalsifiable, ancient and playful) and yet it remains a logos.  
 
Returning to the Phaedrus and to Plato’s attitude towards the written 
word, most of what is contained in a written work, and not just myth, 
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is playful (277e5), but not all. Perhaps we are to understand complex 
‘stories’ as being the only serious element in written works, and that 
by this Plato means passages of writing that are dialectical. Certainly, 
it would be difficult to conceive of them as merely playful, especially 
when compared to myths, such as those that feature in many of the 
dialogues. Nevertheless, Sokrates restates his claims against the 
written word and particularly the superiority of spoken dialectic 
(277e4-278b5).  
 
In his critique of philosophical writing in the Seventh Letter, Plato’s 
target is treatises on first principles. Unlike other branches of 
knowledge, Plato claims, first principles do not lend themselves 
easily (or at all) to written exposition (the authenticity of the Seventh 
Letter may be contentious, but exactly the same position is stated in 
the Timaeus at 48c3-9, cf. Phaedrus 272d4). 
 
If such things could be written down, says Plato, then it is he himself 
who would have done so. However, and notwithstanding Plato’s 
assumption that such things have never been committed to writing, if 
they were ever to be so then they must only be read by people who 
know the truth of the matters that the written work is dealing with, 
that is, the dialectician (therefore, such works would not be used for 
teaching as such). As for the common run of men, those not skilled in 
dialectic, it is best for them never to read such materials since they 
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take things at face value and have a largely uncritical approach to 
everything they read.  
 
Therefore, even if such writings did exist, it is not clear what value 
they would have. Indeed, in the case of metaphysical treaties, works 
which (purportedly) contain truths, such a function would be 
redundant because the truth once known cannot be forgotten. But what 
about if one does not know the truth, would not works which contain 
truths be useful for imparting such truths? In the simple case of ‘facts’ 
this is indeed true. But truths about first principles can only be 
grasped through a process which demands a level of communication 
between teacher and pupil which cannot be replicated by the written 
word.  
 
Although the type of writing discussed in the Phaedrus and the 
Seventh Letter is not of the same kind, in both cases it is contrasted 
with a superior method of philosophical communication, dialectic. 
The only conclusion I wish to draw from this is that, even if Plato is 
silent on the merits of the dialogue form (other than what is made 
manifest in reading the dialogues themselves), for the written word 
to be of any value (we shall come on to what that value is later) it 
must be written by someone who knows inside out the subject matter 
in question, and that the condition of all writing is that it does not, 
and indeed cannot, contain truths. And it is this that is partly 
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responsible for the educational value of the dialogues. However, it is 
not merely the absence of truth that makes a work educational: a 
work is educational (philosophical) if it is a piece of writing that can 
inculcate in the reader a desire to know truth.49 Therefore Leo Strauss 
is partially50 correct when he says: 
 
The proper work of a writing is truly to talk, or to reveal the truth, to some 
while leading others to salutary opinions; the proper work of a writing is to 
arouse to thinking those who are by nature fit for it51 
 
 
A philosophical work (a work written for those who would never be 
satisfied with it) demands that a person does not take what it says as 
being definitive, which, we might conjecture, is one of the reasons 
why Plato finds it advisable not to ‘speak’ in his own voice. However, 
a philosophical work has to do more than this, it has to reinforce the 
philosophical spirit, to exhort a person towards further study, but 
above all it must facilitate the turning of the reader’s soul. A 
philosophical work, as a work of education, contains no truth but it 
must have a power even greater than an epic poem, even greater than 
the combined forces of non-Sokratic education.   
 
The dialogues, of course, do not just warn us against the limitations 
of the written word but also the spoken, as this passage from the 
Protagoras demonstrates:  
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μαθήμασιν δήπου...καὶ ὅπως γε μή…ὁ σοφιστὴς ἐπαινῶν ἃ πωλεῖ 
ἐξαπατήσῃ ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος τροφήν, ὁ ἔμπορός τε 
καὶ κάπηλος. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοί που ὧν ἄγουσιν ἀγωγίμων οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἴσασιν 
ὅτι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν περὶ τὸ σῶμα, ἐπαινοῦσιν δὲ πάντα πωλοῦντες, 
οὔτε οἱ ὠνούμενοι παρ᾽ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν μή τις τύχῃ γυμναστικὸς ἢ ἰατρὸς ὤν. 
οὕτω δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ μαθήματα περιάγοντες κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ πωλοῦντες 
καὶ καπηλεύοντες τῷ ἀεὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντι ἐπαινοῦσιν μὲν πάντα ἃ 
πωλοῦσιν, τάχα δ᾽ ἄν τινες…καὶ τούτων ἀγνοοῖεν ὧν πωλοῦσιν ὅτι 
χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν: ὡς δ᾽ αὕτως καὶ οἱ ὠνούμενοι παρ᾽ 
αὐτῶν, ἐὰν μή τις τύχῃ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν αὖ ἰατρικὸς ὤν. εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ 
τυγχάνεις ἐπιστήμων τούτων τί χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρόν, ἀσφαλές σοι 
ὠνεῖσθαι μαθήματα καὶ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου καὶ παρ᾽ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν: εἰ 
δὲ μή, ὅρα…μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις κυβεύῃς τε καὶ κινδυνεύῃς. καὶ γὰρ δὴ 
καὶ πολὺ μείζων κίνδυνος ἐν τῇ τῶν μαθημάτων ὠνῇ ἢ ἐν τῇ τῶν σιτίων. 
σιτία μὲν γὰρ καὶ ποτὰ πριάμενον παρὰ τοῦ καπήλου καὶ ἐμπόρου 
ἔξεστιν ἐν ἄλλοις ἀγγείοις ἀποφέρειν, καὶ πρὶν δέξασθαι αὐτὰ εἰς τὸ 
σῶμα πιόντα ἢ φαγόντα, καταθέμενον οἴκαδε ἔξεστιν 
συμβουλεύσασθαι, παρακαλέσαντα τὸν ἐπαΐοντα, ὅτι τε ἐδεστέον ἢ 
ποτέον καὶ ὅτι μή, καὶ ὁπόσον καὶ ὁπότε: ὥστε ἐν τῇ ὠνῇ οὐ μέγας ὁ 
κίνδυνος. μαθήματα δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀγγείῳ ἀπενεγκεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ 
ἀνάγκη καταθέντα τὴν τιμὴν τὸ μάθημα ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα καὶ 
μαθόντα ἀπιέναι ἢ βεβλαμμένον ἢ ὠφελημένον (Protagoras 313c8-
314b4)xxv 
 
                                                 
xxv ‘With doctrines…we must take care…that the sophist, in commending his 
wares, does not deceive us, as both merchant and dealer do in the case of 
our bodily food. For among the provisions, you know, in which these men 
deal, not only are they themselves ignorant what is good or bad for the 
body, since in selling they commend them all, but the people who buy from 
them are so too, unless one happens to be a trainer or a doctor. And in the 
same way, those who take their doctrines the round of our cities, hawking 
them about to any odd purchaser who desires them, commend everything 
that they sell, and there may well be some of these too…who are ignorant 
which of their wares is good or bad for the soul; and in just the same case are 
the people who buy from them, unless one happens to have a doctor’s 
knowledge here also, but of the soul. So then, if you are well informed as to 
what is good or bad among these wares it will be safe for you to buy 
doctrines from Protagoras or from anyone else you please: but if not, take 
care…that you do not risk your greatest treasure on a toss of the dice. For I 
tell you there is far more serious risk in the purchase of doctrines than in 
that of eatables. When you buy victuals and liquors you can carry them off 
from the dealer or merchant in separate vessels, and before you take them 
into your body by drinking or eating you can lay them by in your house and 
take the advice of an expert whom you can call in, as to what is fit to eat or 
drink and what is not, and how much you should take and when; so that in 
this purchase the risk is not serious. But you cannot carry away doctrines in 
a separate vessel: you are compelled, when you have handed over the price, 
to take the doctrine in your very soul by learning it, and so to depart either 
an injured or a benefited man’ (trans. W. R. M. Lamb, slightly adapted, 
pp.107-109). 
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Plato uses his dialogues not only to critique Homer and the other 
‘educationalists,’ traditional and sophistic, but also to present his own 
vision of education. However, considering his audience, Plato cannot 
dismiss his rivals out of hand; they must be given a hearing. Like the 
poet who wishes to display his wares in the ideal polis, Plato’s 
educational rivals are given the opportunity to state their case, 
sometimes in their ‘own’ voice and sometimes through a third 
party.52 He does this not by reporting or summarising their claims, or 
indeed their actions, but by setting their views and deeds within an 
educational context where an analysis of these views is carried out 
dialectically either with or for the benefit of the young student. As 
Kent Moors puts it: 
 
In dialogue, while worthy and unworthy arguments and actions are 
presented, the distinction between what is valuable and what is not can still 
be made. Dialogue distils and dissects points of view, dialogue compares 
and contrasts. It does not simply present.53 
 
 
The dialogue form, however, does have its limitations, and this must 
be recognised by the student himself if he is going to benefit from 
them. As William Johnson stresses, even though the dialogues 
operate in a way that is intended to draw us towards philosophy, and 
towards the truth, they are not, ‘strictly speaking, either the doing of 
philosophy or philosophy itself.’54 As John Fisher says: ‘Socratic 
dialogues are useful for education, but even Socratic dialogues cannot 
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take the place of philosophy.’55 Indeed, this is an important message 
in the dialogues: that philosophy must remain primarily an oral 
discipline. Speaking about the Republic, John Evan Seery comments:  
 
The difficulty of writing and reading such a book is that the paideia of the 
book cannot be transmitted directly from one person to another (as Homer’s 
poetry could be). Hence the book wrestles with and embodies the logical 
paradox involved in any truly liberal education: How do you teach others 
the virtue of thinking for themselves?56  
 
 
In addition to this, moreover, the dialogues have to take into 
consideration the reader even more directly, for, as Moors states: 
‘unlike a treatise – which can choose its mode of expression in terms 
of the subject matter being examined – a dialogue must say different 
things to different participants (and readers).’57 
 
Moors suggests, and I would agree with him up to a point, that we 
must ask ourselves why certain characters appear in the dialogues as 
such, rather, say, with being too preoccupied with the historical 
background of Sokrates’ interlocutors, and also to reflect upon what 
this might say about the kind of audience that Plato was seeking.58 
 
The audience that Plato was seeking when he wrote the dialogues, as 
we touched upon at the end of the last chapter, is spirited but 
philosophically minded young people. And, no matter how widely 
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read the dialogues may be today, especially in certain university and 
college courses where such reading is mandatory, the audience 
remains the same. 
 
Sokrates often stands between the supposed expert and the young 
pupil eager for wisdom. As Fisher says (and I shall come back to this 
idea in Chapter Six):  
 
The true lover is the philosopher, that daimonic man whose understanding 
of the important things precludes the possibility that a speech or a book 
could communicate his knowledge to another. Rather the truth comes as an 
illumination only realizable after long association, conversation, exposure to 
elenchus and ultimate dialectical activity in the companionship of one who 
knows.59 
 
 
Sokrates’ intervention is essential if the young pupil is to be shielded 
from the corrupting influence of the sophist and his pseudo-wisdom 
(Republic 539b1-6). The example of Sokrates is not one which is forced 
upon the reader. Whether all the readers of the dialogues, past, 
present or future, would take Sokrates as a role model is not certain. 
In any case, we should not even see this as Plato’s primary aim with 
his portrayal of Sokrates. What Plato is pushing, through argument, 
exhortation, and even myth, is philosophy not a Sokratic way of life. 
We cannot but help imitate that which we admire, and Plato’s task is 
to get us to admire the one who seeks the truth and not mere 
refutation (539c6-d1).  
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However, as readers and potential pupils, we must make our own 
minds up about whether we admire the philosopher or the sophist,60 
we must, as Sokrates says to Krito: 
  
ἀλλ᾽ ἐάσας χαίρειν τοὺς ἐπιτηδεύοντας φιλοσοφίαν, εἴτε χρηστοί εἰσιν 
εἴτε πονηροί, αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα βασανίσας καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ, ἐὰν μέν σοι 
φαίνηται φαῦλον ὄν, πάντ᾽ ἄνδρα ἀπότρεπε, μὴ μόνον τοὺς ὑεῖς: ἐὰν δὲ 
φαίνηται οἷον οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἐγὼ εἶναι, θαρρῶν δίωκε καὶ ἄσκει, τὸ 
λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, αὐτός τε καὶ τὰ παιδία (Euthydemus 307b7-c6)xxvi 
 
 
 
A full recognition of the necessity of philosophy for happiness is not 
one that the dialogues alone can furnish – only actually ‘doing’ 
philosophy can achieve that. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
xxvi ‘Let those who practise philosophy have their way, whether they are 
helpful or mischievous; and when you have tested the matter itself, well and 
truly, if you find it to be a poor affair, turn everyone you can away from it, 
not only your sons: but if you find it to be such as I think it is, pursue and 
ply it without fear, both you, as they say, and yours’ (trans. W. R. M. Lamb 
p.505).  
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because he is the captain of his soul and body; and Plato’s education is always an 
education of free men for even greater freedom.’ Plato’s Theory of Education, London: 
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co Ltd, 1947 (p.116). 
2 Within the context of the ideal polis, this may seem somewhat absurd. Neither the 
guardians nor the producers seem to be free in the conventional sense. The guardians 
are public servants, with no private property and no private life, and the producers 
are nothing more than glorified slaves, with no say in the administration of the polis. 
The philosopher rulers could be said to be free in a more important sense. If nothing 
else, this tells us that philosophy, either as the pursuit or the possession of truth, is 
not something undertaken purely for one’s own sake. Our first priority as 
philosophers is, of course, care of our souls, but the real trajectory of philosophy is 
the good life, which, at its most consistent, is sought not merely for our own sakes 
but also for the sake of others. Hence in the ideal polis the happiness of the whole is 
more important than the happiness of any one of its parts. For more on the 
relationship between philosophy and freedom see Lysis 207d6-210d4). 
3 Republic 534d4.  
4 Republic 432b2-444e3. 
5 Symposium 201d4-5.  
6 Leo Strauss, The City and Man, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964 
(pp.59-60). 
7 Trans. C. P. Jones (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970 (p.91). 
8 In part we can see this as a continuation of Sokrates’ response to Kallikles in the 
Gorgias. However, in the Republic this position is taken even further (519b7-c6); in his 
Philebus Plato also stresses the practical abilities of the philosopher, 62a2-b2). 
9 Republic 521c1-3.  
10 Republic 523a3.  
11 Which is also hinted at in other dialogues (Laches 199d4-e1, Hippias Major 297b2-7, 
Phaedrus 237d6-e3.  
12 There are, of course, good structural reasons why Sokrates is moved to describe the 
degeneration of the ideal polis, because he wants to discuss the variety of imperfect 
societies and souls. However, the tragedy of the rise and fall of the ideal polis, the 
Kallipoleia if you will, serves a more important function: it stands to reminds us about 
the limits of public education.  
13 Aristotle’s criticisms of Plato’s Republic in books 2 and 5 of his Politics are not 
always apposite, nevertheless some of his remarks are quite telling (See Robert 
Mayhew’s Aristotle’s Criticisms of Plato’s Republic, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1997 (in particular pp.1-2).  
14 For how one might arrive at this number, see Desmond Lee n.1, pp.299-300 (Plato: 
Republic, Penguin: London, 1987).  
15 The ideal polis is bookmarked by the healthiest polis, the ‘city of sows,’ and the 
unhealthiest, the tyrannical polis (Republic 369a4-372d4). Why does Sokrates choose 
this procedure? Aside from its pleasing symmetry (the Healthy city (including: 
Democracy, Oligarchy, and Timarchy) – Kallipolis – Timarchy – Oligarchy – 
Democracy – The Unhealthy city (tyranny), it enables Sokrates to make the 
knowingly false claim that all forms of existing constitution are derivations of a once 
existing ideal, in order to make the somewhat more plausible claim that no existing 
regime is perfect, or even near to perfect. 
16 By invoking Homer’s Iliad Sokrates tempts one to think of the quarrel between 
Agamemnon and Akhilleus, especially these lines from the opening book: Διὸς δ᾿ 
ἐτελείετο βουλή, | ἐξ οὗ δὴ τὰ πρῶτα διαστήτην ἐρίσαντε | Ἀτρεΐδης τε ἄναξ 
ἀνδρῶν καὶ δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς (my emphasis, Iliad I.5-7, ‘And the will of Zeus was 
accomplished | since that time when first stood in division of conflict | Atreus’ son 
191 
 
                                                                                                                   
the lord of men and brilliant Akhilleus’ (trans. Lattimore, The Iliad of Homer, 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951, p.59). Should one resist this 
temptation? If all depends upon how seriously one is willing to entertain the 
possibility that Sokrates is drawing a parallel between the philosopher rulers and the 
auxiliaries and Agamemnon and Akhilleus. This seems unlikely, as neither 
Agamemnon nor Akhilleus has a true counterpart in the ideal polis. This is truer of 
Agamemnon than it is for Akhilleus, but we must remember, as we saw in Chapter 
Three, that Sokrates makes a point of distancing his young guardians from the 
example of Akhilleus. Agamemnon is no more a suitable ruler (and hardly a 
philosopher ruler!) than Akhilleus is a suitable auxiliary; neither could be trusted to 
be guardians of society in the way that Sokrates maintains. (The line that Sokrates 
quotes is more likely, perhaps, to be adapted from book 16 of the Iliad, ἔσπετε νῦν 
μοι Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ᾽ ἔχουσαι, | ὅππως δὴ πρῶτον πῦρ ἔμπεσε νηυσὶν 
Ἀχαιῶν (XVI.12-13). This is Bloom’s view (“Interpretative Essay,” p.467). 
17 Cf. John D. Harman, “The Unhappy Philosopher: Plato’s “Republic” as Tragedy,” 
Polity, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1986 (pp.577-594). 
18 Cf. William Chase Greene, “The Spirit of Comedy in Plato,” Harvard Studies in 
Classical Philology, Vol. 31, 1920 (pp.64-65); Ludwig Edelstein, “The Function of Myth 
in Plato’s Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1949 (p.480). 
19 Byran Harries sees the meeting between Diomedes and Glaucos as serving an 
educational function: ‘Diomedes triumphs here, as intellectually supreme in his 
contest of wits with Glaucus as he is militarily supreme in the previous book. His 
triumph here is one which the reader of the Iliad is invited to emulate: the reader who 
can read the past as a constructive influence on our current moral choices and 
understand its formative value for our cultural perceptions, such a reader has a 
Diomedes-like advantage in all the 'strange meetings' that confront us nearer home’ 
(Byran Harries, “'Strange Meeting': Diomedes and Glaucus in 'Iliad' 6,” Greece & 
Rome, Second Series, Vol. 40, No. 2, 1993, pp.13-14). 
20 Taking the property away from the producers is necessary because it is now a 
source of their power, since they were formerly in control of large estates and farms. 
21 Surely the ideal polis has now become more like a traditional aristocracy?  
22 What evidence is there that Sokrates imagines that any of the philosopher rulers 
emerge from the transition uncorrupted? Well, considering that it is unlikely that any 
philosopher ruler is the produce of the system alone, then it may well be the case that 
there are some who, being so good by nature, will not be corrupted, although this 
depends on them not being involved in any subsequent political activity. 
23 Cf. John B. Morrall, Aristotle, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977 (p.39). 
24 Phaedo 100c2-107b9. 
25 There is, perhaps, a third alternative, to become a Plato.   
26 Cf. Paul Stern, “The Philosophic Importance of Political Life: On the “Digression” 
in Plato’s “Theaetetus”,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 96, No. 2, 2002 
(pp.275-289).  
27 The philosopher of the Theaetetus has, of course, some affinities with Sokrates: both 
are strangers in the law courts, and we think, naturally of the Apology, indeed the 
Theaetetus ends with Sokrates preparing to go to the King Archon to hear the charges 
against him (Theaetetus 210d1-3). We can see Sokrates here as the philosopher ruler, 
he is a matchmaker, not of physical bodies, but of souls. In Athens Sokrates’ mental 
midwifery is a secret; his reputation is one of an ‘eccentric and someone who 
confuses people’ (Theaetetus 149a8). But despite what Sokrates says, or, rather, what 
Plato continually hints in the dialogues, Sokrates was hardly a fish out of water at his 
trial.  
28 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. Mary Gregor, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996 (6:409). 
29 For a discussion on what this longer way might be see Mitchell Miller’s “Beginning 
the Longer Way,” The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, ed. G. R. F. Ferrari, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 (pp.310-344).  
192 
 
                                                                                                                   
30 According to the hierarchy of the Phaedrus, the lover of wisdom and the Muses is 
the true lover (Phaedrus 248d3-4). But where does Alkibiades rank? The second place 
goes to the lawful king or the warrior, the one who values honour above wisdom 
(248d5; 256b9-d12).  
31 Alkibiades complains ‘Σωκράτους παρόντος τῶν καλῶν μεταλαβεῖν ἀδύνατον 
ἄλλῳ’ (Symposium 223a5-b1). Agathon and Alkibiades, the poet and the statesman, 
fight over Sokrates, they want his praise – but neither can get it in an unqualified 
sense.  
32 Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 
1981 (p.258).  
33 If the idea of freedom is an important principle of Athenian democracy, then it is 
significant that in the cave, which is surely a representation of Sokrates’ Athens, 
people are described as prisoners; the freedom that they are so proud of, however, is 
merely an illusion.  
34 ‘How, then, can we correlate the first stage of education, which is based on 
oral/aural activities geared towards ethical and political praxis, with the radically 
different aims and claims of the second stage – with an education which is directed 
towards intellectual “vision” or contemplation achieved by dialectic?’ (Andrea 
Wilson Nightingale, “Education in Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Politics”, Education 
in Greek and Roman Antiquity, ed. Yun Lee Too, Boston: Brill, 2001, p.149). As many 
scholars have noted, the imagery that Plato employs in the Cave is not altogether 
consistent, and is not easy to reconcile, in particular, with the previous similes of the 
Sun and the Line. What one should be aware of, however, is the implicit criticism 
here of Heraclitos. The Cave is the world of becoming, and, as such, it is sharply 
contrasted with the ‘realm of the forms,’ the world beyond the Cave, and thus this 
can often make a direct comparison with the Sun and Line difficult. Indeed, Plato 
seems to have made the separateness of the Cave and the realm of the forms too 
complete. As Nightingale observes: ‘Although the first stage of education served to 
free the individual from bondage to the irrational parts of the soul (as well as from 
false logoi), the second stage frees it from the external influences of all human affairs 
and all physical phenomena. Dialectic and the “contemplation” of truth confers 
complete knowledge and freedom even as it denigrates “our” world with its 
manifold enticements’ (Ibid p.148). The obvious tension between the practical and the 
contemplative is hard to resolve. When Sokrates moves on to describe the education 
of the philosopher rulers this tension is eased somewhat, although other questions 
remain. Nevertheless, and continuing with the Cave, what we should focus on is the 
picture that Sokrates is drawing of the current state of education and its resulting 
affects. 
35 The released prisoner is Meno, or, indeed, any person who, on account of the 
Sokratic elenkhos has reached the stage where they are no longer sure about their 
former convictions. For some interlocutors, Alkibiades for instance, this process is too 
much. 
36 As we see in the Protagoras, after a dialogical discussion has broken down (usually 
due to unwillingness on the behalf of his interlocutor to continue), Sokrates considers 
his work to be finished (335b1-3). Protagoras claims skill in being able to answer a 
question with brevity (Protagoras 335a1-4, and Sokrates also claims this skill for 
Protagoras in the Theaetetus), as does Gorgias (Gorgias 449b9-c2); but neither is as 
adept at dialectic as Sokrates (Protagoras 336c1-d3).  
37 Is Sokrates always ‘frank’ in his interaction with his interlocutors? Cf. Jerry 
Stannard, “Socratic Eros and Platonic Dialectic,” Phronesis, Vol. 4, No. 2, (1959), p.39. 
38 For Kallikles, Alkibiades, and Thrasymakhos it is a doubly disquieting process. The 
life of the philosopher is, according to these men, hardly enviable: Alkibiades would 
rather be dead than live without honour (Alcibiades I 105a5-8), and Kallikles takes 
philosophy to be child’s play (Gorgias 484c5-9), while Thrasymakhos has nothing but 
contempt for Sokrates. 
193 
 
                                                                                                                   
39 W. K. C. Guthrie , Plato: The Man and his Dialogues Earlier Period, A History of Greek 
Philosophy IV, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 (pp.525-526). 
40 ‘The myth, while offering needed relief, also makes a contribution to the pursuit of 
the nature of the statesman; it is play with a serious purpose’ (Janet E. Smith, “Plato’s 
use of Myth in the Education of Philosophic Man,” Phoenix, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1986, p.25, 
cf. Laws 803c, 814d, Sixth Letter 323d1). 
41 For an excellent account of the nature of Greek myths, see G. S. Kirks’ The Nature of 
Greek Myths, London: Penguin, 1974.  
42 Cf. Julia Annas, “Plato’s Myths of Judgement,” Phronesis, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1982). 
43 Ludwig Edelstein, “The Function of Myth in Plato’s Philosophy,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1949 (p.474).  
44 Luc Brisson, Plato the Myth Maker, trans. and Ed. Gerard Naddaf, Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1998 (pp.91-111). 
45 Ibid p.11.  
46 ‘We listen attentively because we dimly imagine that if we could interpret them, 
we should gain rich instruction. But we listen in vain; the only instruction we receive 
is the instruction how to listen attentively’ (Philip Merlan, “Form and Content in 
Plato’s Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1947, p.411).  
47 Ibid p.24. 
48 ‘An examination of the use of myth in the dialogues shows that myths serve 
several functions: (1) they are "playful" in a way which is vital to philosophy; (2) they 
serve the related purpose of providing insights or hypotheses for examination; (3) 
they help keep the dialogues "undogmatic" and encourage further investigation of 
topics probed in the dialogues; (4) they serve Plato's philosophical goal of shifting 
one's attention from the World of Becoming to "worlds beyond" which include the 
World of Forms and the afterlife; and (5) they tend to draw together many of the 
concerns and images of the dialogue as a whole’ (Janet E. Smith, “Plato’s Use of Myth 
in the Education of Philosophic Man,” Phoenix, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1986, p.21).  
49 In its entirety, Homer’s Iliad is not educational, although certain passages could 
well be appropriated for the purpose of teaching, those which, for example, would be 
used in the education of the guardians. A written speech by Lysias or Isokrates, may 
have various merits, as perhaps would Protagoras’ On Truth, but none could be 
called educational because in each case such works are taken as sufficient, self-
contained, and as not requiring any further inquiry.  
50 I say ‘partially’ because the dialogues do not reveal truth, although they may 
indicate a path towards it.  
51 Leo Strauss, The City and Man (p.54). 
52 Gorgias/Gorgias, Protagoras/Protagoras, Theaetetus, Thrasymakhos/Republic, 
Parmenides/Parmenides, Lysias/Phaedrus, Homer/Ion, Heraklitos/Theaetetus, 
Kratylos/Cratylus  etc. 
53 Kent F. Moors, “Plato’s use of Dialogue,” The Classical World, Vol. 72, No. 2, 
October, 1978 (p.93). 
54 William A. Johnson, “Dramatic Frame and Philosophic Idea in Plato,” The American 
Journal of Philology, Vol. 119, No. 4, 1998 (p.594). 
55 John Fisher, “Plato on Writing and Doing Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 
Vol. 27, No. 2, April – June, 1966 (p.171). 
56 John Evan Seery, “Politics as Ironic Community: On the Themes of Descent and 
Return in Plato’s Republic,” Political Theory, Vol. 16, No. 2, May, 1988 (p.247). 
57 Moors, “Plato’s use of Dialogue” (p.77).  
58 Ibid pp.88-89. 
59 Fisher, “Plato on Writing and Doing Philosophy” (p.168). 
60 ‘The realization of philosophy, however, is exclusively the individual’s. It is, 
ultimately, he, and no other, who must persuade himself to follow the lead of 
philosophy and seek out the truth. While the interlocutor is led by the dialogue to 
perceive the inadequacies of appearance and opinion, it still remains solely the task 
194 
 
                                                                                                                   
of the interlocutor to set in motion the final persuasion’ (Moors, “Plato’s use of 
Dialogue,” p.79). 
195 
 
Chapter Five 
 
Seeming and Being in Plato’s Ethics 
 
ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ πάνυ εὐφυὴς ᾖ καὶ πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας φιλοσοφῇ, ἀνάγκη 
πάντων ἄπειρον γεγονέναι ἐστὶν ὧν χρὴ ἔμπειρον εἶναι τὸν μέλλοντα 
καλὸν κἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον ἔσεσθαι ἄνδρα. καὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων 
ἄπειροι γίγνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τῶν λόγων οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον 
ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, καὶ τῶν 
ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, καὶ συλλήβδην τῶν ἠθῶν 
παντάπασιν ἄπειροι γίγνονται (Gorgias 484c9-d8)i 
 
 
In this chapter I shall be looking at emulation and role adoption, 
ethical complexity (a term which I use in reference to Plato’s theory of 
the relationship between a person’s character traits and their psukhē), 
and the problem of ethical deception (an issue that arises due to a 
certain feature of character traits which impacts on our ability to 
judge a person’s character and psukhē). I shall begin, in the first 
section, by outlining Plato’s theory of the complex, and often 
changing,1 relationship between the psukhē and character, and the 
challenge this represents for ethical judgement (something which is a 
particular concern of Plato’s, cf. Gorgias 463e5-464a9; 470c8-e2). Next, 
                                                 
i ‘However well endowed one may be, if one philosophizes far on into life, 
one must needs find oneself ignorant of everything that ought to be familiar 
to the man who would be a thorough gentleman and make a good figure in 
the world. For such people are shown to be ignorant of the laws of their city, 
and of the terms which have to be used in negotiating agreement with their 
fellows in private or in public affairs, and of human pleasures and desires; 
and, in short, to be utterly inexperienced in men’s character’ (W. R. M. Lamb 
p.389).  
196 
 
in section two, I shall discuss role models and role adoption more 
generally, particularly in respect to ethical complexity. In section 
three I shall discuss the use of ‘role-models’ in the character 
education of the guardians, and Plato’s solution for countering ethical 
deception, before finishing, in section four, with an examination of 
Plato’s use of ‘life-models’ in the dialogues. 
 
§1 
 
Seeming rather than Being: Ethical Deception 
 
It is not enough that your Designs, nay that your Actions, are intrinsically 
good, you must take Care they shall appear so2 
 
 
According to Plato there can be no real disparity between a person’s 
character (ēthos) and their soul (psukhē) because the former is 
representative of the latter; to speak about specific character traits 
(ēthē) is to speak about specific virtues (aretai) or vices, and, more 
generally, to speak about a person’s character is to speak about their 
virtue or vice (Republic 400d10-400e3; 401a5-8; 401b1-4). At least in 
respect to the psychology of the Republic, the soul has three ‘parts’ or 
faculties: the ‘calculating’ faculty (logistikon), the ‘spirited’ faculty (to 
thumoeides), and the ‘appetitive’ faculty (epithuētikon); and it is the 
perfect functioning of each of these faculties which gives rise to 
197 
 
specific excellences or virtues. For example, the virtue of the logistikon 
or calculating ‘part’ is wisdom (sophia), or, to put it another way, that 
excellence, wisdom, which we can predicate of a person, is due to the 
perfect functioning of the calculating faculty. But we must also bear 
in mind that the particular arrangement of a person’s soul is also 
relevant to the presence of virtue, and that this has an effect on the 
quality of their character traits. That is to say: it is not just the fact that 
character traits depend upon the parts or faculties of the soul but also 
that how these parts or faculties are related to each other will 
determine the range and force of their associated character traits. A 
person’s character, therefore, is a summation of their virtue or vice.3    
  
If this is the case, then, it should be fairly easy to ascertain a person’s 
virtue, even in cases where the person in question is not well known 
to us. Who, for example would doubt Brasidas’ courage when he 
stormed Amphipolis? And what about Domitian’s piety, his devotion 
to Athene was well known? And there would be no need to ask who 
is the happiest, a beggar or Kroesus, the latter’s treasure stores give 
ample evidence. As even Orestes recognised, however, true character 
and nobility is more than skin deep, so we must be able to sharply 
distinguish between the reputation for virtue and virtue itself 
(Euripides, Electra 367-379). This, however, is not an easy thing to do: 
for few of us get to delve into a so-called virtuous person’s life, and to 
unmask them, to see their naked souls. But supposing that we wished 
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to be virtuous, and to emulate the virtuous, how is it possible to do 
this safely? How do we know if our paradigms or role models are as 
virtuous as they would like us to believe? And what does it matter if 
we are mistaken in this?  
 
Early in the Republic, when Socrates is countering Simonides and the 
traditional view of dikaiosunē (helping one’s friends and harming 
one’s enemies), he asks Polemarkhos: ‘φίλους δὲ λέγεις εἶναι 
πότερον τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἑκάστῳ χρηστοὺς εἶναι, ἢ τοὺς ὄντας, 
κἂν μὴ δοκῶσι, καὶ ἐχθροὺς ὡσαύτως;’ (334c1-2).ii Polemarkhos 
replies: ‘οὓς ἄν τις ἡγῆται χρηστοὺς φιλεῖν, οὓς δ' ἂν πονηροὺς 
μισεῖν’ (334c3-4).iii However, as Socrates points out, people are liable 
to make mistakes in this crucial regard. The problem, although it is 
not at this point stated in these terms, is that it is possible to imitate 
good character, and therefore in a sense one must look beyond the 
character presented (the classic model, which Plato indeed refers to, 
is Seven against Thebes, ‘οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος, ἀλλ᾽ εἶναι θέλει’, 
591-592). This, of course, is easier said than done.  
                                                 
ii ‘Do you mean by friends those who seem to be good to an individual, or 
those who are, even if they don’t seem to be, and similarly with enemies? 
(trans. Bloom p.11).  
iii ‘[It’s likely, he said] that the men one believes to be good, one loves, while 
those he considers bad one hates’ (trans. Bloom Ibid).  
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However, as Adiemantos says later: ‘οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀεὶ λανθάνειν κακὸν 
ὄντα’ (Republic 365c6).iv Nevertheless, there are various options open 
to the would-be dissembler:  
 
ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λανθάνειν συνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἑταιρίας συνάξομεν, εἰσίν τε 
πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι σοφίαν δημηγορικήν τε καὶ δικανικὴν διδόντες, ἐξ 
ὧν τὰ μὲν πείσομεν, τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα, ὡς πλεονεκτοῦντες δίκην μὴ 
διδόναι (Republic 365d2-4)v 
 
 
The possibility, therefore, of the vicious person appearing to be 
virtuous, rests upon their ability to dissemble. We are sufficiently 
sophisticated and experienced to be able to pretend to be something 
we are not (indeed, this assumption is central to Plato’s concern about 
the power of dramatic performance). In these cases, as Plato suggests, 
such misjudgements are most often due to ignorance or naivety, that 
is, to people’s inability to discern imitation from reality – to see 
through the masquerade of the unjust dissembler. However, what I 
am primarily interested in here is not so much with moral 
dissembling, but with what I call ethical deception. Ethical deception 
occurs when a person is led, by no serious fault of their own, to make 
false judgements about whether a person is virtuous or vicious based 
upon some aspect of that person’s character, that is, on the character of 
                                                 
iv ‘It’s not always easy to do bad and get away with it unnoticed’ (trans. 
Bloom p.42). 
v ‘To remain uncovered we will form secret societies and political clubs. And 
there are teachers of persuasion to make us clever in dealing with assemblies 
and law courts. Therefore, partly by persuasion, partly by force, we will 
contrive to do better than other people, without paying the penalty’ (trans. 
C. D. C. Reeve p.43). 
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the person that they wish to emulate. The possibility of ethical 
deception is going to depend, therefore, on a feature of certain 
character traits, and, more fundamentally, on the relationship 
between character, virtue, and the soul.  
    
The possibility of ethical deception rests upon the fact that although a 
person’s genuine character traits always represent the condition of 
their soul some character traits are not necessarily peculiar to a 
particular type of soul, that is, certain character traits can be 
predicated of differently arranged souls (even if Plato would not 
think this an appropriate thing to do). According to the psychology of 
the Republic, therefore, some character traits that we could attribute to 
a virtuous person could also be attributed to a vicious one. 
Gentleness and harshness are a case in point. Let us consider these 
traits in respect to two types of people, the philosopher and the 
tyrant. Although they represent the extremes of what is humanly 
possible, the philosopher and the tyrant, insofar as they are human, 
could, in principle, be gentle or harsh.4 Indeed, for the philosopher 
these character traits are supposed to be representative of at least part 
of their virtue, and the correct functioning of their thumos in 
particular (indeed: ‘οἵ γε δίκαιοι ἥμεροι,’ Gorgias 516c3). In terms of 
the guardians of the ideal polis, gentleness is mainly spoken of in 
terms of their philosophical nature and their moderate behaviour 
towards their fellow citizens and each other.  Due to certain measures 
201 
 
in their early education, as we saw in Chapter Three, the guardians 
are disposed to act to those they know with gentleness and to those 
they do not know with harshness (Republic 375a2-376c5, cf. Timaeus 
17d4-7; 18a3-7).  
 
With the tyrant, of course, the matter is not so straightforward. 
Bearing in mind the nature of the tyrant, at least the sort that Plato is 
interested in, we might want to deny outright that such a person 
could be gentle. Certainly, when Plato does speak about the tyrant’s 
gentleness he thinks of it mainly as a conceit, and therefore the 
tyrant’s gentleness is an example of moral dissembling (Republic 
566d8-e3). Plato neither denies nor asserts whether he thinks that it is 
possible for the tyrant to be gentle, although the idea, though perhaps 
counterintuitive, is not impossible. 
    
However, even if we deny the possibility that a tyrant could be 
gentle, or at least gentle in any way that resembles the gentleness of 
the philosopher, it is more obviously the case that the tyrant could be 
harsh, indeed, it is, for Plato, a key feature of his personality. The 
tyrant’s harshness, however, is not only reserved for his enemies but 
is directed to the entire populace. As I have already indicated, Plato 
explains the difference in the scope, force, and range of these 
character traits in terms of the arrangement of the soul that they 
originate from. In the Republic gentleness and harshness are 
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associated with the thumos, but since the thumos never acts alone, we 
have to understand such character traits as emerging from the 
relationship between the other two elements of the soul. The 
philosopher is gentle and harsh to the right degree, and she acts in a 
gentle way in situations that call for gentleness and acts in a harsh 
way in situations that call for harshness. In Aristotle’s language, the 
philosopher hits the mean every time. For the philosopher this is 
possible because she knows which situations call for gentleness and 
harshness; her thumos listens to reason, and thus she is disposed to act 
in the appropriate way in the appropriate circumstances. The tyrant’s 
soul is under no such constraints, and therefore he acts accordingly, 
venting his anger capriciously and without consideration.  
  
Ethical deception taken alone is not necessarily a problem because, 
typically, the way that we formulate judgements about people’s 
character and virtue is not entirely dependent on the estimation of a 
single character trait. When judging whether a person is virtuous we 
would probably, and ideally, demand as much ‘ethically relevant’ 
information as possible. Where the impact of ethical deception can be 
felt most strongly is when it arises in situations where a more 
thorough knowledge of person’s character is either impossible or 
undesirable; and one such situation is role adoption. In order to see 
why this is the case we have to examine what role adoption entails 
and, more particularly, what a role-model is.5  
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§2 
 
Role-Models and Role Adoption 
 
Typically a role-model is a person who, in respect to the role (or 
roles) they are thought to excel in or exemplify, is the subject of 
emulation by another person or persons. Generally the roles that a 
person might seek to adopt are either specific or general. For 
example, Bill could be a model father to Richard in the sense that for 
Richard, Bill is, all round, a good example of what a father should be 
like in general. Or it could be the case that for Richard that Bill is a 
good model of a father in a specific way or in specific situations. 
Perhaps Bill is a good father in the sense that he listens to his 
children. But in cases where it is a specific role that is being 
highlighted for adoption, it is quite often the case that the model as a 
whole is not endorsed, either accidentally or deliberately. Bill might 
be a good listener but perhaps he spends too much time away from 
his children. In this case, perhaps, Richard is only interested in 
emulating a single aspect of Bill, that is, his ability or tendency to 
listen to his children. Richard does not want to spend less time with 
his children, so the level of identification that he has with Bill is 
limited to this single aspect.  
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We might want to bring in here a distinction that Robert King Merton 
makes in his Social Theory and Social Structure, between a role-model 
and a reference individual. For Merton the main difference between a 
role-model and a reference individual is cashed out in terms of the 
level of identification that is involved in each case: ‘the concept of a 
role-model can be thought of as more restricted in scope, denoting a 
more limited identification with an individual in only one or selected 
few of his roles,’ however ‘the person who identifies himself with a 
reference individual will seek to approximate the behaviour and 
values of that individual in several roles.’6 Whether a person can be 
chosen as a reference individual rather than as a role-model will 
depend, not just on whether such a move is advisable in the given 
circumstances, but also upon the level of social interaction between 
the person and the individual that they wish to emulate. I shall come 
back to this notion of a reference individual in the last section, for 
now I want to concentrate on a problem that is more often associated 
with the kind of role adoption common to the convention of role-
models.  
    
The very nature of role adoption is that it is partial and the level of 
identification that it involves is restricted to a single, or, at most, a 
handful of roles; it must ignore, either by design or by accident, those 
aspects which are not thought to be suitable for emulation, either 
because they are not relevant or because they are morally suspect. It 
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is only by selecting the desirable aspects and ignoring the undesirable 
that a role-model can be chosen: discrimination is a key feature of role 
adoption. Role adoption can often involve a minimising or disguising 
of the ethical complexity of the role-model.  
 
All I mean by ethical complexity is that network of traits, 
dispositions, wants, and desires, that compose a person’s 
‘personality,’ and that from which knowledge of that person’s 
motivations and intentions are better understood. (I admit that not all 
role adoption has to be moral in nature, but what I am particularly 
interested in is the ethico-pedagogical efficacy of role adoption, rather 
than an analysis of role adoption in all its varieties).  
 
The problem with role-models is that they are one-dimensional. Role-
models, as they appear to the prospective role-player, present an 
incomplete picture of the role-model’s character, which in turn denies 
or obscures the kind of ethical complexity fundamental to the 
individual. Role adoption, of the type where the object of emulation 
is understood only in respect to the role that a person seeks to 
emulate, causes what I call the sandglass effect, which can be 
illustrated thus:  
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The first figure on the left-hand side of the glass, X, is a possible role-
model for Y, who is on the right-hand side of the glass. A, B, and C 
represent the role options that a person, including Y, may want to 
adopt. The narrow opening in the centre of the sandglass represents 
the moment where Y chooses a role option, in this example B, to the 
exclusion of A and C. The small figure next to Y (x) represents Y’s 
view of X, who is now largely understood in terms of the role B. In 
respect to the role he has adopted Y now identifies himself with B/x; 
Y emulates X in respect to B. This has an impact on ethical complexity 
in the following way. Since Y has chosen, at whatever level, to ignore 
A and C, his wish to become like X in respect to B is taken out of its 
original and specific context, a context which for X not only includes 
the relationship between A, B and C (and for that matter E, F, G etc.) 
but also the intricate pattern of his life, behaviour and character. 
 
Role adoption de-contextualises the role, and it creates a one-sided 
picture of the character of the role ‘giver.’ Roles are un-
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problematically transferable, discrete, and unambiguous. In a sense, 
role-adoption, in the largely uncritical and unreflective sense in 
which it is often employed, is a source of ‘bad faith.’  
 
A good example of the issue of partiality and denial of ethical 
complexity in respect to role adoption can be found in Homer’s 
Odyssey.7 Early on in book one of the Odyssey we are introduced to 
Telemakhos, who, because of the disastrous situation in his 
household caused by the suitors, is badly in need of guidance, and, 
largely because of his father’s absence, a strong role-model, and this 
is where Orestes comes in. But what we shall see is that the eligibility 
of Orestes as a role model to Telemakhos is only possible when 
certain facts about him are suppressed, that is, when ethical 
complexity is ignored. 
 
In the Odyssey Orestes is twice held up as a role model for 
Telemakhos, the first time by Athene: 
 
ἢ οὐκ ἀίεις οἷον κλέος ἔλλαβε δῖος Ὀρέστης 
πάντας ἐπ᾽ ἀνθρώπους, ἐπεὶ ἔκτανε πατροφονῆα, 
Αἴγισθον δολόμητιν, ὅ οἱ πατέρα κλυτὸν ἔκτα; 
καὶ σύ, φίλος, μάλα γάρ σ᾽ ὁρόω καλόν τε μέγαν τε, 
ἄλκιμος ἔσσ᾽, ἵνα τίς σε καὶ ὀψιγόνων ἐὺ εἴπῃ 
(Odyssey 1.298-302) vi 
                                                 
vi ‘Or have you not heard what glory was won by great Orestes among all 
mankind, when he killed the murderer of his father, the treacherous 
Aigisthos, who had slain his famous father? So you too, dear friend, since I 
can see you are big and splendid, be bold also, so that in generations to come 
they will praise you’ (trans. Lattimore p.35). 
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The example is sold to Telemakhos by suggesting that if he acts like 
Orestes then he too will win glory (kleos),8 and be well spoken of (eu 
eipē) for generations to come. Athene urges Telemakhos to be bold 
(alkimos) like Orestes, who is praised for avenging his father, 
Agamemnon, who was killed by his wife’s lover, Aigisthos. As the 
following lines suggest, Telemakhos will also gain praise by killing 
his mother’s suitors and protecting his father’s household (1.295-296). 
Telemakhos is urged to relinquish his childhood, to become a man, 
and act accordingly, as Orestes did when he returned from Athens to 
avenge his father (1.296-297). These themes are revisited in book 3 in 
Nestor’s speech to Telemakhos:  
 
ὡς ἀγαθὸν καὶ παῖδα καταφθιμένοιο λιπέσθαι 
ἀνδρός, ἐπεὶ καὶ κεῖνος ἐτίσατο πατροφονῆα, 
Αἴγισθον δολόμητιν, ὅ οἱ πατέρα κλυτὸν ἔκτα. 
καὶ σὺ φίλος, μάλα γάρ σ᾽ ὁρόω καλόν τε μέγαν τε, 
ἄλκιμος ἔσσ᾽, ἵνα τίς σε καὶ ὀψιγόνων ἐὺ εἴπῃ 
(Odyssey 3.196-200)vii 
 
 
By emphasising this moral, that it is good for a father to have an 
avenging son, Nestor’s speech serves to reinforce Athene’s words at 
1.298-302.9 However, neither Athene nor Nestor sees fit to mention to 
Telemakhos that Orestes is responsible for his mother’s death. Could 
                                                 
vii ‘…so it is good, when a man has perished, to have a son left after him, 
since this one took vengeance on his father’s killer, the treacherous 
Aigisthos, who cut down his glorious father. So you too, dear friend, for I 
see you are tall and splendid, be brave too, so that men unborn may speak 
well of you’ (trans. Lattimore p.56). 
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the endorsement of Orestes as a role-model depend upon this crucial 
fact being suppressed?  
    
The murder of his mother, his subsequent pollution, trial and 
absolution, form the centrepiece of the Orestes myth, in particular the 
dramatic representations by Aiskhylos, Sophokles, and Euripides. 
But in book 3 of the Odyssey (309-310), although we learn that 
Klytemnestra is dead, the author is silent about how she met her end. 
There are various possible reasons for this omission. It may be that 
Homer was not aware of this part of the myth, or, if he was, 
deliberately omitted it, or, as it has been suggested by some scholars, 
it may be the case that the story postdates the composition of the 
Odyssey.10 Whatever the reason, as we learn in book 3 that 
Klytemnestra is dead and that she is implicated in her husband’s 
murder, and it is not much of a stretch to assert that she was probably 
killed by Orestes or, at the very least, that he was involved in her 
death, and that Homer must understand his characters as being 
aware of this.11 It is not, therefore, the case that Telemakhos might not 
know that Orestes killed his mother, but that, for the purposes of 
recommending him as a role-model, Athene and Nestor think it 
prudent to omit mention of the crime.  
 
But why would being a matricide affect Orestes’ eligibility to be a 
role-model to Telemakhos? The roles suggested to Telemakhos are to 
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avenge this father and protect his household, and in this respect 
Orestes is an acceptable (or at least understandable) role-model, what 
does it matter that he is also his mother’s murderer?12 It could be 
argued that matricide, or indeed any obviously ethically dubious act, 
is not only relevant to our understanding of a person’s character and 
life but also to the roles that they play and those that could be 
adopted by others. In the case of some roles this is not so clear, 
particularly when the role in question is morally neutral, but where it 
presents a bigger problem is when a suggested role carries with it 
tacit claims about the ways in which a person ought to behave and 
the kinds of things that a person ought to value. To take another 
example: Akhilleus may be a suitable role-model in respect to his 
martial prowess, his skill with a spear for instance, but his fighting 
skill is used for certain purposes, which presuppose a commitment to 
certain aims (killing Hektor, avenging Patroklos, winning honour 
etc), which fighting well helps to achieve, and a certain moral 
standpoint (honour is a good thing, avenging one’s friends is a good 
thing etc). When we decide to emulate another person, to take on one 
or more of their roles, it might be better to have some understanding 
of why they themselves perform these roles, and to what end, and to 
see, moreover, if their claims are justified.13 
 
Plato’s own view of role-adoption is complex. On the one hand, and 
within the confines of the ideal polis, role-models must be tailor-
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made, morally unambiguous, and have clearly defined motivations. 
Ethically complexity, in other than in the case of virtuous role-
models, must be denied because of the way that role-adoption is used 
in the character education of the guardians. On the other hand, under 
the auspices of Platonic education, and therefore situated within 
imperfect societies, Plato has a more subtle approach to role-
adoption.  
 
§3 
 
Emulation in the Ideal Polis 
 
The warts and all Orestes would not be a suitable role-model for the 
guardians, as is clear from book 3 of the Republic (386a1-392c4).14 
Nevertheless, role adoption and emulation is, as I have indicated, 
central to the young guardians’ education in the Republic. 
 
There is, of course, no Greek word for ‘role-model,’ however, there 
are two terms that Plato uses which come close to the same meaning: 
τύπος (type) and παράδειγμα (paradigm, model). As I say, neither of 
these is equivalent to the English term ‘role-model’15 but both appear, 
nevertheless, in certain contexts at least, to be associated with role-
taking and emulation. τύπος features heavily in books 2 and 3, where 
Sokrates outlines the educational program for the guardians. 
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παράδειγμα features mostly in the later books, and is often a term 
which is used in the context of the forms (472c3-d2,16 484c7-d4,17 
500d9e5).   
 
Importantly τύπος plays a special role in Plato’s notion of mimesis.18 
τύποι can refer either to specific forms of musical presentation or 
content (377cb2, c9, 379a2, 389b3, 397c7); in the case of the latter 
Sokrates calls these τύποι laws (νόμοι, 383b1019). Sokrates identifies 
three models or laws that are of particular importance. The first 
comes in book 2, to the effect that god is not the cause of all things, 
but only of good things (Republic 380c6-7).20 The second comes at 
380d1-383a5,21 and stipulates the gods are not wizards and nor do 
they mislead, either in speech or deed.  
    
The third law, pertaining to how heroes are to be represented, is 
particularly pertinent to the guardians’ early education (386a-
392a2).22 In book 3 at 365a5-1b Adeimantos points out how the 
behaviour not only of gods but also of men in the traditional mythoi 
are used by the young as a guide for ‘what sort of man one should be 
and what way one must follow to go through life best.’23 And, as we 
saw in the Chapter Two, these traditional stories were embedded 
within traditional education, specifically in mousikē.  
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The regulation of mousikē, therefore, is an important first step in 
Sokrates’ formulation of the guardians’ educational program, as we 
learn at 377a10-b2: ‘Οὐκοῦν οἶσθ’ ὅτι ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον, 
ἄλλως τε δὴ καὶ νέῳ καὶ ἁπαλῷ ὁτῳοῦν; μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τότε 
πλάττεται, καὶ ἐνδύεται τύπος ὃν ἄν τις βούληται ἐνσημήνασθαι 
ἑκάστῳ’ (my emphasis).viii The young are impressionable and, 
therefore, particularly susceptible to any model (τύπος) that one 
would want to impress on them. Janaway calls this the ‘Principle of 
Assimilation, ‘which states that people come to resemble what they 
enact.’24 Therefore, the kinds of people that one might imitate are 
especially relevant. As Aristotle states, ‘Ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ 
μιμούμενοι πράττοντας, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ 
φαύλους εἶναι’ (Poetics 1448a1-2),ix and, in respect to the education of 
the guardians, only the former can be countenanced. 
 
In respect to the mimicry common in musical performance the young 
guardians must restrict their imitation to the words and deeds of 
good men. The guardians will be ashamed to mimic the words and 
deeds of bad men on two counts: first, because they are unpractised 
at such imitations, and second, because of their disgust with fitting in 
                                                 
viii ‘Don’t you know that the beginning is the most important part of every 
work and that this is especially so with anything young and tender? For at 
that stage it’s most plastic and each thing assimilates itself to the model 
whose stamp anyone wishes to give it’ (trans. Bloom p.54).  
ix ‘Those who imitate must imitate agents, and these agents must necessarily 
be either admirable or inferior’ (trans. Michael Richard Hart).  
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with, and taking possession of, such models (τύποι, Republic 396c3–
396e3). 
 
τὸ μὲν πολλὴν μίμησιν καὶ ποικίλην ἔχει, τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν, τὸ δὲ 
φρόνιμόν τε καὶ ἡσύχιον ἦθος, παραπλήσιον ὂν ἀεὶ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, οὔτε 
ῥᾴδιον μιμήσασθαι οὔτε μιμουμένου εὐπετὲς καταμαθεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ 
πανηγύρει καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰς θέατρα συλλεγομένοις· 
ἀλλοτρίου γάρ που πάθους ἡ μίμησις αὐτοῖς γίγνεται (Republic 604e1-5)x 
 
 
As part of their education in mousikē, the trainee guardians are 
exposed to good models of character and are shielded from the bad. 
Consequently, poets like Homer, whose works contained the 
traditional models of behaviour, are to be censored, since heroes like 
Akhilleus and Agamemnon, at least how Homer presents them, are 
not suitable models for the guardians. The early education of the 
guardians, as we saw in Chapter Three, is intended to produce 
characters of a certain kind, people who are both philosophical and 
spirited, people who can excel at both philosophy and war (Republic 
543a1-5; Timaeus 24d1-4, cf. Euripides’ Rhesus 105-108). Hence, and 
considering these very specific roles, the guardians are not to emulate 
anything other than suitable ‘role-models.’25 It will not do, therefore, 
for the guardians to emulate the Akhilleus of Homer’s Iliad, who, 
                                                 
x ‘…the irritable disposition affords much and varied imitation, while the 
prudent and quiet character, which is always nearly equal to itself, is neither 
easily imitated nor, when imitated, easily understood, especially by a festive 
assembly where all sorts of human beings are gathered in a theater. For the 
imitation is of a condition that is surely alien to them’ (trans. Bloom p.288).  
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despite his undoubted spiritedness, could never be called 
philosophical and is not, therefore, guardian material.   
    
However, there could be a problem with the censorship that runs 
through the guardians’ role emulation. What protects the guardians 
in respect to bad role-models in their education would frankly be a 
hindrance if they ever come face to face with fully rounded, three 
dimensional, and crucially, unjust people. Because the use of role-
models in their education is restricted only to those types deemed 
worthy and useful, the guardians have no knowledge of bad 
character or vice (they do, of course, know of the existence of such 
people, but this seems to be as far as their association with such types 
will go, Republic 396a2-3). If, therefore, a young guardian were to 
meet a clever villain, he would, we might conjecture, be easily duped, 
either deliberately through moral dissembling or accidentally 
through ethical deception. 
 
It could be objected that the guardians, being watchful sheepdogs, are 
trained to respond in anger to those they do not know, and hence 
they would automatically be on their guard against any enemy of 
them and their society. This is hardly reassuring, for ignorance can 
hardly be called a valid criterion for action. What, then, is the 
answer?  
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Plato has a solution however. In the Republic Plato side steps the 
issues of moral dissembling and ethical deception by bypassing 
character, insisting instead that judgements on a whether a person is 
virtuous or vicious be based on an understanding of a person’s soul. 
In order to be a good judge of character, and hence of virtue, the 
guardians must be late learners of bad character and vice, gaining a 
knowledge of it not through their own soul, through personal 
experience, but through studying it in the souls of other people:  
 
 
πονηρία μὲν γὰρ ἀρετήν τε καὶ αὑτὴν οὔποτ’ ἂν γνοίη, ἀρετὴ δὲ φύσεως 
παιδευομένης χρόνῳ ἅμα αὑτῆς τε καὶ πονηρίας ἐπιστήμην λήψεται. 
σοφὸς οὖν οὗτος, ὥς μοι δοκεῖ, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁ κακὸς γίγνεται’ (Republic 
409d7-e1)xi 
 
 
It is the bad man who is the poor judge of character, knowing only 
his own type, since he acts only according to his own paradigms 
(paradeigmata). The bad man can never study the souls of others and 
can hence never understand moral goodness (409d1-4). The good 
judge by contrast is a sound appraiser of the character of others; he 
has moved beyond the simple stage of the young guardians’ 
education that involves role-models. His view of character is total 
and he cannot therefore be taken in by the reputation or the seeming 
goodness of the bad man. In the myth of the Gorgias, we learn that the 
                                                 
xi ‘For badness would never know virtue and itself, while virtue in an 
educated nature will in time gain a knowledge of both itself and badness 
simultaneously. This man, in my opinion, and not the bad one, becomes 
wise’ (trans. Bloom p.88). 
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only way to judge the virtue of a person is by examining their naked 
soul, that is to say, as it is when it is freed from the body and its 
adornments (Gorgias 523a1-d4). The true judge is the one 
 
ὃς δύναται τῇ διανοίᾳ εἰς ἀνδρὸς ἦθος ἐνδὺς διιδεῖν καὶ μὴ καθάπερ παῖς 
ἔξωθεν ὁρῶν ἐκπλήττεται ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν τυραννικῶν προστάσεως ἣν πρὸς 
τοὺς ἔξω σχηματίζονται, ἀλλ᾽ ἱκανῶς διορᾷ (Republic 577a3-6)xii 
 
 
It is, unlike Kallikles’ assertion in the Gorgias (484c9-d8), the task of 
philosophy to enable a person to gain experience in human character. 
However, if role adoption is to be a useful method for developing 
virtue it must be employed in a way that is sensitive to moral 
dissembling and ethical deception and the more diverse nature of 
human character in less than ideal societies.  
 
§4 
 
Life-Models 
 
In her Plato and the Hero, Angela Hobbs offers another reading of how 
Plato uses ‘role-models’ in the dialogues, which extends beyond their 
use in the educational system of the ideal polis of the Republic. For 
                                                 
xii ‘Who is able with his thought to creep into a man’s character and see 
through it – a man who is not like a child looking from outside and 
overwhelmed by the tyrannic pomp set up as a façade for those outside, but 
who rather sees through it adequately (trans. Bloom p.257, slightly adapted).  
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Hobbs a role-model is an historical or fictional person ‘who serves as 
a model to be emulated to a greater or lesser extent.’26 According to 
Hobbs’ definition we should place less emphasis on the emulation of 
specific roles and more on the life as a whole. In this sense Hobbs’ 
definition of a role-model is closer to what Merton calls a reference 
individual, and this is important. However, we need to note that 
Hobbs is not arguing that we should seek to emulate a person as 
closely as possible, or seek total identification, but rather that what 
we should be seeking to ‘adopt’ is not so much discrete roles but a 
certain model of living, with all the complexity and ambiguity that 
this may suggest. As Hobbs goes on to say, the term ‘life-model’ is 
more appropriate (a term that I have already used but have yet to 
elaborate on). The term ‘life-model’ is especially useful because of its 
more obvious ethical connotations. What distinguishes a life-model 
from a role-model is that with the former one is able to reflect on the 
overall structure of the life rather than a particular and incomplete 
part of it. The stress is no longer on specific roles but on a broad but 
subtle understanding of a person’s life, where the roles that they 
choose can be seen within their ethical context. As such, life-models 
can help to give our own lives a kind of a structure that they might 
otherwise not have or that we might be struggling to find:  
 
If we need to feel that our lives have meaning, then one way of achieving 
this would be to feel that they possess shape as a whole; the question ‘how 
should life be lived?’ also seems to lead in this direction. It is, however, 
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usually very difficult to discern any kind of structure and shape from inside 
the stream of one’s own experiences: the messy onward rush of everyday life 
can all too easily strike us as just one damned thing after another. It is often 
easier to discern some sort of shape in the lives of others, particularly if 
those lives are in some sense complete – either because the people are dead, 
or because they are fictional. Reflection on the overall structure of these 
whole lives then makes two further moves possible. Firstly, through 
comparison and contrast one may come to perceive some sort of structure 
emerging in one’s own life. Secondly, through emulation one may be able 
consciously to impart some kind of structure to one’s life.27 
 
 
This stress on historical (deceased) and fictional characters suits this 
purpose well, because it is easier to appraise a life when it is complete 
and therefore open to a thorough examination. Such life-models are, 
of course, present in the dialogues, and, therefore, as Hobbs states, in 
the dialogues Plato is able to present the reader with ‘a range of 
potential or actual role-models in action.’28 As Hobbs goes on to say:  
 
We shall find that through the skilful use of forward-shadowing we are 
enabled to glimpse not only what their lives are currently like, but what they 
will shortly become. Far from giving us vague injunctions, Plato wishes to 
ensure that our choices are as concrete as possible.29 
 
 
Making the right choices requires a thorough examination of the 
proposed life-model that we might be thinking of ‘adopting.’ We 
want to know how that person fared with the choices they have 
made; we want to see whether the reasons that they gave for living as 
they did turned out to be justified. It is easy for the tyrant, at the 
height of his powers, to consider himself happy, and for others, 
perhaps, to look on in envy (cf. Gorgias 470d1-471a2). Kroesos may 
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appear enviable when he is surveying his vast riches but not so much 
when he is about to be burnt alive. A person’s life, and hence their 
character, can only truly be assessed once that person is dead: in 
Solon’s words one must telos horan.30 
 
In the myth of Er in book 10 of the Republic the use of life models or 
patterns is explicitly referred to (Republic 617d5; 618a2). Life models 
or patterns are chosen by the souls who are about to be reincarnated. 
All the souls are free to choose whatever life model they wish, 
although their choice is heavily determined by the kind of character 
they had in their previous lives (cf. Phaedo 81d6-82c9, Timaeus 90e8-
92c2). However, the kind of character that the souls will develop in 
their new lives, and the attending daimon, is the choice of the 
individual (οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ’ ὑμεῖς δαίμονα 
αἱρήσεσθε, Republic 617e1-2).xiii 
 
The dialogues are rich in human drama and personality; Plato 
chooses Sokrates’ adversaries carefully. The interlocutors are not 
merely foils to Sokratic irony they also play an important role in the 
overall shape and meaning of the dialogues in which they appear. 
Plato pits Sokrates against the greatest thinkers of his (Sokrates’) day, 
such as Gorgias, Protagoras, and Parmenides, and he does so not just 
                                                 
xiii ‘The blame belongs to him who chooses; the daimon is blameless’ (trans. 
Bloom p.300, slightly adapted). 
221 
 
to test their ideas but to clearly set out in the reader’s mind just what 
sort of men make what sort of claims; not just what they say but how 
they say it and in what context. Indeed, because the dialogues are set 
in Plato’s past he is able to do even more: he can test the speaker’s 
words against their deeds; he can show (insofar as his audience 
would have known most of the dialogues’ participants and their 
fates) how men fare in respect to the choices that they make.  
  
It is not so much the case that the dialogues help us to make the right 
choices but rather that through them we become aware that we have 
choices to make, and that, whatever direction that we decide to go in, 
that it is we who are responsible. More than this, the dialogues make 
a specific case, that it is philosophy, not conventional opinions and 
customs, however treasured, which will enable us to make the right 
choices.  
    
It is through the dialogue form that this concern with choice and 
responsibility is situated and which is brought out through Plato’s 
skilful handling of character and dramatic setting. Through the 
dialogues a picture of various lives, and the philosophical life, the life 
of Sokrates, are expertly developed, and in the Republic in particular, 
where we are not only shown the model city (from birth to death) but 
also the model of the just individual, the philosopher. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Heroes and Daimons: Plato’s Cult of the Philosopher 
 
Sokrates, like the great heroes whom Plato censors, is part fact and 
part fiction; he is both historical and mythical, hero of history and 
Platonic drama. However, Sokrates is not a hero after the fashion of 
an Oedipus or an Orestes, and nor is he a cult hero in the traditional 
sense. Sokrates’ heroization entails neither suffering nor recompense, 
but a confirmation of the philosophical life. The emulation of Sokrates 
by some of his followers, humorously depicted by Plato in the 
Symposium (173b1-4, 172cb-173a5, 173c2-e3), may point to a Sokratic 
cult, however, as Plato also makes plain in the same dialogue, 
Sokrates is unique, and his uniqueness makes him, to use modern 
parlance, a rather hard act to follow. Despite his inimitability, 
however, Sokrates stands as an example to us as the ideal polis stands 
as an example to legislators.  
    
As a rival to Homer, Plato presents us with his champion, a doer of 
deeds and a speaker of words: Sokrates the warrior-dialectician.1 In 
fact, as we shall see, Sokrates has more in common with the daimon 
than he does with the traditional hero of poetry, drama, or religion. I 
do not refer simply to the Sokratic daimon but rather to the daimonic 
character of Sokrates himself.  
225 
 
In the Symposium, Plato carefully draws out Sokrates’ daimonic 
nature and the eroticism of the philosophical experience (Symposium 
203c7-204a7). In this immensely complex dialogue, we catch a 
glimpse of what Sokratic education would be like, its heights and its 
limitations. In the Republic we learn little about how the dialectical 
process is carried out between teacher and pupil. We are told that 
dialectic is the only sure path to truth, standing over and above the 
other sciences, but Sokrates does not go into the specifics of the 
philosopher ruler’s role as an educator (cf. Republic 540a4-c2). And 
while it is true that in the similes of the sun, the line, and the cave we 
are given a broad understanding of the intellectual journey the 
philosopher must take, he appears to take this journey alone.  
 
This, however, is not the whole picture. As long as Sokratic teaching 
remains the benchmark of true education (as it does in most the 
dialogues, the Timaeus and the Laws, are not, strictly speaking, 
dialogues), then the relationship between master and pupil remains 
at centre stage. The Sokratic teacher, unlike his rivals, does not claim 
to know the truth, and nor must his pupil; both the teacher and the 
pupil must loudly exclaim their ignorance, for ‘οὔκουν ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ μὴ 
οἰόμενος ἐνδεὴς εἶναι οὗ ἂν μὴ οἴηται ἐπιδεῖσθαι’ (Symposium 
204a5-7).i Education begins at the moment of this recognition, and it 
                                                 
i ‘The man who does not feel himself defective has no desire for that whereof 
he feels no defect’ (trans. W. R. M. Lamb p.183).  
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ends (if it can ever be said to end), when one no longer lacks 
knowledge. Whether Plato envisions such a possibility is uncertain. 
But what is certain is that it is only dialectic that can help us to attain 
knowledge of the beautiful and the good, a daimonic task indeed 
(δαιμόνιον γάρ, Republic 531c5), and it is not one that the dialogues 
themselves can perform. As I discussed in Chapter Four, the 
dialogues can only ever serve as a propaedeutic to an education in 
virtue, and this is not the kind of education that can lead to a vision 
of the beautiful and the good. But what makes the dialogues such a 
suitable vehicle for this propaedeutic education?  
    
One way in which the dialogues could help to facilitate the 
educational process is by operating as a medium between the teacher 
and the student in the way that Sokrates operates as a medium (or 
midwife) between the knowledge that he and his interlocutor seek and 
the interlocutor himself. This puts Plato in the position of a teacher in 
a subtly different sense than that we would attribute to Sokrates. 
Nevertheless, the Sokratic dialogue like Sokratic discourse stands 
between us and the truth; the philosopher is a mediator. This truth, 
however, is not something that the dialogues can reveal. The realm of 
the dialogue like the realm of the daimon is one of true opinion; it 
stands between the truth that the author possesses and our ignorance.  
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§1 
 
Hero Cult and Daimon Worship in Plato’s Republic 
 
καὶ μόλις ἂν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς οὐχ ὁμοῖοι, ἀλλ' ὀλίγῳ χείρους 
κριθεῖτε. φθόνος γὰρ τοῖς ζῶσι πρὸς τὸ ἀντίπαλον, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐμποδὼν 
ἀνανταγωνίστῳ εὐνοίᾳ τετίμηται. εἰ δέ με δεῖ καὶ γυναικείας τι ἀρετῆς, 
ὅσαι νῦν ἐν χηρείᾳ ἔσονται, μνησθῆναι, βραχείᾳ παραινέσει ἅπαν 
σημανῶ. τῆς τε γὰρ ὑπαρχούσης φύσεως μὴ χείροσι γενέσθαι ὑμῖν 
μεγάλη ἡ δόξα καὶ ἧς ἂν ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον ἀρετῆς πέρι ἢ ψόγου ἐν τοῖς 
ἄρσεσι κλέος ᾖ (Thukydides, Peloponnesian War 2.45.1)ii 
 
 
The origin of the hero cult, and more particularly, its relationship 
with the Homeric tradition, is not clear.2 What is clear, however, is 
that hero cults did play a significant part in the religious life of the 
ancient Greek polis.3 The hero cult also had a social and political 
aspect.4 The creation of a hero cult was a deliberate social act,5 and as 
Friedrich Solmsen says, ‘cultic and religious institutions could not 
remain unaffected by changes in the political order.’6 Indeed, the 
political exploitation of the hero was widespread, and was due in 
part to the localised nature of hero worship; as Robert Parker states ‘no 
god was an Athenian, whereas many heroes and heroines had been 
so.’7 Heroes were in some sense ‘national.’8 
    
                                                 
ii ‘…even if you rise to the greatest heights of heroism, it will be a hard thing 
for you to get the reputation of having come near, let alone equalled, their 
standard. When one is alive, one is always liable to the jealousy of one’s 
competitors, but when one is out of the way, the honour one receives is 
sincere and unchallenged.’  
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What the Greek citizen seeks in his worship of the hero, Martin 
Nilsson says, ‘is not first and foremost his own personal interest, but 
that of the state, the general good.’9 As Erwin Rohde states: ‘the 
spirits of Heroes hovered nearer to men; in good fortune and bad, 
men traced their handiwork.’10 The hero protects from beyond the 
grave and ‘is a centre of local group identity,’11 therefore ‘in all the 
circumstances of human life, in happiness or in need, for individuals 
or the city, the Heroes are thus very near to men,’12 and nearer, as 
Walter Burkert observes, than the gods.13 The hero of cult has a 
permanent place in the community through his grave.14  
    
In addition to the hero of cult is the hero of poetry and drama. There 
is a considerable overlap between the hero of worship and the hero of 
poetry, because, for the most part, the great heroes that we encounter 
in epic poetry and in drama did have their own cults. However, not 
all cult heroes were represented in epic poetry or drama, and they 
were, for the most part, a rather less glamorous bunch.15  
 
Related to the hero is the daimon. It is important to note that the hero 
and the daimon, although they share many characteristics, are not 
identical. Typically the daimon is a natural power,16 a spirit. This 
represents the daimon of popular belief. Daimons also had chthonic 
and underworld abstractions, as we see in Aiskhylos’ Libation Bearers: 
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κηρύξας ἐμοὶ  
τοὺς γῆς ἔνερθε δαίμονας κλύειν ἐμὰς  
εὐχάς, πατρῴων δωμάτων ἐπισκόπους, 
καὶ Γαῖαν αὐτήν, ἣ τὰ πάντα τίκτεται, 
θρέψασά τ᾽ αὖθις τῶνδε κῦμα λαμβάνει 
(124-129)iii 
 
 
And it is in this respect that the daimon falls into the domain of the 
hero.17 However, the daimon, as B. C. Dietrich says, could be ‘present 
anywhere and virtually at any time,’18 while the hero, and his power, 
was bound to his grave. The term ‘daimon’ although often connected 
with mysterious, ancient powers, and even, as with Homer, the 
Olympian gods, could also be applied to deceased men or women, as 
in Hesiod: 
 
τοὶ μὲν δαίμονες ἁγνοὶ ἐπιχθόνιοι καλέονται 
ἐσθλοί, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων 
(Works and Days 122-123)iv 
 
 
Hesiod’s daimons belong to the golden race, those who in death have 
become guardians over the subsequent, degenerate races of 
humankind. The daimon, therefore, is superior to the hero (cf. Laws 
717b3-6). As Dietrich observes: ‘the daemons in Hesiod displayed 
certain moral qualities and thus were superior in some measure to the 
                                                 
iii ‘Announce my prayers to the charmed daimons underground, who watch 
| over my father’s house, that they may hear. Tell Earth | herself, who 
brings all things to birth, who gives them strength, | then gathers their big 
yield into herself at last’ (trans. Lattimore, slightly adapted, p.97).  
iv ‘But still they live as daimons of the earth | Holy and good, guardians who 
keep off harm’ (trans. Dorothea Wender, slightly adapted). 
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heroes and kindred spirits who often employed their powers at 
random.’19 Indeed, Hesiod seems to have played an important role in 
the development of the idea of the daimon as a superior kind of hero, 
and also the idea, as Burkert has observed, that the deceased person 
could come to be worshipped not only as a hero but also, where 
appropriate, as a daimon.20 This was rare, however, because daimons 
were thought of as minor deities, while the divide between men and 
gods, even heroes and gods, was vast. 
 
The only exception to this rule was Herakles, hēros-theos, both hero 
and god. For the Greeks such a notion was rather puzzling, even 
contradictory;21 however the blurring of such distinctions became 
more common from the 4th Century B.C. onwards, and this is 
especially evident in Plato’s treatment of hero and daimon worship, 
to which we shall now turn.  
 
In the ideal polis of the Republic, the formal aspect of hero worship, as 
with the creation of individual hero cults, is to follow standard 
practice, as the next passage makes clear:  
 
῾Ιερῶν τε ἱδρύσεις καὶ θυσίαι καὶ ἄλλαι θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων καὶ ἡρώων 
θεραπεῖαι· τελευτησάντων τε αὖ θῆκαι καὶ ὅσα τοῖς ἐκεῖ δεῖ 
ὑπηρετοῦντας ἵλεως αὐτοὺς ἔχειν. τὰ γὰρ δὴ τοιαῦτα οὔτ’ ἐπιστάμεθα 
ἡμεῖς οἰκίζοντές τε πόλιν οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ πεισόμεθα, ἐὰν νοῦν ἔχωμεν, οὐδὲ 
χρησόμεθα ἐξηγητῇ ἀλλ’ ἢ τῷ πατρίῳ· οὗτος γὰρ δήπου ὁ θεὸς περὶ τὰ 
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τοιαῦτα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις πάτριος ἐξηγητὴς ἐν μέσῳ τῆς γῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ 
ὀμφαλοῦ καθήμενος ἐξηγεῖται (Republic 427b4-c5)v 
 
 
However, the hero of cult in the ideal polis, we assume, as with the 
hero of poetry and drama, must differ drastically from traditional 
models. The hero of cult would have to conform to the ethical 
standards of the Kallipolis, with no exception, and this would represent 
a radical departure for the hero of cult.22 It is not clear if any of the 
traditional heroes, however sanitised, would be worshipped in the 
ideal polis. Who, then, are the heroes of cult in the ideal polis? If 
anyone would be worshipped as a hero in the ideal polis, we 
imagine, it would be a guardian, and most likely a philosopher ruler. 
Indeed, the hero and the guardian have much in common. Both are 
benefactors and protectors of their communities and both are, in a 
sense, and, recalling the imagery of the cave, chthonic beings: both 
remain underground for the benefit of others (Republic 415a1-c7).23  
 
The hero’s continued ‘existence’ in the grave, however, is recompense 
for his deeds in life, or, in some cases, reparation for crimes 
perpetrated against the hero himself; in either case, as Burkert states, 
                                                 
v ‘The founding of temples and the institution of sacrifices, and other 
services to the gods and spirits and heroes, besides the arrangements for the 
burial of the dead and the rites we must pay to the powers of the other 
world to secure their goodwill. We know nothing of these things ourselves, 
and when we found our state we won’t entrust them, if we have any sense, 
to anyone but their traditional interpreter. And it is Apollo who by tradition 
is the interpreter of such matters to all men, delivering his interpretation 
from his seat at the earth’s centre’ (trans. Bloom p.105). 
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the hero demands the honour appropriate to him.24 The deceased 
guardian also receives honours upon his death:  
 
καὶ τὸν ἀεὶ ἔν τε παισὶ καὶ νεανίσκοις καὶ ἐν ἀνδράσι βασανι ζόμενον καὶ 
ἀκήρατον ἐκβαίνοντα καταστατέον ἄρχοντα τῆς πόλεως καὶ φύλακα, 
καὶ τιμὰς δοτέον καὶ ζῶντι καὶ τελευτήσαντι, τάφων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
μνημείων μέγιστα γέρα λαγχάνοντα (Republic 414a1-2)vi 
 
 
The honours that the guardian receives upon his death also reflect his 
deeds in life, but his worship is not recompense or reparation; the 
guardian’s rewards for his service to the community range far 
beyond the mortal offerings associated with the hero cult. Indeed, 
considering what we learn in the myth of Er, it is not clear how 
seriously we should understand hero worship in the ideal polis as 
being genuine worship rather than just another method for controlling 
all the classes, and, perhaps, of Plato’s readiness to exploit traditional 
beliefs for higher ends. However, far from identifying the guardians 
with heroes Plato prefers to identify them with daimons. In book 5 
Sokrates tells Adiemantos:  
 
Διαπυθόμενοι ἄρα τοῦ θεοῦ πῶς χρὴ τοὺς δαιμονίους τε καὶ θείους 
τιθέναι καὶ τίνι διαφόρῳ, οὕτω καὶ ταύτῃ θήσομεν ᾗ ἂν ἐξηγῆται … Καὶ 
τὸν λοιπὸν δὴ χρόνον ὡς δαιμόνων, οὕτω θεραπεύ σομέν τε καὶ 
προσκυνήσομεν αὐτῶν τὰς θήκας; ταὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα νομιοῦμεν ὅταν τις 
                                                 
vi ‘And the one who on each occasion, among children and the youths and 
among men, is tested and comes through untainted, must be appointed ruler 
of the polis and guardians; and he must be given honours, both while living 
and when dead, and must be allotted the greatest prizes in burials and the 
other memorials’ (trans. Bloom p.93, slightly adapted).  
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γήρᾳ ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ τελευτήσῃ τῶν ὅσοι ἂν διαφερόντως ἐν τῷ βίῳ 
ἀγαθοὶ κριθῶσιν (Republic 469a3-469b2)vii 
 
 
It is only those who have proved themselves as being of the gold 
standard that can hope for such an honour (468e3-5). And, referring 
to the rulers of the Kallipolis, and slightly adapting a passage from 
Works and Days, Sokrates declares that: ‘οἱ μὲν δαίμονες ἁγνοὶ 
ἐπιχθόνιοι τελέθουσιν, ἐσθλοί, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες μερόπων 
ἀνθρώπων’ (469a1-3).viii In death the philosopher ruler becomes a 
daimon, and continues his service to the community in this new 
capacity. 
 
The same lines are referenced in the Cratylus. According to Sokrates, 
Hesiod’s meaning is not that daimons are actually golden but rather 
he describes them as golden to reflect their good and noble natures. 
Moreover, and in a passage clearly invoking the Republic, Sokrates 
states that Hesiod would also consider good men in present day 
Athens as golden. The good, golden man is also wise, and a clue to 
this is contained in the word daimon, from which Sokrates rather 
                                                 
vii ‘We’ll inquire, therefore, of the god how the demonic and divine beings 
should be buried and with what distinction, and we’ll bury then as he 
indicates…And for the rest of time we’ll care for their tombs and worship at 
them as at those of demons. And we’ll make the same conventions for any 
one of those who have been judged exceptionally good in life when dying of 
old age or in some other way’ (trans. Bloom p.149).  
viii ‘They become holy daimons dwelling on earth, | Good, warders-off of 
evil, guardians of humans | endowed with speech’ (trans. Bloom p.149, 
slightly adapted).  
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slyly derives daēmones (knowing). Importantly, however, Sokrates 
states that a good and wise man can be called a daimon in life and 
well as in death (Cratylus 397e7-398c4). But what, if anything, does 
this mean in a wider sense, and why, in the final analysis, is the 
philosopher (as a ruler or otherwise) better understood as daimonic 
rather than heroic?  
 
To answer this we must bear in mind Plato’s attitude towards, not 
just the hero of cult or even to the hero as a concept, but also the hero 
as described in poetry and drama. What concerns Plato about the 
hero as depicted in, for example, Homer’s poems, is what he is said to 
value above all else: timē (honour). The hero does, of course, value his 
strength and martial abilities, but such excellences are worthless 
without the recognition; indeed, it is only for such recognition that a 
hero will display his ‘virtue.’  
 
Honour drives the hero. It drove Akhilleus, Agamemnon and Hektor 
to make some dubious, and indeed, fatal decisions. If the philosopher 
and the hero disagree about the nature of human excellence, then 
they are, although in different senses, at least united by the principle 
that human excelling must inevitably lead to their death. In the case 
of the hero this is often ambiguous. Akhilleus is aware of his 
impending death, even at moments where he is at his most vital.25 
The hero of cult demands honour and respect from his grave, small 
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comfort perhaps. One thing is apparent however: death does not 
prevent one from desiring or pursuing honour (and nor does it 
necessarily prevent the philosopher from desiring and pursuing the 
truth, indeed, it may enhance it).26 Akhilleus hates death, but despite 
his famous words (Odyssey 11.488-491), he retains his old conception 
of honour. Nothing pleases him more than to hear about the exploits 
of his son, Neoptolemos (Odyssey 11.491-540). Death, as Jean-Pierre 
Vernant says, is necessary for the heroic ideal.27  
 
The philosopher, as an over-ground being, has a conception of 
honour cleansed of all physical impurities and inclinations. The ‘free 
soul’28 of the philosopher is not bound to the earth in quite the same 
way as the hero’s, in life or in death. The hero seeks to gain honour, 
in life, through good repute and material possessions, and in death 
through sacrifice. The heroes’ desire for honour informs their whole 
outlook on life and death, and one can say, tentatively, that it is 
central to their conception of happiness. In book 9 of the Republic, 
Sokrates weighs the happiness of the philosopher against the ‘gain-
lover’ and the ‘honour-lover’. Each of these, the lover of gain, the 
lover of honour and the philosopher (the lover of wisdom) have their 
own motivation and pleasure: the lover of gain is motivated by greed, 
and he desires, above all else, profit; the lover of honour is motivated 
by the desire to be of good repute, and his chief pleasure is in victory. 
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The lover of wisdom seeks only to possess the truth, and his pleasure 
is the pleasure of knowing the truth. 
  
The question, as Sokrates poses it, is which life is the most pleasant? 
Each type would answer that it is their own life that is the most 
pleasant. So, says Sokrates, ‘τίνι χρὴ κρίνεσθαι τὰ μέλλοντα καλῶς 
κριθήσεσθαι; ἆρ’ οὐκ ἐμπειρίᾳ τε καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ; ἢ τούτων 
ἔχοι ἄν τις βέλτιον κριτήριον;’ (Republic 582a3-5).ix Given these 
criteria, it is the philosopher who is best able to judge, a happy 
coincidence indeed.  
 
However, there is a substantial claim here. The philosopher is in a 
unique position. She, unlike the other two types, can not only claim to 
have the highest and most pleasurable of pursuits, but can also claim 
to have a superior understanding and appreciation of the pleasures of 
the other two types. The philosopher has inhabited the same world as 
the lover of gain and the lover of honour; he too has tasted their 
pleasures, but none is as true as the pleasure derived from intellectual 
activity (586d9); and it is only by following the guidance of wisdom,29 
however, that one will come to realise the proper merit of the 
pleasures of victory and gain, and intelligence.  
 
                                                 
ix ‘But what are things to be judged, if they are to be judged rightly? Is it not 
by experience, intelligence and discussion?’ (trans. Paul Shorey p.377).  
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Interestingly, as he does elsewhere, Plato sees the life of the honour 
lover as a second best (583a7-10). In the context of the Republic this 
makes sense. The auxiliaries are not philosophers, indeed, and insofar 
as they are supposed to both represent and be manifestations of the 
thumos, the auxiliary is easily identifiable with the hero, and this idea 
is supported by their rigorous character education, which, as we saw 
in Chapter Three, is designed to inhibit the excesses that can often be 
the result of spiritedness, and those which so often characterise the 
hero. The ‘heroes’ of the ideal polis, however, are not, like so many of 
the heroes of poetry and drama, rulers. Given that spiritedness and 
the qualities that are associated with it are not enough to qualify a 
person to rule, this duty is passed on to the philosophers.   
 
Plato recognises the oddity of this reversal. The philosopher does not 
even want to rule, and this could hardly be said of the honour-lover 
(475a7-b3). In book 1 of the Republic, Sokrates presses the point that, 
in respect to ruling, and indeed all services, care for one’s subjects is 
distinct from the payment that one receives for this service: that the 
benefit of ruling is not the act of ruling but the payment that one gets 
for undertaking it (345e1-346a1). Sokrates sees two basic types of 
payment for ruling depending on the nature of the ruler: ‘μισθὸν 
δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐθελήσειν ἄρχειν, ἢ ἀργύριον ἢ 
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τιμήν (347a4-5).x However, no decent person would accept a position 
of authority, Sokrates says, for wealth or honour. Even at this earlier 
stage Sokrates has the philosopher in mind. But it is also clear from 
Glaukon’s reaction to Sokrates’ comments that he is also drawing on 
a stereotype; the unambitious man (or the reluctant hero as we might 
say today), the opposite of the contemporary politician. It is such a 
person, not the types currently running for office (the honour or 
money lovers), who must be forced to take power, either through the 
fear of punishment or through the fear that someone worse will take 
their place (347a9-d1). What, however, is the philosopher ruler’s 
payment? At this stage in the argument, prior to the introduction of 
the philosopher rulers, this question is not addressed. However, as I 
stated in Chapter Four, the philosopher does receive some 
compensation for his official duties: he ‘sees’ the Good.  
 
But what about the auxiliaries, what do they get out of participating 
in the running of the ideal polis? Early in the Republic, before the 
division is made between guardians that rule and those that do not, 
Adeimantos raises this objection: other rulers have fine houses and 
gold, all the trappings of wealth and honour. The guardians are the 
leading citizens and the polis belongs to them, and yet they seem to 
be nothing but glorified caretakers (419a1-420a2). 
                                                 
x ‘…pay must be provided for those who are to consent to rule, either in the 
form of money or honour or a penalty if they refuse’ (trans. Paul Shorey 
p.79).  
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Later in the Republic, as we have seen, Sokrates tries to prove that, at 
least in respect to the philosopher ruler, it can be shown that he could 
be in some recognisable sense ‘happy.’  
 
Prior to this, however, Sokrates merely makes the point that, on the 
central issue of happiness, the ideal state does not promote the 
happiness of one class above the other (420b3-8). This being the case, 
the auxiliaries must be happy in the way that auxiliaries are happy, 
as Sokrates puts it ‘νῦν μὴ ἀνάγκαζε ἡμᾶς τοιαύτην εὐδαιμονίαν 
τοῖς φύλαξι προσάπτειν, ἣ ἐκείνους πᾶν μᾶλλον ἀπεργάσεται ἢ 
φύλακας’ (420d5-e1).xi The auxiliary’s happiness is bound up with 
his status; he cannot, as with the philosopher, seek a kind of 
happiness that is not consistent with it (466b3-7), and not, moreover, 
which is inconsistent with the proper functioning of the thumos. And 
as for the honour the auxiliary may crave, he will be amply satisfied 
both in life and death (465e1-3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
xi ‘Don’t compel us to attach to the guardians a happiness that will turn them 
into everything except guardians’ (trans. Bloom p.98).  
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§2 
 
Daimonology in the Myth of Er 
 
The subject of this work must first be considered according to the letter, then 
be considered allegorically. The subject of the whole work, then, taken in its 
literal sense alone, is simply “The state of souls after death,” for the 
movement of the whole work hinges on this. If the work be taken 
allegorically, the subject is “Man – as, according to his merits or demerits in 
the exercise of his free will, he is subject to reward or punishment by 
Justice”.xii               
 
 
Dante did not know Greek, although he was aware of Plato, mainly 
through the Latin poets and the Neo-Platonists. Still, in the above 
passage, taken from his letter to Can Grande, we see, aside from the 
Christian doctrine of freewill, something which is very reminiscent of 
the Republic. Justice and death are intertwined in the Republic; indeed, 
the work is framed by these two interrelated themes. In book 1, 
Kephalos’ beliefs about justice are dependent, in at least some 
respects, upon his views on the afterlife. And, if one looks ahead to 
the myth of Er in book 10, in some respects so too are Sokrates.’ 
 
Both Kephalos and Sokrates have concerns about the afterlife. 
Kephalos is concerned, chiefly because he is close to death, and 
hopes, that the life he has led will safeguard him from the horrors of 
                                                 
xii Dante, The Divine Comedy Volume 1: Inferno, trans. Mark Musa, London: 
Penguin Classics, 1984.  
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Hades that in his youth he used to take so lightly (Republic 330e1). 
Sokrates is also, although in a different sense, concerned with the 
‘popular’ depiction of the underworld. The popular view is faulty in 
an important respect: it fails to discriminate between the just and the 
unjust. The common complaint, and the one that was in danger of 
eroding traditional religion,30 was that the wicked go unpunished and 
justice is never valued for itself; and that among heroes and men, 
‘πώποτε ἔψεξεν ἀδικίαν οὐδ’ ἐπῄνεσεν δικαιοσύνην ἄλλως ἢ 
δόξας τε καὶ τιμὰς καὶ δωρεὰς τὰς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν γιγνομένας’ (366e4-
5).xiii  
    
Much of the remainder of the Republic is dedicated to countering 
Glaukon’s challenge. However, in book 10 Sokrates returns to the 
theme of the rewards of the just life, not in order to mollify the likes 
of Kephalos, but to put the finishing touches to his analysis of the 
relationship between good character (euētheia) and happiness 
(eudaimonia), and the relationship between one’s character and one’s 
daimon.  
 
Er is a ᾄλκῐμος man like the guardian, and his journey, like the 
philosopher’s, has a distinct purpose: ‘ἑαυτοῦ δὲ προσελθόντος 
εἰπεῖν ὅτι δέοι αὐτὸν ἄγγελον ἀνθρώποις γενέσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ καὶ 
                                                 
xiii ‘…there is not one who has ever blamed injustice or praised justice other 
than for the reputations, honors, and gifts that come from them’ (trans. 
Bloom p.43).  
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διακελεύοιντό οἱ ἀκούειν τε καὶ θεᾶσθαι πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ’ 
(614d1-3).xiv After his remarkable journey, Er will return to the land of 
the living, much like the philosopher, and speak of the truth that has 
been revealed to him. What is this truth? Not merely that one can 
expect to be punished for one’s crimes or rewarded for one’s virtue, 
but the fact that we are responsible for the kind of life that we choose 
to live. 
    
Plato sees happiness as dependent upon character, specifically good 
character. But Plato would not agree with Heraklitos (‘ἦθος 
ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων’).31 One’s daimon is not one’s character as such, 
but that aspect of character that makes a person more or less 
consistent in their behaviour, despite the continual changes that they 
undergo. One’s daimon is one’s soul insofar as it has character.  
    
According to the myth of Er, as we saw in the last chapter, the kind of 
character that one will develop in one’s life, and the attending daimon, 
is the choice of the individual (‘οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ’ ὑμεῖς 
δαίμονα αἱρήσεσθε’, 617e4-5, there is a similar mythology in the 
Phaedo 68d2-13, 82a9-b4, 83e5-8).xv One chooses one’s character 
insofar as one chooses to live a certain type of life. And it is we who 
                                                 
xiv ‘…they said that he had to become a messenger to human beings of the 
things there, and they told him to listen and to look at everything in the 
place’ (trans. Bloom p.298).  
xv ‘A daimon will not select you, but you will choose a daimon’ (trans. Bloom 
p.300, slightly adapted). 
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are responsible for our lives, and not our daimon (cf. Phaedo 107d4). 
The type of soul that one will develop in one’s new incarnation will 
depend solely on the kind of life chosen: ‘ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν οὐκ ἐνεῖναι 
διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἄλλον ἑλομένην βίον ἀλλοίαν γίγνεσθαι’ 
(Republic 618b3-4).xvi Generally, the lives that the souls pick are 
informed by their previous lives and characters, ‘κατὰ συνήθειαν 
γὰρ τοῦ προτέρου βίου τὰ πολλὰ αἱρεῖσθαι’ (620a2-3).xvii After the 
choice has been made, for better or worse, the daimon will guard 
(φύλαξ) the soul in its new incarnation ensuring that it remains true 
to the life it chooses (620d7-e1).  
 
The story of the first soul illustrates this. The first soul to step 
forward, despite a previous good record, rather like Kephalos 
perhaps (‘ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βεβιωκότα, 
ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα’, 619c9-d1),xviii chooses 
foolishly, picking from the selection the greatest tyranny (‘μεγίστην 
τυραννίδα’). This soul’s ten thousand year spell travelling the 
heavens did nothing for its judgement. This is to be expected 
(Phaedrus 249c4-7). This aspiring tyrant is not a philosopher; as Bloom 
says, ‘the correct choice of a life depends on knowledge of the soul, 
                                                 
xvi ‘Because of necessity it is not possible for the order of the soul to become 
different having chosen another life’ (trans. Bloom p.302). 
xvii ‘For the most part the choice was made according to the habitation of  
their former life’ (trans. Bloom p.302).  
xviii He had ‘lived in an orderly regime in his former life, participating in 
virtue by habit [ethos], without philosophy’ (trans. Bloom p.302).  
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not on the practice of moral virtue.’32 Knowledge of the soul is, of 
course, the main task of the philosopher. Indeed, the ‘practice of 
moral virtue’ is worth little without the wisdom to accompany it: 
 
ἔνθα δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὁ πᾶς κίνδυνος ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ διὰ 
ταῦτα μάλιστα ἐπιμελητέον ὅπως ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων 
ἀμελήσας τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος καὶ ζητητὴς καὶ μαθητὴς ἔσται, ἐάν 
ποθεν οἷός τ᾽ ᾖ μαθεῖν καὶ ἐξευρεῖν τίς αὐτὸν ποιήσει δυνατὸν καὶ 
ἐπιστήμονα, βίον καὶ χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν διαγιγνώσκοντα, τὸν βελτίω 
ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν ἀεὶ πανταχοῦ αἱρεῖσθαι: ἀναλογιζόμενον πάντα τὰ 
νυνδὴ ῥηθέντα καὶ συντιθέμενα ἀλλήλοις καὶ διαιρούμενα πρὸς ἀρετὴν 
βίου πῶς ἔχει, εἰδέναι τί κάλλος πενίᾳ ἢ πλούτῳ κραθὲν καὶ μετὰ ποίας 
τινὸς ψυχῆς ἕξεως κακὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἐργάζεται, καὶ τί εὐγένειαι καὶ 
δυσγένειαι καὶ ἰδιωτεῖαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἰσχύες καὶ ἀσθένειαι καὶ εὐμαθίαι 
καὶ δυσμαθίαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν φύσει περὶ ψυχὴν ὄντων καὶ 
τῶν ἐπικτήτων τί συγκεραννύμενα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐργάζεται, ὥστε ἐξ 
ἁπάντων αὐτῶν δυνατὸν εἶναι συλλογισάμενον αἱρεῖσθαι, πρὸς τὴν τῆς 
ψυχῆς φύσιν ἀποβλέποντα, τόν τε χείρω καὶ τὸν ἀμείνω βίον, χείρω μὲν 
καλοῦντα ὃς αὐτὴν ἐκεῖσε ἄξει, εἰς τὸ ἀδικωτέραν γίγνεσθαι, ἀμείνω δὲ 
ὅστις εἰς τὸ δικαιοτέραν. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα χαίρειν ἐάσει: ἑωράκαμεν 
γὰρ ὅτι ζῶντί τε καὶ τελευτήσαντι αὕτη κρατίστη αἵρεσις (Republic 618b4-
e3)xix 
 
 
                                                 
xix ‘Now here, my dear Glaucon, is the whole risk for a human being, as it 
seems. And on his account each of us must, to the neglect of other studies, 
above all see to it that he is a seeker and student of that study by which he 
might be able to learn and find out who will give him the capacity and the 
knowledge to distinguish the good and the bad life, and so everywhere and 
always to choose the better from among those that are possible. He will take 
into account all the things we have just mentioned and how in combination 
and separately they affect the virtue of a life. Thus he knows the effects, bad 
and good, of beauty mixed with poverty or wealth and accompanied by this 
or that habit or soul; and the effects of any particular mixture with one 
another of good and bad birth, private station and ruling office, strength and 
weakness, facility and difficultly in learning, and all such things that are 
connected with a soul by nature or are acquired. From all this he will be able 
to draw a conclusion and choose – in looking off towards the nature of the 
soul – between the worse and the better life, calling worse the one that leads 
it towards becoming more unjust, and better the one that leads it to 
becoming juster. He will let everything else go. For we have seen that this is 
the most important choice for him in life and death’ (trans. Bloom p.301).  
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The context of this passage takes its lead from Er’s experiences, but it 
finds its true meaning in the broader context of our own lives. One’s 
choice must be made according to a careful deliberation based upon a 
sound understanding of all the relevant factors. Philosophy is central 
to this. One must carefully scrutinise the kinds of life and the kind of 
life models that one is presented with, no matter how limited one’s 
options may be.33 This concrete understanding of all conditions, 
material and otherwise, which are likely to affect one’s life, and 
which may lead one to justice or injustice, is essential for making the 
right choices in either life or death. And, if one is unable to do this 
alone, then one must take the lead from those who know and are able 
to distinguish between the good and the bad life. Through 
philosophy, specifically through the mediating power of the 
philosopher, we can be in a better position to make the right choices.  
 
We have before us in the dialogues, as with the souls in the myth of 
Er, various patterns (paradeigmata) of life. Two of the greatest, that of 
the philosopher and that of the tyrant stand at opposite ends of what 
is humanly possible, and, even if, as Plato is fond of saying (cf. Crito 
44d6-9), we may not be in a position to fully exercise ourselves for 
good or for evil, we still have a choice about which way we want to 
go and which patterns we take as being the most likely to lead us 
towards eudaimonia.  
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§3 
 
Between Gods and Men 
 
Εἷς χορός, ἒν μέλος ἀνθρώποισι καὶ ἀγγελιώταις, οὕεκεν ἄνθρωπος καὶ 
θεὸς ἒν γέγονεxx 
 
 
Being a hero entails suffering and death; and the hero’s suffering and 
death are of an epic magnitude. Heroes are ‘tragic’; suffering is a key 
feature of the tragic life. The heroic life is not all bad however. It is a 
life of high achievement and great deeds; the free exercise of one’s 
aretē. However, the gods are envious, and the greater the man the 
more the gods take notice. The gods give or withhold their favour as 
is their wont; but their power extends only so far, and no matter how 
mighty the hero may be he cannot escape his fate. The hero’s death 
releases him from suffering, but death does not, as we have seen, 
necessarily signify the end of the hero’s activities. 
    
Akhilleus questions his status as lord of the dead (Odyssey 11.488-
491), and by doing so questions the heroic code that he strove so hard 
to maintain, but we would expect no such complaints from Sokrates. 
This attitude to death, as we shall see shortly, is just one of the many 
                                                 
xx ‘One dance, one song for men and angels, for man and God are become 
one’ (Agathias Scholasticus).  
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ways that Plato attempts to distance Sokrates from Akhilleus, and 
hence from the Akhillean model. Despite this, Sokrates actually 
(partly at least), compares himself to Akhilleus. Citing Akhilleus as 
his example, Sokrates claims one ought not to be afraid of death; in 
the face of danger there is only one consideration ‘πότερον δίκαια ἢ 
ἄδικα πράττει, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ’ (Apology 28b8-9, 
see Crito 48b6-d5)xxi. Neither Sokrates nor Akhilleus disregard their 
mortal existence, but both recognise a higher principle than life. For 
Sokrates this is his philosophical mission, and for Akhilleus it is his 
need to avenge Patroklos and restore his own diminished timē. Death 
was certainly an evil for Akhilleus, as it was for any Homeric hero, 
for all was in living and the expression of one’s vital energy. Sokrates, 
however, has an open mind on this question, and insofar as he does 
not know whether death is an evil or a boon, he is unwilling to 
compromise himself and his principles (Apology 29d2-e2). As ever in 
his life, Sokrates places faith in his daimon and in the god who 
sanctified his mission (37e5-38a7).  
 
The parallels between Sokrates and Akhilleus extend even further. 
On account of their outstanding aretē both Sokrates and Akhilleus 
faced undeserved punishment, Sokrates at the hands of Meletos and 
Anytos, and Akhilleus at the hands of his chief, Agamemnon. For 
                                                 
xxi ‘Whether the things he does are right or wrong and the acts of a good or 
bad man’ (trans. Harold North Fowler p.105). 
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Sokrates the better man cannot be harmed by the worse, but 
Akhilleus would hardly agree with this. For Akhilleus his virtue is 
exercised for his honour alone. This is not the case with Sokrates. 
Sokrates cares for Athens, and he may sting it when necessary, but 
he, unlike the more narrowly partisan Akhilleus, kicks against the 
goad for the good of his fellow men, and not merely himself (30a6-
b4).  
 
Sokrates’ dream concerning the day of his death (‘ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤματί 
κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἵκοιο’, Crito 44b1-2),xxii is adapted from 
the Iliad (‘ἤματί κε τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἱκοίμην’, IX.363),xxiii and 
refers to Akhilleus’ plan to sail home. Sokrates makes his journey, but 
Akhilleus does not. Both are given an option, both had the 
opportunity to leave and escape their fates. In the Crito Sokrates gives 
his reason for remaining to face his punishment. As we also learn in 
the Republic, the worst evil that one can do is to one’s city (Republic 
434c4-5). But there is even more at stake. The god’s will must be 
obeyed. Akhilleus remains in order to restore his diminished timē, but 
at too high a price. Akhilleus’ prison term, if one can call it such, 
results in an altogether different sort of anguish for his friends.34 Both 
Sokrates and Akhilleus suffer death at the hands of another, and both 
                                                 
xxii ‘Sokrates, on the third day thou wouldst come to fertile Phthia’ (trans. 
Harold North Fowler p.155). 
xxiii ‘on the third day thereafter we might raise generous Phthia’ (trans. 
Lattimore p.207). 
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their deaths are presided over by the same god, Apollo.35 It was 
Apollo’s anger after Agamemnon’s rough treatment of his priest that 
would eventually lead to Akhilleus’ wrath, and it was Apollo, 
moreover, who would fire the fatal arrow.36 Sokrates’ own mission 
began with Apollo, and with his last words he paid him honour 
(Phaedo 118a8). 
   
Sokrates has no divine parent, but he does have aretē, but not after the 
fashion of the Homeric heroes. Indeed, Sokrates is the antithesis of 
the hero whom Plato critiques in book 3 of the Republic. Sokrates may 
have this aristeiai, but his triumphs over his foes represent a failure 
rather than a victory. Sokrates cannot vaunt over his fallen opponents 
because he too falls with them; for Sokrates success, and the virtue 
that it represents, is always shared, as is the failure.  
 
Integral to philosophy as a co-operative, educative process is the idea 
that love is not love of the beautiful or the good but a desire to 
produce something on account of and through the beautiful or the 
good (Symposium 206e3-7). Education is not copulation but pregnancy 
and giving birth. Knowledge is not inserted into a person but drawn 
out of them (Republic 518b6-c1). Hence, education can often be a 
painful process, and, for some, can prove too painful. The goodness 
of the beautiful young man, the potential that the Sokratic teacher 
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sees within him and motivates him to teach, is his fertility, and to 
speak less figuratively, his willingness to learn. 
 
The power of Sokratic teaching extends beyond the man himself. 
Sokrates’ discourses retain their effectiveness whether they are 
delivered by him or by others (Symposium 215c10-d6). There is no 
suggestion that Plato is referring to himself here, and certainly not to 
the dialogues. Nevertheless, the dialogues do at least represent 
Sokratic discourse. However, when Sokratic teaching, understood as 
a live educational process conducted between teacher and pupil, 
passes over into the dialogue form it cannot not survive this 
transformation unaltered. What ensures the educative effectiveness of 
discourse as written dialogue is the continued role of Sokrates as a 
mediator. The dialogues remain daimonic even after Sokrates’ passing, 
and even though it is not his voice that speaks.  
 
Death, for the hero, however, is always a relief and release from 
suffering. The Oedipus of Sophokles’ Oedipus at Colonus is a prime 
example of the tragic hero: a once prosperous man brought low by a 
mixture of his own short-comings and the ‘will of the gods.’37 The 
theme of heroization and cult is present in other dramas, Herakles in 
his eponymous drama, Eurystheus in the Children of Heracles, even 
Orestes in the Eumenides. But only in Oedipus at Colonus are we 
presented with the full drama of heroization.38 Oedipus evolved out 
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of the Theban Cycle as the subject of a series of Greek dramas, the 
most well received (and the best? Aristotle, Poetics 1452a31-33) being 
Sophokles’ Oedipus the Tyrant, and he was later appropriated by the 
Athenians as a cult hero.39 The location of the play is Kolonos, a 
district of Athens, the birthplace of Sophokles himself, whose 
founder, we are told in the play, is worshiped as a hero (Oedipus at 
Colonus 58-63). Oedipus comes to Kolonos already partially 
transformed (102-110), but for the transformation to be complete yet 
more suffering must befall him. The grove into which he unwittingly 
enters (although he is surely led to this place) is the home to the 
mysterious and terrifying Furies, punishers of kin-killers, which is 
most appropriate for Oedipus. We are led to think, and this was no 
doubt Sophokles’ intention, of the Eumenides of Aiskhylos. With its 
theme of restoration and blame, the Eumenides fits in well with the 
pattern of Oedipus at Colonus. Heroes suffer, and, in part, heroization 
is a form of divine compensation.40  
    
Oedipus is a ‘man born for pain’ (Oedipus the Tyrant 1181). This refers 
not just to Oedipus’ characteristic deformity but also to the whole 
structure of his life (59-61), but not, it seems, to his death. Oedipus’ 
language after discovering the truth hints at what is to come; 
Oedipus’ sightlessness is a readiness for his new struggles ahead and 
his eventual heroization (1307-1311). Oedipus’ self-mutilation is an 
acknowledgement of culpability and a foreshadowing of his later 
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self-immolation. Oedipus will go to a place whether he can neither 
hear nor see (Oedipus at Colonus 1312).  
    
For Plato suffering must be extracted from heroization.41 In terms of a 
tragedy like the Oedipus at Colonus this would be quite impossible. 
Plato knows this. Tragedy would have no role whatever in the 
Kallipolis. The connection between tragedy and hero cult, through 
such ideas as community and suffering, is strong; this being the case 
would a ban on tragedy affect the hero cult in the ideal state? I am not 
speaking here about the prohibition on excessive mourning (and 
lavish graves and offerings, as was typical with ancestor worship), 
but of the idea that the suffering of the hero, and his death, is 
ultimately beneficial, if not in its moment of realisation, then later, for 
the community where the hero eventually comes to rest, as Seaford 
explains: 
 
Hero-cult may accordingly have promoted social cohesion by extending to a 
larger group the solidarity-in-lamentation of the kinship group at the funeral 
albeit perhaps in a less intense form. Such an extension may result in part 
from the collective significance of the hero’s suffering, as having benefited or 
been caused by the community, or from their exceptional pathos.42 
 
 
Kerenyi seems to go even further than this, suggesting that ‘the cult 
and the myth of the hero contain tragedy in germ.’43 For Bowra, 
through the hectic action of the play and Oedipus’ transformation 
from beggar to hero (like, perhaps, Sokrates), ‘the scenes are essential 
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to the whole design. They illustrate some vital points in the nature 
and state of a hero. Through them we see what the new power of 
Oedipus should mean to the ordinary man.’44 As Bowra also points 
out, this theme is unique in Greek tragedy; Oedipus at Colonus is one 
of a kind, in it one sees ‘the passing of Oedipus from a human to a 
heroic state.’45 As Segal puts it:  
 
Standing at the crossing of civilization and savagery, life and death, superior 
and subterranean powers, humanity and divinity, tragedy, like Oedipus, is 
rooted in local attachments but moves beyond them to the hidden places 
where the boundaries between man and god give way, where the 
biologically and socially conditioned passes into the timeless.46 
 
 
The question of self-knowledge, so much a part of the Sokratic ethos, 
forms the psychological background to the Oedipus story. Oedipus 
unknowingly commits acts he was purposefully trying to avoid: ‘no 
one errs willingly,’ and this is true of Oedipus. Oedipus is the 
antithesis of Sokrates and, indeed, of the philosopher of the Republic: 
Oedipus’ journey to knowledge is a descent but the philosopher’s 
journey takes him up; knowledge is an ascent to the forms. The closer 
Oedipus gets to discovering the truth the closer he is to his own 
mortal destruction. The philosopher too will perish, but both she and 
Oedipus will, the former in life and the latter in death, serve the 
community from the grave (as Sokrates does in the dialogues).  
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Oedipus’ ‘journey’ has three stages, and each one can be seen to fit 
into the pattern set down in book 7 of the Republic. The first stage is 
ignorance. For Oedipus this represents his ignorance of certain key 
facts concerning his origins, and, later, his ignorance of the cause of 
the plague that strikes Thebes. The second stage represents Oedipus’ 
correct beliefs; this is the start of his journey towards knowledge. It 
begins when he decides to ask the Delphic oracle about the plague 
and it ends when he finally discovers the truth. Oedipus gains his 
knowledge but he does so at a price (Sokrates too visits the Delphic 
oracle, but he gains not knowledge but the recognition of his own 
ignorance). Oedipus’ knowledge is tragic because it brings suffering. 
Death appears to follow knowledge, and we get a hint of his in the 
Phaedo (64a4-9).  
 
Oedipus seeks his own death rather than return, and with it, the 
eventual destruction of his former community. Sokrates too, in the 
philosopher’s sense, seeks death. Sokrates, however, does not seek to 
destroy Athens; the city is doing that all by itself. In contrast to 
Oedipus, however, Sokrates is still bound to his city; Oedipus seeks 
out another, Athens. And just as Sokrates will not save himself, 
Oedipus will not save Thebes (Oedipus at Colonus 840). Moreover, the 
Athens of Sokrates is not just, but the Athens of Theseus is (1040). But 
both Sokrates and Oedipus are not over keen on life, although for 
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different reasons; Oedipus is a tragic figure and the Sokrates of Plato 
certainly is not (1380).   
 
Oedipus is known in equal measure for his wisdom and his folly. The 
wisdom of the blind but perceptive Tiresias is set in contrast to the 
blinkered sight of Oedipus (cf. Meno 100a3-7). Oedipus solved the 
riddle of the Sphinx but the riddle of his own life, although it was 
eventually solved, brings, it appears, not salvation but damnation. It 
is fitting that Oedipus will never get to see the sun again, not in life or 
death (Oedipus at Colonus 1760). The situation is different for the 
philosopher. It is in this respect, as we shall see below, the 
philosopher and the cult hero are to be distinguished. What does the 
‘hero’ gain through his heroization? For Herakles his death brought a 
welcome end to his labours, for Oedipus it brought a similar relief. 
The Delphic riddle of Sokrates is the riddle of knowledge as such; it is 
a riddle that led both Herakles and Oedipus to their graves and out of 
suffering (the death of Sokrates). A more positive doctrine must be 
found, however, the search for knowledge must not be blocked 
(aporia); one must be allowed to leave the cave. The key thing, of 
course, is that the philosopher does not suffer. The philosopher must 
die, sometimes for philosophy itself, but his passing is to himself of 
no consequence.  
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Sokrates also returns as the ‘hero’ of Platonic dialogue, and, in 
common with Er and the hero of cult, he returns as a benefactor; and 
he returns with a message. It is through his mission, rather than in a 
more traditional, ‘heroic’ sense, that Sokrates calls himself a 
benefactor of Athens (Apology 30e3-7). Only by being elevated to the 
status of a daimon can Sokrates help Athens, or indeed, any society; 
only by returning as Er does with his message, can Sokrates continue 
to educate from beyond the grave.  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 However, as we saw in Chapter Three, the Akhillean type has much in common 
with the young guardian, and, as we see in his presentation of figures such as 
Kallikles and Alkibiades, Plato is not so much interested in eradicating the old heroic 
ideals but rather with giving them a new focus. I shall return to this theme later in 
the chapter. 
2 ‘Heroic poetry is, so far as we know it, unconnected with cult. The hero with his 
cult is more differentiated from the hero of Epic than from the hero of Tragedy, 
which after all presents an act of cult’ (C. Kerenyi, The Heroes of the Greeks, London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1959, p.3). As J. N. Coldstream says ‘Greek hero-worship has 
always been a rather untidy subject,’ “Hero-Cults in the Age of Homer”, The Journal 
of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 96. 1976 (pp. 8-17). Homeric heroes and heroes of cult ‘do no 
more in the classical period than overlap’ (Parker 1996, p.36). The origin of the hero 
cult is not to be found in Homer’s epics (Erwin Rohde, Psyche: The Cult of Souls and 
Belief in Immortality among the Greeks, trans. W. B. Hillis, London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1950 (p.119-121). ‘In Homer the hero is the strong man alive, mighty in 
battle; in cultus the hero is the strong man after death, dowered with a greater, 
because a ghostly, strength’ (Jane Ellen Harrison, Prolegomena to the Study of Greek 
Religion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903, p.333). Cf. Jennifer Larson, 
Ancient Greek Cults: A Guide, London: Routledge, 2007, pp.197-199). For a discussion 
on Hero cult in Homer’s poems, see Theodora Hadzisteliou Price, “Hero-Cult and 
Homer,” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 22, H. 2, 1973 (pp. 129-144) and 
Roy Kenneth Hack, “Homer and the Cult of Heroes,” Transactions and Proceedings of 
the American Philological Association, Vol. 60, 1929 (pp. 57-74). 
3 ‘δοκῶ μέν, ἃς μή τις πράξας μηδὲ αὖ μαθὼν τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο 
ἀνθρώποις θεὸς οὐδὲ δαίμων οὐδὲ ἥρως οἷος δυνατὸς ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμέλειαν σὺν 
σπουδῇ ποιεῖσθαι· πολλοῦ δ' ἂν δεήσειεν ἄνθρωπός γε θεῖος γενέσθαι μήτε ἓν 
μήτε δύο μήτε τρία μήθ' ὅλως ἄρτια καὶ περιττὰ δυνάμενος γιγνώσκειν, μηδὲ 
ἀριθμεῖν τὸ παράπαν εἰδώς, μηδὲ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν διαριθμεῖσθαι δυνατὸς ὤν, 
σελήνης δὲ καὶ ἡλίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων περιφορᾶς ἀπείρως ἔχων. ταῦτ' οὖν 
δὴ πάντα ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖά ἐστι μαθήματα τῷ μέλλοντι σχεδὸν ὁτιοῦν τῶν 
καλλίστων μαθημάτων εἴσεσθαι, πολλὴ καὶ μωρία τοῦ διανοήματος· ποῖα δὲ 
ἕκαστα τούτων καὶ πόσα καὶ πότε μαθητέον, καὶ τί μετὰ τίνος καὶ τί χωρὶς τῶν 
ἄλλων, καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν τούτων κρᾶσιν, ταῦτά ἐστιν ἃ δεῖ λαβόντα ὀρθῶς πρῶτα, 
ἐπὶ τἆλλα ἰόντα τούτων ἡγουμένων τῶν μαθημάτων μανθάνειν. οὕτω γὰρ 
ἀνάγκη φύσει κατείληφεν, ᾗ φαμεν οὐδένα θεῶν οὔτε μάχεσθαι τὰ νῦν οὔτε 
μαχεῖσθαί ποτε’ (Laws 818b9-e2). ‘Those, as I believe, which must be practised and 
learned by every god, daimon, and hero, if he is to be competent seriously to 
supervise mankind: a man certainly would be far from becoming godlike if he were 
incapable of learning the nature of one and of two, and of even and odd numbers in 
general, and if he knew nothing at all about counting, and could not count even day 
and night as distinct objects, and if he were ignorant of the circuit of the sun and 
moon and all the other stars. To suppose, then, that all these studies are not 
“necessary” for a man who means to understand almost any single one of the fairest 
sciences, is a most foolish supposition. The first thing we must grasp correctly is this 
– which of these branches of study must be learnt, and how many, and at what 
periods, and which of them in conjunction with others, and the method of combining 
them; this may proceed to the learning of the rest. For such is the natural order of 
procedure as determined by Necessity, against whom, as we declare, no god fights 
now, nor ever will’ (trans. R. G. Bury pp.101-103).  
4 ‘The states needed divine champions, and the heroes seemed to have been created 
on purpose to satisfy particularist demands for champions of the kind’ (Martin P. 
Nilsson, A History of Greek Religion, trans. F. J. Fielden, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949, 
p.233, also see Robert Parker, Athenian Religion: A History, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1996, p.37, p.131) 
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would be a matter for dispute. But the maintenance of a specific cult is still a social 
act; cults could dwindle or be superseded. The existence of worship must imply a 
duty of care to the dead hero and would follow from the understanding that the hero 
had something to offer the community.  
6 Friedrich Solmsen, Plato’s Theology, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967 (p.7). 
7 Parker, Polytheism and Society at Athens (p.446). 
8 Rohde, Psyche (p.115). 
9 Nilsson, A History of Greek Religion (p.252). 
10 Rohde, Psyche (p.135).  
11 ‘An important difference between the hero cult and the cult of the gods is that a 
hero is always confined to a specific locality: he acts in the vicinity of his grave for his 
family, group or city’ (Burkert, Greek Religion, p.206).  
12 Rohde, Psyche (p.137).  
13 ‘The gods are remote, the heroes are near at hand’ (Burkert, Greek Religion, p.207). 
14 Rohde, Psyche (p.121).  
15 Many heroes were founders of colonies, contemporary war heroes or, indeed, 
public benefactors. And this is important. Heroes can be created and do not have to 
belong to the existing canon, and, logically speaking, the number of heroes is 
inexhaustible. 
16 B. C. Dietrich, Death, Fate and the Gods: The Development of a religious idea in Greek 
Popular belief and in Homer, London: The Athlone Press, 1965 (pp.18-19).  
17 Dietrich, Death, Fate and the Gods (p.29).  
18 Ibid p.56. 
19 Dietrich, Death, Fate and the Gods (p.57). 
20 Burkert, Greek Religion (p.181).  
21 The literature bears testimony to the peculiar position of Herakles. Herakles’ 
famous trip to the underworld and his apotheosis frame a remarkable life (and 
death), and, in the Odyssey at least, this is reflected in Herakles’ ambiguous status as 
both a chthonic and an Olympian deity (Odyssey 11.717-747, see also Philoctetes 1411-
12). Herakles suffered the most: his labours, the murder of his children, and his 
painful death and self-immolation. Even the great Herakles, favoured son of Zeus, 
could not call himself fortunate until he had died (‘νῦν δ᾽ ἤδη θεός ἐστι, κακῶν δ᾽ 
ἐξήλυθε πάντων’, Hesiod, Gynaikōn Katalogos Fr. 22.26, Hesiod: The Shield, Catalogue 
of Women, other fragments, trans. and ed. Glenn W. Most, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2007, p.76).  
22 See the example of Cleomedes in Pausanias 6.9.6-9. 
23 The guardians, indeed, the whole populace, is earth-born (autochthonic). This is 
hardly a new idea (the founders of Thebes were said to have been sown from the 
teeth of the dragon that Cadmos slew, and the Athenians also had an autochthonic 
legend. These claims had their propaganda uses, and so it is with Plato) but Plato 
uses autochthony to explain, not only the bond between individual and community, 
but the existence of social hierarchy (Republic 414d1-e5). 
24 Burkert, Greek Religion (p.203). 
25 Iliad XXII 355-366. 
26 Apology 40e4-41c8. 
27 Jean-Pierre Vernant, “Death with Two Faces”, trans. Janet Lloyd, Reading the 
Odyssey: Selected Interpretive Essays, ed. Seth L. Schein, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996 (p.58).  
28 Jan Bremmer, The Early Greek Conception of Soul, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987. 
29 Τῷ φιλοσόφῳ ἄρα ἑπομένης ἁπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μὴ στασιαζούσης ἑκάστῳ 
τῷ μέρει ὑπάρχει εἴς τε τἆλλα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν καὶ δικαίῳ εἶναι, καὶ δὴ καὶ 
τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον καὶ τὰς βελτίστας καὶ εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν τὰς 
ἀληθεστάτας καρποῦσθαι (586e-587a) 
30 ‘The religion of the city-state could continue unquestioned as long as there was no 
doubt that the morality of the gods completely corresponded to the official morality 
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of the city and as long as the individual citizen’s morality fell in with it as well’ 
(Solmsen, Plato’s Theology, p.15). 
31 Fr. 119. 
32 Bloom, “Interpretative Essay” (p.436).  
33 The last soul to make his choice is Odysseus, and he, unlike his unfortunate coeval, 
chooses more carefully. Odysseus, because of his former life of toil and hardship, 
chooses a life devoid of ambition.  
34 By this I mean his self-imposed withdrawal from battle; Akhilleus remains in his 
tent while his ‘colleagues’ fight and die. 
35 Phaedo 60d3. 
36 Paris (Alexandros) fired the arrow, Apollo guided it.  As Neoptolemos says 
‘τέθνηκεν, ἀνδρὸς οὐδενός, θεοῦ δ᾽ ὕπο, τοξευτός, ὡς λέγουσιν, ἐκ Φοίβου δαμείς 
(Sophocles, Philoctetes 334-335). Neoptolemos‘ death also involved Apollo, as Peleus 
laments: 
οὐ σπαράξομαι κόμαν, 
οὐκ ἐμῷ ᾿πιθήσομαι 
κάρᾳ κτύπημα χειρὸς ὀλοόν; ὦ πόλις, 
διπλῶν τέκνων  
μ᾽ ἐστέρησ᾽ ὁ Φοῖβος 
(Euripides, Andromakhe 1209-1213). 
37 We cannot take Oedipus at Colonos to be definitive. As we saw earlier, it was the 
general practise to worship the hero at his grave, but with Oedipus this is prohibited, 
at least to anyone other than the rulers of Athens (OC, 1760-1767). 
38 Historical examples are generally confined to archaeology or to brief references in 
historical writers such as Thucydides, Herodotus, and ‘travel writers’, such as 
Pausanias and Strabo.  
39 ‘The central theme is the transformation of Oedipus into a hero. As such he seems 
to have been honoured in Sophocles’ own deme of Colonus, and it is likely that 
Sophocles invented the whole story. It was no doubt of little importance, but in the 
last years of the fifth century devout and patriotic Athens must have turned their 
minds to all the supernatural helpers that they could find’, C. M. Bowra, Sophoclean 
Tragedy, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press 1944 (pp.307-308).  
40 Bernard Knox, The Heroic Temper: Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1964 (p.164).  
41 ‘This play has two peaks: with one it reaches into the realm of spirits and heroes, 
with the other into the buffeting of fate that beset a life that is unique and plagued by 
suffering.’ Karl Reinhardt, Sophocles, trans. Hazel Harvey and David Harvey, Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1979 (p.194).  
42 Richard Seaford, Reciprocity and Ritual: Homer and Tragedy in the Developing City-
State, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994 (p.111).  
43 Kerenyi, The Heroes of the Greeks (p.14). 
44 Bowra p.309  
45 Ibid.  
46 Charles Segal, Tragedy and Civilization: An Interpretation of Sophocles, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1981 (p.407).  
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Chapter Seven 
 
Education and Ethics in Aristotle’s Politics 
 
For the psukhē of a state is nothing else than its politeia, having as much 
power over it as does the mind over the body…and all the members of the 
state must fare well or ill according to the kind of politeia under which they 
livei 
 
 
In his Politics Aristotle argues that in imperfect poleis the chief 
function of education ought to be the safeguarding of the 
constitution, and that, with this in mind, the main aim of education 
should be the development of civic virtue. There is nothing 
remarkable about the notion that education should make provision 
for civic virtue and citizenship; it was, as I discussed in Chapter Two, 
the standard Greek view. However, Aristotle was perhaps the first 
educational thinker to insist that, in any form of constitution, education 
should be regulated by and be under the firm control of the state.  
 
Aristotle’s insistence that all states should undertake to educate their 
future citizens, and educate them in the responsibilities of citizenship, 
politics, and the workings of government, is one that is very much in 
vogue in educational policy and practice in contemporary England, 
particularly under the auspices of Citizenship Education.1 Of course, 
                                                 
i Isokrates, Areopagitcus 142, 14-15. 
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for Aristotle, true education as such is aimed at virtue, and he would 
not recognise, in respect to liberal education at least, a distinction 
between paideia and an education that aims at developing virtue 
(however conceived). This is not true of modern education, and nor, 
it is important to add, is Citizenship Education understood as the 
primary form of moral education in English schools; moral education 
is not restricted to Citizenship Education – it exists in various subjects 
across the National Curriculum. However, and importantly, as a 
statutory subject, and considering its relatively uncontroversial remit, 
Citizenship Education could become, if it has not become so already, 
the main platform for introducing pupils to moral issues and a 
conception of moral personhood and behaviour.  
 
I am not suggesting that with Citizenship Education there is a 
deliberate attempt to usurp more traditional forms of moral 
education (such as they exist in the National Curriculum), but rather 
that, insofar as Citizenship Education could be seen as playing a 
leading role in moral education, it might seem to suggest that good 
character (or what the ‘moral’ person should be like) is reducible to a 
notion of what constitutes the good citizen.  
 
However, as I discussed briefly in the Introduction (and will discuss 
in greater length in the next chapter) the reason for this, although in a 
sense accidental, is a direct consequence of the difficulty of moral 
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education in diverse societies. In any case, what state education 
would not, in some way, and to use rather neutral language, desire to 
teach pupils to be and act in a way that the state would consider to be 
beneficial to itself? However, the question I want to discuss here, 
before returning to Citizenship Education in the next chapter, is this: 
given Aristotle’s claim that education is best under the control of the 
state, does this mean that the main aim of state education in imperfect 
societies should be civic virtue? 
 
Perhaps; but this would not necessarily exclude the possibility of a 
non-civic moral education being provided privately. And this, of 
course, is what generally happens, although not in any systemised or 
formal sense. Can we trust private individuals to provide an 
organised moral education to children? In the case of parents 
educating their own children, we do. In any case, all private moral 
education still happens in conjunction with state taught moral 
education – and that must invite its own special problems.  
 
§1 
 
Politeia and Paideia 
 
Arguing against Plato’s conception of unity, Aristotle claims that the 
proper way is for a polis, while being a multitude, to be made a 
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partnership by means of education (Politics 1263b36-37).2 To anyone 
even remotely conversant with the Republic and the education of the 
guardians in particular, this criticism seems rather misplaced. For 
Socrates seems to support exactly what Aristotle endorses, the idea 
that education is the key to social cohesion.  
 
However, complains Aristotle, the stability of Plato’s ideal polis is not 
based on education but on a particular conception of unity. Sokrates’ 
error, states Aristotle, stems from his misunderstanding of the nature 
of the polis (Politics 1263b30-36). The polis is not a unity but a 
partnership. According to Aristotle’s account of social evolution, the 
polis is a partnership (koinōnia) composed of several villages, which 
are in turn composed of family units, which are themselves 
composed of several key relationships (husband-wife, master-slave). 
Every polis is a sort of partnership (koinōnia); every partnership is 
formed with a view to some good (agathon). The partnership that is 
most supreme and the one that includes all the others will aim at (but 
not necessarily attain) the most supreme good; this partnership is the 
polis, the political partnership (1252a1-8). 
 
Indeed, Aristotle is perplexed as to why Sokrates insists upon 
communism of property, wives and children to make his polis good 
(spoudaios) rather than by relying on habits, philosophy, and law 
(1263b40). With the exclusion of law, is not the ideal polis of the 
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Republic heavily reliant upon just what Aristotle says it should be, 
habit and philosophy?  
 
In book 5 of the Republic, Sokrates claims that the community of 
women and children is the cause of the ‘greatest good’ (megasiton 
agathon) to the ideal polis (Republic 462a1-464b7). The greatest good of 
the ideal polis is its community of pleasure and pain (462a10-464a4), 
where all citizens feel in the same way about the same things. This 
community is only possible because of its communism of property, 
wives and children; and it is through holding everything in common3 
that the city can avoid the greatest evil, stasis.4 The whole argument, 
therefore, can be reduced to this principle: koinēi panta.5  
 
However, Aristotle doubts that any of these measures will create a 
stable and unified society. Moreover, Aristotle is particularly critical 
of the fact that only a few from a specific class are allowed to rule. 
Indeed, it is this, claims Aristotle, more than anything else which will 
cause the Plato’s ideal polis to succumb to stasis (Politics 1264b7-23).  
 
Sokrates, of course, has an answer to this, one that Aristotle 
characteristically chooses to ignore. A polis can only be stasis free, 
claims Sokrates, if those that rule it do not want to rule, hence 
eradicating the possibility that the rulers will compete for civic 
honours. The desire for ruling in any polis is the cause of stasis 
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(although could we not imagine the rulers of the Kallipolis falling out 
because of their desire not to rule?). This seems to suggest that no 
non-ideal polis can ever be stasis free.6 Everything depends upon 
whether there is an alternative to ruling for those that rule, something 
that they value higher; and for the rulers of the Kallipolis this is 
philosophy. I shall return to this issue later.  
 
As I discussed in Chapter Two, Plato recognises a tension between 
civic virtue and human virtue in imperfect societies; but does 
Aristotle? This is a complex question. Aristotle’s idea that all citizens 
should be educated in the constitution of their polis seems to suggest 
he does, for he sees it as the most effective way for a state to avoid 
stasis and create political harmony and partnership.  
 
As we learn in book 1 at 1260b15-17, for Aristotle how a partnership 
is achieved in a polis is quite simple. The answer is by making sure 
that the education of future citizens is conducted according to the 
form of the constitution (politeia) of their polis (1310a16). It is only by 
this method, civic education (1280b5-6; 1283a20; 1341a1), that a polis 
can successfully be governed according to its constitution (1310a16-
23).7  
 
Education may be essential for establishing stability in a polis 
(1310a13-14), but its purpose is not limited to this alone. The polis 
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comes into existence not merely for the sake of life but for the sake of 
the good life (1252b30-31, cf. 1280a31-32; 1280b33-34; 1280b40; 
1291a17-19), and, as we learn in book 3, this is achievable only with 
education and virtue (1283a23-26). The dual function of education is 
political and social stability (by creating citizens who are sympathetic 
to the constitution of their polis) and the good life (through educating 
citizens in virtue, although not necessarily in full virtue).  
 
Hence Aristotle holds the view that education in any society must be 
state sponsored and regulated.8 In the best state education must also 
be, in respect to citizens, uniform and universal.9 In Aristotle’s ideal 
polis, as I shall discuss later, all citizens must share in ruling and being 
ruled to the same degree, and all are required to have the knowledge 
that enables them to rule and be ruled well (cf. Laws 762e1-5; 942c7-9).  
 
In the case of less than ideal political communities, democracies for 
instance, an education that is one and the same for all would be 
simply infeasible, and even unnatural (and οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν παρὰ 
φύσιν καλόν, Politics 1325b10),ii because in such poleis there is, within 
the citizenship body, a wide range of functions, some of which are 
geared towards providing for the necessities of life and others that 
help to contribute to the community’s excellence; most citizens in 
most poleis simply do not have the leisure or the ability to receive and 
                                                 
ii ‘Nothing that is against nature is noble’ (trans. Michael Richard Hart). 
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benefit from an education in the fullest sense (1290b20-1291b14, cf. 
1280b5-6, 1283a20, 1341a1, 1281b25-32).10 This, however, does not 
mean that some citizens are not educated and educated in civic 
virtue, but rather that civic virtue, that excellence displayed in 
fulfilling one’s civic duties, is relative to the functions that particular 
citizens carry out.  
 
Since Aristotle understands education as ideally being relative to the 
constitution to which it serves, we should pause for a moment, and 
prior to moving on to look at Aristotle’s ideal polis, to consider what 
he understands by constitution (politeia). A constitution, we are told 
at the start of book 3, ‘τῶν τὴν πόλιν οἰκούντων ἐστὶ τάξις τις’ 
(1274b38-39).iii More particularly, it is ‘πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων 
ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς κυρίας πάντων’ (1278b9-10).iv  
 
Here Aristotle is referring to government (of whatever kind). Indeed, 
constitution means the same as government (1279a26-27). Hence: 
‘πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα 
                                                 
iii
 ‘Is a form of organization of the inhabitants of a state’ (trans. H. Rackham 
p.173). 
iv
 ‘The ordering of a state in respect of its various magistracies, and 
especially the magistracy that is supreme over all matters’ (trans. H. 
Rackham p.201, cf. 1290a8-9, ‘πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν τάξις’, ‘for a 
constitution means the arrangement of the magistracies’, trans. H. Rackham 
p.287).  
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τρόπον νενέμηνται, καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τί τὸ τέλος 
ἑκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστίν’ (1289a15-18).v 
 
There are only a limited number of primary forms of constitution (as I 
shall discuss in a moment), although there are many more deviant 
forms, that is, types of constitution that share features with more than 
one of the primary forms.  
 
According to Aristotle there are three basic forms of government 
(1279a26-28): government of the one, of the few, and of the many; and 
each of these forms of government comes in one of two categories, 
those which are administered with a view to the interest of the ruling 
class, and those which are administered with a view to the common 
interest. Aristotle calls those in the former category derivative forms 
and those in the latter correct forms.11 The correct or best (aristos) 
form of single rule is kingship (basileia), the correct or best form of a 
polis that is governed by the few is called aristocracy, and finally the 
correct or best polis that is governed by the many is called ‘polity’ 
(politeia).12 At the close of book 3 Aristotle states that ‘τούτων δ᾽ 
                                                 
v
 ‘A constitution is the regulation of the offices of the state in regard to the 
mode of their distribution and to the question what is the sovereign power 
in the state and what is the object of each community’ (trans. H. Rackham 
p.281). 
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ἀναγκαῖον ἀρίστης εἶναι τὴν ὑπο τῶν ἀρίστων οἰκονομουμένην’ 
(1288a33-34).vi But which of these correct forms is the best?  
 
Here I shall only consider, and briefly, monarchy and aristocracy. 
Aristotle identifies five forms of monarchy (Spartan kingship, 
Oriental monarchy, dictatorship, Heroic monarchy, and absolute 
monarchy, Politics 1284b35-1285b33), although he will later reduce 
that number to two essential forms, Spartan kingship and absolute 
monarchy (1285b34-1288a32); and here I only wish to concentrate on 
the latter.  
 
Aristotle begins his inquiry into absolute monarchy with this 
question: is it better to be ruled by the best men (ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου 
ἀνδρός) or by the best laws (ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων νόμων)?13 Absolute 
monarchy, as Aristotle understands it (or rather, as he has its 
supporters and detractors understand it) is in opposition to the rule 
of law. However, at this time Aristotle is not so much interested with 
the absolute monarch’s superiority over written law but with the 
more general problem of the inability of law to arbitrate in all cases. 
So, in these circumstances, where the law cannot decide, whose view 
is to be sovereign?  
  
                                                 
vi ‘Of these the one governed by the best men must necessarily be the best’ 
(trans. H. Rackham p.273). 
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Aristotle is of the view, very much against Plato, that, and 
particularly if those involved are agathos, that a majority decision is 
always superior to the decision of an agathos individual. Hence, in 
this matter at least, aristocracy is better placed than a monarchy (‘εἰ 
δὴ τὴν μὲν τῶν πλειόνων ἀρχὴν ἀγαθῶν δ᾽ ἀνδρῶν πάντων 
ἀριστοκρατίαν θετέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς βασιλείαν’, 1286b5-6).vii 
 
Indeed Aristotle is largely critical of absolute monarchy, with the 
exception of when the monarch is possessed of the most outstanding 
virtue; and in such a case it is right for the wider community to yield 
to total obedience (1288a15-29).  
 
But which does Aristotle think would be the best state of affairs for a 
polis, being governed by a king of outstanding virtue or by a body of 
equally virtuous citizens? This is an important question, because the 
answer must affect how we judge the ideal polis of books 7 and 8, 
which, as we shall see, resembles not monarchy (in any form) but the 
correct form of aristocracy.  
 
Earlier on in the text, leading to his discussion of monarchy, Aristotle 
first introduces the problem of how a state (any state) is to 
accommodate the man of outstanding virtue. In democracies and 
                                                 
vii ‘If then the rule of the majority when these are all good men is to be 
considered an aristocracy, and that of the one man kingship, aristocracy 
would be preferable for the states to kingship’ (trans. H. Rackham p.259).  
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oligarchies the man of outstanding virtue would present something 
of a problem, since this individual would pose a direct threat against 
the government. In the case of the best constitution (which here I take 
Aristotle to mean the ‘ideal’ constitution) there is some doubt as to 
what to do (1284b26-27).  
 
For Aristotle, to ostracise such an individual, a fairly typical tactic in 
5th Century B.C. Athens,viii is out of the question. Besides, who would 
think that it is right for such an exceptional person to submit to being 
ruled by the inferior?  
 
κἂν εἰ τοῦ Διὸς ἄρχειν ἀξιοῖεν, μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς. λείπεται τοίνυν, 
ὅπερ ἔοικε πεφυκέναι, πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ πάντας ἀσμένως, ὥστε 
βασιλέας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους ἀιδίους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν (Politics 1284b31-
34)ix 
 
 
For people of equal standing, however, it is just and noble to share in 
government (1325b6-7), otherwise: 
 
τὸ δὲ μὴ ἴσον τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ τὸ μὴ ὅμοιον τοῖς ὁμοίοις παρὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲν 
δὲ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καλόν. διὸ κἂν ἄλλος τις ᾖ κρείττων κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ 
κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀρίστων, τούτῳ καλὸν ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ 
                                                 
viii
 Although not necessarily because the person exiled was thought to be 
outstandingly virtuous, though Aristides the ‘Just’ maybe be one such 
person. 
ix ‘That would be the same as if they claimed to rule over Zeus, dividing up 
his spheres of government. It remains therefore, and this seems to be the 
natural course, for all to obey such a man gladly, so that men of this sort 
may be kings in the cities for all time’ (trans. H. Rackham p.247). 
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τούτῳ πείθεσθαι δίκαιον. δεῖ δ' οὐ μόνον ἀρετὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν 
ὑπάρχειν, καθ' ἣν ἔσται πρακτικός (Politics 1325b7-14)x 
 
 
The man of outstanding virtue (κατ᾽ ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν)14 is 
characterised as a god among men (θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις).15 Indeed, 
the man of outstanding virtue (aretē) perhaps cannot even be 
considered a part of the polis (1284a5-8); such a person is either a 
beast or a god.16  
 
Who or what does Aristotle have in mind here? Considering the era 
that Aristotle probably wrote the Politics, and also his political and 
personal connections,17 it is not surprising that some scholars have 
conjectured that by the man of outstanding virtue and absolute 
monarch we are supposed to see Alexander the Great. Is this 
justified? Alexander was quite possibly a god to some (and quite 
possibly a beast to many more) – and he certainly had a power that 
ranged far beyond the polis – so perhaps there is something to this 
claim.  
 
According to H. Kelsen’s interesting analysis, the Politics includes an 
‘apology’ for Macedonian kingship, and that, on the whole, 
                                                 
x ‘For those that are equal to have an unequal share and those that are alike 
an unlike share is contrary to nature, and nothing contrary to nature is 
noble. Hence in case there is another person who is our superior in virtue 
and in practical capacity for the highest functions, him it is noble to follow 
and him it is just to obey; though he must possess not only virtue but also 
capacity that will render him capable of action’ (trans. H. Rackham p.551).   
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Aristotle’s account of kingship is ‘a vindication of monarchy.’18 
However, Aristotle’s account of sovereignty is complex, and we 
should not draw our conclusions in haste. Besides, Aristotle is 
reasonably clear in his insistence that monarchy should only be 
employed and would only be constitutional if there is an individual 
who is evidently more virtuous than the rest; and I see no reason to 
believe that Aristotle thought Alexander to be such a man (but that he 
may have hoped that he would become so remains a possibility).19 
 
There is no easy answer to the question how we are to understand 
Aristotle’s attitude to the man of outstanding virtue or to his alleged 
endorsement of absolute monarchy. This much seems clear however 
– that if an individual of outstanding virtue did exist then certain 
consequences must follow, that is, that such a person must rule 
absolutely. This does not commit Aristotle to saying that such a 
person ought to exist, or that absolute monarchy is the very best form 
of constitution.  
 
Aristotle’s analysis of aristocracy is found, in the main, at various 
points in books 3 and 4. In book 3 we are given this definition: 
‘ἀριστοκρατικὸν δὲ ὂ πέφυκε φέρειν πλῆθος ἄρχεσθαι δυνάμενον 
τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ὑπὸ τῶν κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἡγεμονικῶν πρὸς 
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πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν’ (Politics 1288a10-13).xi According to book 4, 
‘ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν […] ὅρος ἀρετή’ (1294a11),xii for aristocracy in 
the most complete sense distributes ‘honour according to virtue’ 
(1294a11); as Aristotle states earlier: 
  
τὴν γάρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἁπλῶς κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς 
ὑπόθεσίν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν 
ἀριστοκρατίαν, ἐν μόνη ἁπλῶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ πολίτης ἀγαθός ἐστιν, 
οἱ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν εἰσὶ τὴν αὑτῶν (Politics 
1293b4-9)xiii 
 
 
Citizens in the ‘best’ (aristos) form of aristocracy are ‘good’ (agathos), 
not relatively, but absolutely, and ‘ἀριστοκρατία βούλεται τὴν 
ὑπεροχὴν ἀπονέμειν τοῖς ἀρίστος τῶν πολιῶν’ (1298b41-42).xiv  
 
In addition to these best (aristoi) constitutions there is also an ‘ideal’ 
constitution (kat’ eukhēn, 1295a25-32). Whether in this and other such 
passages Aristotle has the ideal polis of books 7 and 8 in mind is not 
altogether clear. The phrase ‘kat’ eukhēn’ does recur in book 7,20 so 
                                                 
xi ‘A community fit for aristocracy is one that naturally produces a populace 
capable of being governed under the form of government fit for free men by 
those who are fitted by virtue for taking the part of leaders in constitutional 
government’ (trans. H. Rackham p.271).  
xii ‘Virtue is the defining factor of aristocracy’ (trans. H. Rackham p.317). 
xiii ‘For it is right to apply the name ‘aristocracy’ – ‘government of the best’ – 
only to the constitution of which the citizens are best in virtue absolutely 
and not merely good men in relation to some arbitrary standard, for under it 
alone the same person is a good man and a good citizen absolutely, whereas 
those who are good under the other constitutions are good relatively to their 
own form of constitution’ (trans. H. Rackham p.313).  
xiv ‘Aristocracy means the assignment of the highest place to the best citizens’ 
(trans. H. Rackham p.317).  
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even if we cannot be sure that in the above passage Aristotle is 
referring to the ideal polis of books 7 and 8, we should perhaps still 
understand the phrase ‘kat’ eukhēn’ in these contexts as referring to 
the best possible constitution with, therefore, the best possible 
material conditions,21 rather than as another example of a best 
constitution to stand alongside the correct forms of aristocracy, 
monarchy and polity.22 
 
However, as it seems that the correct form of aristocracy is very 
similar to the ideal constitution, if not in all the details then at least in 
respect to an important principle (that its citizens are virtuous 
absolutely and not merely relatively, 1332a10-11), how then are we to 
understand this contrast between best and ideal? We must, it seems, 
understand the correct form of aristocracy of books 3 and 4 as 
somehow falling short of the ideal, but in what respect? Perhaps the 
clue is in Aristotle’s choice of words. ‘kat’ eukhēn’ literally means 
‘what one would pray for’, hence the translation ‘ideal’ is not 
misplaced. It seems to refer to a state of affairs that does not exist, but 
that one hopes will. It is also fairly close in meaning to ‘wish for’, and 
sometimes with the connotation that what is being wished for is 
unrealistic or unattainable, like a day-dream (Republic 450d1-3, 
456b12, 499c4, 540d1-3, Laws 841c4-7).  
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In the Republic, eukhēn and its derivations is used in the context of 
Sokrates’ musings on the possibility of the ideal polis. Sokrates is 
anxious to point out that while his theory is, on the face of it, an 
attempt at wishful thinking, that nevertheless, and with the proviso 
that not everything in his theory will be realized in practice, the ideal 
polis is not a logical impossibility. And much, I would argue, is the 
same with Aristotle. In both cases, with both Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
ideal poleis, what we are presented with is an example of political 
theorizing.23 
 
Aristotle adds the important qualifier that what has been imagined 
must not exceed the bounds of what is possible (Politics 1265a19). 
What will distinguish the correct form of aristocracy from the ideal 
form, therefore, will be that in the case of the latter what we get is a 
discussion of an aristocracy that may never have existed and one 
which will have every advantage possible that Aristotle can conceive.  
 
Earlier in book 4, Aristotle makes it clear that it is the task of political 
science to consider the ‘ideal’ (kat’ eukhēn) constitution (1288b25), and 
in book 2 he also declares that he takes as a subject of primary interest 
the political community that is ‘πασῶν τοῖς δυναμένοις ζῆν ὅτι 
μάλιστα κατ᾽ εὐχήν’ (1260b26-29, my emphasis).xv  
                                                 
xv ‘Best of all the forms for a people able to pursue the most ideal mode of 
life’ (trans. H. Rackham p.69).  
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The investigation into the best form of constitution first requires an 
inquiry into the best mode of life and whether the same kind of life is 
desirable for both the individual and the polis (1323a14-1323a22). 
Aristotle concludes, of course, that the best life for the individual and 
the polis is the life of virtue (1323b40-1324a2). Following from this, it 
is also apparent that the eudaimonia of the individual is also the same 
as that of the state (Politics 1324a5-9), since happiness is defined as the 
life according to virtue (1325b15-17).  
 
The best constitution, states Aristotle, is: ‘τὴν τάξιν καθ᾽ ἣν κἂν 
ὁστισοῦν ἄριστα πράττοι καὶ ζῴη μακαρίως’ (1324a23-25).xvi  
 
However, even if we accept this, and accept that the virtuous life is 
the best, there is still, according to Aristotle, the problem that it is not 
absolutely clear which life of virtue is most desirable, the life of active 
citizenship or the life of the philosopher, detached from political 
participation (Politics 1324a25-29). This question is an important one, 
and especially for Aristotle’s ideal polis, because politics and 
philosophy are chosen by those who are most anxious for virtue 
(1324a29-31).24   
 
                                                 
xvi ‘The system under which anybody whatsoever would be best off and 
would live in felicity’ (trans. H. Rackham p.541).  
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Evidently Aristotle does not want to consider the life that combines 
politics and philosophy.  This, of course, is deliberate. Aristotle’s 
ideal polis has no philosopher rulers, no men (or women) of 
outstanding virtue. Aristotle’s perfect community is based on quite a 
different conception of justice: it is based upon the equality of virtue.  
 
§2 
 
The Good Citizen and the Good Man 
 
σπουδαία πόλις ἐστὶ τῷ τοὺς πολίτας τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς πολιτείας 
εἶναι σπουδαίους (Politics 1332a33-34)xvii 
 
 
But who is this good citizen? Aristotle’s discussion of citizenship is 
largely confined to book 3.25 However, we shall find that what he says 
about the citizen in the best constitution (as he calls it in book 3) does 
seem to fit in with what we learn about the class structure and 
education of the ideal polis. A citizen, says Aristotle, is the one who 
has the right to share in deliberative and judicial office (Politics 
1275b19-21). This is a broad definition. Citizenship, of course, differs 
from constitution to constitution.26 In book 3 we are told that:  
 
                                                 
xvii ‘The good of the polis is caused by the citizens who share in its 
government being virtuous’ (trans. H. Rackham p.599).  
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πολίτης δὲ κοινῇ μὲν ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαί ἐστι, καθ᾽ 
ἑκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἕτερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστης ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ 
προαιρούμενος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ᾽ ἀρετήν 
(Politics 1283b44-1284a3)xviii 
 
 
 
Does this mean that for Aristotle the virtue (aretē) of the good 
(agathos) man is the same as that of the good (spoudaios) citizen 
(1276b16-19)? The answer, as we shall see, is that, given certain 
conditions, i.e., in the ideal polis, they are the same. Let us look at 
Aristotle’s argument in detail.  
 
The first stage of Aristotle’s argument runs like this: 
 
1. Citizens have a virtue (aretē) that is relative to the function (ergon) 
that they fulfill in their community 
2. Citizens have a virtue (aretē) that is common to all citizens in all 
constitutions – that which helps to safeguard their particular 
constitution 
3. The aretai of a citizen are relative to the constitution to which they 
belong 
4. If there are various forms of constitution, there cannot be a single 
virtue (aretē) of the good (spoudaios) citizen (since functions differ 
                                                 
xviii ‘A citizen is in general one who shares in governing and being governed, 
although he is different according to each form of constitution, but in 
relation to the best form a citizen is one who has the capacity and the will to 
be governed and to govern with a view to the life in accordance with virtue’ 
(trans. H. Rackham p.241).  
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according to the constitution, as do the means of preserving the 
constitution) 
5. The good (agathos) man possesses perfect virtue (aretē) 
6. Hence it is possible to be a good (spoudaios) citizen without having 
the virtue (aretē) of the good (spoudaios) man (1276b20-35) 
 
But what about in respect to the best (aristos meaning ‘ideal’) polis: 
 
1. Even the best polis cannot consist entirely of good (spoudaioi) men 
2. Performing functions well is dependent on virtue (aretē) 
3. All citizens cannot be alike because their functions are not alike 
4. The virtue (aretē) of a citizen is not the same as the virtue (aretē) of a 
good (agathos) man 
5. A necessary condition of the polis being the best is that all its 
members are good (spoudaioi) citizens 
6. It is not possible for all citizens to possess the virtue (aretē) of a 
good (agathos) man since it is not necessary for all citizens in the best 
polis to be good (spoudaios) men.  
7. Therefore the virtue (aretē) of the good (spoudaios) citizen and the 
good (spoudaios) man are not the same (1276b36-1277a5) 
 
But perhaps the aretē of the spoudaios citizen of a particular sort will 
be the same as the aretē of the spoudaios man:  
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1. A good (spoudaios) ruler is wise (phronimos) and virtuous  
2. The virtue (aretē) of the ruler is the same as the virtue (aretē) of the 
good (agathos) man 
3. The virtue (aretē) of the citizen in general will not be the same as 
that of a man 
4. The virtue (aretē) of a particular citizen is the same as that of the 
good (agathos) man 
5. Therefore: the virtue (aretē) of the ruler and the non-ruling citizen 
are not the same (1277a13-25) 
 
And finally: 
 
1. The virtue (aretē) of the citizen consists in the ability to rule and be 
ruled well 
2. The virtue (aretē) of the good (agathos) man is displayed in ruling 
3. Therefore: the virtue (aretē) of the non-ruling citizen is not the same 
as the virtue (aretē) of the ruler/good (agathos) man (1277a25-29) 
 
To sum up: the citizen has three aretai: virtue in respect to function; 
virtue in respect to the preservation of the constitution; (and in the 
best polis) virtue in respect to the capacity to rule and be ruled. When 
the citizen is a ruler he gains an additional virtue, that of being 
phronimos, and since being phronimos is a feature of the agathos man, 
the citizen who rules has the virtue of the agathos man, hence the 
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virtue of the citizen who rules is the same as the virtue of the agathos 
man.27  
    
Although the virtues of the ruler and the ruled are different, the good 
(agathos) citizen must have both the knowledge and ability to rule and 
submit to rule, for the virtue of the citizen (as we saw above) consists 
in just this (1277b10-16).28 The virtue of the good citizen consists in his 
knowledge of government from both sides; and it is in respect to this 
knowledge that a citizen is best able to discharge their political 
functions. Therefore, says Aristotle, both of these virtues (ruling and 
being ruled well) are characteristic of a good (agathos) man. In the 
‘best ordered’ polis, says Aristotle, artisans and craftsmen will not be 
citizens, because citizenship in its fullest sense includes the right to 
hold the highest offices of the polis (1278a5-8). Therefore artisans and 
farmers are only quasi-citizens and not citizens in the fullest sense of 
the word; only the true citizen is capable of sharing in the honours of 
the polis (1278a35-38). The answer to the initial question has been 
answered therefore: in the best polis there is a sense in which the virtue of 
the good citizen and the virtue of the good man is the same, but in other, 
lesser regimes, this does not obtain (1278b1-5). But how are such 
individuals to be created? To wit, how does a person become a 
perfect citizen and at the same time a perfect man, capable of ruling 
and being ruled well according to virtue?29 
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§3 
 
Education in the Ideal Polis 
 
Aristotle’s formal discussion of education is carried out over two 
books, starting in book 7 at 1331b25 and finishing, incomplete, at the 
end of book 8 at 1342b35. The educational system of Aristotle’s ideal 
polis has two related aims: a political aim, which is partly concerned 
with creating citizens who can rule (Politics 1332b11-1333a2), and an 
ethical aim, which is concerned with the character of the citizens.  
 
For a ruler to be good (kalōs) it is necessary first for him to have been 
ruled (1331a3-5): for in order for a ruler to have a sound 
understanding of what it requires to govern others his experience as a 
subject is indispensable. Accordingly the citizen body in the ideal 
polis is divided into three groups:30 soldiers (trainee rulers), 
councillors (actual rulers), and priests (retired rulers), and all citizens 
go through this process: starting out as soldiers (and as subjects), 
before becoming rulers themselves (and finally retiring to religious 
office, and becoming subjects once more).31 Hence, and following this 
structure, education must also be the same but in another way 
different (1332b15-1333a2, a similar point is made in book 3 at 
1276b16-20). As Aristotle put it earlier, it is almost the same education 
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that makes a good (spoudaios) man that also makes him capable as a 
citizen or king (1288a38-46). 
 
His educational system is also designed to create people (or more 
accurately, men) who are both intelligent and spirited in the right 
degree (1327b18-1328a22). Sound familiar? For Aristotle, the Greeks 
occupy a mean position both geographically and ethnically; they can, 
therefore, be invested – correct education withstanding – with the 
perfect blend of spirit and intelligence. This idea, as I discussed in 
chapter three, was a common Greek preoccupation. Aristotle, of 
course, gives his own spin on it. Aristotle’s ideal citizen, while being 
intelligent, should not, like Plato’s guardians, be harsh towards 
strangers, but only towards wrongdoers. Again Aristotle is 
misinterpreting here. Plato does not state that the guardians must be 
harsh towards strangers, but only towards enemies of the state (who 
may or may not be xenoi). 
 
Aristotle’s next criticism is nearer the mark however. He points out 
that the chief function of anger (in the sense of ‘righteous 
indignation’) should be more properly reserved for friends or 
colleagues who err rather than one’s enemies. I think this is a fairly 
good insight, and whilst Plato does not seem to consider it, I think 
that he would have expected nothing less of his guardians (1327b38-
1328a16). 
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The first concern of the government of the ideal polis is with ensuring 
that suitable children are produced for the state, children who as 
adults will be able to take a full and active role in the polis, and this 
requires some rather strict rules governing marriage, sexual relations 
and procreation.  
 
The first stage of a child’s education in the ideal polis begins at home 
at the age of two and terminates at five. This early, pre-school 
education must focus on both the body (the purpose of which is to 
create physical health and appropriate bodily habits) and on ‘moral’ 
development. Official tutors will regulate – much like in the Republic 
and the Laws – which mythoi are suitable for young children. 
Children’s games are to be conducted with a view to their future 
occupation; and with this in mind, children are not to be allowed to 
associate with slaves. Children are also to be shielded from indecent 
talk, behaviour and images, in both public and private. At five years 
of age children enter the state school system, where they will spend 
two years watching the older children work at the lessons that they 
themselves will eventually take up. At seven years old and up to 
puberty, children are to study gymnastics; and then, to the age of 
twenty-one, they will study mousikē (1334b29-1337a3).  
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Book 8 begins by restating some of the principles presented in the 
earlier books:  
 
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τῷ νομοθέτῃ μάλιστατευτέον περὶ τὴν τῶν νέων παιδείαν, 
οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀμϕισβητήσειεν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ γιγνόμενον τοῦτο 
βλάπτει τὰς πολιτείας· δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάστην παιδεύεσθαι, τὸ γὰρ ἦθος 
τῆς πολιτείας ἑκάστης τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ ϕυλάττειν εἴωθε τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ 
καθίστησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οἷον τὸ μὲν δημοκρατικὸν δημοκρατίαν, τὸ δ᾽ 
ὀλιγαρχικὸν ὀλιγαρχίαν· ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ βέλτιον ἦθος βελτίονος αἴτιον 
πολιτείας (Politics 1337a10-19)xix 
 
 
Apart, perhaps, from the addition of drawing, Aristotle’s educational 
syllabus in book 8 follows standard Athenian practice; the four 
formal subjects are (1) grammatikē (2), gumnastikē (3), mousikē (4), 
graphikē (1337b24-28). 
 
The absence of mathematics, and, indeed, of any higher, 
philosophical studies, has been noted by scholars. This might reflect 
the singularly civic nature of Aristotle’s educational programme, or it 
may imply, perhaps, an implicit criticism of the more ambitious 
educational system of the Republic. But we have to remember, 
however, that book 8 is unfinished, and that in terms of what 
                                                 
xix ‘Now nobody would dispute that the education of the young requires the 
special attention of the lawgiver. Indeed the neglect of this in states is 
injurious to their constitutions; for education ought to be adapted to the 
particular form of constitution, since the particular character belonging to 
each constitution both guards the constitution generally and originally 
establishes it – for instance the democratic spirit promotes democracy and 
the oligarchic spirit promotes oligarchy; and a better spirit always produces 
a better constitution’ (trans. H. Rackham p.635). 
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Aristotle has to say about education, he does not really get beyond a 
discussion of character education, and it is unlikely that he would 
have had nothing more explicit to say about the education of the 
intellect. Besides, Aristotle does state at 1338a4-8 that, along with the 
education of character, that the intellect will also need educating; and 
in the Ethics we are told that intelligence is gained through 
instruction (Nicomachean Ethics 1103a14-16, cf. 1144a7), and this 
presumably means instruction in the sciences, or at least in some 
systemised programme of study whose aim is to refine and expand a 
student’s ‘mental’ faculties.  
 
The greater part of Aristotle’s formal discussion on education is 
focused on mousikē. Again, as with Plato, this is testament to the 
centrality that this ‘subject’ had within traditional Greek education, 
and again to this idea that any reform in education, or any proper 
attunement of education, requires the educator or theorist to come to 
grips with it.  
 
Before Aristotle can state whether music ought to be included within 
his educational programme its pedagogical merits must be 
ascertained (Politics 1339b12-13). Music, Aristotle informs us, is 
usually undertaken with a view to either amusement, entertainment, 
or because of its educative effects.32 Despite this, however, its 
usefulness compared with the other educational pursuits is not 
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altogether clear (1338a13-25). The study of music must not result in a 
vulgar professionalism; education in music is not so much about 
mastering an instrument or gaining technical ability (although some 
technical ability is inevitably involved), but more about the effect that 
the music has on both the person performing and their audience.33  
 
Through rhythm and melody the full range of character traits can be 
represented (1340a20); and through listening to music one is 
compelled to feel certain emotions. Playing and listening to music has 
a direct effect on human character and soul (1340b10-14). In fact 
music is imitative of character (μιμήματα τῶν ἠθῶν, 1340b40). And 
through playing or listening to the right kind of music (1341b33-35),34 
we are able to use its emotive effect and put it to a sound ethical 
purpose.35 Aristotle sees a correspondence between the pleasure that 
one might derive from music and certain feelings that go along with 
ethically infused emotions, therefore music must be relevant to 
ethical habituation: ‘δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθιζεσθαι 
μηθὲν οὕτως ὡς τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν 
ἤθεσι καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν’ (1340a16-18)xx.  
 
As Aristotle does not get beyond a discussion of mousikē – and hence 
the education of character – we are not in a position to adequately 
                                                 
xx …’there is obviously nothing that it is more needful to learn and become 
habituated to than to judge correctly and to delight in virtuous characters 
and noble actions’ (trans. H. Rackham p.657).   
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judge if Aristotle’s education is sufficient for the task that he sets for 
it – that is – the creation of a citizen body who can at some period all 
possess the virtue of the good man and the virtue of the good citizen.  
 
But in the absence of the ideal condition of the ideal polis how are we 
to approach education? What is Aristotle’s answer to the question of 
teaching virtue in imperfect societies? Aristotle concludes his 
Nicomachean Ethics with a discussion on education. One of the 
purposes of education is to create virtuous character; to create in the 
subject a love of what is noble and a hatred of what is base. The best 
way to accomplish this is through the law, that is, through state 
education, since through the law it is easier to regulate the kinds of 
habits, in the young and in adults alike, which are conductive to 
virtue.  
 
τὸν ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν τραφῆναι καλῶς δεῖ καὶ ἐθισθῆναι, εἶθ᾽ οὕτως ἐν 
ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπιεικέσι ζῆν καὶ μήτ᾽ ἄκοντα μήθ᾽ ἑκόντα πράττειν τὰ 
φαῦλα, ταῦτα δὲ γίνοιτ᾽ ἂν βιουμένοις κατά τινα νοῦν καὶ τάξιν ὀρθήν, 
ἔχουσαν ἰσχύν (Nicomachean Ethics 1180a15-19)xxi 
 
 
Education at home, argues Aristotle, is very much a second best; 
ideally education should be state run. Paternal authority is not 
                                                 
xxi ‘In order to be a good a man must have been properly educated and 
trained, and must subsequently continue to follow virtuous habits of life, 
and to do nothing base whether voluntarily or involuntarily, then this will 
be secured if men’s lives are regulated by a certain intelligence, and by a 
right system, invested with adequate sanctions’ (trans. H. Rackham p.633). 
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always sufficient, and the law has greater force. But if such a system 
is not forthcoming, then it becomes the duty of the individual to 
oversee the training of their young. And an indispensable element in 
this is knowledge of government (Nicomachean Ethics 1179b20-
1180b28). For Aristotle, education retains its essentially political 
nature even if it is conducted in the home.  
 
Aristotle’s ‘universal’ education can only work if a significant 
number of the residents are not given a liberal education and are not 
citizens: Aristotle’s ‘ideal’ education, and the state which it serves, is 
exclusive, indeed more even exclusive than his contemporary Athens. 
In addition to this, Aristotle claims that the virtues of citizenship only 
find their expression (in varying degrees) in poleis.  
 
This may appear ironic considering that Aristotle was writing during 
a time where the city-state, as a centre of power, was on the wane.36 
Whatever the reason for Aristotle’s defense of the polis as a political 
unit,37 he does seem to be of the view that, as a model of community 
living and as a necessary result of certain features of human nature, 
the polis is the most desirable form of human habitat.  
 
I am not going to quarrel with Aristotle on all of these points. Suffice 
to say, he is probably wrong. Because he believes that moral 
education is essential to the stability of a state, Aristotle is not willing 
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to countenance a system of moral education that exists outside of 
state control (Aristotle does not consider the possibility that a non-
state run moral education need not be at variance with the basic 
demands that the state makes of its citizens).  
 
Plato, as I have argued, does. However, in his Laws, which describes a 
society which is less than ideal (although if it existed it would still 
rank as the most perfect of all imperfect societies), moral education is 
still under the control of the state.  
 
§4 
 
Education in Plato’s Laws  
 
The model of education that we are given in the Laws is very specific; 
like its sister in the Republic it is one which, taken in its entirety, is 
intended to serve a very particular kind of society. Magnesia, we are 
told, is the second best polis (Laws 739a6), does this mean, therefore, 
that its system of education is also second best? Possibly, but it is 
certainly not second rate.  
 
Indeed, in the Laws Plato actually imagines a state of affairs where 
education is even more pervasive than it is in the best polis of the 
Republic. Not only is education extended to all the citizens (tailored, 
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still, by their individual capabilities) but it is also even more heavily 
regulated, and regulated by persons dedicated to the task. This extra 
command and control is a result of the more imperfect nature of the 
polis, and of the emphasis on written law rather than on unwritten 
custom. Hence, more truly than the ideal polis of the Republic, 
Magnesia has a distinctly Orwellian feel. Indeed, reading through 
this rather curious dialogue one can at times do nothing but take the 
Athenian at his word; there seems to be nothing ironic or figurative 
about the second best polis. 
 
In the Republic there is at least the suggestion that the bigger thing is 
being used to better illustrate the lesser (Republic 368e2-369a2, cf. 
Statesman 218d8-9), and that what Plato is most interested in is the 
psukhē; but there is no such suggestion in the Laws. The issue of how 
we should understand the relationship between the Republic and the 
Laws, their poleis, and Plato’s intention when he wrote them, both as a 
philosopher and a political theoriser (if one can permit such a 
distinction), is not something that I wish to get into here.  
 
I am more interested in the basic idea we find in the Laws that 
education is aimed at creating good citizens across the board and not 
just with philosophers who rule. Education still has as its final aim (in 
the best case scenario) perfect virtue, but it does appear to be the case 
that with the Laws Plato is offering a system of public education that 
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is more sympathetic to the realities of civic life and the general 
condition of Homo Sapiens. 
 
The broadest definition of the function of education in the Laws is 
found at 643d1-3: 
 
κεφάλαιον δὴ παιδείας λέγομεν τὴν ὀρθὴν τροφήν, ἣ τοῦ παίζοντος τὴν 
ψυχὴν εἰς ἔρωτα μάλιστα ἄξει τούτου ὃ δεήσει γενόμενον ἄνδρ᾽ αὐτὸν 
τέλειον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρετῆςxxii 
 
 
However, a few lines later at 643e6-9, the Athenian narrows his 
definition; contrasting it with mere vocational training, he declares: 
 
εἶναι παιδείαν ὁ νῦν λόγος ἂν εἴη, τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων 
παιδείαν, ποιοῦσαν ἐπιθυμητήν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι 
τέλεον, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκηςxxiii 
 
 
How this process of education works is fleshed out early in book 2:  
 
τῶν παίδων παιδικὴν εἶναι πρώτην αἴσθησιν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, καὶ ἐν 
οἷς ἀρετὴ ψυχῇ καὶ κακία παραγίγνεται πρῶτον, ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι, φρόνησιν δὲ 
καὶ ἀληθεῖς δόξας βεβαίους εὐτυχὲς ὅτῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας παρεγένετο: 
τέλεος παιδείαν δὴ λέγω τὴν παραγιγνομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετήν: 
                                                 
xxii ‘First and foremost, education, we say, consists in that right nurture 
which most strongly draws the soul of the child when at play to a love for 
that pursuit of which, when he becomes a man, he must possess a perfect 
mastery’ (trans. R. G. Bury p.65). 
xxiii ‘The education we speak of is an education from childhood in goodness, 
which makes a man eagerly desirous of becoming a perfect citizen, 
understanding how both to rule and be ruled justly’ (trans. R. G. Bury p.65, 
slightly adapted). 
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ἡδονὴ δὴ καὶ φιλία καὶ λύπη καὶ μῖσος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται 
μήπω δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον, 
συμφωνήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ ὀρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐθῶν, 
αὕτη 'σθ᾽ ἡ συμφωνία σύμπασα μὲν ἀρετή, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ 
λύπας τεθραμμένον αὐτῆς ὀρθῶς ὥστε μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν εὐθὺς ἐξ 
ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ στέργειν, τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ ἀποτεμὼν τῷ 
λόγῳ καὶ παιδείαν προσαγορεύων, κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν ὀρθῶς ἂν 
προσαγορεύοις (652a5-c3)xxiv 
 
 
 
 
A key word in all the above passages is teleios. The aim of education 
(not necessarily fulfilled), any education, is the mastery of the 
‘subject’ by the person being educated. For the young man studying 
pottery, for example, the ultimate aim of his vocational education is 
the ability to throw perfect pots, to become a master potter. In respect 
to true education, the mastery does not refer to a skill or set of skills 
but to the mastery of one’s soul. True education is an education in 
aretē, the object of which is to become perfect or at the very least a 
perfect citizen.  In the above passage, the Athenian seems sceptical 
about the possibility of people, even in Magnesia, becoming ‘perfect 
                                                 
xxiv ‘In children the first childish sensations are pleasure and pain, and that it 
is in these first that goodness and badness come to the soul; but as to 
wisdom and settled true opinions, a man is lucky if they come to him even 
in old age; and he that is possessed of these blessings, and all that they 
comprise, is indeed a perfect human being. I term, then, the goodness that 
first comes to children ‘education.’ When pleasure and love, and pain and 
hatred, spring up rightly in the souls of those who are unable as yet to grasp 
a rational account; and when, after grasping the rational account, they 
consent thereunto through having been rightly trained in fitting practices – 
this consent, viewed as a whole, is goodness, while the part of it that is 
rightly trained in respect to pleasures and pains, so as to hate what ought to 
be hated, right from the beginning up to the very end, and to love what 
ought to be loved – if you were to mark this part off in your definition and 
call it ‘education,’ you would be giving it, in my opinion, its right name’ 
(trans. R. G. Bury p.91, slightly adapted).   
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human beings.’ The aim of the education system of the second best 
polis appears to be the creation of virtuous citizens. 
 
Education, claims the Athenian, owes its origin to Apollo and the 
Muses, and, to lesser extent, Dionysos (654a3-5; 672d1-3); and it is 
under their auspices, specifically through drinking parties and taking 
part in choral training, that children and adults receive their civic 
education. The well educated person will be able to sing and dance 
well (eu), provided, of course, that the songs and dances are good 
(kalōs, 654a7-c2). Indeed, it is by knowing which songs and dances are 
kala that we are able to determine who has received a proper 
education (6546-e2). Hence, from this point the Athenian goes on to 
describe the kinds of songs and dances which will form an integral 
part of the education of the Magnesians.  
    
Insofar as song and dance involve rhythm and harmony, and, 
crucially, imitation, only those models which are indicative of 
orderliness and proportion will be appropriate. And, of course, in 
terms of the imitation of specific characters or kinds of behaviour, 
only those that inspire the right feelings and thoughts, particularly in 
respect to pleasure and pain, in both the performer and in the 
audience, are to be admitted (654e9-659c9). The Athenian still 
maintains, however, as the majority do, that the object of music 
(mousikē) is pleasure, but with the important difference that it is the 
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kind of pleasure that pleases the best man, the one who excels all 
others in education and virtue (aretē, 658e8-659a2). Hence, the 
Athenian comes back to the same conclusion: 
 
ὡς ἄρα παιδεία μέν ἐσθ᾽ ἡ παίδων ὁλκή τε καὶ ἀγωγὴ πρὸς τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ 
νόμου λόγον ὀρθὸν εἰρημένον, καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικεστάτοις καὶ πρεσβυτάτοις 
δι᾽ ἐμπειρίαν συνδεδογμένον ὡς ὄντως ὀρθός ἐστιν: ἵν᾽ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ 
παιδὸς μὴ ἐναντία χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐθίζηται τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τοῖς ὑπὸ 
τοῦ νόμου πεπεισμένοις, ἀλλὰ συνέπηται χαίρουσά τε καὶ λυπουμένη 
τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις οἷσπερ ὁ γέρων (659d1-9)xxv 
 
 
 
What education must seek to do in particular is make sure that what 
is thought of as just is also thought of as pleasant. It is the lawgiver’s 
task as educator to tackle the more popular idea that what is unjust is 
pleasant and what is just is unpleasant:  
 
νομοθέτης εἰ μὴ δόξαν εἰς τοὐναντίον τούτου καταστήσει, τὸ σκότος 
ἀφελών, καὶ πείσει ἁμῶς γέ πως ἔθεσι καὶ ἐπαίνοις καὶ λόγοις ὡς 
ἐσκιαγραφημένα τὰ δίκαιά ἐστι καὶ ἄδικα, τὰ μὲν ἄδικα τῷ τοῦ δικαίου 
ἐναντίως φαινόμενα, ἐκ μὲν ἀδίκου καὶ κακοῦ ἑαυτοῦ θεωρούμενα ἡδέα, 
τὰ δὲ δίκαια ἀηδέστατα, ἐκ δὲ δικαίου πάντα τἀναντία παντὶ πρὸς 
ἀμφότερα (663b8-c6)xxvi 
 
                                                 
xxv ‘That education is the process of drawing and guiding children towards 
that principle which is pronounced right by the law and confirmed as truly 
right by the experience of the oldest and the most just. So in order that the 
soul of the child may not become habituated to having pains and pleasures 
in contradiction to the law and those who obey the law, but in conformity 
thereto, they must be pleased and pained at the same things as the old man’ 
(trans. R. G. Bury pp.111-113, slightly adapted).  
xxvi But our lawgiver will reverse the appearance by removing the fog, and 
by one means or another – will persuade people that their notions of justice 
and injustice are illusory pictures, unjust objects appearing pleasant and just 
objects most unpleasant to him who is opposed to justice, through being 
viewed from his own unjust and evil standpoint, but when seen from the 
standpoint of justice, both of them appear in all ways entirely the opposite’ 
(trans. R. G. Bury p.125).  
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Even if this is not the case, that the just is identical to what the man of 
virtue considers to be pleasant (and Plato clearly thinks it is), the 
lawgiver must seek to persuade the citizens that it is, and he must 
devise all means possible to ensure that all the citizens use the same 
language whenever such matters are discussed, whether in tales, 
songs or serious discourse (664a4-10). 
 
All the citizens of Magnesia receive the same basic education. 
However, and despite what the Athenian seems to imply for the 
majority of the discourse, there is a further education reserved for the 
elite. Plato is still of the view, apparently not shared by Aristotle, that 
only a few will be able to be educated to the fullest extent (817e5-
818a3). Even though all of the citizens of Magnesia are required to 
study the ‘divine’ sciences, arithmetic, solid and plane geometry, and 
astronomy, it will only be a select few, the members of the Nocturnal 
Council, who will examine these subjects in any great detail (818a3-
c4). The divine sciences are complemented by two philosophical 
pursuits: (1) a dialectical inquiry into the nature of virtue, the good, 
and the beautiful (965c8-e4, cf. 963c3-e9), and (2) the formulation of 
arguments and proofs for the existence of the gods (965a10-966d4).  
 
The Nocturnal Council must possess every virtue. Its prime virtue, 
according to the Athenian, is its ability to fix its gaze on a single aim – 
obedience to the law for the sake of virtue (962d1-6; 963a1-4). It is not 
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just that the council as a whole is fully virtuous but also – and 
paralleling the state soul analogy of the Republic – its individual 
members, the lawgivers and law-guardians (964b3-6). The Athenian 
likens the Nocturnal Council to the human skull, with the younger 
law-guardians playing the part of the eyes. They pass on their 
perceptions to the elder law-guardians, who serve in the analogy as 
memory and reason, acting wisely on the information they receive 
from their sharp-eyed colleagues (964e1-965a4).  
 
Within this particular scheme – of the virtuous citizens and the more 
virtuous elite – the Athenian is not, insofar as he has the welfare of 
the whole polis in mind rather than one section of it, championing 
philosophical virtue over civic; he thinks that the happiness of any 
polis is going to rest upon the ability its educational system has of 
bringing out the best in its citizens; and no matter the superior 
quality of the elite’s virtue, they must also possess the civic virtues. 
However, the law-guardians, on account of their greater wisdom and 
knowledge, and hence their greater political power and 
responsibility, do have the appearance of being better citizens than 
the majority.  
 
However this is not necessarily the case. Civic virtue for Plato is 
function based – it is quantitative not qualitative. The civic virtue of a 
law-guardian is no greater than the civic virtue of any other law 
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abiding citizen. The elite’s greater knowledge is primarily used for 
the sake of their official functions. In Magnesia there seems to be no 
sense in which people can be virtuous in a way that is not somehow 
relevant to their citizenship, and the same could be said of the 
inhabitants of the Kallipolis.  
 
This should not, however, lead us into thinking that with Plato virtue 
has its higher expression in the political arena. However, the force 
with which Sokrates argues for the ideal polis and the rule of the 
philosopher can often colour our wider view of Plato’s ethical and 
educational theory.  
 
According to Alasdair MacIntyre, Plato’s concept of virtue is a 
political concept, hence:  
 
Plato’s account of the virtuous man is inseparable from his account of the 
virtuous citizen. Indeed this is an understatement, there is no way to be 
excellent as a man which does not involve excellence as a citizen and vice 
versa. But the excellent citizen will not be at home in any actual city, in 
Athens or Thebes or even in Sparta.38 
 
 
MacIntyre is partially correct in saying this, and although I would 
agree with him that Plato’s ‘excellent’ citizen has no natural home, I 
want to question this idea the Plato’s account of the virtuous man is 
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inseparable from his account of the virtuous citizen. The only sense in 
which this is true is in the ideal polis.  
 
If Plato’s concept of virtue does take civic virtue into consideration, 
which I believe it does, it has to do so in a way that makes sense in 
imperfect states. For, if the example of Sokrates is to be trusted, then 
Plato clearly sees virtue (leaving aside its political aspect) to be 
possible in a society such as 5th Century B.C. Athens. In respect to 
Sokrates’ civic virtue, the issue is rather more complicated. On the 
one hand Sokrates might be of the opinion that his actions are 
beneficial to Athens, and in this light those actions could be said to be 
indicative of civic virtue. On the other hand, the nature of Sokrates’ 
civic virtue is not one which is recognized by Athens herself or the 
majority of her citizens. Therefore, to speak about Sokrates’ civic 
virtue is problematic.  
 
Nevertheless, Plato seems to be of the view that it is possible to be a 
virtuous human being without being at the same time a virtuous 
citizen as measured by the standards of one’s fellow citizens and 
despite the fact that the virtuous person is not a citizen of the ideal 
state. This does not mean, of course, that virtue is apolitical: it exists 
(and of course, must exist) in a political climate, but it should never 
be subordinated to it.   
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 See the Crick Report (p.10, 1.17; p.12, 2.6). 
2 The initial partnership is between man and woman, and it is formed, as Aristotle 
says, for the preservation of the species. And the second relationship is that of master 
and slave, formed for the purpose of security (Politics 1252a24-b15). The next 
partnership goes beyond mere material or physical necessities, and this partnership 
is the village, a unit composed of several families (Politics 1252b16-28). The 
partnership (koinōnia) finally composed of several villages (Politics 1252b29-31), says 
Aristotle, is the polis: it has at last attained the limit of virtually complete self-
sufficiency. The individual person is more of a unity than the family, and the family 
is more of a unity than the polis, and, in terms of self-sufficiency, the individual is 
surpassed by the family, and the family by the polis. Hence, any drive to make the 
polis into a complete unity is more likely to destroy rather than preserve it.  
3 Strictly speaking the community of women and children is reserved for the 
guardian class, but ‘τούτων μὴν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μὴ στασιαζόντων οὐδὲν δεινὸν μή 
ποτε ἡ ἄλλη πόλις πρὸς τούτους ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους διχοστατήσῃ’ (Republic 465b8-
10).  
4 Republic 464d9, 464e2.  
5 These are Glaukon’s words at 451e1.  
6 Is democracy the most stasis ridden constitution therefore?  
7 It would, for example, be counterproductive in a democracy, not to say dangerous, 
to educate the young in oligarchic principles.  
8 Politics 1337a33-1337b3. 
9 However, Aristotle’s endorsement of universal education must be seen within its 
political context (a context which is surprisingly similar to the one that we find in 
Plato’s Republic). 
10The most extreme and unstable form of democracy, says Aristotle, is the one where 
the people act like an unlawful monarch, despotically ruling over the better classes. 
And it is in such poleis that the artisan and the craftsmen are granted citizenship. 
Civil war everywhere is due to inequality and one of its chief objects and causes is 
honour (Politics 1302a32-b15). In the most extreme democracy, the principle of 
equality is taken to its limit; and in such a society the notables are deprived of their 
share of the honours. The life of politics, writes Aristotle in book 7 (Politics 1324a29-
31), is chosen by those who excel in virtue (aretē), and such people would not want to 
vie for political honours with a blacksmith or a tanner. 
11 But even though aristocracy, monarchy and polity, rightly considered, are held up 
as the three best constitutions (with aristocracy being the best of these, the right 
circumstances permitting, see Politics 1286b5-6) in book 4 Aristotle is careful to 
distinguish these from another best form: ‘τίς δ᾽ ἀρίστη πολιτεία καὶ τίς ἄριστος 
βίος ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων, μήτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν 
συγκρίνουσι τὴν ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας, μήτε πρὸς παιδείαν ἣ φύσεως δεῖται καὶ 
χορηγίας τυχηρᾶς, μήτε πρὸς πολιτείαν τὴν κατ᾽ εὐχὴν γινομένην, ἀλλὰ βίον τε 
τὸν τοῖς πλείστοις κοινωνῆσαι δυνατὸν καὶ πολιτείαν ἧς τὰς πλείστας πόλεις 
ἐνδέχεται μετασχεῖν;’ (1295a25-33). But what is the best constitution and what is the 
best mode of life for the most cities and most of mankind, if we do not judge by the 
standard of a virtue that is above the level of private citizens or of an education that 
needs natural gifts and means supplied by fortune, nor by the standard of the ideal 
constitution, but a mode of life able to be shared by most men and a constitution 
possible for most states to attain?’ (trans. H. Rackham p.327).This is the government 
of the middle-classes, which Aristotle identifies as another aristos constitution, 
meaning not that it is one that sustains a virtuous way of life but rather that it is one 
which is the best possible for most states (other than the correct forms) to attain – it is 
aristos relative to the kind of life that the majority in most societies can live. It is, in a 
sense, the next best form of constitution after the correct forms of monarchy, 
aristocracy, and polity. 
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12 Politics 1279a28-33. Polity is the rule of the many, and in such a polis, given the 
sheer numbers involved in the running of the state, it is unlikely that the all the 
citizens will possess every kind of ‘virtue’ (aretē), but ‘μάλιστα τὴν πολεμικήν’ 
(Politics 1279a39-1279b5, ‘They can excel in military valour’ (trans. H. Rackham 
p.207). Aristotle’s definition runs thus: πολιτικὸν δὲ ἐν ῷ πέφυκεν ἐγγίνεσθαι 
πλῆθος πολεμικὸν δυνάμενον ἄρχεσθαι κὰι ἄρχειν κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατ᾽ ἀξίαν 
διανέμοντα τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχάς’ (1288a13-15, ‘A republican community, [is] 
one in which there naturally grows a military populace capable of being governed 
and of governing under a law that distributes the offices among the well-to-do in 
accordance with merit’ (trans. H. Rackham p.271). Polity is a mixture of oligarchy 
and democracy (Politics 1293b33-34; 1297a40-b1), and a good (eu) mixture is the one 
that takes the middle course between the policies of democracies and oligarchies 
(1294a30-b40). The example given is Sparta (cf. David Ross, Aristotle. p.259), and so a 
comparison with Plato’s timarchy is not totally unwarranted (cf. Mary P. Nichols, 
Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle’s Politics, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers Inc., 1991, p.64), but as most scholars agree, the polis that Aristotle has in 
mind here is probably Theramenes’ Athens (Politics 1296a37-b2; 1297b2-7, cf. Barker, 
The Politics of Aristotle, p.xxiv). After the disastrous rule of the Four Hundred, 
Theramenes created a government of Five Thousand. It was, as Ehrenberg states, a 
government based on the middle-classes, and was, at least according to Thukydides 
the first good constitution in his lifetime, ‘a mixture of oligarchy and democracy’ and 
it was heralded by some as a return to an older, ‘ancestral,’ and more moderate form 
of democracy (Peloponnesian War 8.97.2, patrios politeia, cf. Victor Ehrenberg, From 
Solon to Socrates, London: Routledge, 1993, pp.320-321). 
13 Politics 1285a9-10. ‘In the beginning authority over the peoples and nations of the 
world lay with monarchs, who rose to supreme power not because they courted 
popular support but because their restraint won the approval of honest men. There 
were not laws to regulate the masses; the decisions of the leaders were the law’ 
(Justin, Epitome of the Phillippic History of Pompeius Trogus, trans. Y. C. Yardley, 
Atlanta: Atlanta Press, 1994, 1.1 1-2, p.14). 
14 Politics 1284a3-4. 
15 Politics 1284a11.  
16 The man who is incapable of entering into a political partnership (as we learn back 
in book 1) is either a beast or a god (Politics 1253a27-29).  
17 Aristotle was tutor to Alexander the Great and also a friend of Antipater (who was 
Macedonian regent whilst Alexander was in the East).  
18 H. Kelsen, “Aristotle and Hellenic-Macedonian Policy,” Articles on Aristotle 2: Ethics 
and Politics, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield, Richard Sorabji, London: 
Duckworth, 1977 (p.173). Kelsen’s textual evidence is based largely on a passage 
from book 5, where various monarchies (the Macedonian among them) are held out 
as being good. 
19 And certainly not after the death of Aristotle’s nephew, Callisthenes, who was 
apparently killed on Alexander’s orders. 
20 Politics 1325b36, 1330a25, 1332a30. 
21 See Politics book 2 (kat eukhēn, 1265a18).  
22 The ‘ideal’ polis requires the ‘ideal’ constitution (politeia), but what is the 
constitution of the ‘ideal’ polis of books 7 and 8? Like many of the questions 
pertaining to Aristotle’s Politics, there is no straightforward answer. Some 
commentators identify the best constitution of books 7 and 8 with some sort of 
aristocracy; because even though Aristotle does not call it by this name, much of 
what he says in these books strongly indicates that this is what he has in mind. 
Aristotle describes the polis of books 7 and 8 as ‘τῇ κάλλιστα πολιτευομένῃ πόλει’ 
(Politics 1328b37); it is a virtuous polis with virtuous citizens (Politics 1329a23-25; 
1332a34-40). It seems clear, therefore, that the polis of books 7 and 8 is a kind of 
aristocracy (Politics 1334a13). 
23 Politics 1288b11. 
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24 In respect to this important question, Aristotle considers not just whether the 
external life of virtue is best for an individual, but also whether it is best for the state; 
and conversely, with the internal life of virtue. In both cases (for the individual and 
for the state) what is important is that, internally or externally, a life is comprised of 
virtuous activity. 
25 This issue, of course, raises the question of the composition of the Politics, the 
approach to which will impact on any attempt to find within it a consistent and 
coherent theory of education. Aristotle’s most extended treatment on education is 
found in books 7 and 8 of his Politics; there are references to education in some of the 
other books, however, the political context of his educational theory appears to be 
the ‘ideal’ polis of the last two books. The educational system of books 7 and 8 is, 
therefore, designed for the ‘ideal’ constitution, and hence is one that will help create 
and maintain, by providing a suitably virtuous citizen body, the ‘ideal’ political 
community. But what of the references to education in the other books of the Politics? 
Are Aristotle’s comments about education in books 1-6 consistent with those in 
books 7 and 8? There is, perhaps, no prima facie reason why there should not be a 
consistent theory of education in the Politics as a whole. However, considering the 
problematic composition of the work nothing can be taken for granted. The end of 
book 3 represents our biggest challenge. At the end of this book at 1288b3-7 Aristotle 
promises to move on to a discussion of the best constitution, therefore this passage is 
clearly meant to lead into book 7 and not, as it does, book 4. Because of this some 
editors, notably Newman, prefer to arrange the Politics in the following way: 1-2-3-7-
8-4-5-6. This method has several disadvantages. Although it makes some sense, at 
least thematically, for books 7 and 8 to follow on from book 3 (if the MSS is to be 
trusted), the same cannot be said in respect to placing books 4-6 after books 7 and 8. 
Book 8 is concerned with education in the best polis and is unfinished, while book 4 
is largely an analysis of existing constitutions. However, perhaps the apparently 
idiosyncratic ordering of books can be explained in another way. According to 
Jaeger’s infamous analysis (Werner Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his 
Development, trans. Richard Robinson, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948 (pp.259-262), 
the Politics is an amalgamation of two separate works on politics composed at 
different times, one (encompassing books 2, 3, 7 and 8), dealing with an ideal polis ‘in 
the manner of Plato’ and possibly written at the time when Aristotle was still under 
his master’s influence, and the other (books 4-6), dealing with more realistic and 
empirical topics, and supposedly written during Aristotle’s time at the Lyceum 
(According to Jaeger, book 1 of the Politics was written after the two different 
versions of the work and was added as a general introduction (Ibid pp.271-273). Some 
scholars, with certain reservations (H. Kelsen, “Aristotle and Hellenic-Macedonian 
Policy,” Articles on Aristotle 2: Ethics and Politics, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm 
Schofield, Richard Sorabji, London: Duckworth, 1977, pp.170-194, Fritz and Kapp, 
“Development of Aristotle Political Philosophy,” ibid pp.113-126, R. G. Mulgan, 
Aristotle’s Political Theory: An Introduction for Students of Political Theory, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1977, pp.307-322), are broadly in agreement with the German 
scholar’s claims. Most, however, hotly contest Jaeger’s conclusions. Jaeger’s ‘genetic 
method’ has been adequately addressed by Barker, who suggests, quite rightly in my 
opinion, that we give up the search for ‘chronological strata’ and instead adopt the 
view that the Politics is a work made up several different though interrelated 
‘methods’ (Ernest Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946, 
pp.xxvii-xxxix) and therefore that it is a mistake, as Ross argues, ‘to suppose that 
there is an original or a proper order of the books of the Politics’ (David Ross, 
Aristotle, London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1923, p.236). I have nothing new to add to the 
debate here. However, I will say, that even if it could be proved that the Politics is a 
combination of two separate works in the way that Jaeger maintains, this would not 
necessarily mean that we should expect Aristotle’s pronouncements on education 
throughout the whole work to be inconsistent. Some of Aristotle’s comments on 
education do appear to suggest that books 3 and 7-8 ought to be considered as being 
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particularly close; and in terms of education and its relationship with citizenship 
book 3, 7 and 8 are in basic agreement. But this probably has more to do with the 
similarity of the topics covered in these books rather than an indication that these 
two pairs of books ought to be grouped together. I would argue that the theory of 
education in the Politics is consistent and this consistency is derived from the fact that 
throughout the work education is seen to be, at its most effective, a means for 
establishing the best political community. 
26 Politics 1278a15-16. 
27 Agathos and spoudaios appear to synonymous terms here.  
28 Aristotle does add that in respect to the other virtues (temperance, justice), that 
they are not the same for the man who is in government and the man who is a 
subject. There is a type of justice that a man requires to rule and a type that he 
requires to be ruled, and so on for the other virtues. It is only ‘wisdom’ that always 
operates in the same way regardless of whether a person is ruling or being ruled.  
29 Cf. W. L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle Volume II, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon 
Press, 1950 (p.240). 
30 This is an interesting twist on the Platonic model. In Plato’s ideal polis the citizens 
are divided into three types: rules, auxiliaries, and farmers and artisans. In Aristotle’s 
re-vamped model farmers and artisans are jettisoned, but the three-fold model is 
retained in the shape of the priestly class. 
31 Politics 1329a35-39; 1328b25-1329a39. 
32 Music is a leisure activity, and therefore noble and fitting for the freeman; it is an 
activity that can be pursued for the sake of pleasure (Politics 1338a33-35). 
33 Politics 1341b9-1342b35. 
34  Politics 1341b9-1342b35. 
35 As perhaps Akhilleus does: 
Μυρμιδόνων δ᾽ ἐπί τε κλισίας καὶ νῆας ἱκέσθην,  
τὸν δ᾽ εὗρον φρένα τερπόμενον φόρμιγγι λιγείῃ 
καλῇ δαιδαλέῃ, ἐπὶ δ᾽ ἀργύρεον ζυγὸν ἦεν, 
τὴν ἄρετ᾽ ἐξ ἐνάρων πόλιν Ἠετίωνος ὀλέσσας· 
τῇ ὅ γε θυμὸν ἔτερπεν, ἄειδε δ᾽ ἄρα κλέα ἀνδρῶν 
(Iliad IX.185-189). ‘Now they came by the ships of the Myrmidons and they found 
Akhilleus delighting his heart in a lyre, clear sounding, splendid and carefully 
wrought, with a bridge of silver upon it, which he won out of the spoils when he 
ruined Eetion’s city. With this he was pleasuring his heart, and singing of men’s 
fame.’  
36 The Athenian economy and culture blossomed under its empire, and even after the 
disastrous Peloponnesian war, Athens continued to exert its cultural dominance far 
into the 4th century B.C. (Moreover, the 4th Century B.C. witnessed a new 
development in Athenian education and wisdom with the emergence of the great 
schools and the great philosophers. Athenian culture was expanding far beyond 
Attica, and it would soon extend to the borders of modern day India). Nevertheless, 
the internal strife and factional infighting that had marred the 5th Century continued 
into the next, but the Athenian orator and ‘philosopher’ Isokrates had a remedy: to 
unite, again, and direct their energies against the Persians. This seemed an unlikely 
prospect (Individually and collectively the Greeks were highly competitive (‘αἰὲν 
ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων’, Iliad IV.208. This has become something 
of a cliché, but in essence it remains true. See Adkins’ Merit and Responsibility: A Study 
in Greek Values, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1960, pp.30-49), and, in terms of the 
internal politics of Greece, this frequently resulted in war and revolution. Treaties 
and pacts came and went, alliances were short lived and unreliable, except when 
they could be enforced militarily). Only twice in their living memory, and once in 
their mythical past, had the Greeks stood together (It has to be stated that not all the 
Greek city-states rallied to the course, Thebes was a notable exception, see 
Thukydides, Peloponnesian War IX.31-33, 67-69, and Arrian, Campaigns of Alexander 1.9 
6-8), in the Persian Wars, and, of course, in the Trojan War. What did appear to unite 
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the Greeks was their education. What makes a Hellene a Hellene, claims Isokrates, is 
a shared education, or, more specifically, an Athenian education (καὶ τὸ τῶν 
Ἑλλήνων ὄνομα πεποίηκε μηκέτι τοῦ γένους ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας δοκεῖν εἶναι, καὶ 
μᾶλλον Ἕλληνας καλεῖσθαι τοὺς τῆς παιδεύσεως τῆς ἡμετέρας ἢ τοὺς τῆς κοινῆς 
φύσεως μετέχοντας. ‘And she [Athens] brought it about that the name ‘Hellenes’ 
suggests no longer a race but an intelligence, and that the title ‘Hellenes’ is applied 
rather to those who share our culture than to those who share a common blood’ 
(Isokrates, Panēgyrikos 50, Isocrates Volume I, trans. George Norlin, London: William 
Heinemann Ltd, 1928). Philosophy (For Isokratean philosophy see Antidosis 270-294, 
Isocrates Volume II, trans. George Norlin, London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1929), 
linguistic beauty and deftness are all Athenian gifts which, now thanks to men like 
Isokrates, are revered all over the Hellenic peninsula (Isokrates, Antidosis 295-296, 
and 299, Isocrates Volume II, trans. George Norlin, London: William Heinemann Ltd, 
1929). The Spartans, however, proved to be a notable exception. Looking at it from a 
purely cultural perspective, the Peloponnesian war represented an ideological 
contest between Greece’s two greatest city-states, Athens and Sparta. It was a culture 
war; Athenian wisdom and love of words was set against Spartan military discipline 
and laconism. Spartan austerity may have been respected by men like Xenophon 
(Xenophon, Constitution of the Spartans 1.10-11), but their illiberalism (In opposition to 
the Athenian ‘liberal education’, Paul H. Hirst, “Liberal Education and the Nature of 
Knowledge,” Philosophy of Education, ed. R. S. Peters, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987, pp.87-111) and ridge social life could not compete with the artistic 
freedom and buoyancy of democratic Athens. Fundamental to this contest were 
Athens and Sparta’s divergent conceptions of education, as Perikles highlights in his 
funeral speech (Thukydides, 11.39, 29, Thucydidis Historiae, Volume I, ed. Henry Stuart 
Jones, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1970). Perikles compares the Athenian and 
Spartan attitudes to education (Paul Cartledge, Spartan Reflections, London: 
Duckworth, 2001, p.80), particularly in respect to courage, and by doing so critiques 
Athenian and Spartan conceptions of character and virtue. It is the Athenian way of 
life Perikles concludes, and not the Spartan, that has had the most influence; 
therefore, it is they and not the Spartans who have become the educators of Greece 
(Russell Meiggs, The Athenian Empire, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1975, p.273). 
Some years later, Isokrates exploited this idea for his Panhellenic ideals. Considering 
Athens’ cultural dominance, it is she that is the natural hegemon of Greece, not 
Sparta (cf. Isokrates’ Panathenaicus 54. The inward looking Spartans never attempted 
to replicate their way of life, and nor could they have), and therefore it is the 
Athenians who should lead the alliance against the Persians (cf. Ulrich Wilcken, 
Alexander the Great, trans. G. C. Richards, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
1967, p.45). But it would be under the leadership of Macedon, and not Athens, that 
the Hellenic cities would eventually go to war with Persia. However, they fought 
Persia, not as a coalition of free cities, but as subjects of Macedonian rule. The 
Spartans took no part in the adventure (other than starting a rebellion in 331 B.C.). 
Athens was not finished, and even under the Macedonian yoke, she retained some of 
old glory (As a naval power, however, Athens never recovered. Christian Habicht, 
Athens from Alexander to Antony, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997, pp.36-
42). Athenian culture was long lived (‘Every nation which has reached a certain stage 
of development is instinctively impelled to practise education. Education is the 
process by which a community preserves and transmits its physical and intellectual 
character. For individuals passes away, but the type remains’ (Werner Jaeger, Paideia: 
The Ideals of Greek Culture, Volume I, Archaic Greece, The Mind of Athens, trans. Gilbert 
Highet, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965, p.xiii). However, Athenian culture and ideals 
were no longer hers alone. The parochialism of the city-state gave way to the 
cosmopolitanism of the Hellenic world (Ernest Barker,  The Cambridge Ancient 
History, Volume VI Macedon 401-301 B.C., ed. J. b. Bury, S. A. Cook, F. E. Adcock, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933, p.511), and Athens lost her identity 
along with her leadership. The ‘classical Greek’ (G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of 
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History, trans. J. Sibree, New York: Dover, 1956, p.273) world was over – the world 
had grown; the city-state lost its relevance (See D. Graham J. Shipley and Mogens H. 
Hansen, “The Polis and Federalism,” The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic 
World, ed. Glenn R. Bugh, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.52 and 
p.59). Independent city-states and minor allegiances gave way to Hellenic kingdoms; 
Demosthenes and Athenian democracy gave way to Alexander and monarchy (‘His 
[Demosthenes’] resistance to the forces moving his age was a fulfilment of a supra-
personal law – the law by which every nation tries doggedly to maintain the pattern 
of life moulded by itself, founded on its natural disposition, and responsible for the 
highest achievements in its history’ (Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, 
Volume III: The Conflict of Cultural Ideals in the Age of Plato, trans. Gilbert Highet, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p.265). The influence and appeal of Athenian 
culture and education beyond its borders is evident in the rise of Macedonia power, 
and culminated, we might say, with Alexander the Great. Alexander was educated 
by Aristotle (John Maxwell O’Brian, Alexander the Great: The Invisible Enemy, A 
Biography, London: Routledge, 1992, pp.19-23), who, although yet to reach full fame, 
was preferable to the other candidates (Victor Ehrenberg, Alexander and the Greeks, 
trans. Ruth Fraenkel Von Versen, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1938, p.63). Alexander’s 
favourite work was Homer’s Iliad, and his favourite hero was Akhilleus, his ancestor 
(Robin Lane Fox, Alexander the Great, London: Allen Lane, 1973, p.59, cf. pp. 145-146). 
On the whole Alexander’s education was more Macedonian than Athenian (N. G. L. 
Hammond, Philip of Macedon, London: Duckworth, 1994, pp.41-42), as we would 
expect, but insofar as Macedonia sought to incorporate Greek ideals and cultural 
models (Ibid pp.42-43), we must understand his education as being heavily flavoured 
by the most dominant and marketable culture in the Greek world, the Athenian. The 
war against the Persians was Alexander’s inheritance, and he pursued it with 
amazing vigour and success. However, Alexander’s attitude to panhellenism is hard 
to gauge (‘And to Alexander’s Greek contemporaries, his emulation of Achilles 
would have appeared inseparable from his panhellenic claims to be avenging Greece, 
since in the popular imagination the Trojan War had long since become a mythic 
analogue for the Persian wars’, Michael Flower, “Alexander the Great and 
Panhellenism,” Alexander the Great in Fact and fiction, ed. A. S. Bosworth and E. J. 
Baynham, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p.108): part liberator (the Greek 
cities of Asia Minor for instance) part autocrat, Alexander exploited the panhellenic 
ideal where appropriate (Victor Ehrenberg, Alexander and the Greeks, p.105, p.39). 
Alexander was a man of political realities; the romantic Alexander may not be 
entirely fiction Victor Ehrenberg, Alexander and the Greeks, pp.52-61), but Alexander 
was neither a champion of panhellenism nor a unifier of men (W. W. Tarn, The 
Cambridge Ancient History, Volume VI Macedon 401-301 B.C., ed. J. b. Bury, S. A. Cook, 
F. E. Adcock, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933, p.437). Alexander was 
not a champion of the polis (although he had a certain affection for Athens), and he is 
not Aristotle’s outstanding man of virtue, or even his ideal monarch. Greek unity 
came at a price. Alexander’s short-lived empire and its rapid fragmentation after his 
death, is indicative of the very notion of Greek unity. It was an externally imposed 
and ‘factitious unity’; ‘Greek unification,’ as Ernest Barker states, ‘in the form in 
which it was achieved, meant the purchase of material progress at the price of moral 
regression’ (Barker, The Cambridge Ancient History, volume VI, p.509).  
37 It might be the case, however (and also taking into consideration anti-Macedonian 
feeling), that is was precisely because the city-state was under threat that Aristotle 
extols it virtues so forcibly. 
38 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (p.141). 
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Chapter Eight 
 
Teaching ‘Virtue’ in the United Kingdom 
 
The end of Education is to render the individual, as much as possible, an 
instrument of happiness, first to himself, and next to other beings1 
 
 
Education for the Greeks and for Plato is essentially an ethical 
practice, but what is it for us? In terms of wider educational policy, in 
the UK at least, the dominant principle, unsurprisingly, is economic 
rather than ethical: ‘within policy, education is now regarded 
primarily from an economic point of view. The social and economic 
purposes of education have been collapsed into a single, overriding 
emphasis on policy making for economic competitiveness and an 
increasing neglect or sidelining (other than in rhetoric) of the social 
purposes of education.’2 The concern of schools and colleges is to 
prepare their students for the ‘world of work’; the demands of 
business take precedence over broader social concerns, which are in 
turn seen mainly from the perspective of the market, the private 
sector and globalisation.3 Education is mainly concerned with fiscal 
usefulness.4  
 
This is to be expected, perhaps, because as soon as education becomes 
a concern of the state, with all the regulation and supervision that this 
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entails, then it becomes to a large extent enslaved to a set of interests 
that are for the most part economic in nature.5   
 
This, of course, represents a radical departure from the Greek 
conception of education. The Greeks, as I discussed in Chapter Two, 
did not clearly distinguish between ‘liberal’ education and ‘moral’ 
education. The Athenians for example (excluding, of course, Plato, 
and to a lesser extent, Aristotle), believed that, first and foremost, 
education in the liberal sense was an education that would help to 
create the next generation of citizens. ‘Men are born but citizens are 
made,’6 and this was the main aim of paideia for the Greeks. However, 
education was not civic training in any deliberate sense. This has to 
do with how Greeks thought about citizenship. To be a citizen of 
Athens was not just to have certain privileges, obligations, and rights, 
but was to be assimilated into a well defined and exclusive culture. To 
be an Athenian meant more than the opportunity for political 
participation (although the Athenians did pride themselves on this 
aspect of their citizenship perhaps more than any other): it meant 
claiming one’s birthright. However, being an Athenian was more 
than a matter of birth it was a matter of blood.7 
 
Notions of what it meant to be a citizen differed from constitution to 
constitution, as did the character ideal contained within it. Athenians 
had, (whether they had genuine knowledge of the virtues they so 
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coveted or not), a distinctive view of what good character was and 
what it meant to be a good citizen, and even if their view was 
misconceived as Plato thought, it was, at least, teachable. In modern 
education the emphasis is, as we would expect, quite different from 
the ancient Greek. Although the word paideia suggests that the 
emphasis is on the young, the term is actually extremely broad. For 
us, perhaps, education is now almost synonymous with schooling; 
education is art rather than culture. Nevertheless, it would be a 
mistake to think that the term education is no less an ambiguous and 
semantically generous term than paideia. It has, however, become 
somewhat departmentalised. The complexity of modern society and 
the specialism that follows in its train means that, properly speaking, 
education cannot have a single aim. However, even though the aims of 
modern education are many, the overriding concern, as we saw in the 
Introduction, is with, as James Mill calls it, ‘technical’ education, and 
it is one that is ‘chiefly to do with Intelligence.’8 
 
However, taking the notions of education and morality in a simple 
and uncontroversial sense, guidance in the use of moral language and 
reasoning occurs both in the home (often in a highly traditional and 
uncritical way) and, more formally, in the school; moral training is 
something that, in some form or another, all children are subjected to. 
Indeed, schools today, apart from stressing their academic 
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credentials, also lay considerable emphasis on their school’s 
environment and the moral development of their pupils.9   
 
Broadly speaking (and I am not necessarily talking of the ‘hidden 
curriculum’),10 moral education pervades the school environment. All 
schools have rules, student councils, forms of punishment and 
incentive, not to mention the interaction between the children and 
children and teaching staff, all of which will contribute, often in a 
rather haphazard way, to a pupil’s moral development. Formal 
teaching also has a moral component: subjects such as history and 
English have scope in which to discuss ethical issues and opinions, 
and in subjects such as Personal Social and Health Education (PSHE), 
Citizenship Education (CE), and Religious Education (RE), ethics and 
morality are addressed more directly. The task of this moral 
education, however, is not to teach moral rules or norms, still less to 
indoctrinate pupils into a certain belief system. A common sense 
approach is preferred, where it is assumed that, generally speaking, 
the rights and wrongs of human conduct are fairly self-evident. It is 
not the responsibility of the school to inform children, as if for the 
first time, that stealing is wrong, but rather why stealing is wrong. The 
teacher’s task, initially at least, is to strengthen a child’s already 
existing but ill-formed moral sense. The teacher’s power, of course, is 
limited; and the teacher is often in competition, openly or otherwise, 
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with other ‘moral teachers,’ such as the pupil’s family or friends, or 
even, as is increasingly the case, with media or cultural figures.   
 
The emphasis, for the most part, is on moral reasoning, on intellectual 
rather than moral virtue; but even so, there is no specific programme 
in UK schools, a la Kohlberg, for improving pupils’ powers of moral 
reasoning. Instead, moral reasoning is seen more as a particular 
attitude to moral problems or issues. Pupils are encouraged to apply 
a critical approach to the judgements that they bring to bear on the 
behaviour of others. In addition to this, pupils must be sensitive to 
both the consequences of their and other’s actions and to the possible 
motivations behind them; outright condemnation is rarely endorsed, 
except only in straightforward cases. Moral education is not about 
creating moral automata but agents who have some training in how 
they should act and judge in certain ethical situations.  
 
For a society caught between moral traditionalism and cultural 
relativism (or moral diversity as I would call it), clothing the 
language of ethics in the language of citizenship becomes both 
prudent and, in a sense, inevitable. Which is the reason why, perhaps, 
that citizenship education has come to the fore in recent years, not 
only as an answer to political apathy and poor voter turnout but also 
as a way of dealing with moral pluralism. However, and even 
admitting the importance of teaching pupils about their political 
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systems and their future role within them, is citizenship education 
the best method for dealing with the problems that arise from moral 
diversity? 
 
§1 
 
Citizenship Education 
 
After years of consultation between Government and various 
educational bodies, citizenship education became part of the National 
Curriculum in England on 12th September 2002.11 The Advisory 
Group on Citizenship, which issued its final report (the Crick Report), 
“Education for citizenship and the teaching of democracy in schools,” 
on 22nd September 1998, played a leading role in the latter stages of its 
development. The Crick Report has an ambitious mandate for 
citizenship education:  
 
We aim at no less than a change in the political culture of this country both 
nationally and locally: for people to think of themselves as active citizens, 
willing, able and equipped to have an influence in public life and with the 
critical capacities to weigh evidence before speaking and acting; to build on 
and to extend radically to young people the best in existing traditions of 
community involvement and public service, and to make them individually 
confident in finding new forms of involvement and action among 
themselves.12 
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As the Crick Report states, citizenship education ‘is novel to this 
country,’13 however, the Report is unanimous in respect of its belief 
that citizenship education must be a statutory requirement in all 
secondary schools.14 We shall look at the Crick Report’s proposals in 
detail in a moment, but for now the question we should ask is: why is 
citizenship education required now? In the report of the Commission 
on Citizenship, Encouraging Citizenship, published in 1990, the reasons 
behind the need for an expansion of citizenship education are 
sketched out, ‘since the war, Britain has been transformed into a 
multi-racial society. At the same time, shifts in the income, life style, 
nature of work and demographic balance of the population are 
affecting people’s expectations.’15 As Frances Morrell states, ‘the 
context of the commission’s work was the great changes that have 
affected our society and the sense that change is taking place at a 
faster pace than ever before.’16  
 
The complexity of modern society is inimical to, it would appear, 
active political, and perhaps, to a lesser degree, social, participation. 
Hence, as the Commission states, ‘we believe that citizenship is one of 
the most important concepts of modern political struggle and social 
development,’17 and the Crick Report is largely in agreement. The 
‘worrying levels of apathy, ignorance and cynicism about public 
life,’18 reflected both in voter turnout and in attitudes towards public 
service, and the problems that arise from ‘youth alienation’19 and 
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antisocial behaviour seem to confirm that there is a substantial and 
growing problem,20 all of which could be addressed through a 
program of civic education. As Tony Breslin puts it:  
 
The promotion of citizenship education for all through the creation of a new 
foundation subject is clearly a statement about the duty of schools to 
contribute to the creation of active adult citizens and constitutes a reflection 
on a range of areas of concern: a lack of participation in political life, the 
apparent breakdown of a range of social structures (notably the family), 
concerns around the essential civility of the young…and, as a context for 
much of this, the reality of social exclusion.21   
 
 
The background to the Commission’s report is not only the issue of 
apathy and the changing nature of British society, but also about the 
knowledge and skills22 that people would need in order to take full 
advantage of their roles as democratic citizens.23 According to Jagdish 
Gundara: 
 
The role of citizenship and politics in society is predicated on the fact that 
citizenship education itself is necessary for all sections of society. Politically 
undereducated or ill-educated and inactive members of societies are 
dangerous because they misrepresent the complexity of humanity and opt 
for simplistic solutions based on populist politics, often encouraging 
authoritarian and undemocratic solutions to complex societal issues.24 
 
 
The Crick Report therefore places a substantial stress on skills and 
aptitudes and knowledge and understanding.25 The purpose of 
citizenship education in schools is ‘to make secure and to increase the 
knowledge, skills and values relevant to the nature and practices of 
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participative democracy; also to enhance the awareness of rights and 
duties, and the sense of responsibilities needed for the development 
of pupils into active citizens.’26 Non-participation comes, in part, from 
the belief that a person cannot make any genuine contribution, which 
is perhaps indicative of a general ignorance about what being a 
citizen means. Therefore a key challenge in the development of 
citizenship education is coming to an understanding of what 
citizenship is; if citizenship is to be taught then there must be a clear 
definition of what being a citizen entails. The Crick Report, and 
before it, the Commission Report, draw heavily on T.H. Marshall’s 
influential three-fold division of citizenship:  
 
I shall call them parts, or elements, civil, political and social. The civil 
element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom – liberty 
of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own 
property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice. The last is 
of a different order from the others, because it is the rights to defend and 
assert all one’s right on terms of equality with others and by due process of 
law. This shows us that the institutions most directly associated with civil 
rights are the courts of justice. By the political I mean the right to participate 
in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with 
political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body. The 
corresponding institutions are parliament and councils of local government. 
By social element I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum of 
economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social 
heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards 
prevailing in the society. The institutions most closely connected with it are 
the educational system and the social services.27 
 
 
The report of the Commission on Citizenship28 broadly supports 
Marshall’s definition of citizenship, as does the Crick Report,29 which 
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recognised that they must adopt a definition of citizenship which is 
‘wide without being all things to everyone’30 but which must also 
identify the three dimensions highlighted by Marshall.31  
 
The first strand of the definition is social and moral responsibility: 
‘Socially and morally responsible behaviour both in and beyond the 
classroom, both towards those in authority and towards each other’ – 
this is ‘at the heart of the matter’, ‘guidance on moral values and 
personal development are essential preconditions of citizenships.’32 
The second strand is community involvement: ‘Learning about and 
becoming helpfully involved in the life and concerns of their 
communities, including learning through community involvement 
and service to the community.’33 The third and final strand is political 
literacy: ‘Pupils learning about and how to make themselves effective 
in public life through knowledge, skills and values.’34 
 
This represents a change in emphasis from Marshall’s definition; 
there is, as many commentators have noted, a shift from rights to 
responsibilities, ‘whereas Marshall viewed civil citizenship as the 
foundation of individual rights and freedoms, the Crick Report sees 
this level as the exercise of social and moral responsibilities of 
reciprocity and social trust as a foundation for sociability.’35 
Citizenship education is not merely about making people aware that 
they are citizens with certain rights but also that they are citizens 
 317 
with certain responsibilities, which, if properly exercised, would 
benefit not only themselves but also the wider community. According 
to the Crick Report, citizenship education will have benefits for 
pupils, teachers, schools and society. The benefit for pupils is that 
they will be able to participate effectively in society as informed, 
critical and responsible citizens; and the benefit for society will be 
that it gains ‘an active and politically literate citizenry convinced that 
they can influence government and community affairs at all levels.’36  
 
As we saw, the Crick Report claims that there must be a strong 
connection between the duties of citizenship and social and moral 
responsibility. Eirini Pasoula, in her “Moral, Social and Civic 
Education in Greece,” endorses the Crick Report’s stress on the 
relationship between social, moral and civic, with the proviso that 
‘we understand the term ‘moral’ in its full sense and in relation to the 
‘social’ and second, that we clarify which are the relevant [types of] 
knowledge, values, skills and dispositions.’37  
 
The Crick Report does address this concern. An integral part of 
citizenship education (in theory at least) will be the acquisition of a 
set of values and dispositions: ‘certain values and dispositions are 
appropriate to citizenship’; therefore ‘pupils should be encouraged to 
‘recognise, reflect and act upon these values and dispositions,’38  
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They should be helped, in particular, to reflect on and recognise values and 
dispositions which underlie their attitudes and actions as individuals and as 
members of groups and communities. This is vital in developing pupils into 
active citizens who have positive attitudes to themselves, as individuals, and 
in their relationship with others.39 
 
 
The Report is understandably quite hazy40 about what these values 
and dispositions are and how they are to be cultivated: values and 
dispositions41 range between active citizenship and the most general 
moral ideas, including a ‘concern for the common good’ and ‘judging 
and acting by a moral code.’42 The Report is wary of charges of 
indoctrination43 and political bias: 
 
It would not be appropriate for the government to give precise prescriptions 
on some politically or morally sensitive matters, the detail should be at arm’s 
length from the state…in the very nature of citizenship there must be local 
discretion. It would have been paradoxical for a subject designed to 
encourage thought and action, action based on thought, to be too 
prescriptive.44 
 
 
Perhaps it is simply not desirable, or even possible, to promote a 
single set of moral principles, values or virtues within a state 
programme of education.45 The central question, as Graham Haydon 
frames it, is this: ‘in a society which is not only liberal but plural in its 
cultures and traditions, can the promotion of a set of virtues be 
compatible with inclusion and the proper recognition of diversity?’46 
By promoting, for example, a single set of virtues we risk, unless they 
are suitably inclusive (as I discussed in the Introduction), excluding a 
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section or sections of society that do not, for whatever reasons, 
prescribe to them.  
 
Therefore, perhaps the greatest challenge for citizenship education, as 
Jagdish Gundara states, ‘is the molding of the one out of the many 
and to construct appropriate educational responses to difference and 
diversity within British society.’47 The Crick Report does address this 
concern, 48 but a recent report by the House of Commons Education 
and Skills Committee, “Citizenship and Education,” following the 
recommendations of Sir Keith Ajegbo,49 has stressed the need for 
citizenship education to address the issues of multiculturalism, race, 
religion, and identity, in greater depth: 
 
Since the publication of the Crick Report and the introduction of National 
Curriculum citizenship education, several tragic events have occurred – 
including the terrorist bombings on London’s transport network on the 7 
July 2005 – which have in some quarters been interpreted as a sign that 
society is coming unstuck at the edges and is increasingly lacking ties that 
binds all citizens together.50 
 
 
Whether or not these events were directly caused by a lack of 
cohesion in British society, they are certainly indicative of a failure to 
satisfactorily create a sense of national identity and commonality of 
purpose that reflects the diversity of modern Britain. Therefore, a key 
concern and motivation behind citizenship education must be with 
creating ‘a modern, cohesive British society,’51 and, as Ajegbo argues, 
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‘if children and young people are to develop a notion of citizenship as 
inclusive, it is crucial that issues of identity and diversity are 
addressed explicitly.’52  
 
The link between education for diversity and Citizenship education is clear: 
whilst we need to understand and celebrate the diverse cultures and 
backgrounds of the UK’s population, we also need to acknowledge what 
brings us together as active citizens and agents of change53 
 
 
‘Education for diversity is crucial, not just for the future wellbeing of 
our children and young people but also for the survival of our 
society’;54 therefore, what is called for is a fourth stand in citizenship 
education, Identity and Diversity: Living Together in the UK,55 which 
includes not only ‘critical thinking’ about ethnicity, religion and race, 
and how these feed into the political climate and debate, but also ‘the 
use of contemporary history in teachers’ pedagogy to illuminate 
thinking about contemporary issues relating to citizenship.’ As the 
Commons Education and Skills Committee states:  
 
Such coverage should rightly touch on what is distinctive in the inheritance 
and experience of contemporary Britain and the values of our society today. 
But it should not be taken to imply an endorsement of any single 
explanation of British values or history. Indeed, it should emphasise the way 
in which those values connect to universal human rights, and recognise that 
critical and divergent perspectives, as well as the potential to have 
alternative and different layers, are a central part of what contemporary 
Britishness is56 
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If citizenship education must include a particular view about 
morality, it must be one that is confined to what it means to be an 
active citizen who participates in the democratic processes, locally 
and nationally, of the United Kingdom.57  As Haydon says, it should 
be possible ‘for citizens in a plural and democratic society to agree on 
one way of seeing morality which can be shared on the level of public 
discourse, while not having to give up their perhaps favoured and 
more deeply held understandings of morality which may stem from 
cultural tradition or personal reflection.’58  
 
In a sense citizenship education attempts to resolve the tension 
between public and private morality by introducing a notion of moral 
and social responsibility which is common to all British citizens, 
regardless of their ethnicity and religion, and regardless of whatever 
moral positions that they or their communities hold. A good person 
becomes, in effect, a good citizen.59  
 
Citizenship education can only promote a notion of morality that is 
primarily civic (this is not a criticism it is just a reality); it has nothing 
substantial to say about virtue or good character, and it cannot 
recommend a way of life; all it can do is to teach the young what is 
expected of them as citizens not what is expected of them as human 
beings.  
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§2 
 
Moral Education in the UK 
 
Citizenship Education is not the only provision made for moral 
education in the national curriculum. Both RE (statutory) and PSHE: 
Personal Wellbeing and PSHE: Economic Wellbeing and Financial 
Capability, both of which are non-statutory, cater for the moral 
development of pupils. PSHE: Personal Wellbeing has an even more 
general approach to ‘morality’ than CE. The ‘ethical’ scope of PSHE 
can be gleaned from the following: 
 
As they explore similarities and differences between people and discuss 
social and moral dilemmas, they learn to deal with challenges and 
accommodate diversity in all its forms. The world is full complex and 
sometimes conflicting values. Personal wellbeing helps students explore this 
complexity and reflect on and clarify their own values and attitudes. They 
identify and articulate feelings and emotions, learn to manage new or 
difficult situations positively and form and maintain effective relationships 
with a wide range of people. Personal wellbeing makes a major contribution 
to the promotion of personal development.60 
 
 
Accordingly: ‘Personal wellbeing makes a significant contribution to 
young people’s personal development and character.’61 PSHE covers 
issues such as sex, drug abuse, racism, healthy living, and ‘values.’ 
Some of these aspects of PSHE, such as drug awareness, are 
doubtfully useful, the problem, as ever, is with the lack of any strong 
moral content.  
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Under its explanatory note ‘values’, we are told: ‘exploring topical 
and real-life social and moral dilemmas provides the context for 
exploring complex and conflicting values. Reflecting on how this 
impacts on personal values and re-evaluating them is important at 
this stage [key stage 4].’ The important phrase here is ‘conflicting 
values.’  
 
PSHE: Economic Wellbeing and Financial Capability has a different 
although complimentary remit to PSHE: Personal Wellbeing:  
 
Education for economic wellbeing and financial capability aims to equip 
students with the knowledge, skills and attitudes to make the most of 
changing opportunities in learning and work. Through their learning and 
experiences inside and outside school, students begin to understand the 
nature of the world of work, the diversity and function of business, and its 
contribution to national prosperity. They develop as questioning and 
informed consumers and learn to manage their money and finances 
effectively.62  
 
 
Its key concepts are ‘career,’ business enterprise, risk management, 
and ‘economic understanding’; its true interest, however, as the 
explanatory notes indicate, is with ‘employability.’  
 
Taken together, it is a central function of both forms of PSHE to 
prepare pupils to be able to deal with life in a morally diverse and 
consumerist society.  
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In Scotland and Wales, where Citizenship Education is not part of the 
school syllabus, moral education appears to be more expansive. 
According to the Personal and Social Education Framework for 7 to 19-
year-olds in Wales: 
  
The school ethos, enshrined in democratically agreed rules, can provide a 
stable and ordered environment in which values such as respect, honesty, 
fairness and responsibility can be promoted. Learners should be encouraged 
to reflect on their personal beliefs and values and apply them to their own 
experiences. They can also be inspired to express their inner feelings using 
imagination and creativity. This can be evoked by a sense of awe and 
wonder at the natural world, by the mysteries of life and death, by the 
limitations of human understanding or by a response to a divine being.63 
 
 
In addition to the promotion of values, the importance of cultural 
heritage is also stressed: 
 
Learners aged 7-14 should be given opportunities to develop and apply 
knowledge and understanding of the cultural, economic, environmental, 
historical and linguistic characteristics of Wales64 
 
The actual aims of PSE, however, are somewhat more general (and a 
good deal less interesting):  
 
1. Develop learners’ self-esteem and a sense of personal responsibility 
2. Promote self-respect, respect for others and celebrate diversity  
3. Equip learners to live safe, healthy lives 
4. Prepare learners for the choices and opportunities of lifelong 
learning 
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5. Empower learners to participate in their schools and communities 
as active responsible citizens locally, nationally and globally 
6. Foster positive attitudes and behaviour towards the principles of 
sustainable development and global citizenship 
7. Prepare learners for the challenges, choices and responsibilities of 
work and adult life 
 
Indeed, PSE does not differ substantially from CE and PSHE – it too 
stresses the importance of social responsibility and political literacy – 
and it is very much orientated towards ‘active’ citizenship and the 
demands of modern, global, and to a lesser extent, consumer living.65  
 
In its guidelines for the teaching of Religious and Moral Education in 
Scotland, and specifically to its contribution to the wider curriculum, 
we learn:  
 
Values such as justice, wisdom, compassion and integrity are constantly 
being enacted through all aspects of the life of the school as a community. 
They can be further developed through exploration and discussion in 
religious and moral education66 
 
There is also, as in Wales, a strong stress on ‘cultural heritage and 
identity’: 
 
The experience and outcomes [of Religious and Moral Education] draw on 
rich and diverse context of Scotland’s’ cultural heritage through the use of 
Scottish stories, images, music and poems. As Teachers make use of the 
 326 
experiences and outcomes they will draw on the resources of the school’s 
community and context to inform their planning. Within practices and 
traditions, this can be made explicit through visits to local places of worship 
as well as through festivals and celebrations67 
 
 
The wording here is careful, and concerning the history of 
sectarianism in Scotland, this is perhaps wise.68 The context of 
Scotland’s cultural heritage is ‘diverse’, but still recognisably 
‘Scottish’. This may be, as it is in the case of Wales, because there is 
less reticence in countries that are less multicultural (and less 
multiracial) to celebrate and even promote strong and distinctive 
cultural ideals.  
 
Why is the word ‘value’ preferred to the word ‘virtue’ in modern 
mainstream education? To answer this fully we would have to 
examine why the language of values has become so prevalent in our 
society; I cannot undertake such an examination here. I will, however, 
say a few words about why modern moral education favours the 
language of values.  
 
Values are held; virtues are possessed. A person can value courage 
without being courageous; they could admire the courage of others 
and wish to be so themselves (and, of course, a courageous person 
can be said to value courage).  
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It is just easier to get people to value courage than it is to teach them 
to be courageous. In a sense, Sokratic protreptic attempts to get 
people to ‘value’ qualities like courage; but the ultimate aim of 
education is seen as the possession of this ‘quality’ (although for Plato 
being courageous does also mean ‘knowing’ what courage is – but 
still, courage is a ‘quality’ of a person’s character; it is a virtue, and 
excellence of the soul).  
 
Certain virtues, as I discussed in Chapter Three, are created through 
imitation and habit. The modern school system – and indeed modern 
society – does not look kindly on such explicit methods for training 
character. Modern society is fearful of socialisation and 
indoctrination.    
 
Character education, however, need not be indoctrination, although it 
must, to some extent, include socialisation. I suppose a lot depends 
upon one’s notion of society.  
 
However, even from our brief look at moral education in the UK, it is 
clear that it does seek to both socialise and indoctrinate – it seeks to 
create individuals who can cope with diversity and values pluralism, 
individuals who are naturally suspicious of terms like ‘virtue’ and 
phrases such as ‘goodness of character.’ In this sense, moral 
education in the UK is a great success.  
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Before concluding, I wish to consider religious education more 
generally and the role it plays in moral education in England.  
Religious education (or ‘religious instruction’ as it was initially) was 
made compulsory in British schools in 1944, mainly due to concerns 
about the rise of dangerous continental ideologies, such as Nazism 
and Communism. Religious education was seen, not only as a way of 
teaching the Christian faith, but also as a way of supporting 
democratic values.69 
  
But should RE be used as a vehicle for moral education in a society 
that is largely secular? I shall return to this in a moment. First I would 
like to look into the ‘moral’ component of religious education as it is 
outlined in the National Curriculum.  
 
One of the curriculum opportunities will be to provide pupils with 
the chance to ‘discuss, question and evaluate important issues in 
religion and philosophy, including ultimate and ethical issues.’70 
What is an ethical issue? We are told that ethical issues are those 
which ‘could include the difference between right and wrong; the 
application of principles to issues in crime and punishment, war and 
peace, family life, relationship, use of money and property, 
entertainment, employment or technology; and religious and cultural 
toleration.’ This list is fairly impressive, providing of course that 
these issues are regularly discussed in schools (which they need not 
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be since the content of RE is solely down to the discretion of 
individual schools, and in faith schools we might expect a somewhat 
less objective consideration of many of these issues).  
 
Religious education in many non-faith schools is taught to pupils 
with an increasingly secular background, and so the purpose of 
religious education can no longer be about teaching a Christian about 
Christianity or to solidify religious belief (of whatever variety). 
Besides, in a society that is diverse in its religions, RE has a greater 
obligation to compare religious beliefs and foster tolerance and 
understanding rather than inculcate a specific religious creed. As 
with CE and PSHE, RE deals with issues such as diversity and 
identity, and also encourages community belonging and civic 
responsibility. In a sense RE has adapted itself quite well to the 
changing needs of pupils and of modern society.  
 
However, and returning to our earlier question: should religious 
education be used as a vehicle for moral education? According to 
John White, to use religious education as a vehicle for moral 
education is to invite confusion, and therefore he argues that moral 
education is better catered for by other curriculum subjects:  
 
A central obligation on schools is to help children to move away from 
confusion in their thinking towards clarity and well-groundedness. If we 
want them to think clearly about ethical matters it would make better sense 
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to rely on vehicles like school ethos, PSHE and citizenship rather than on 
religious education with its multiple potentialities for sowing confusion. If 
religious education continues to have its traditional moral remit, there is 
further danger of confusion, not now from within religious education itself, 
but as a result of conflicting messages reaching them from different parts of 
the curriculum – the suggestion of a linkage between morality and religion 
in one area, the absence of this in another. Intellectual confusion can, of 
course, be challenging and lead to intellectual growth. Often, though, it 
simply breeds distress71 
 
 
For children brought up outside faith communities the coupling of 
religion and morality, argues White, is unhelpful and even damaging. 
White thinks that CE and PSHE are in a much stronger position to be 
the main focus for moral education in schools since ‘these vehicles do 
not face the particular problem which confronts religious education. 
That is that religion has traditionally been seen, and is still seen in 
some quarters, as a backing for morality, as the foundation on which 
our moral beliefs and conduct rest.’72  
 
This certainly could be a danger.73 However, I think that White is 
quite wrong in respect to this idea that there is no similar danger in 
using CE as a vehicle for moral education, because it could be the 
case that the moral or ethical aspects of CE might lead pupils into 
believing that morality is somehow dependent upon citizenship, and 
this will only be reinforced if RE loses its moral dimension. Indeed, I 
would suggest that this is the most valuable part of RE: its scope for 
the discussion of ethics and morality in both religious and secular 
terms.  
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Jacqueline Watson, in the first study undertaken on the relationship 
between CE and RE in state schools, argues that religious education 
could play a vital role in supporting the teaching of citizenship.74  
 
Yet religious education is about more than just the problem of pluralism – 
religious education has a spiritual dimension which engages with the 
meaning and purpose of our lives – and an emphasis on religious conflict 
resolution may end by endorsing and reinforcing the popular view of 
religion as essentially about conflict. If religious education makes closer ties 
with citizenship education, it needs to be careful to keep sight of its broader 
interests, alongside continuing to question the foundations of morality 
within the context of a global and complex conceptualisation of what it 
means to be a citizen75 
 
 
However, in addition to this ‘explicit’ moral education, there are 
other subjects in which morality and ethics can be discussed. In 
recent years history has been singled out as perhaps being the most 
appropriate subject within which to explore ethical questions and our 
moral identity in particular. What history offers is narrative. And it 
also offers the benefit of hindsight. Looking back at how our society 
has developed and the mistakes that have been made is very useful 
when one is seeking to impress on the young the importance of moral 
and social responsibility and the role that we can have in shaping our 
lives and the lives of others for the better.  
 
The idea that history could be used as a vehicle for the teaching of 
citizenship was endorsed by the previous government. In speeches 
by the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown, and the then Home 
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Secretary Jack Straw, they argued that there ought to be a stronger 
emphasis in schools on the teaching of British history, ‘we should not 
recoil from our national history – rather we should make it central to 
our education. I propose that British history should be given much 
more prominence in our curriculum – not just dates, places and 
names, nor just a set of unconnected facts, but a narrative that 
encompasses our history’ (Brown 2006). As such, according to 
Gordon Brown, citizenship education should be more closely aligned 
to the teaching of history. The thinking is that an historical approach 
will help to shape and give meaning to the values that citizenship 
education seeks to communicate to pupils. As Jack Straw says: 
 
You cannot transmit these ideas [‘core democratic values’ such as freedom, 
fairness and tolerance and plurality] without stories. We must…bring out 
the freedom that lies at the heart of the story. That means freedom through 
the narrative of the Magna Carta, the civil war, the Bill of Rights, through 
Adam Smith and the Scottish Enlightenment, the fight for votes, for the 
emancipation of Catholics and nonconformists, of women and the black 
community, the second world war, the fight for rights for minority groups, 
the fight now against unbridled terror.76 
 
 
This ‘British story’ has its villains as well as its heroes, and no one is 
suggesting that an historical approach to citizenship education is not 
without its difficulties. Some have expressed concern that to put such 
a distinctive British framework to citizenship could alienate some 
pupils, notably those who do not consider themselves to be primarily 
British. However, it has long been acknowledged that history, and 
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narrative in particular, plays an important role in how people situate 
themselves within a tradition.  
 
§3 
 
Narrative, Pluralism, and Dialogue 
 
For some scholars, notably Alasdair McIntyre, narratives are 
fundamental to any moral culture and to the moral life of any 
community. I will not look at MacIntyre’s arguments here, instead, 
and following William A. Barbieri Jr’s informative paper, I will 
consider ‘Narrativist ethics’ more broadly.77  
 
The central thesis of a narrativist ethics, broadly stated, is that morality is, at 
root, constituted by stories – that our judgments about right and wrong and 
good and evil, and our resulting actions, are dependent on the stories we tell 
and are shaped by78  
 
 
The Narrativist thesis, claims Barbieri, represents a response to a 
number of shortcomings that arise in more ‘traditional’ ethical 
theories, especially those which are influenced by Kantian models, 
and ones, moreover, which are indebted to the ‘ideal’ of a conception 
of morality that is objective and scientific.79 Barbieri states:  
 
We must realize that all moral theories – including moral concepts 
themselves – develop over time and are shaped by the communities and 
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institutions that provide them with their settings. Ethical systems depend on 
some contextualizing human tradition for their coherence, and this is a 
circumstance that ethicists need to recognize if they are to theorize 
effectively about the complicated moral landscape of the contemporary 
world.80  
 
 
The challenge is not just to the study of ethics but also to the teaching 
of it, and narrative may just be an effective means for meeting this 
challenge. A Narrativist, argues Barbieri,  
 
describes the way in which we create or use coherent linguistic forms to 
interpret, evaluate, and represent the situations in which we find ourselves. 
Such an understanding of narrative is, at first blush, so broad as to risk being 
unwieldy, unenlightening, or both. Yet it seems to me useful to the extent 
that it captures the central insight of the various thinkers [Hauerwas, 
Murdoch, Nussbaum, and MacIntyre] who have latched onto the moral 
significance of the realm of storytelling. For this use of “narrative” points out 
that the locus of meaning and value lies not so much in words themselves, 
nor in what they signify, as in the dynamic between words and the people 
who employ them in ordering and reflecting on the world in which they 
act.81 
 
 
According to Barbieri, the Narrativist thesis includes three main 
claims: (1) ‘that stories are prior to rules in the moral life. People tend 
to act, in this view, not so much according to rules and obligations as 
in accordance with their own narratively formed character’ – ‘that 
every principle, law, rule, obligation, or other such rational construct 
relies on some narrative context, however broadly conceived, in order 
to make sense’; (2) that narratives, through their shaping of morality, 
forms us: ‘the stories we are brought up with are responsible for the 
manner in which we conceptualize moral phenomena throughout our 
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lives’; (3) that ‘ethics is appropriately, and in a variety of ways, a 
narrative pursuit.’82 
 
Barbieri identifies three potential problems with the Narrativist 
thesis, none of which, however, are difficult to counter.83 Granting 
that narratives could be central to morality and to how human beings 
think of themselves as moral beings, then it would obviously be of 
immense importance not only to ethical theory but also to moral 
education, and to a limited extent this is recognised by contemporary 
educational policy in the teaching of history; but I must emphasise, 
only to a limited extent.  
 
‘A system of education,’ claims Jerome Bruner, ‘must help those 
growing up in a culture find identity within that culture. Without it, 
they stumble in their effort after meaning. It is only in the narrative 
mode that one can construct an identity and find a place in one’s 
culture. Schools must cultivate it, nurture it, cease taking it for 
granted.’84 As he states earlier:  
 
It has been the convention of most schools to treat the art of narrative – song, 
drama, fiction, theatre, whatever – as more “decoration” than necessity, 
something with which to grace leisure, sometimes even as something 
morally exemplary. Despite that, we frame the accounts of our cultural 
origins and our most cherished beliefs in story form, and it is not just the 
“content” of these stories that grip us, but their narrative artifice. Our 
immediate experience, what happened yesterday or the day before, is 
framed in the same storied way. Even more striking, we represent our lives 
(to ourselves as well as to others) in the form of narrative.85 
 336 
However, in a diverse society there is more cultural choice, and many 
narratives (often conflicting); and there is not even, in any 
straightforward sense, a single tradition, and certainly not a single 
moral tradition. The impact of pluralism on morality is explored by 
Roger Trigg in his Morality Matters:  
 
Morality is just about people and their attitudes and choices. This has led in 
politics to the idea that all a democracy has to do is to take account of the 
differing views of its members, without adjudicating between them. All that 
matters is that people may have strong beliefs, and that they have to be 
reconciled if we are all to live together. Such an idea is encouraged by, and 
helps to encourage, a strong view of ethical pluralism. This does not just 
accept that people disagree, but holds that there is no way in principle of 
resolving differences over morality86  
 
And again:  
           
Pluralism, however, may begin by noting the fact of difference, but it quickly 
comes to accept that it is actually desirable. It follows that no one particular 
conception of the good should be given precedence. An ethically neutral 
position soon becomes an ethically charged one. The aim is a pluralist, 
preferably multicultural, society, where freedom in moral matters is to be 
regarded as the highest good, subject only to the constraints of our being 
able to live together. Respect for difference becomes an ethical principle, 
instead of being regarded as an obstacle on the way to moral agreement. 
Anyone who wishes to impose their view on others, or even dares to suggest 
that their view is the right one, must be seen as challenging the very fabric of 
society. A shared morality, instead of being the glue that holds a community 
together, comes to be seen as a challenge to its very existence87 
 
And finally:  
 
The problem is that a liberal picture of society is one where morality is a 
private matter, and public reason may not appeal to private, individual 
moral beliefs. Yet at the same time it depends on tacit, or actual, agreement 
and promises to live by certain public procedures, and to follow them in 
good faith. It is all very individualist, in that it starts from a number of 
individuals, regarding them as a collection of atoms. They are unrelated to 
each other in any way, yet are liable to collide. There is no wider vision of 
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society, or of morality, as its basis. The ‘public square’ may be one where 
individuals congregate, and establish ways of living together, but their own 
private attitudes remain, and are not moulded or harnessed to the common 
good. The stability of the whole may depend on the character and principles 
of the participants, but liberal doctrine wants to remain neutral as to what 
those should be88 
 
 
Given this, and recalling James Hunter’s thesis in the Introduction, 
moral education in state schools must reflect this agenda: it must be 
sensitive to the demands created by multiculturalism, it must pursue 
moral pluralism; how could it do otherwise?  
 
Plato’s dialogues give us a picture not of a morally diverse society 
(not at least according to how we might understand it) but of a 
society that was becoming more diverse in its moral opinions.  
 
In particular, the dialogues are set against the backdrop of a 
transitional period in the ethical life of a community, the transition 
from a traditional and increasingly untenable view of virtue (within 
an Athenian context) to a more pragmatic and progressive view. 
Plato’s ethical theory is neither traditionalist nor progressive: his is 
the first attempt – and in light of the problem – to give a coherent and 
consistent account of the virtues; and to provide an alternative to 
both traditional and progressive ethics, and Plato does this through 
narrative.89  
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Many of the most enjoyable narratives, and I am thinking here 
primarily of the narratives contained within the novel and stories 
(often semi-mythical, although typically of legend, such as Robin 
Hood, Dick Turpin, King Arthur, my Grandfather’s tales of his 
exploits during the Second World War) are, in part, morally 
ambiguous, either in respect to the author, authors or story-teller’s 
own views or intentions and or in respect to the presentation of the 
motivation and actions of their protagonists. Plato’s worry with all 
‘great’ art (that is, what we now consider to be great art, the Iliad, the 
plays of Euripides, Pindar’s Odes etc.) is that they very often fail to 
depict ‘moral’ harmony (the castration of Kronos, Zeus’ rough 
treatment of his spouse etc.), and as such they are unsuitable material 
for moral education.  
 
I think with some of the Greek myths, Plato may have a point. But if 
Plato was so against depicting moral ambiguity or disharmony, then 
why did he write the dialogues and populate them with characters 
such as Kallikles, Thrasymakhos, and Alkibiades, to name but three? 
And why present a diversity of opinion, ways of living, attitudes and 
beliefs on the most important subjects: why give evil a voice?  
 
Well, we might say, one can only silence a person if one gives them 
the chance to speak. However, the dialogues are not simply ways for 
Plato to rebuff bogus ideas and alternative life styles; for the most 
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part, although Sokrates is able to silence his interlocutors, he is 
unable to posit an adequate theory of his own. We must, of course, 
understand Sokrates’ reticence as being partly the result of irony and 
partly the result of Plato’s own caution and also due to his belief in 
the limitations of the written word, in whatever form.  
 
The dialogue form is not only the best medium for written 
philosophy it is also, given the opportunities it can afford the good 
writer, an ideal medium, via its narrative structure, on which to build 
an effective propaedeutic moral education. 
 
Is Plato a Narrativist, that is, does he hold the view that ‘morality’ is 
in some important sense bound to stories – and, if he is, could we 
understand some of the dialogues as examples of ethical narrative? 
Given Plato’s insistence that it is dialectic and not myth that leads to 
moral knowledge, it seems implausible that he could be a Narrativist, 
at least according to how Barbieri understands the term. This, 
however, does not necessarily mean that some of the dialogues could 
not be examples of ethical narrative – it is a logical possibility that a 
person might not hold a Narrativist view of ethics but still, through a 
medium such as the dialogue, create a narrative which is ‘ethical.’ Of 
course, a narrative that is ethical would not have to be what the 
Narrativist means by an ethical narrative. For instance, it is not clear 
whether the Narrativist would think that it is possible (or even 
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desirable) for an ethical narrative to be purposely created (as, for 
example, appears to have been the case in Soviet Russia, and today in 
North Korea). Indeed, ‘genuine’ ethical narratives seem to be largely 
authorless (or authorship is hard to determine), and grow 
organically, and often in spite of what the author(s) or originator may 
have intended. Moreover, in terms of those narratives that often 
inform our lives and the way in which we understand ourselves and 
the world we live in, they need not be either explicit or even be 
known. For the Narrativist, ethical narratives are essentially long 
established community narratives; they are narratives that a person 
grows into, often in a quite unconscious sense.  
 
However, all narratives, ethical or otherwise, have a beginning, even 
if it is impossible to clearly understand the nature of their origins 
(and in particular the relationship between narratives), and there is 
no prima facie reason why we could not consciously create an ethical 
narrative in the Narrativist’s sense (although whether the narrative 
will be taken up by a community is another question). We would 
probably have to understand the processes of the assimilation of a 
narrative throughout a culture as being a long one.  
 
Narratives are not myths (although a myth may be described as a 
narrative in a mundane sense), but they are sometimes fictions, but 
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they can also be historical. In the case of Plato’s dialogues, they can 
contain myth, history and, crucially, reasoned accounts on the nature 
of virtue, character, and the good life.  
 
The dialogues are not ethical narratives as a Narrativist might 
understand them, but they are narratives that are largely ethical. The 
pseudo-historical narrative of the dialogues and the techniques that 
are embedded within them provide the basis on which a person 
might begin to question their own moral culture; and they provide 
the all important ‘critical distance’ which many narratives do not 
readily offer. Moreover, insofar as Plato undermines some of the 
narratives of his society, the dialogues must offer alternative 
narratives. These narratives cannot, in the first instance (in the 4th 
Century B.C. for example), be true community narratives (except, 
perhaps, in the ideal polis), because, like myths, the period of 
dissemination must be great and in a sense form the initial and 
fundamental moral history of a society. The dialogues as narrative 
are more drama than myth, but unlike the great tragedians, Plato 
does not clothe what he understands as key problems in society by 
exploiting established myths; however he does, by setting the 
dialogues in the recent past – a past modified where necessary 
according to Plato’s intentions, artistic or philosophical – is create a 
type of historical drama, one which takes on some of the 
characteristics of a myth (the Sokratic cycle for instance).  
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As Alasdair MacIntyre observes: ‘morality is always to some degree 
tied to the socially local and particular’ – ‘and the aspirations of the 
morality of modernity to a universality freed from all particularity is 
an illusion…there is no way to possess the virtues except as part of a 
tradition in which we inherit them and our understanding of them 
from a series of predecessors in which series heroic societies hold first 
place.’90 Plato, of course, sought to challenge his moral culture along 
with its heroic past; to create a new educational tradition and 
narrative. But he did so not because he wished, as Popper would 
have it, to cast the present in the image of an imaginary past,91 but in 
order to create the necessary foundation which would make moral 
education possible, and it is in respect to this end that the dialogues 
should, in part, be understood.92   
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Conclusion 
 
πάντων δὲ καλλίστη ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, περὶ τούτων ὧν σὺ δή 
μοι ἐπετίμησας, ποῖόν τινα χρὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τί ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ 
μέχρι τοῦ, καὶ πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ὄνταi 
 
 
In the preceding chapters I outlined the principles of Platonic 
education as well as Plato’s methods as an educationalist; I argued that 
the dialogues must, in part, be seen as educational works and that 
consequently we must approach them in a way that is congruent with 
Plato’s pedagogical aims.     
 
By taking the dialogues as a vehicle for Platonic education, I have 
argued that we gain a deeper insight into what Plato thinks is the main 
objective of education, as well as helping us to better appreciate his 
method as a writer of educational material. Platonic education is a written 
representation of Sokratic education, and it does not, other than in the 
method of its delivery, differ essentially from it. Like its Sokratic 
counterpart, Platonic education seeks to create an alternative learning 
environment and an alternative ethical narrative, where fundamental 
issues can be discussed openly, and where all questions are assumed to 
be unanswered (or at least subject to further clarification). Platonic 
                                                 
i ‘Of all the themes that one could make inquiry, Kallikles, none is finer than 
the one you have reproached me with, that is, what one’s character should be, 
and the kinds of activities one should pursue, and to what degree, throughout 
one’s life’ (Gorgias 487e9-488a2, trans. Michael Richard Hart).  
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education seeks to turn the reader away (however briefly) from 
conventional educational theory and practice and towards the pursuit 
of wisdom; and Plato attempts to accomplish this through certain 
techniques embedded within the dialogues, protreptic rhetoric, life-
models, argumentation, and myth. Also like Sokratic education, Platonic 
education is, in the first instance, propaedeutic, and its effectiveness rests 
not on the student’s attainment of full virtue but merely on the 
possibility that they will pursue it.  
 
The Greek word from which we get ‘propaedeutic’ is προπαιδεύω, 
meaning ‘to give preparatory instruction,’ and as is often the case with 
its English cousin, it points to a further course of study. Propaedeutic is 
not ‘pre-schooling’ (in the sense that we attach to the modern nursery); 
its focus is more restricted. The dialogues prepare the ground for 
virtue by making its readers responsive to further education. This 
further education is an education in virtue proper, and it is achieved, 
taking book 7 of the Republic as representative, through rigorous 
academic study. It is a course of study that few could follow, and it 
remains the reason why, properly speaking, so few people can claim 
the title of ‘philosopher.’ 
 
This view, that Plato’s theory of education ought not to be seen 
primarily from the perspective of his ideal poleis, may have become 
more popular in recent years, but it has yet to be given an adequate 
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treatment, and nor has its relevance for modern moral education and 
educational theory been fully understood. I hope that I have helped to 
go some way in rectifying this. 
 
As I discussed earlier, provision is made in England for moral 
education;1 nevertheless, the school system is not in the business of 
explicitly promoting or inculcating specific virtues or a specific ethical 
or moral system. Other than in faith schools or schools with a strong 
tradition of religious education, Citizenship Education (CE) takes the 
lead in dealing with ethical issues, broadly understood, in most 
secondary schools in England. However, CE was not brought in 
primarily to address the problems arising from pluralism and moral 
diversity, or because of concerns about ‘moral standards’ as such. The 
emphasis of the Crick report, as we saw in Chapter Eight, was with the 
issue of voter apathy and the feeling of disconnectedness that many 
young people experienced in respect to government and their own role 
as citizens in a democratic society. Nevertheless, the initial remit of the 
Crick Report did include a strong ‘moral’ component, and, as a 
statutory subject, CE could therefore play an important and guiding 
role in the moral education of children in England.2 
 
However, and crucially, the primary concern for CE is with helping to 
produce good citizens. But what is a good citizen? A good citizen 
understands his or her own rights and responsibilities both as a 
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participator in a liberal democracy and as a member of society as such. 
Whatever private views or beliefs a citizen may hold (and can be said 
to be ‘moral’ in nature), are, as long as they do not impinge on their 
role as citizens, of no consequence. There is no sense in which the 
virtue of the good citizen can be the same as the virtue of the good 
person. Not because public and private cannot coincide, but because 
the good person in a distinct and recognisable sense does not exist. 
Many good people do exist, it would be argued, and I would not 
dispute this. However, the endorsement of a particular model of 
character and behaviour is not something that a government in a 
liberal democracy can do. All a government can do is to ensure that 
moral education is suitably inclusive so that it can encompass the 
heterogeneity of moral opinion.  
 
The chief difficulty in implementing an effective programme of moral 
education now stems from the nature of our society, its ‘values’ (its 
moral culture), its demographic, and its constitution. The UK is 
culturally, ethnically, religiously, and morally diverse, and yet at the 
same time it is a liberal democracy, which, in theory at least, embraces 
and promotes the values of equality, justice and human rights. A 
National curriculum demands nothing less than that no culture, race, 
religion, is privileged over another in the teaching of subjects in either 
content or form (whether this is always born out in practice is, of 
course, another matter). Therefore, even though modern education 
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does promote and inculcate certain moral principles, such as human 
rights, fairness, and tolerance, it does not do so from the perspective of 
a particular designated system because, for the most part, such values 
are held as universal and not belonging to the UK exclusively. The 
United Kingdom, as I discussed in the Introduction, does not have a 
distinct moral culture capable of sustaining an effective program of 
moral education.  
 
A moral culture as I understand it, and largely following James 
Davidson Hunter, is that which forms the basis for what the human 
being thinks or feels that he/she values or ought to value and be 
according to, and largely directed by, the demands made on him/her 
by a particular type of community living. This community living 
includes a history and a number of narratives and a central and 
overarching moral principle, ideal or concept. Moreover, every moral 
culture is a complex whole, a whole that includes within it various 
moral ‘sub-cultures,’ such as illustrated by the following figures:  
 
5th-4th Century B.C. Athens 
 
Moral Culture: dominated by a principle of Liberty 
 
Moral Sub-Cultures 
Sokratic ethics; Homeric ethics; Sophistic ethics; Platonic 
Education/philosophy; Euripidean ethical realism; Sophoklean ethical 
idealism, etc. 
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5th Century B.C. Sparta 
 
 
Moral Culture: dominated by an ideal of Andreia 
 
Moral Sub-Cultures 
??? 
 
The Kallipolis of the Republic  
 
 
Moral Culture: dominated by a conception of Eudaimonia 
 
Moral Sub-Cultures 
None 
 
21st Century A.D. United Kingdom 
 
 
Moral Culture: dominated by the ideal of Inclusivity 
 
Moral Sub-Cultures 
Christian ethics; Muslim ethics; citizenship; consumerism, ad nauseam   
 
 
 
In terms of the extent to which moral sub-cultures are tolerated 
depends upon how they are seen to contradict or support the 
dominant moral culture and its guiding ideal, principle, or concept. It 
also needs pointing out that an individual sub-culture can be in conflict 
with one or more rival or competing sub-cultures. Moreover, some 
sub-cultures are more independent (depending on the level of tension 
between them) of the dominant moral culture than others, although all 
moral sub-cultures are to some degree embedded within it. History 
and narrative give life to and inform the overall shape and texture of 
moral culture and moral sub-cultures, and they also support their 
authority. The level of authority that a moral culture (and by authority 
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I mean the power it has to continue unchanged), depends upon its 
dominance over its sub-cultures. In a society such as ancient Sparta, 
deviant moral sub-cultures would be actively suppressed; and this 
would also be true in respect to Plato’s Athens. However, given 
Athens’ cultural breadth, heritage, and pretensions, it could sustain a 
greater number of moral sub-cultures than most other ancient Greek 
poleis (providing, of course, that they were not seen as obviously 
dangerous). 
 
In order to improve or change state moral education one must change 
the dominant moral culture. Indeed, this is what Plato imagines in the 
Republic. In the ideal polis of the Republic, there are no moral sub-
cultures, only one dominant moral culture. Plato’s proposals in the 
Republic are both radical and, even by his own admission, problematic. 
However, given that it is unlikely that we would be able or willing to 
instigate the kinds of reforms that Plato would think necessary in order 
to make the virtuous society possible, what are our alternatives?   
 
One alternative, although by no means the only one, would be to do as 
Plato did with the dialogues: to embed moral education within some 
sort of narrative, and to create, if not an ideal culture and society, a 
new moral sub-culture, and therefore in a sense to exploit the 
inclusiveness of our moral culture. Whether this is something which 
could be done within the state school system as such is unclear.  
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But why would narrative be a suitable medium for moral education? – 
because, as Jerome Bruner states, ‘it is through our own narratives that 
we principally construct a version of ourselves in the world, and it is 
through narrative that a culture provides models of identity and 
agency to its members.’3  
 
Narratives can offer children numerous life-models; various claims 
about what it means to be a good human (and what it means to be a 
bad human); various claims about the nature of human flourishing and 
about how life should be lived (and how it should not be lived). The 
problem is not that suitable narratives do not exist (or that too many 
narratives exist in principle), but rather, we are without the skill, 
imagination, and most importantly, the will to exploit them for 
educational ends.  
 
None of us know as much as we should about how to create narrative 
sensibility. Two commonplaces seem to have stood the rest of time. The first is 
that a child should “know,” have a “feel” for, the myths, histories, folktales, 
conventional stories of his or her culture (or cultures). They frame and nourish 
an identity. The second commonplace urges imagination through fiction. 
Finding a place in the world, for all that it implicates the immediacy of home, 
mate, job, and friends, is ultimately an act of imagination4 
 
 
 
As is currently the case, children are heavily informed by narratives, 
through books, Television, Video, and the Internet, to name but a few. 
However, the moral education that children receive via these media is 
in most cases disorganised, unsystematic, and potentially bewildering 
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and conflicting, and sometimes damaging. Therefore, in addition to 
narratives moral education requires a method of teaching and, of 
course, teachers – people who have the skills to utilize the potential of 
narrative and guide children through the process. I am not suggesting 
that it is the teacher’s role to necessarily choose children’s stories for 
them, to deliberately attempt to mould their aesthetic and moral 
sensibilities through a rigorous process of discrimination, but rather to 
help children understand what stories say about how people have 
lived, are living, and what they suggest about ‘who we are’ (or indeed 
‘were’), and ‘where we are going.’  
 
The teacher’s task, claims Richard Pring, is to help the pupil make 
sense of his or her tradition by appraising the values that are 
embedded within it. Hence ‘the profession of teaching is the custodian 
of such traditions – not in a clear or inert sense (as archivists or 
librarians), but in the sense of critical engagement.’5 For Pring, 
therefore, education is a moral practice; it is a special sort of activity ‘in 
which the teacher is sharing in a moral expertise, namely, the initiation 
of (usually) young people into a worthwhile way of seeing the world, 
of experiencing it, of relating to others in a more human and 
understanding way.’6 Teaching, as Pring observes, is a social activity 
and hence it is one which ‘inevitably reflects the moral divisions within 
society.’ Teaching, therefore, is ‘concerned with the learning of those 
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concepts, ideas, principles, understandings which enable the young 
person to make sense of the world.’7   
 
The importance of narrative for the cohesion of a culture is great, very likely, 
as it is in the structuring of an individual life. Take law as an illustration. 
Without a sense of the common trouble narratives that the law translates into 
its common law writs, it becomes arid. And those “trouble narratives” appear 
again in mythic literature and contemporary novels, better contained in that 
form that in reasoned and logically coherent propositions. It seems evident, 
then, that skill in narrative construction and narrative understanding is crucial 
to constructing our lives and a “place” for ourselves in the possible world we 
will encounter.8 
 
 
 
  
I would go further than Bruner and Pring, and insist that, although 
narrative ought to form the centre-piece of moral education, and that a 
critical engagement with one’s tradition is of vital importance to how a 
person’s moral identity is formed (for good or bad), the main aim of an 
effective moral education must be one that might help a person to 
become a good human. It does not matter if the question ‘what is it to 
be a good human being?’ cannot be answered definitively; what moral 
education must offer, through narratives, at the very least, are possible 
ways in which to answer this question. Moral education, broadly 
considered, is a means of transmitting this history, and these narratives 
and this sense of authority to the individual members of a community. 
Moral education, however, and correctly understood, seeks not 
transmission but transformation: moral education is an act of 
rejuvenation, but more than this, it is an act of creation.  
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Plato’s dialogues contain an ethical narrative, a narrative which forms 
the basis on which certain questions can be explored in a recognisable, 
imaginative, and lively context. With the dialogues Plato is not merely 
engaging with a tradition (and, indeed, criticising it), but creating a 
moral sub-culture, a distinct and semi-independent moral community; 
and he does this in order to create the space in which a person can take 
their first step on the journey towards the attainment of perfect human 
virtue. Therefore, moral education may begin with narrative (and in a 
sense always be sustained by it), but it comprises, through actual 
discourse, an on-going search for truth, wisdom, beauty, and the 
Good.9 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 With Personal Social and Economic Education (PSHE), Citizenship Education (CE), and 
Religious Education (RE), and in Scotland, with Religious and Moral Education, and in 
Wales with Personal and Social Education (PSE). 
2   Late in 2010 the DfE (formally the DfES) published the findings of its Citizenship 
Education Longitudinal Study (CELS). The main aim of the study was threefold. First, 
to ‘access the short-term and long-term effects of citizenship education on young 
people in England,’ and second, ‘to explore whether different processes – in terms of 
school, teacher and individual-level variables – can have variable results and produce 
different outcomes, and lastly, ‘to consider what changes could be made to the delivery 
of citizenship education in order to improve its potential effectiveness.’ 
   The results of the study have shown that up to date the success of CE has been 
mixed. The study focuses on three research questions. In respect to the first (‘how have 
young people’s citizenship practices changed over time?’), political and civic 
participation was seen to increase with age, at least in the short term. At the same time, 
however, other non-civic, extra-curricular activities deceased.  Interestingly (and not 
surprisingly), civic and political participation was motivated more by a sense of 
personal benefit than through a sense of duty. More worrying, perhaps, was the 
finding that certain attitudes, particularly towards issues of social justice, tended to 
harden with age. Along with this, and perhaps most perplexingly, the sense of 
community attachment weakened over the years of the study. However, pupils’ 
general awareness of the importance of politics (variables withstanding) remained 
throughout the study and, in some cases, was significantly strengthened.  
   The second research question looked at what factors contributed to creating the 
above ‘citizenship outcomes.’ Briefly, the study found a correlation between what they 
call ‘received citizenship’ (that is, the level to which a pupil thought that they had 
received an education in citizenship) and positive attitudes towards civic and political 
participation. It was also discovered that CE was best delivered in discrete, regular 
slots rather than incorporated within others subjects, PSHE being a prime example, 
and delivered by teachers specially seconded for the purpose. It was also found that 
formal examination was also contributed to the effectiveness of CE. The study’s final 
research question (‘what would make citizenship education more effective?’), is drawn 
largely from these findings, but it also stresses the need for additional support to be 
given to teachers and schools in order for them to better expedite the learning aims of 
CE.  
   What I found most interesting about the study was its rather narrow focus. The study 
looks more at civics than at citizenship, at least in the sense that it is defined in the 
Crick Report. Little if anything is said about moral or social responsibility, and nor 
does the Study address the issues of diversity or identity, which since Sir Keith 
Ajegbo’s report (largely endorsed by the House of Common Education and Skills 
Committee), had come to the forefront of CE. An earlier Home Office report, Children 
and Citizenship, did examine the issues of social and moral responsibly in some detail, 
but the emphasis has now appeared to have shifted towards participation and political 
literacy. The CELS is particularly interested in the latter, and sees this as the major 
challenge in the years to come.  
3 Jerome Bruner, The Culture of Education, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996 
(p.xiv). 
4 Ibid p.41.  
5 Richard Pring, “Education as Moral Practice,” Journal of Moral Education, Vol. 30, No. 
2, 2001 (p.106).  
6 Ibid p.106. 
7 Ibid p.106.  
8 Jerome Bruner, The Culture of Education (p.40). 
9 Today we might take the notion of ‘perfect human virtue’ as nothing more than a 
fruitless ideal, and even an insidious one. However, as Morris Ginsberg states: ‘The 
notion of an “ideal” is central in moral experience. For in the notion of an ideal there is 
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a fusion of the conception of something that “would” satisfy us if attained and the 
conception of something that “should” or ought to satisfy us. In other words in moral 
experience appeal and constraint, pressure and aspiration are in various degree 
intermingled. The ideal stands before us as something desirable though not necessarily 
desired, as something which makes demands on us and which may involve abnegation 
of desire but which in the end would be not repressive but liberative.’ (Morris 
Ginsberg, On the Diversity of Morals, London: Mercury Books, 1962, pp.132-133). ‘That 
no human being will ever act adequately to what the pure idea of virtue contains does 
not prove in the least that there is something chimerical in this thought. For it is only 
by means of this idea that any judgement of moral worth or unworth is possible; and 
so it necessarily lies at the ground of every approach to moral perfection, even though 
the obstacles in human nature, as yet to be determined as to their degree, may hold us 
at a distance from it’ (Critique of Pure Reason (A315/B372). 
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